Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001165
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02769/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

AHF (Egypt)
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant in person
For the Respondent: Mr A. McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 8 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 30 December 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 7 June 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. Permission to appeal that decision was sought and permission was granted by FtTJ Singer on 9 March 2026 on grounds 1,2 , 3 and 5 of challenge.
3. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
4. The appellant is a citizen of Egypt, who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) against a decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
5. In a decision promulgated on 30 December 2025 , the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having made an adverse credibility assessment of his claim on all grounds.
6. Permission to appeal having been granted by FtTJ Singer the appeal was listed for hearing.
7. The appellant appeared in person. The appellant was assisted by the court interpreter in the Arabic language as requested. Steps were taken at the outset of the hearing to ensure that both the appellant and the interpreter could both properly understand each other. Both confirmed that they were able to understand each other and I record that throughout the hearing there were no problems identified by either the interpreter or the appellant as to any issues in this regard. It is also recorded that the submissions made by Mr McVeety were translated so that the appellant would be able to hear, understand and follow them. The interpreter was asked to do so after each line and I am satisfied that that was carried out in such a way that the appellant was able to understand and follow the proceedings.
8. When asked if he remembered the grounds which had been submitted for his appeal, the appellant stated that he did and proceeded to state that it was because he did not get the chance to “do his appeal”. That was a reference to ground 4 of the grounds which was headed “procedural unfairness” and where it was stated “I was unrepresented and declined to make submissions (paragraph 43). The judge did not explore whether I understood the implications or offer an adjournment for legal advice”. It was explained to the appellant that when FtTJ Singer considered the grounds that the appellant had submitted, FtTJ Singer had refused permission on that ground. As stated by the judge he was not satisfied that ground 4 was arguable because the judge offered the appellant an opportunity to make submissions at the close of the hearing and he declined to do so and there was no obligation on the judge to offer the appellant an adjournment. On the face of the decision, there was no arguable procedural unfairness in this respect.
9. In respect of the other grounds for which permission was granted, he stated that he relied on those grounds. When asked if he wished to say anything further the appellant stated that he was to “make a request for more proof” and when asked what he was referring to, the appellant said that they were documents that the court had sent in his absence but he could not provide them as his mother was old and was difficult to communicate with and also they had moved to a different city. That appears to be in respect of ground 5 and the failure to engage with evidence on the basis that the judge dismissed the claim partly due to lack of documents without considering whether it was reasonable to expect him to obtain documents from Egypt given his circumstances.
10. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr McVeety on behalf of the respondent conceded that the decision of the FtTJ involved the making of material errors of law as set out in the appellant’s grounds which related to grounds 1-3. He submitted that the reference made at paragraph 57 where it was said by the FtTJ that “ I do not accept on balance that there is a real risk of harm to the appellant on his return to Egypt for Convention reasons or any other reason.” He submitted that he accepted that the FtTJ had not applied the correct legal framework under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 as the grant of permission had set out. The reference made applied to all claims and the FtTJ did not assess the humanitarian protection grounds/Article 3 grounds based on non-state actors to the correct standard of proof. He submitted that it was not clear what standard of proof the FtTJ had applied.
11. Thus, in the circumstances, that error went to the heart of he claim and the assessment made and therefore the decision should be set aside for a fresh hearing.
12. Dealing with the error of law, whilst the appellant has referred to the procedural unfairness, permission was not granted on that ground but in any event it is not material to the outcome in light of the concession made on behalf of the respondent that the decision of the FtTJ involved the making of an error on a point of law on different grounds and upon which permission was granted and were material.
13. The parties are in agreement that the decision discloses the making of a material error of law and that the FtTJ erred in law in the way set out at ground 1 which was a failure to apply the correct standard of proof adverse to the assessment made upon matters relevant to the appellant’s core claim as to the events in Egypt which necessarily affected the overall assessment of the claim. The respondent accepts that the judge failed to follow sections 31-36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 in respect of the varying standard of proof and applied the wrong standard of proof (see JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC). As the protection claim was made after 28 June 2022, Mr McVeety submitted that the FtTJ fell into error by not following the 2022 Act in respect of the standard of proof and his reference to “on balance” at paragraph 57 in the context of the Convention claim and “ any other reason” failed to identify the different standards of proof in relation to different claims. In particular as FtTJ Singer identified when granting permission, the FtTJ imported the balance of probabilities standard into the humanitarian protection and in the article 3 self-direction. As that error went to the heart of the claim and the correct legal framework, it is not necessary to address the other grounds.
14. In terms of remaking the decision, it is evident that both parties agree that the credibility findings are flawed on the claim so that none of the findings of fact are sustainable. The respondent has invited the Upper Tribunal to set aside the decision and in view of the fact finding that is necessary on all parts of the claim it is submitted that the appeal should properly be heard afresh.
15. Having given careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal and the decision of the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and the decision in Begum [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) I am satisfied that in light of the errors of law identified and the fact findings and assessment of the evidence which will be necessary, the appeal falls within paragraphs 7.2 (b) of the practice statement. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for that hearing to take place.
16. As indicated to the appellant at the hearing, he should ensure that he provides a witness statement setting out his claim prior to any hearing before the FtT. He has the opportunity to seek legal representation for any hearing in light of his claim that he did not have that previously. Any other directions that are necessary can be made by the FtT.
17. Having considered the decision reached, the FtTJ did not apply the correct legal framework as Mr McVeety highlighted in his submissions and therefore the decision should be set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ involved the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ is set aside and remitted to the FtT for a hearing.

8 June 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds