Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001161
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57641/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R THOMAS KC

Between

THELMA NNEKA CHUDE
[NO ANONYMITY DIRECTY MADE]
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms M Malhotra of counsel, instructed by the RakLAW Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Nigeria.
2. The appellant sought leave to remain on the basis of her private life. It is helpful to set out the manner in which the claim developed before the substance of the appeal can be assessed.
3. By letter dated 26th January 2023, solicitors instructed by the appellant wrote requesting “our client is allowed to stay” for various reasons, all of which could be said to fall within ‘private life’. That letter asserted the appellant first entered the UK as a visitor on 1st July 2018, but that was erroneous because the appellant in fact entered with entry clearance as a Tier 4 (General) student. No mention was made of a relationship. In the Respondent’s refusal letter dated 19th June 2024 it was made clear “You have not told us about a partner, parent or dependent children in the United Kingdom, therefore I have not considered the family life Rules under Appendix FM”. The claim was considered under the Immigration Rules, Appendix Private Life and Article 8 ECHR. It was not accepted there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Nigeria or that removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. To the extent that the letter had made reference to the appellant being “under a lot of depression and distress to face the struggle again in Nigeria”, consideration was given to Article 3 ECHR but the claim on that ground was rejected on the basis of the lack of severity of her condition and the availability of medical treatment in Nigeria.
4. In a witness statement dated 9th January 2025, the appellant now gave detailed evidence as to difficulties she would face re-integrating into Nigeria. At some points in the witness statement, this was presented in a way that could potentially form the basis of a protection claim (see, e.g. paragraphs 14-16). There was, again, no mention of a relationship. The skeleton argument served a few days later (14th January 2025) on behalf of the appellant made clear that the issue remained “whether the refusal of the application would be a breach of Appendix Private PL5.1(b) in that there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration or alternatively whether removal would be disproportionate / have unjustifiably harsh consequences and breach in breach of Article 8 ECHR with regard to NIAA 2002 Part 5A”. The skeleton argument did not seek to argue matters raised in the witness statement as a protection claim and, in any event, consent was refused in the Respondent’s review of 7th March 2025 which maintained the refusal on the same grounds.
5. It was not until 24th November 2025 (two days before the hearing) that a supplementary bundle was lodged with the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) which included a witness statement from Ephraim Salumu who said he was “a long term partner of the Appellant”, explaining “We began a romantic relationship in August 2019, and we have now been together for over six years”. The witness statement provides a detailed account of their relationship and co-habitation. Documentary evidence, including messaging, tenancy agreements, and pay slips was exhibited.
6. The Respondent refused consent for the relationship to be treated as a new matter, and therefore the issues at the hearing remained as set out above, albeit it was accepted the relationship was relevant to the Article 8 ECHR assessment. The appellant and Mr Salamu gave evidence and were cross-examined.
7. The FtT dismissed the appeal on the basis that “the concerns the appellant has raised about her return to Nigeria” did not amount to very significant obstacles to her reintegration (paragraph 14) and removal would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant (paragraph 21).
8. Given this appeal has been allowed on the basis the FtT failed to make relevant findings, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT with no preserved findings of fact.
9. The grounds of appeal are that the FtJ (i) failed to make findings of fact as to whether the Appellant was in a relationship (ii) failed to make findings of fact as to whether she would have family support on return (iii) made a finding that she could return to Nigeria with her partner without sufficient evidential basis (the partner is in fact a refugee from DRC with a UK travel document issued in 2025, a matter on which evidence had been given at the hearing) (iv) failed to make a finding on potential obstacles to reintegration arising from violence and discrimination against women, especially if it was accepted she would be returning as a lone female without family support, and (v) failed to make a finding as to whether the appellant had begun her relationship at a time she knew her leave was curtailed. Leave was granted on the basis these grounds were arguable: “Findings have been made without demonstrable consideration to support such a conclusion”.
10. The Respondent’s position in the Rule 24 response is that the FtT “gave cogent reasons” and submits the FtT was “entitled to find there was limited evidence of the relationship based on the evidence before them” and the FtT “rightly refers to inconsistent accounts given by the appellant and Mr Salumu”. The Respondent also notes “The appellant had ample time to notify the respondent and request consent. This speaks volumes about the appellant’s relationship”.
11. Given the chronology I have set out in paragraphs 3-5 above, the Respondent is right to submit that the FtT would have been entitled to draw inferences adverse to the appellant as to the existence or nature of the relationship. The error identified in the grounds however is that there was a failure to make a finding at all: at paragraph 15, the FtT appears to accept there was a relationship (“I find the appellant has established a private life which includes the links she has developed in the UK and her relationship”) but the only analysis is then confined to two sentences which appear to doubt the existence of the relationship: “…there is limited supporting evidence of the relationship. The tenancy agreement provided is dated on a few weeks prior to the hearing. The GP record lists her partner’s address in addition to one other document, but this is not sufficient to show they have been in a relationship, simply that she has used his address in the past”. There is no finding of fact as to whether the relationship exists and, it follows, no finding of the nature of the relationship or when it began (and her state of knowledge when it began). Similarly, whilst paragraph 12 very briefly rehearses the evidence of lack of family ties and of the challenges the appellant faces on return as a woman, there are no findings of fact on the issue.
12. I have considered whether it could be inferred that the FtT has taken the appellant’s case at its highest and then rejected that account. That might be arguable in respect of the first of the two tests, because at paragraph 14, the FtT held “I do not find the concerns the appellant has raised about her return to Nigeria amount to very significant obstacles to her integration on return” but even then, it is unclear whether that conclusion is based on adverse findings made (which, on one view, is the tone of paragraph 12) or on the basis of her account having been accepted. Certainly, it is difficult to infer that the FtT accepted the appellant’s evidence as to her relationship, given the findings set out in the previous paragraph. Additionally, the FtT does not explain the evidence given about him being a refugee when finding (a conclusion perhaps meant to be in the alternative) that she could return to Nigeria with her partner.
13. It is trite law that a court or Tribunal should make clear findings on the factual conclusions that shape its determination. Even in a case where there is a clear route to rejecting evidence or to a finding why the evidence presented by a party is insufficient, it is necessary those findings are made and made with clarity. It can then be understood how those findings have been applied to the relevant test. The FtT failed to make factual findings on the key evidential issues (as identified in the grounds), and, it follows, has not provided an adequately reasoned basis for its adverse conclusions.
14. Given this appeal has been allowed on the basis the FtT failed to make relevant findings, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT with no preserved findings of fact.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed and the case remitted to the First Tier Tribunal with no preserved findings of fact.

Richard Thomas KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7th July 2026