Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001158
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57343/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

YA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Appeal Determined without a hearing pursuant to Rule 34
of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
1. The appellant is a citizen of Turkey who has made a claim for international protection in the UK. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity direction, and I consider that it is in the public interest for it to continue. The UK’s obligations towards persons seeking international protection and the public interest in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the asylum determination process.
2. The appellant claimed asylum on 20 September 2022. The respondent refused his claim, and in a decision dated 25 November 2025, the FtT dismissed his appeal. In summary, the FtT rejected the appellant’s account of having deserted from the Turkish army on credibility grounds and found, in the alternative, that even if he had deserted, the punishment would at most be a fine.
3. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, and on 10 March 2026, a different judge of the FtT granted him permission to appeal on all grounds. In the grant of permission, the grounds were summarised as: (i) inadequacy of reasons; (ii) procedural unfairness; and (iii) material errors of fact.
4. On 16 March 2026, the respondent filed a Rule 24 response. It states, in its entirety:
“1. The respondent to this appeal is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Documents relating to this appeal should be sent to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, at the above address.
“2. The Respondent does not oppose the appellant’s appeal. In summary, the respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal erred in law.
“3. The Respondent submits that the FTTJ erred in making findings on issues not raised in the respondent’s refusal nor in cross examination and thus did not give the appellant an opportunity to address them.
“4. The Respondent requests an oral hearing.”
5. The appellant prepared a Rule 25 reply dated 24 March 2026. The appellant noted that the respondent accepted that the FtT had erred in law by making findings on issues not raised in the refusal decision nor on cross-examination. The appellant submitted that this was an issue of procedural fairness and that therefore the appeal should be remitted to the FtT for re-hearing de novo in accordance with the decision in Begum [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). It appears that this was served promptly on the respondent on 24 March 2026 but not filed with the Upper Tribunal until 18 May 2026.
6. On 29 July 2026, I issued directions to the Secretary of State, as follows:
“10. As the respondent does not oppose the appeal and explicitly accepts that the FtT erred in law by making findings on issues that were raised neither in the refusal decision nor on cross-examination, I am minded to set aside the FtT’s decision without an oral hearing. The hearing is not necessary in order to decide whether the FtT erred in law; this is conceded. Nor is it necessary to decide the materiality of the conceded error: the respondent implicitly accepts it was material in conceding the appeal.
“11. I am also minded to agree with the appellant that the FtT’s decision should be set aside in its entirety. The accepted procedural unfairness was in the context of the FtT’s adverse credibility findings, such that it is difficult to see how any of the FtT’s findings of fact about the appellant’s account could be preserved. The respondent has not specifically conceded that the FtT also erred by assessing the risk to the appellant as a deserter on the basis of country evidence about the treatment of draft evaders. My preliminary view is that there is an obvious distinction between draft evasion and desertion, and that this has not been taken into account. Moreover, the FtT has not explained why it speculated that the punishment for desertion would be likely to be less severe than the punishment for draft evasion. My preliminary view is therefore that this alternative finding was irrational and cannot stand.
“12. I am also minded to agree with the appellant that this appeal should be remitted to the FtT. I have considered the recent guidance of the Court of Appeal in Majera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1597 and I recognise that it is the normal course for decisions to [be] re-made in the Upper Tribunal. However, this case falls squarely with Para. 7.2(a) and (b) of the applicable Practice Statement: the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing before the FtT and considerable further fact-finding will be required.
“13. However, I am required by Rule 34(1) to have regard to the views of the parties before deciding whether to make a decision without a hearing. The respondent has expressly requested an oral hearing. She has not given her reasons for doing so, and under the circumstances, it may be that this request is a typographical error. I therefore make the following directions:
“1. The respondent shall write to the Upper Tribunal by noon on Friday, 31 July 2026, copying in the appellant, confirming whether she continues to request an oral hearing in this matter and if so, for what purpose.
“2. If she continues to request an oral hearing, her reasons for doing so will be put before me promptly for a decision.
“3. If no response to these directions is received, the appeal will be remitted to the FtT for a fresh hearing, before any other judge, for the reasons set out above.”
7. No response has been received from the respondent as of 15:30 on 31 July 2026. I am satisfied that the respondent has had a fair opportunity to set out her reasons for seeking an oral hearing in this matter. In the first place, she could have done so in her initial Rule 24 response. Indeed, she ought to have done so, given the obvious difficulty in understanding why holding an oral hearing would be consistent with the overriding objective if the appeal was conceded. She then had a further opportunity to set out her reasons, following service of the Rule 25 reply in March 2026, albeit that she was not required to do so. She has since been served with my directions. Although the period for a response was short, anything longer would have been inconsistent with the overriding objective, as it would have potentially led to the hearing being vacated on the day before the hearing.
8. The respondent submits that the FtT materially erred in law and does not oppose this appeal. She has requested an oral hearing but has given no reasons for doing so. I have given my reasons above for considering that there would be no purpose served by holding an oral hearing in this case.
9. I consider that it is appropriate and in accordance with the overriding objective to set the FtT’s decision aside without an oral hearing.
Notice of decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 25 November 2025 is set aside in its entirety.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all issues before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 July 2026