Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001129
UI-2026-001130, UI-2026-001131
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/63689/2024
PA/63685/2024, PA/63671/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

SHA
ASH
SSH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Sepulveda, Solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr S. Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants are all citizens of Iraq; and appeal under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge Young Harry (“the judge”), which upheld the respondent’s decisions dated 21 April 2024 to refuse the appellants’ protection claims made on 16th October 2022.
2. For the reasons below, it is unnecessary to set out the background to this matter in any detail. Suffice to say that the first appellant claims that he is at real risk of harm on return to Iraq on the basis that his father-in-law was killed by his business partners and two Arab men; and, as the first appellant’s wife had asked for the scope of the resulting arrest warrant to be expanded to target the Arab men, the first appellant has come to the adverse attention of them. It is argued that the first appellant’s wife decision to pursue the arrest of the Arab men has led the Arab men to consider it a matter of honour, such that the first appellant would be the victim of an honour crime on return. As the second and third appellants are the first appellant’s minor children, it is further argued that they are also at risk.
3. At [16] to [35] of the decision, the judge made a series of adverse credibility findings in respect of the first appellant’s account. As the second and third appellants’ claim is parasitic upon the first appellant’s, the judge found at [35] and [36] that none of the appellants showed there would be very significant obstacles to their integration on return, nor that return amounted to a disproportionate interference with their Article 8 rights such that the refusal of their claim would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.
4. It is the first ground in the undated renewed grounds of appeal that has been the focus before me. That ground asserts that the judge failed to make findings on material matters: specifically, that the judge failed to make findings on whether the appellants are each able to obtain a Civil Status Identification Document (“CSID”) or an Iraqi National Identity Card (“INID”) prior to, or on return to Iraq, within a reasonable timeframe. The appellants argued this point was spelled out both in the first appellant’s witness statement dated 12 August 2025 and in the appeal skeleton argument dated 14 October 2025. However, at [7], the judge recorded the live issues as being limited only to the following:
“The parties agreed that the following issues remain in dispute:
(a) Whether [the first appellant’s] father-in-law was killed by his Kurdish business partners and two Arab men
(b) Whether [the first appellant] and his family have come to the adverse attention of the Arab men because [the first appellant’s] wife asked the police to extend the scope of the arrest warrant.”
5. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton on 24 February 2026. Referring to [7], Judge Hamilton considered that the grounds before him did not specifically plead that the ambit of the issues to be determined was erroneously recorded by the judge and, as ground 1 fell outside of the scope of [7], the decision could not be criticised for failing to determine a matter outside of the issues the parties had agreed were live.
6. I note that the appellants’ second ground was said to have no merit for the same reason. The appellants argued that the judge failed to consider whether the appellants were members of a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. This issue also falls outside [7]. Judge Hamilton also rejected a further limb of ground 2, which was that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for her credibility findings referred to above.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 22 April 2026. Considering the renewed grounds, Judge Blundell was of the view that the issue of whether the appellants could obtain CSIDs or INIDs “was squarely identified in the appeal skeleton argument which was before the judge”. Regarding ground 2, Judge Blundell was no more impressed than Judge Hamilton with the argument that the judge’s credibility findings were inaccurate; and also anticipated a fatal circularity if the particular social group asserted was founded only upon fear of persecution. However, Judge Blundell did not propose to limit the scope of the matters before me.
8. In the Rule 24 response dated 5 May 2026, the respondent accepted that the judge failed to make findings upon whether the appellants are able to obtain CSIDs or INIDs. It was argued, however, that following the promulgation of AH & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 150, such error was not material, as the Country Guidance confirms at paragraph 22A that:
“Where a person is returned to Iraq on a laissez-passer, they may request and keep a copy of the same after arrival, which will show their recent arrival from the United Kingdom. Procedures are in place at both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports for those who return to the KRI without a CSID or INID and such persons will not be prevented from leaving either airport for this reason. Prior to departure, a person will be given an authorisation letter setting out their name and contact details of the issuing authority, valid for five days, within which a person is expected to return to their home area to start the redocumentation process.”
9. This point has not however been taken before me. In his short submissions, Mr Walker confirmed that the respondent, having accepted that the judge omitted to make findings on an unambiguously substantive live issue, cannot then argue that the decision is anything other than fatally undermined. It follows that the respondent accepts there is a material error of law under ground 1. On the basis of that concession, Ms Sepulveda has declined to expand on any other points. Both invite me to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
10. I concur with Mr Walker’s analysis; and commend his pragmatism in declining to contest ground 1. As Judge Blundell noted, the issue of whether the appellants would be in difficulty in returning to Iraq because of an absence of acceptable civil status documentation was (a) an issue entirely separate from whether the appellants’ account of being at risk on return to Iraq, per [7], was credible; and (b) squarely before the judge. That is was omitted amounts to a material error of law. I have not heard submissions on the cogency of those credibility findings; but the fundamental nature of the omission identified in ground 1 in itself requires that the matter is considered de novo and, as such, I do not preserve any findings.
Notice of Decision
1. The judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 September 2026