Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001120
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62792/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOKE

Between

ML
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, International Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Friday 3 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Revill dated 10 November 2025 (“the Decision”) dismissing the appeal of the Appellant against the Respondent’s decision dated 21 November 2023 refusing his protection claim.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 18 February 2023. On 22 April 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Meah granted permission on all grounds.
3. The Appellant pleads six grounds, which can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: The Judge’s failure to adjourn the part-heard hearing despite the fact counsel was not the original counsel amounted to procedural unfairness.
Ground 2: The Judge irrationally gave no weight to relevant documentary evidence.
Ground 3: The Judge irrationally failed to consider the fact that the Appellant was a minor and had been trafficked when reaching her credibility findings.
Ground 4: The Judge irrationally failed to consider the Appellant’s vulnerabilities and background when making her assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration into Bangladesh.
Ground 5: The Judge unlawfully required evidence of the unavailability of medical treatment for the Appellant’s wife and failed to consider the evidence that was before her.
Ground 6: The Judge irrationally failed to consider the fact the Appellant’s background and manner of entry into the United Kingdom when applying section 117(B) and considering the Article 8 proportionality exercise.
4. The appeal comes before me in order to decide whether there is an error of law. If I determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, I then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If I set the Decision aside, I must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
5. I had a bundle running to 1071 pages (pdf) ([B/xx]) containing the documents relevant to the appeal before us, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. There has been a Rule 24 Reply from the Respondent at B/57. I was also given the Respondent’s review separately at the hearing.
6. Having heard from both representatives, I indicated I would reserve my decision and provide that in writing, which I now turn to do.

SECTION 15(2)(a) APPLICATION
7. The Respondent made an application to adduce further evidence under section 15 of the Upper Tribunal Rules, namely the original counsel Mr Fazli’s availability as was sent to the Tribunal, and the record of the Presenting Officer’s evidence of the First-tier appeal hearing. The substance of this evidence is contained at B/61.
8. This application was unopposed. The evidence sought to be adduced is plainly relevant. Firstly it confirms that when the First-tier listed the part-heard hearing, it did so having had regard to Mr Fazli’s availability as was submitted to them. Secondly Mr Rana was provided with the presenting officer’s notes of the previous hearing, which assist with respect of how prepared Mr Rana ought to have been for the hearing. Both these matters are relevant when assessing the lawfulness of the Judge’s decision to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the change in counsel. I therefore admitted the evidence under section 15(2)(a) of the Upper Tribunal Rules.

DISCUSSION
9. In relation to Ground 1, Mr Karim submitted that the Judge ought to have exercised her discretion to adjourn the hearing and relist it for Mr Fazli’s convenience. Mr Karim pointed to the fact the Judge had noted at [17] that the change of counsel was ‘deeply unsatisfactory.’ In oral submissions Mr Karim stated that this was apparent where:
(i) Mr Rana was unable to address the Judge on the application of Alam [2023] EWCA Civ 30 regarding Article 8.
(ii) Mr Rana was unable to address the judge about concerns regarding the FIR document, in particular the translation summarised by the Judge at [41] of the Decision.
10. As a general rule it is plainly preferable for the Appellant to have been represented by the same counsel in the previous hearing for obvious reasons. In this particular case the first part of the appeal had been heard on 30 May 2025. Mr Fazli submitted his dates of availability, which, at that time had included 22 October 2025. The matter had been listed for that date, and there had been no request from Mr Fazli to have the matter relisted for his availability. At the hearing the Judge was given no information as to why Mr Fazli had returned the part-heard appeal. From [17] it appears Mr Fazli had been contacted that morning but had not responded. Significantly, Mr Rana, who appeared in his place did not apply for an adjournment. He had the presenting officer’s notes of the previous hearing, and indicated that he was content to proceed. While the Judge was correct to note that it was ‘deeply unsatisfactory’ not to have continuity of counsel, this does not automatically mean she ought to have adjourned the appeal of her own motion in these circumstances. The Judge was entitled to accept from Mr Rana that he was prepared and instructed to proceed.
11. With respect of the two specific instances relied on by Mr Karim to illustrate the point, it is important to note that it is not claimed that Mr Rana was unqualified to represent the Appellant, nor that he was incompetent in his conduct of the hearing. With respect of Mr Rana’s inability to make submissions on the basis of Alam, this was a submission of law rather than relating to any evidence that was adduced at the previous hearing. Mr Karim was understandably unable to put forward any reason as to why this would have been attributable to the change in counsel.
12. With respect of the problematic translation of the FIR, it is difficult to envisage what Mr Rana could have said in response to the translation. Mr Karim intimated that the Judge ought to have adjourned for a second translation. There was no submission before the Judge that the translation was inaccurate. Had there been an issue with the translation then one would have expected that instructing solicitors would have identified this prior to the appeal hearing. Alternatively Mr Fazli would have made such a submission at the first hearing. Alternative to that, it would have also been reasonable to expect Mr Rana to have taken his own instructions and identified any issues with the translation, and made any necessary application at the hearing. It certainly was not for the Judge to initiate any speculation about the quality of the translation. In any event, the lack of submissions on this point cannot be attributable to the change in counsel.
13. The Judge was entitled to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the change in counsel, and there were no specific issues that were raised in the course of the hearing that can be credited to the lack of counsel continuity such that an adjournment would have been necessary. Ground 1 does not disclose any error of law.
14. With respect of Ground 2 it is submitted that the Judge erred in giving the documents no weight. At [44] the Judge noted that there was nothing on the face of the police complaint that caused her to question unreliability but as it accompanied the other documents she found she could place no reliance on it. It was submitted by Mr Karim that this was an error following Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 in that a document that was on the face of it reliable should not be attached no weight whatsoever.
15. Mibanga involved a rejection of an expert report on the basis of adverse credibility findings. The error found by the Court of Appeal was that the judge had reached a negative conclusion based only on the appellant’s evidence and then asked whether that conclusion could be shifted by the expert evidence. There was no dispute in that case as to the expert’s qualifications or any reason on the face of it to reject the expert report or fail to take it into account. This is quite a different set of circumstances. Here, while the Judge made a number of adverse credibility findings, she also made specific findings on the provenance and content of the documents received. The Judge found:
a) At [40] the Judge noted that the Appellant had only produced evidence relating to one of the claimed false cases.
b) At [41] The Judge noted there were serious issues with the FIR. Frankly, the translation disclosed a nonsensical document.
c) At [43] the Judge made a number of findings with respect of Mr Uddin’s letter based on the content of the letter, and inconsistencies between the letter and the facts as related by the Appellant.
16. This was not a case where the Judge had made adverse credibility findings based on the Appellant’s evidence and then had perfunctorily dismissed the documentary evidence on that basis. The Judge had considered the documentation individually and in context of the rest of the evidence. While her conclusion that no weight was to be placed on the documentation was a bold one, in my assessment she was entitled to find that taking into account the very apparent problems with the FIR and Mr Uddin’s letter, and given all the documents were submitted together, the police complaint was similarly questionable. Frankly, when adopting Tanveer Ahmed approach and looking at the police complaint in context with all the evidence as a whole, it would have been anomalous for the Judge to have found that the police complaint was a reliable document.
17. Even if this is incorrect, the Judge at [40] noted that at its highest, the documents only related to one case and only disclosed the police complaint. There were no documents purporting to emanate from the court. This must be looked at together with the observations at [45], that the Appellant had made no effort to obtain any other supportive documentation. In light of these findings, even if the Judge had given the police complaint some weight, it is highly unlikely that this would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
18. At [24] of the grounds it is also submitted that the Judge failed to consider the Appellant’s history of trafficking or the fact he was a minor when concluding his failure to obtain further documentation was damaging to his credibility. Looking at the notes of the presenting officer the following relevant note is made of the evidence:
Q How many cases were filed against you
A 1

Q In your WS 20 and 27 you refer to cases plural why would you use the plural cases if there was only one case against you.
A I was young and I did not have lawyer. My father’s lawyer gave us the paperwork for this case. Afterwards I got to know that more paper was served. And on that time I was 15-16 years old, I did not have much knowledge about the cases.

Q So are you saying there is more than one case
A First there was this case and then I left the country and then more came. I don’t know exactly how many but there were more because it came from the police and because we were in a rally. So to put my dad in trouble they were trying to frame us.

Q You have not provided any of the papers relating to the other cases have you, just the first one. I’ve got documents from one of the cases and then I left the country and I wasn’t going back. I also knew I wasn’t going back therefore I wasn’t concerned about the other cases.

[….]
Q Have you tried to contact your father’s lawyer to find out about the stage of the case
A I was underage then I wasn’t contacting the lawyer. My mother was contacting the lawyer

Q You are still in contact with your mother
A Yes

Q That means you can indirectly reach the lawyer
A Yes even then if anything need to be known it was through my mother. They were looking for me dad they wanted to harm my dad and then they wanted to harm my brother, then they wanted to harm me.
19. The fact that the Appellant was a minor was raised as a reason why he did not bring case documents with him from Bangladesh. However, the Appellant accepted that he was still in contact with his mother who was in contact with his father’s lawyer. That he was a minor or had been trafficked is not a reasonable explanation as to why he had not since tried to obtain documentation. It was therefore not unreasonable for the Judge to find that this failure to obtain documents damaged his credibility without any reference to the Appellant being a minor or having been trafficked. I therefore find Ground 2 discloses no material error of law.
20. Turning to Ground 3, it was submitted by Mr Karim that the Judge did not refer to the Appellant being a minor or having been trafficked in her assessment of credibility, on her assessment of risk upon return or when evaluating whether there were very significant obstacles to his integration under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi).
21. At [24] the Judge states in terms that she took into account the fact the Appellant was a minor at the time of the events he describes and that this would affect his recollection. At [27] and [32] when making an adverse credibility findings, the Judge considers his youth as to whether this might explain the discrepancies. At [33] the Judge points to the Appellant’s youth when stating she did not hold the fact the Appellant did not know details about his father’s role against him. It seems to me that the Judge had in mind throughout the fact the Appellant was a minor when she was assessing his credibility.
22. With respect of the Appellant’ account of being trafficked, firstly there is nothing in the skeleton argument which prays and aids this as a factor operative on the Appellant’s risk upon return or his credibility. The Appellant’s account of being trafficked is at [28-33] of his witness statement. Without seeking to minimise this experience at all, which must have been frightening and traumatic for a minor, the essence of the trafficking was the movement of the Appellant through dangerous and illegal routes to the United Kingdom. There was no suggestion made to the Judge that the Appellant’s experience in being trafficked would have impacted his credibility.
23. Furthermore this was not a case where it was submitted that the Appellant having been trafficked was at risk of being re-trafficked. The purpose of the trafficking was ultimately to get the Appellant from Bangladesh to the United Kingdom. The Appellant’s protection claim was squarely placed upon a fear of persecution on the basis of imputed political opinion. In the circumstances it was not incumbent on the Judge to refer to trafficking when considering risk upon return. I therefore find Ground 3 discloses no material error of law.
24. With respect of Ground 4, it was submitted that when undertaking the assessment as to whether there were very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration into Bangladesh and applying the test as set out in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, the Judge failed to consider the Appellant’s vulnerabilities and history. I remind myself that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the Judge I should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account; Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. There was no submission made or evidence to indicate that the Appellant’s experiences in being trafficked would have impacted on his ability to reintegrate back into life in Bangladesh. The Judge was required to give reasons as to why she found the Appellant enough of an insider to re-integrate back into Bangladeshi society, and she gave perfectly adequate reasons for this at [56-57] of the Decision. Having made the wholesale adverse credibility findings that she did with respect of the Appellant’s protection claim, it reasonably followed that she did not consider the fact that the family had been politically targeted as a relevant factor. Ground 4 discloses no material error of law.
25. With respect of Ground 5 it was submitted by Mr Karim that the Judge failed to properly consider whether RI’s circumstances amounted to very significant difficulties when applying EX.1.(b) of Appendix FM. It was further submitted that the Judge imposed a requirement for expert evidence with respect of whether there were medical services in Bangladesh for her fertility issues. The test for whether there are ‘very significant’ difficulties under EX.1. is a high threshold. The burden of proof is on the Appellant on the balance of probabilities. The Judge at [66-67] accepted RI’s circumstances. This included the fact that RI had lived her life in the Untied Kingdom, was in employment and had her family in the United Kingdom. The Judge also acknowledged the evidence of gender inequality in Bangladesh. The Judge was entitled to further note that RI was able to speak the language, she was on Bangladeshi origin, and she would not be returning as a lone female. It was therefore not unreasonable in the light of the latter findings that while the Judge found that RI would face significant difficulty, this fell short of amounting to insurmountable obstacles.
26. The Judge further stated that there was no evidence before her that appropriate fertility treatment was not available in Bangladesh, or that her mental health would deteriorate in Bangladesh or that she could not obtain treatment if it did. In my view this assessment does not reverse the burden of proof, which remains firmly on the Appellant. It was for the Appellant to show that RI could not obtain appropriate medical treatment in Bangladesh, and the Judge was entitled to note that there was no such evidence on that point.
27. In submissions Mr Karim sought to submit that the Judge erred in finding there was no medical evidence before her, and pointed to the evidence in the CPIN at B/675 as evidence that mental health provisions were scarce. This was not a point that was argued in the grounds, and in fact amounts to an entirely new ground. There had been no previous application to amend or augment the grounds. There is no reason given as to why this was not pleaded before. I therefore refuse to admit this particular ground. In any event it is of limited force. As Mr Terrell noted, the CPIN is limited to state medical care provided only. Even then the report indicates that the main scarcities lie outside of the urban areas. Ground 5 therefore discloses no material error of law.
28. Finally turning to Ground 6, it was submitted that the Judge incorrectly applied section 117(B)(4) of the Immigration Rules. It is submitted that the Judge incorrectly considered that the Appellant was in the United Kingdom unlawfully and therefore gave his private and family life little weight, whereupon in fact the Appellant had been brought to the United Kingdom under the Dublin Regulations as an unaccompanied minor, and in those circumstances his tenure was not unlawful.
29. Section 117(4) and (5) of the 2014 Act provides:
(4) Little weight should be given to—

(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,

that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.

(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
At [75] the Judge stated:
75. The Appellant’s private and family life were established during unlawful residence. I should therefore afford them little weight unless there are ‘particularly strong features’ (Rhuppiah at [49]). It was not argued before me that such features exist. I therefore attach little weight to the Appellant’s private and family life.
Turning to the issue as to whether the Appellant’s tenure in the United Kingdom is unlawful, Section 1 of the Immigration Act 2014 provides:
1. Removal of persons unlawfully in the United Kingdom
For section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, substitute—
“10 Removal of persons unlawfully in the United Kingdom
(1)A person may be removed from the United Kingdom under the authority of the Secretary of State or an immigration officer if the person requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it.
The Appellant was brought to the United Kingdom as an unaccompanied minor under the Dublin Regulations that were in operation at the time. While he may not have status in the United Kingdom, he was brought into the United Kingdom under immigration powers and given leave to enter as an asylum claimant. Thus it cannot be said that he is in the United Kingdom unlawfully. The fact he may not have status in the United Kingdom does not automatically mean he is here unlawfully; Akinyemi v SSHD (No 1) [2017] EWCA Civ 236. It seems to me that while the remainder of the Judge’s decision was perfectly careful and considered, unfortunately in concluding the Appellant’s residence to be unlawful, the Judge fell into error.
30. I turn to whether this error was material. Under section 117B(5) the Appellant’s private life still fell to be afforded little weight. However, given the misapplication of 117B(4) the Appellant’s family life did not. At [76] the Judge stated:
76. Reliance was placed on the Appellant’s likely ability to meet the Immigration Rules were he to seek entry clearance from Bangladesh - the so-called Chikwamba principle. I have found that the relationship requirements are met, and Mr Pugh accepted that the financial requirement would be met from RI’s employment income. I further accept that he would satisfy the English language requirement, and would therefore satisfy the eligibility requirements for entry clearance as RI’s spouse.
It appears that the Judge found that but for the fact the Appellant did not satisfy the Immigration Status requirements, he would have met the remainder of the Immigration Rules. I do not accept Mr Karim’s submission that TZ and PG was misapplied and the Appellant ought to have been considered as someone who met the Rules, as the Appellant did not meet the Rules in their entirety. Thus the Judge was right to firstly consider paragraph EX.1. and then to go on to consider Gen 3.2 as to whether there were exceptional circumstances which meant the consequences of the decision under appeal were unjustifiably harsh.
31. Notwithstanding the adverse credibility findings with respect of the protection claim, the Judge did find that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship and accepted the fertility issues that the couple had suffered together. Therefore, given that the Judge found that all other requirements of the Immigration Rules were met, had she given more than little weight to the Appellant’s family life, this may have been material to proportionality exercise. I therefore find that Ground 6 does disclose a material error of law.
32. At this juncture, I raise the fact that Mr Terrell had properly noted the fact that this error, while developed in Mr Karim’s oral submission was not clearly particularised in the grounds at [43-44]. This submission has force. However I note that at [8] of the grant of permission at B/55 the Judge granted permission on the basis that it was arguable the Judge had misdirected herself by applying the ‘little weight’ direction without clearly distinguishing between the statutory provisions governing unlawful residence, precarious status, private life and family life. The broad terms of this grant of permission in my view sufficiently justify and include the argument raised by Mr Karim in oral submissions.
33. I therefore will allow the appeal in part. I find that Grounds 1-5 disclose no material error of law, however Ground 6 does disclose a material error of law. The decision will be re-made on Article 8 grounds only. The following findings of Judge Revill are confirmed:
• The Judge’s decision to proceed with the part- heard hearing;
• The Judge’s decision on the Appellant’s protection claim.
Due to the evaluative nature of the Article 8 proportionality exercise, it is appropriate for the decision on EX.1. to be re-made as well. Given the limited nature of the re-making, the matter will be retained by the Upper Tribunal.

CONCLUSION
34. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is allowed on the basis of Article 8 only.

DIRECTIONS
35. The Tribunal makes the following directions:
(a) Any further updated Article 8 evidence to be submitted by the Appellant by 21 August 2026;
(b) Any response to be submitted by the Respondent by 18 September 2026
(c) The matter will be listed for a re-making on the first available date in the Upper Tribunal after 5 October 2026. A Bengali (Sylheti) interpreter is to be booked. Time estimate 1.5 hours.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on Article 8 grounds only.

S Y Loke
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Loke
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 July 2026