Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001076
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59559/2024
LP/13711/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

YE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms F Shaw, Counsel instructed by Kreston Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought with permission by the Appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) dated 3 February 2026 in which the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim was dismissed on all grounds.

2. In summary the Appellant’s claim concerns the risk of persecution on return to Turkey due to actual or perceived political opinion as a Kurd who was a member of HDP. He claims to have carried out political activities in Turkey and sur place activities in the UK and as a result of his activities in Turkey he came to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities on two occasions. Although it was accepted that the Appellant is Kurdish and a member of HDP (FtT §6), the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities or that he would be at risk on return (FtT §6). The FtT Judge (“the Judge”) did not find the Appellant to be a credible witness in respect of the events that led to his asylum claim (FtT §§21-32). As for the Appellant’s sur place activities the Judge concluded, given his earlier credibility findings, that the Appellant’s participation in UK demonstrations and membership of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Assembly (KDPA) was likely to be opportunistic and not reflective of any genuinely held belief (FtT §36).

3. In assessing risk on return by reference to the risk factors identified in IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 (the risk factors were actually identified in the earlier case of IA and others (Risk – Guidelines- Separatists) Turkey [2003] UKIAT 00034), the Judge took account of the Appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity, that he is a member of HDP and that the Appellant accepted he was an ordinary member and did not hold any kind of senior or high profile role, that he had failed to prove he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities and that his family did not have connections with separatist organisations. The Judge accepted that the Appellant would be at real risk of being sent to the airport police station for further investigation upon return since he would be returning without a passport but given the findings in respect of alleged events in Turkey and the opportunism of the Appellant’s sur place activities, there would be no real risk of such an investigation leading to persecution. The Appellant had failed to prove that he holds separatist views or that he has ever been arrested on suspicion of holding such views (FtT §38).

4. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

5. It is relevant at this stage that I set out some more detail about the Appellant’s claimed activities in Turkey and how they were addressed by the Respondent and the FtT. The Appellant explained that his role with the HDP included attending meetings at HDP offices, demonstrations and the conference, preparing for Newroz including providing protection and security to the public and raising awareness of Kurdish issues through distributing posters, leaflets, newsletters and going to coffee shops raising awareness of the party and recruiting (SEF Q66-Q77). A similar description was given in the Appellant’s appeal witness statement (w/s §10) and set out in the ASA (§3).

6. The Appellant also provided a HDP General Conference Delegate card in his name dated 12 September 2021 and a document from the Supreme Court of Turkey, Political Parties Registry Bureau confirming that he is an active member of the Peoples’ Democracy Party – Istanbul Fatih Branch 2021/2 term.

7. The Respondent’s decision letter dated 26 March 2024 did not specifically engage with these activities but concluded that being a supporter of HDP is not sufficient to warrant protection under the Refugee Convention and that there was no evidence that the Appellant held a high-profile role with the HDP.

8. The Appellant’s ASA challenged the idea the Appellant would need to establish that he held a high-profile role in order to establish risk and referred to objective evidence to establish that ordinary members engaging in activities such as attending demonstrations and distributing leaflets are at risk of being targeted by the authorities (ASA §12, 14).

9. The Respondent’s Review dated 19 September 2024 (Review §9) referred to the CPIN – Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) paragraph 3.1.1 and repeated the proposition that simply being a member or supporter of the HDP is not likely to result in a person facing persecution and it depends on the persons profile and activities. It was said that the Appellant had not provided cogent evidence or a credible account to substantiate that is a high-profile member and is therefore not accepted to be at risk.

10. In setting out the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, the Judge summarised the nature and extent of inconsistencies in the account, which it is fair to say altered over the course of the claim particularly regarding his journey to the United Kingdom and his claimed detentions by the Turkish authorities (FtT §§21-28). In noting that it is accepted that the Appellant is a member of the HDP, the Judge concluded that the documentary evidence supporting that fact adds nothing further (FtT §30). There is no consideration of the Appellant’s political activities as a member in Turkey anywhere in the decision, save that the Appellant was no more than an ordinary member and did not hold a senior or high-profile role which could put him at risk of persecution (FtT §38).

Summary of grounds

11. The grounds of appeal advance three grounds:

(1) The Judge failed to consider the objective evidence relied upon by the Appellant to demonstrate that risk is not limited to high-profile or senior members of the HDP party.
(2) The Judge made negative credibility findings in isolation from the documentary evidence and erred in concluding that some documents were unlikely to be genuine when no such allegation was advanced by the Respondent.
(3) The Judge placed unduly significant weight on the Appellant’s assertions in the screening interview about his travel history.

12. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal in a decision sealed 30 April 2026. Although permission was granted on all grounds, the Upper Tribunal Judge granting permission expressed some reservation about merits of grounds 2 and 3.

13. I heard submissions from the representatives which are a matter of record.

Decision

14. Ground 1 proceeds on the basis that the Judge failed to consider the objective evidence as set out in the grounds. I need not set that evidence out in full for the purposes of this decision, but I can summarise that there were various sources indicating a risk of targeting by the Turkish authorities for those involved in low level activities such as leafleting, canvassing and attending HDP events. In failing to engage with this evidence, the Judge is said to have misdirected himself on the assessment of risk.

15. I agree that the Judge was required to address that evidence, particularly in the circumstances where it was accepted that the Appellant was a member of HDP and the Appellant had clearly raised the issue of lower-level activities presenting a risk of persecution in the ASA. The Judge failed to do so and to that extent Ground 1 succeeds. However, in my view that is not the end of the matter and an obvious issue arises – what does being an ‘ordinary member’ in this case encompass? The answer to that question is relevant to the reassessment of risk.

16. At the outset of the hearing, I asked the parties to address me on whether the Appellant’s political activities in Turkey were accepted as part of the acceptance that he was an ‘ordinary member’, which is a distinct point to whether he came to the adverse attention of the authorities. The parties were not agreed. Ms Shaw for the Appellant submitted that the FtT decision is silent as to whether his activities were accepted but that the parts of his case that were accepted suggests that they were. Ms Clewley for the Respondent submitted that the Judge did grapple with the issue of political activities in Turkey and that it is bound up with having found that the Appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the authorities and therefore he was not doing those activities.

17. In my view there is a significant gap in reasoning in the FtT decision. In circumstances where it is accepted that the Appellant was a member of HDP and the Appellant had detailed the extent of his political activities in Turkey beyond bare membership, the Judge was required to grapple with what the Appellant’s activities and profile were (IA and others (Risk – Guidelines- Separatists) Turkey [2003] UKIAT 00034 §46(a)). The Respondent relied upon the guidance in the CPIN Peoples’ Democratic Party/Green Left Party (HDP/YSP), October 2023 throughout this appeal and it was referred to by the Judge (§38) in the context of a distinction between an ordinary member and someone high-profile. The executive summary to the CPIN provides:

“In general, simply being a member or supporter of the HDP/YSP is not likely to result in a person facing persecution. However, the risk faced will depend on the person’s profile and activities.”

18. At 3.1.2:

“Given the Turkish authorities’ conflation of the HDP with the PKK, the Country Guidance case of IA and others (Risk-Guidelines-Separatists) CG [2003] UKIAT 00034, heard 12 May 2003 and promulgated 28 July 2003, is relevant. In that case the Upper Tribunal gave consideration of the potential risk to a person involved in ‘separatist’ activities on return to Turkey. It held:
‘The following are the factors which inexhaustively we consider to be material in giving rise to potential suspicion in the minds of the authorities concerning a particular claimant.
a) The level, if any, of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
…”
19. At 3.1.3:

“The starting point should be the person’s claimed involvement with the HDP and their activities”

20. At 3.1.4:

“When ordinary members of the HDP have come to the adverse attention of the authorities, this has generally been whilst participating in demonstrations and rallies, or for being vocal in criticising the government or the president or speaking out on Kurdish political issues including on social media. Otherwise, ordinary members are unlikely to attract the adverse attention of the authorities on account of their political beliefs.”

21. Aside from referring to the Appellant as an ‘ordinary member’ and not a high-profile or senior one (§38) there is no consideration in the FtT decision of what that means in this case. The Appellant’s case was squarely put on the basis that he was not just a card-carrying member but that he also undertook various activities such as attending meetings, demonstrations, helped with the organisation and security of events, handed out posters and leaflets and generally sought to spread the word amongst the community about the HDP party and encourage people to participate. He went on to point to various parts of the objective evidence set out in the ASA and Ground 1 of this appeal to demonstrate that membership plus those activities were sufficient to place him at risk.

22. I am unable to discern from the FtT decision whether those activities were considered to be part of his ‘ordinary’ membership or not. They simply were not addressed at all, either as part of the summary of the Appellant’s claim or in the assessment of his credibility. The Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s claim through his interviews with the Home Office, witness statement and oral evidence quite properly highlights differences in his account. The focus being on his reasons for claiming asylum, which at an earlier stage included the failure to complete military service and having received a suspended prison sentence, his journey to the UK and the number of detentions. What has remained consistent throughout the claim is the Appellant’s reliance on his HDP activities, even if other reasons had been raised and subsequently abandoned. I am not prepared to accept Ms Clewley’s submission that they were obviously rejected because the Judge did not accept that the Appellant came to the adverse attention of the authorities. They are two different issues and amount to two different risk factors in IA. If it had not been accepted that the Appellant was an ‘ordinary member’ of HDP that submission may well have prevailed but that is not the case here.

23. Furthermore, I am unable to infer that this must have been the case from the Respondent’s position. The Respondent’s refusal decision and the review is also silent about the Appellant’s activities, other than to contend that being a member or supporter is not enough and that the Appellant had not demonstrated that he was high-profile. There is a whole spectrum of potentially relevant factors between simple official membership of a party with no more and being a senior or high-profile party member. The Appellant raised a number of relevant factors to demonstrate that he was an ordinary member plus. They have not been addressed by the Respondent or the Judge and in circumstances were both accept that the Appellant is a member of HDP, it is entirely unclear whether that includes his activities. If it does, then there is a failure to fully consider the objective evidence as to whether that would present a risk. If it does not, there is an absence of reasoning to explain why.

24. Finally, I do not accept that the Judge’s finding that the Appellant has failed to prove that he holds any separatist views (§38(v)) amounts to a rejection of the Appellant’s political activities in Turkey. Although the Turkish authorities conflate the HDP, a political party with the PKK, a separatist terrorist organisation, the Appellant’s claim was not that he held separatist views supporting the PKK but rather political ones supporting the HDP. A distinction the Judge drew himself when considering whether the Appellant had proved that his family had any connections with separatist organisations (§38(iv)). As above, there is gap in reasoning in relation to the Appellant’s political activities.

25. There is a further knock-on effect of the Judge’s failure to adequately identify the scope of the Appellant’s profile. The Judge relied on the previous credibility findings to conclude that the Appellant’s sur place activities are opportunistic and not reflective of a genuinely held belief (§36), but those findings contain a significant gap. Had the extent of the Appellant’s profile been properly identified and the objective evidence as to the risk to a person with such a profile been considered the assessment of the genuineness of the Appellant’s sur place activities may well have produced a different outcome. That will determined on another occasion.

26. Even if the conclusion remains that the Appellant’s sur place activities are opportunistic, the Judge accepted that he took part in those activities and that he would be at risk of further investigation from the police at the airport. The failure to consider the objective evidence of risk regarding activities between simple membership and a high-profile person has the consequence that the risk facing the Appellant upon return has not been properly assessed.

27. As such, Ground 1 succeeds.

28. I am not persuaded that Grounds 2 and 3 are made out. The Judge gave sufficient reasons that were open to him for attaching little weight to the various pieces of documentary evidence. I agree with the Judge granting permission to appeal that the Judge was arguably wrong to have concluded that documents about the Appellant’s brother and cousin were not genuine applying Tanveer Ahmed but that does not take matters much further since the Judge would have been entitled to conclude that he could not rely on them.

29. The alterations in the Appellant’s claim from his screening interview about his travel history were substantial and the Judge was entitled to take those into account as part of the global assessment. The Appellant’s contention that the Judge placed undue weight on that issue amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment.

30. The Judge drew the threads together at paragraph 32, in finding on balance that the Appellant had not given a credible account, thus demonstrating a consideration of the evidence in the round, save for the failures I have identified in Ground 1.

31. The consequence of my decision is that the Appellant’s protection claim will be reconsidered. The findings in relation to Article 3 and 8 ECHR, and very significant obstacles, will be preserved.

32. I have considered whether that reconsideration can be confined to reassessing the risk on return by reference to the objective evidence with the negative credibility findings preserved. However, for the reasons explained above, when one comes to approach that task the gap in reasoning regarding the Appellant’s political activities in Turkey leaves any future decision maker in difficulties from the outset as to what the Appellant’s profile as an ‘ordinary member’ encompasses. I have considered whether findings on that issue could be made whilst preserving the negative credibility findings but ultimately, I think that would require mental gymnastics that are likely to lead to unfairness. Although there is no doubt that the Appellant’s claim involves credibility issues as identified by the Judge, which on their face are potentially (in and of themselves) sustainable, those conclusions were reached without engaging with core aspects of the evidence in the claim and consequently I am not confident that, had the Judge considered those, the global assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, including his motivation towards sur place activities, would necessarily be the same.

Notice of Decision

33. The appeal is allowed.

34. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and is set aside with the findings at paragraphs 31 to 44 preserved.

35. The protection appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 October 2026