Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001147
UI-2026-001148
UI-2026-001149
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63677/2024
HU/63679/2024
HU/63674/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

MA, ABA & AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: OA, sponsor in person
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 18 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants or their sponsor. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the parties below as they were known before the First-Tier Tribunal
2. The respondent appeals against the decision of a Judge the First-Tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 3 December 2025 allowing the appellants' human rights appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 1 October 2024 to refuse entry clearance on human rights grounds.
3. The appellants are Syrian Nationals who have relocated to Saudi Arabia. They were born in November 2014, January 2010 and January 2007 respectively. Their parents had been killed in the Turkish-Syrian earthquake. They applied for entry clearance with the assistance of their sponsor brother under Appendix FRP but were refused because they were not related as required to their sponsor (he was their brother rather than their parent). The judge found nevertheless that it would be disproportionate to refuse the appellants entry clearance.
4. The respondent sought permission to appeal, which was refused initially by the First-Tier Tribunal in a decision dated 27 February 2026 but allowed on renewal by Upper Tribunal Judge Grey in a decision dated 23 March 2026. The respondent's grounds for all of which permission was given can be summarised thus. The First-Tier Tribunal judge erred in law in failing to give reasonable weight to the public interest factors set out in section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("the 2002 Act") and/or failed to give adequate reasons for the weight she had given under the various subsections of section 117B. Second, the judge had taken an impermissible approach to her assessment of the appellants' sponsor's credibility.
Error of Law
Ground 1
5. In respect of ground 1, the relevant passages are [43]-[44]:
‘43. In assessing proportionality, I consider the provisions set out at section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as inserted by section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014. I make the following public interest findings:
a. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. This public interest factor is neutral given my finding above.
b. It is in the public interest that the person seeking to remain in the country can speak English. This public interest factor is neutral given the requirements of the relevant appendix.
c. The public interest also requires that persons who seek to remain to be financially independent. This public interest factor is not known as the appellants in error applied under Appendix FRP and were not required to show maintenance. It is not known if they could be financially independent when in the UK.
d. The public interest requires that little weight be attached to any relationship or private life established during the period that the appellant has been here unlawfully, Little weight should also be attached to any private life established during a period where the appellant’s [sic] leave has been precarious. The public interest factor is neutral as their relationship was established prior to the sponsor’s claim for asylum.’
44. Given my findings above and the public interest factors, I find that the factors weigh in favour of the appellants being granted entry clearance to join their sponsor.’
6. What is entirely absent from the above passages is any clarity as to the finding(s) rendering neutral the public interest in effective immigration controls. Neither can any such finding be discerned from a careful reading of the preceding passages of the judgment. It is well established that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is to be given significant weight, albeit of course that there are in many cases countervailing factors that the appellants can point to to balance against that public interest. It may well be that the judge had formed the view that the appellants met the Immigration Rules and therefore that there was no public interest in effective immigration control; however, she does not say so. It is entirely unclear, in any event, which Immigration Rules they could have been found to meet, in particular given the judge’s repeated acceptance that the maintenance provisions of alternative application routes had not been assessed.
7. Therefore, I am satisfied that the judge gave weight to this particular public interest which fell outside the range of reasonable weights to be given. Alternatively, she has failed to provide adequate reasons for her conclusion on this matter.
8. In respect of the public interest in the appellants speaking English, the judge does not identify ‘the relevant appendix.’ If she is referring to Appendix FRP, this is an unreasonable conclusion given that the appellants do not meet the requirements of that Appendix. Therefore, again the judge has either reached an unreasonable conclusion or has failed to give adequate reasons for why that conclusion was reached.
9. As for the public interest in the appellants remaining financially independent, the judge herself accepts that she was unable to establish whether would or would not be the case. This was a matter for the appellants to establish and one might reasonably have expected the judge therefore to consider their failure to do so a factor weighing against the appellants. There is no indication that the judge did.
10. In conclusion, the appeal succeeds on ground 1. The judge has erred in her application of section 117B of the 2002 Act and therefore the decision involves the making of an error on a point of law.
Ground 2
11. Turning to ground 2, the judge says at [35]:
‘35. I start my findings on the basis that this sponsor is a credible individual despite the respondent's submissions that appear to be raising credibility points against him. They have previously found him credible and granted him protection status in the UK. I do not think it fair to then raise credibility points against his evidence at the hearing today and what was said in his asylum interview in 2023. In any event, what has been raised has been small points that would not impact overall credibility. ’
12. Even the sponsor himself accepts that the matters arising in his refugee claim are and were entitled to be considered separately from the matters that arose on his siblings' family unification claim. It would appear therefore that the judge has taken the fact that the respondent has granted asylum to the sponsor, a Syrian National, as being entirely determinative of the truth of everything he says about his siblings' present circumstances. There appears to have been no discerning consideration of the credibility of what he said about them. That is particularly concerning given what is recorded at [30], in particular where it says:
‘With regards to the appellants' education in Saudi Arabia, it says there is a lack of evidence as to whether the appellants are in education or not. In the sponsor's asylum interview he said his brothers were in Saudi for education but today said in private schooling, then changed them to attending a religious school instead and then back to people teaching them as charity.’
If it is that which the judge describes as ‘small points that would not impact overall credibility’, that is not a characterisation within the range of reasonable descriptions. They are manifest inconsistencies which require some explanation.
13. The fact of the matter is that any reasonable judge would have taken a more discerning approach to the credibility of what the sponsor said about his brothers which did not require revisiting his grant of refugee status. In short, this judge took an approach to credibility which no reasonable judge could have taken.
14. Ground 2 discloses an error of law which is undoubtedly material in light of what the judge goes on to say at [36]:
’36. On the basis that [the sponsor] is a credible witness I accept his evidence that the appellants are living on the charity and good will of others to some degree. Their education ceased and they only receive a religious education, mainly as there cannot be much else they can do. They have moved to about 4 different families and have to temporarily be separated as they must fit around the convenience of others.’
15. For these reasons, the First-Tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside. As the parties agreed, I proceeded to rehear the appeal after giving my ex tempore error law decision.
Remaking
16. I heard evidence from the sponsor, who was cross examined by Ms Simbi. They both made oral submissions. Whilst I refer below only to such matters as necessary to understand my decision, I took then oral evidence, the documents to which I was taken and the submissions into consideration in their entirety.
Primary Findings of Fact
17. I make the following findings on the balance of probabilities. Much of what the sponsor says was not challenged in cross-examination. Where facts were in issue, I explain how I have resolved the dispute.
18. The appellants and their sponsor are siblings. They are Syrian nationals who lived together with their parents and several other siblings in Saudi Arabia before the appellant left in 2018 to eventually claim asylum in the United Kingdom on arrival on 11 October 2021. The family’s status in Saudi Arabia was dependent on their father, and none but he had a right to work. The sponsor fled having been apprehended twice working illegally and understanding that the next time he was so apprehended he would be deported to Syria. He had left Syria to avoid compulsory military service.
19. The appellants’ parents and two sisters were killed in an earthquake on 6 February 2023 attending a relative’s wedding. When the sponsor was substantively interviewed for his asylum claim on 27 April 2023, he gave the appellants’ details as relatives for whom he expected to become responsible and whom he would like to bring to the United Kingdom. The appellants have no other relatives in Saudi Arabia. They have other siblings in Syria, although the sponsor claims not to be in touch with them, and not to be sure if they are alive (in particular two brothers who had been deported there from Saudi Arabia). I am not persuaded that the sponsor is being entirely straightforward in this regard. There is no mention in the appeal reasons (which were clearly settled by or with the assistance of the sponsor) or his accompanying letter dated 7 March 2025 of having lost contact with the married sisters, one of whom the sponsor said was in Syria and the other he said was in Iraq.
20. The appellants have been living with a family friend, Mr Abdulrahman. Despite it being claimed in the appeal documentation that the brothers had been moved around and separated, the sponsor said in evidence to me that they all lived together and only lived elsewhere when Mr Abdulrahman was traveling overseas. The sponsor claimed in closing that the person with whom they live mistreats them. However, he had not said that in evidence such that he could be cross-examined on the point by Ms Simbi. Furthermore, had this really been the case, I find that the sponsor would have raised this earlier in proceedings. On balance, I reject the claim that the appellants suffer any mistreatment, but find instead that they are adequately looked after in largely stable circumstances.
21. The sponsor sends money on occasion; however, he was clear that he cannot do so regularly. He claims to be indebted to Mr Abdulrahman for the appellants’ upkeep. However, that is not mentioned in the sponsor’s statement of 30 April 2024 or Mr Abdulrahman’s letter of 12 April 2024, and I am unpersuaded that it reflects reality.
22. The sponsor has occasionally worked in the United Kingdom but not consistently. When suggested that he would not be able adequately to maintain the appellants in the United Kingdom, he replied that they would survive on bread and water if necessary. I am not therefore satisfied on balance that the sponsor could maintain the appellants satisfactorily. No evidence has been given regarding the sponsor’s ability to accommodate the appellants.
23. The sponsor claims that he is unable to obtain a visa to visit the appellants in Saudi Arabia. However, he has provided no corroborative evidence of any unsuccessful attempts. He claims that Saudi Arabia does not grant entry clearance to applicants with refugee travel documents but again has provided no evidence in support of that claim. The applicants claimed in their applications that they faced deportation, their residence visas having expired; however, two years later they still live in Saudi Arabia. In any event, the reason given for why the appellants cannot return to their home area of Deir Ez-Zor, that it is not under government forces control, is not supported by evidence. In any event, no good reasons has been given for why they could not return safely to an area on Syria under government control.
24. MA and ABA are still children (born in November 2014 and January 2010 respectively). However, AA was born in January 2007 and is now an adult. I have heard no evidence that he plays no role at all in caring for his brothers and certainly no evidence that he would be unable to do so if necessary.
25. At the First-tier Tribunal hearing the sponsor gave inconsistent evidence on the education being received by the appellants in Saudi Arabia. I am unpersuaded that their present circumstances are damaging to their best interests.
Consideration
26. It is not in issue that the appellants applied under a route inapplicable to their circumstances, and the requirements of which they do not meet: Appendix Family Reunion (Protection), which is open to the partners and children of refugees. The refusal letters state that each appellant had an alternative safe and legal route to apply for entry clearance but unhelpfully fails to state what that route might be. It appears to me that the correct category of application would have been under Appendix Child staying with or joining a Non-Parent Relative (Protection).
27. The problem facing the appellants is first that that was not the application they in fact made. Even if they had done so, they would have had to satisfy the decision-maker that they would be adequately accommodated and maintained by the sponsor without access to public funds and in accommodation he exclusively owns or occupies (paragraph CNP.3.2), unless paragraphs CNP.3.3 or CNP.3.4 applied.
28. Those paragraphs provide respectively:
CNP 3.3. Where an applicant does not meet the eligibility requirements of CNP.3.1. and CNP 3.2., the decision maker must consider whether a grant of permission to stay or entry clearance is appropriate based on exceptional circumstances which include where:
(a) the applicant has no parent with them; and
(b) the applicant has no family other than in the UK that could reasonably be expected to support them; and
(c) there is an existing, genuine family relationship between the applicant and the UK-based relative; and
(d) the applicant is dependent on the UK based relative.
CNP 3.4. Where the applicant does not meet the requirements in CNP 3.1. and CNP 3.2. and the decision maker is not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances under CNP 3.3. consideration must be given to whether refusal of the application would be a breach of Article 8 ECHR, because such a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.
29. In light of my findings above, I do not accept that the appellants would be adequately maintained or accommodated.
30. As for CNP.3.3, I do not accept that they are dependent on the sponsor. He does provide financial support from time to time, but not enough to maintain them. I do not accept that Mr Abdulrahman is expecting repayment from the sponsor such that the appellants are in effect dependent on the sponsor despite their needs being met for the time being by their hosts. Neither do I find that the appellants have no family other than in the United Kingdom who could reasonably be expected to care for them. I have grave doubts as to whether the sponsor has lost contact with his married sisters in Syria and Iraq and am unpersuaded in any event that he or the appellants could not contact them if necessary. Neither am I persuaded that one of those sisters would be unable (with AA’s help if necessary) to look after the appellants who remain minors.
31. It only remains to consider whether refusal would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such as to render refusal disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
32. I accept that there exists a relationship between the appellants and sponsor such as to engage Article 8. However, they are, I find, adequately cared for in Saudi Arabia by Mr Abdulrahman and, occasionally, other family friends. I am unpersuaded that their remaining there is contrary to their best interests. On the contrary, I find that it would be against their best interests to join the sponsor at a time when he would be unable to maintain and accommodate them adequately.
33. All in all, whilst I am sympathetic to the sponsor’s desire to be reunited with his siblings, they have not lived together for 8 years and the interference caused by continued separation does not outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls (fortified by the fact that they are unlikely to be financially independent of the state if admitted).
34. For these reasons, the appeal fails.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is remade and the appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026