Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001089
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55531/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

SE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mukulu, Counsel instructed by M A Consultants
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the judge dated 20 November, 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant her protection claim.

2. The appellant is a Georgian citizen aged 57 and is gay and currently in a same sex relationship. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim is that based on her sexual orientation she would suffer persecution if returned to her home country from her brother and, more widely, Georgian society, particularly in light of recent legislation introducing certain discriminatory measures aimed at the LGBTI community.

3. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum application on 14 February 2024 on the basis of a number of inconsistencies in her narrative, her failure to claim asylum at the first opportunity and on the basis of the Country Policy and Information Note Georgia : Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression version 2.0 September 2024 (the “CPIN”) there was no real risk of harm if returned nor would the person who stalked her during the 1990s, given the length of time elapsed, represent a continuing danger to her.

4. The judge dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason and the appellant would not face a real risk of serious harm relying on the CPIN and taking account of the evidence before him of the recently introduced Protection of Family Value statute (the “New Law”).

5. The appellant appealed to this Tribunal and permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal judge Mulready on 9 March 2026 on the basis that it was arguable that the New Law increased risks to gay people and the judge’s decision was largely based on the CPIN with no explanation as to why that evidence was preferred.

Initial Matter

6. The commencement of the hearing was delayed as the consolidated bundle and the appellant’s skeleton argument had not been served on the respondent. Following the hearing I confirmed the respondent had properly filed her Rule 24 response.

7. The consolidated bundle and skeleton were sent by Mr Mukulu to Mr Simpson by email. Once Mr Simpson had received the documents and confirmed that he was happy to proceed I commenced the hearing.

8. M A Consultants are reminded of paragraph 7 of the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction dated 31 August 2023 that CE-File cannot be used to provide documents to another party. Documents which are required to be provided to another party must be sent or delivered to that party by another method permitted under rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

Submissions

9. Mr Mukulu relied on his grounds of appeal and skeleton argument dated 24 April 2024. The first ground was that the judge had failed to properly consider the impact of the New Law, requiring evidence of implemented persecution rather than conducting a prospective assessment of risk. In so doing he did not give proper weight to the various international reports indicating increased police hostility and that attacks on LGBTI people were becoming more common and gave undue weight to the CPIN which predated the New Law. Mr Mukulu confirmed that the judge’s interpretation of the CPIN was not in question, the issue solely related to the impact of the New Law on the appellant.

10. The second ground was that he failed to properly apply HJ (Iran) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 by failing to consider whether the appellant could openly live as a gay woman in Georgia or whether she would supress her identity because of the New Law or social hostility.

11. The third ground is that the judge failed to properly consider whether there would be sufficiency of protection by the state given the evidence of police failure to intervene to protect LGBTI victims of violence, the introduction of the New Law and societal hostility towards LGBTI people.

12. Similarly, the judge failed to properly analyse whether internal relocation would be available for an openly gay individual and the cumulative impact of hostility, stigma and legal restriction.

13. Mr Mukulu acknowledged that if I found against an error of law on the basis of his first two grounds then his third and fourth grounds would no longer be relevant.

14. Finally, the judge had failed to engage with the appellant’s personal circumstances which although identified in the decision failed to consider the cumulative effect of past trauma, family hostility, social stigma, fear of exposure and the deteriorating legal framework.

15. Mr Simpson relied on his Rule 24 response. On the first ground, the judge had properly considered all the evidence relating to the New Law in some detail in paragraphs 19 to 25 and was entitled to conclude that it did not meet the required threshold to amount to persecution within HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2009] UKSC 54. On the second ground the judge had not needed to address the question as to whether the appellant would, if returned her home country, conceal her sexual identity as it was clear from his decision was predicated on the basis that she would openly live there as a gay person. On the third and fourth ground the judge had correctly applied the CPIN and set out full reasons in paragraphs 35 and 36. On the final ground, the judge had fully considered all the matters identified and Mr Simpson relied on Budhatkoki [2014] UKUT 00041 for the proposition that first-tier judges are not required to rehearse every detail or issue in a case only the material ones so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.

Decision and Discussion

16. The issue which I have to determine whether is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude there is, I need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or in part.

17. The first ground is that the judge failed to properly consider the consequences of the New Law requiring evidence of implemented persecution when he should have assessed the risk prospectively.

18. The judge noting the date of the asylum application, correctly sets out, in paragraph 12 and 13, the two-stage test to be applied pursuant to s 32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (the “2022 Act”). He then went on to consider the CPIN dated September 2024 and concluded in paragraph 18:

“If the law and attitudes remained as they were when this guidance was published, I would not find that there was a risk of persecution to the appellant because in theory state protection would be available and there is no anti-gay legislation; as explored below, there is no evidence of ‘persecution’ ”.

19. The judge’s treatment of the CPIN is not in question, it is his subsequent treatment of the New Law which was introduced after the CPIN was published that Mr Mukulu takes issue with.

20. The judge, in absence of the legislation itself, considers the various articles in some detail in paragraphs 20 to 24 indicating that it imposes discriminatory restrictions on education, public discussion and gatherings related to sexual orientation and gender identity. The New Law also prohibits positive references to LGBTI people in literature, film and media and a recent pride march was cancelled due to the introduction of the New Law. In particular, the judge refers to the Asylos report and the British Embassy’s comments that it had serious concerns about the legislation because of the risk of stigmatisation and discrimination of the gay community.

21. The judge then went on to consider whether the effect of the New Law amounted to persecution for the purposes of applying the test in the 2022 Act in his paragraphs 26 to 30. The judge quoted HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon), which is now implemented in s.31 of the 2022 Act that to fall within persecution there has to be a severe violation of a basic human right such as the infliction of death, torture or penalties for the adherence of a belief or opinion in order to suppress or extinguish it and that it had to be state sponsored. Additionally, the judge referred to Horvath v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3026 as authority for the proposition that discrimination faced by a particular social group did not amount to persecution and the Refugee Convention was not designed to provide universal human rights.

22. The judge concluded at paragraphs 29 and 30:

“In the present appeal, homosexuality is not outlawed and I have been provided with no evidence of prosecutions of gay people. The evidence provided demonstrates an illiberal, increasingly authoritarian regime. At its highest, some politicians made disparaging remarks as did some police officers as quoted above. There is evidence that the police may take a blind eye when Pride marches have been attacked, although this evidence is limited.

Based on the CPIN, whilst protection may be less than fully effective I find that it is available to people such as the appellant who may wish to live openly in a same sex relationship. I have been provided with no objective evidence that there is state sponsored persecution and the fact that the new statute appears to limit the rights of some categories of people is less than the persecution described above. In any event, it would have limited impact on the appellant. I deal further with protection below.”

23. The issue for me is whether the judge properly took into account the evidence before him and was legitimately able to come to the conclusion he did. I asked Mr Mukulu what evidence he was relying on to discharge the appellant’s burden of proof that the New Law could result in persecution of the appellant living as an openly gay person in Georgia. Mr Mukulu acknowledged that the legislation itself had not been part of the evidence nor any expert report or legal articles of its likely impact on the gay community. He referred me to the IGLA European Report for the authority for the proposition that the New Law limited the right of assembly of the gay community. This report, however, indicates that the legislation was directed at assembly by people of whatever sexual orientation, with the purpose of promoting same-sex relationships rather than the congregation of gay people per se.

24. Mr Mukulu further contended that the statement by the judge, in paragraph 29, that: “The evidence provided demonstrates an illiberal, increasingly authoritarian regime” was sufficient to demonstrate that the threshold for persecution had been reached. I do not accept that. An intolerant or socially conservative attitude towards gay people is not sufficient to amount to persecution nor are restrictions on the right to promote same sex relationships whether through marches or through the media. All the evidence presented to the judge was general in nature and there was no informed view provided of its precise terms or how the legislation would, in practice, be implemented or the consequences for its breach. Whilst it is clear that the New Law will be discriminatory and, indeed, hostile to the gay community, the judge, on the basis of the evidence before him, was entitled to conclude that it provisions would not reach the high bar which Parliament and the Supreme court have set for what merits persecution identified in s 31 of the 2022 Act and HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon).

25. Mr Mukulu also submitted that the judge erred by requiring evidence of implemented persecution rather than conducting a prospective assessment of risk. Given the legislation had been a place for over a year it was not unreasonable for the judge to note the absence of evidence as to how it had been implemented in practice did not assist the appellant’s case. In any event, it would be unreasonable to expect the judge, on the basis of the evidence that had been provided to him, particularly without access to the full text of the legislation or expert evidence, to speculate as how it might be enforced at some point in the future.

26. The second ground relates to the judge’s misapplication of HJ Iran failing to apply the analysis set out in that case relating to the concealment of the appellant’s sexual identity. I find this ground has no merit. The assumption throughout the judge’s decision is that the appellant would want to live openly as a gay woman in her home country. He concluded that the appellant would not face persecution living in an openly gay manner. That being so, there would have been no need for the judge to consider whether the appellant could avoid persecution by concealing her sexual identity.

27. Given that I have no error of law on the first two grounds I do not need to consider the third and fourth grounds on sufficiency of protection and relocation given they are predicated on the basis that the appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return to her home country which the judge legitimately found she would not be.

28. On the final ground of the failure to engage with the appellant s evidence, this ground is no more than a disagreement with the judge’s decision and does not amount to an error of law. The judge considered each of the factors identified by Mr Mukulu in his submission and there is no basis to conclude, nor evidence provided, that the judge had not considered that evidence “holistically and in the round”. The judge fully dealt with the appellant ‘s brother’s hostility and the risk from the stalker in paragraphs 32 to 34. In terms of the risk from her brother, the judge found that the appellant had not been in contact with him since she left Georgia in 2019 and concluded in absence of current evidence of a threat, he posed no risk to her. On the stalker, the judge did not find the appellant’s evidence credible and found she is not currently being stalked. The grounds also refer to the failure to consider the mental health impact on the appellant from concealment of her identity. As I concluded above, the need for concealment was not a relevant matter given the judge’s conclusion on the lack of persecution.

29. As a final matter I would like to emphasise my conclusions on the New Law are limited to the facts of this particular case.

Notice of Decision

For the reasons set out above, there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 May, 2026