Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001170
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00768/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

LOUIS IFECHUKWUDE ELUE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Abdul-Karim, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Richardson, counsel

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 1 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department appeals with permission against the decision, dated 29 January 2026, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to allow the appeal on human rights grounds.
2. To avoid confusion, and for the remainder of this decision, I will refer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the respondent and Mr Elue as the appellant, as they were before the First-tier Tribunal (the ‘FtT’).
3. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings. The appellant was convicted, after trial, of exceptionally serious offences arising out of his use of a hunting knife to repeatedly stab the victim following a grievance over a minor drugs debt. A serious aggravating feature was the fact that the offence was not impulsive because the appellant left the scene of the grievance and returned with the knife. It was fortunate that the victim was not killed. The sentence imposed was 9 years imprisonment with an extended sentence of 4 years to mark the continuing risk he posed of committing further serious specified offences. The length of sentence triggered the automatic deportation process. His time in custody was extended by a further 20 months after he subjected a female prison officer to a serious and sustained assault which he later bragged about to fellow prisoners. He resisted deportation by making an Article 8 human rights claim which was focussed on the private life he had accumulated in the UK over the course of his life, the entirety of which was spent living in this country. The appellant is a Nigerian citizen.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The respondent applied for permission to appeal in reliance on two grounds:
i. Ground 1 - Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters and making a material misdirection of law on any material matter – in relation to the judge’s findings on the very compelling circumstances test.
ii. Ground 2 - Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters – in relation to the judge’s findings on Exception 1
5. In a decision dated 5 March 2026, FtT Judge Curtis granted permission for both grounds to be argued. The following observations were made in granting permission:
[…] It is arguable that the Judge was not entitled to attach weight to ("take comfort from") the fact that the Appellant might not be released and/ or would be subject to licence conditions as a means of either contributing to the very compelling circumstances test "over and above" Exception 1 or otherwise reducing the public interest in his deportation. It is also arguable that it was incumbent on the Judge to have considered, when making findings about family support in the UK, that none of the Appellant's family had attended and that the letters of support appeared to pre-date 2023. […] it is at least arguable that in focussing on the length of residence in the UK that this resulted in a failure to provide adequate reasons for why the test in s.117C(6) was satisfied, not least when set against the Appellant's very serious offending, his lack of remorse and rehabilitation and the risk that he posed to the public.
[…] It is arguable that, in light of the Appellant's appalling record of offending, including a serious offence committed whilst in prison that could have triggered deportation proceedings by itself, and his admission that he continued to supply drugs whilst on licence for an offence that involved dealing drugs, that the Judge provided inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. Further, in relation to integration to Nigeria, the Judge's reasoning appears to be based principally on the fact that the Appellant has never lived in Nigeria and would have no family support there and it is arguable this resulted in a failure to provide adequate reasons for why the Appellant's own circumstances and cultural background deprived him of a chance to become "enough of an insider". In my view the arguability threshold has been reached.
6. At the error of law hearing, the appellant was not made available to join the hearing remotely from custody. However, he was represented by counsel and, having taken instructions, Mr Richardson invited me to proceed to hear the appeal which would turn on oral submissions without the need to receive evidence. I heard oral arguments from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
7. Under the first ground of appeal, the respondent challenged the lawfulness of the judge’s reasoning going to the existence of very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions. It was acknowledged at the hearing that both grounds of appeal involved a considerable degree of overlap in that the challenges to the judge’s analysis of the private life exception necessarily infected and undermined the lawfulness and safety of the very compelling circumstances assessment which was built on that preceding factual consideration.
8. I am satisfied that there are two fundamental defects in the judge’s analysis which can be framed both as a misdirection in law and inadequate reasons. In order for the appellant to satisfy the three-limbed private life exception, it is necessary for him to establish that he would encounter “very significant obstacles” to integration. However, the judge repeatedly assessed this limb of the statutory test by referring only to “significant obstacles” without the essential and elevating qualifier of “very significant obstacles”. While it is fair to say that the judge accurately self-directed himself to “very significant obstacles” when setting out the legal framework at [19] of his decision, when he addressed his mind to whether the appellant actually met this condition on the evidence, he referred only to “significant obstacles”. This can be seen at [22] and [30] - [32]:
[22] The Appellant argued that he fell within Exception 1 and in that regard I make the following findings:
a) It was not disputed by the Respondent that the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for the entirety of his life. I discount a two week visit to Nigeria when he was about 8 years old.
b) Notwithstanding the Appellant's convictions, I find that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated within the United Kingdom. I base this finding on the fact he has lived in the United Kingdom for his entire life with his family around him. Further detail is given below.
c) I find that there would be significant obstacles to the Appellant's integration into Nigeria. Again, this is based on the fact that he has lived his entire life in the United Kingdom and would lack family or other support. Again, more detail is given below.
[…]
[30] In terms of the Appellant's ability to integrate into Nigerian life upon deportation I find that he would have significant difficulties. This would not be a reintegration as the Appellant has never had a life there. I find that the Respondent's submissions as to the ease with which the Appellant could integrate are unrealistic. There is no suggestion of any family support within Nigeria. It would be unrealistic to expect the Appellant's family in the United Kingdom to provide him with financial support. It is difficult to envisage how the Appellant would be able to locate accommodation or paid employment within Nigeria.
I have consider the decision of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 which calls for "a broad evaluative judgement to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life".
[31] I have considered the case of Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Cv 537. I note that was a case involving a deportation from the United Kingdom to Germany and within the conclusion was the remark 'life in Germany is not significantly different from life in the UK'. I do not find that there is a similar comparison to be found between the United Kingdom and Nigeria. In reaching this decision I have considered the contents of the Country Policy and information note: internal relocation, June 2024 (updated January 2026). I noted significant and real and unfavourable contrasts between the United Kingdom and Nigeria in terms of employment, poverty, healthcare, accommodation, crime and education. All of these would, in my judgement, have a significant effect on the appellant's ability to integrate into the country for the first time.
[32] I have considered MA (Prove destitution) Jamaica [2005] UKIAT 00013 which found that an Appellant seeking to make points as to homelessness or destitution upon return to a country of origin must prove that proper enquiries have been made to support such an assertion. Bearing in mind the Appellant's current incarceration and the proposal to return the Appellant to a country he has never been resident in with no family support, I find it likely that the Appellant will have significant difficulties in establishing himself in Nigeria for the first time. I find that this would not be simply a 'culture shock'. I find that this is a significant factor in the Appellant's favour.
[Emphasis added]
9. The repeated omission of the essential and elevating qualifier of “very” matters because it has the effect of diluting the intended stringency of the statutory language where a judge is considering if a private life claim is strong enough to outweigh the public interest in a foreign criminal’s deportation. In this case, the appellant could not succeed on a bare private life claim under s.117C(5) of the 2002 Act because his offending was so serious that only very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions could possibly outweigh the strong public interest in his removal. The seriousness of the offending, and the sentence passed, is the surest gauge of the weight to be attached to the public interest in his removal. The appellant’s sentence was over three times the minimum marker of seriousness to take him into the most serious category of offenders under the legislative scheme. This reflects the exceptional seriousness of the offending involving the planned use of a deadly weapon to repeatedly stab the victim over a trifling grievance. His criminality was more recently exacerbated by the serious offences of violence he subjected a female prison officer to while serving his sentence.
10. The judge was required to undertake the required balancing exercise to assess whether the very weighty public interest in the deportation of the appellant was outweighed by very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. In doing so, he had to properly lay the groundwork for that exercise by lawfully assessing the private life exception on which the appellant’s claim rested. In repeatedly failing to apply the stringent statutory language of the third limb of the private life exception, there is simply no way of knowing if the judge concluded that this exception was satisfied according to the applicable test. It cannot be inferred that a finding of “significant obstacles” also amounted to “very significant obstacles”. Moreover, the judge did not expressly state in his decision whether the private life exception was found to have been met, or not. Given that very compelling circumstances can only be established if it is qualitatively “over and above” the exceptions, the parties should not be required to guess or to engage in a process of inferential reasoning to piece together whether the judge found the private life exception satisfied, or not, before assessing whether very compelling circumstances existed.
11. The foundations for the judge’s assessment of the ultimate question of the existence of very compelling circumstances are wholly unsafe. In failing to apply the “very significant obstacles” limb of the private life exception, it is impossible to understand whether this was a case where the private life exception was found to have been met or if the judge concluded that there were very compelling circumstances qualitatively over and above the exceptions notwithstanding that the exceptions were not met.
12. The above analysis is sufficient to dispose of the appeal because it manifestly discloses material errors of law going to the heart of the judge’s analysis. However, I wish to record additional deficiencies in the judge’s analysis. The judge relied upon the protective measures which would be in place to manage the risk he posed and did not pay adequate regard to the appellant’s wider litany of offending when assessing his social and cultural integrative links to the UK.
13. At [41], the judge made the following observations when conducting the overall balancing exercise:
[41] In making this decision I take comfort from the fact that the Appellant's release from his sentence is not immediately automatic. His case is to be considered by the parole board. If he is not safe for release, then he will not be released. Even at the point of release, the Appellant will remain on licence for at least a further four years with the ability of the relevant authorities to return him to prison were he to be in breach of what will no doubt be strict licence conditions. As a result there will be substantial management of any risk for at least the next 5 years.
14. It is difficult to understand how the judge was rationally able to “take comfort” from the process which would bring about the appellant’s release in due course, or the fact that he would be subject to an extended licence period. At the risk of stating the obvious, the reason why the appellant would be on an extended licence is precisely because of the pronounced risk he poses to the public. The fact that the state will take steps in an attempt to manage the risk he poses is emblematic of risk, not a marker of anything from which comfort can be drawn. If the judge’s analysis were correct it would have the perverse effect that the lengthier the sentence imposed and, accordingly, the lengthier the period of licence, the more comfort could be drawn about the management of offender’s risk profile. At the extreme end of the spectrum, an individual sentenced to life imprisonment would be subject to licence conditions for the rest of his life. It would be absurd if the most comfort could be drawn from the most serious of offending because the licence provisions would apply for accordingly lengthier periods. Such an approach would run the appreciable risk of diminishing the very great public interest in deporting the most serious offenders. The judge’s approach to this issue struck me as entirely misconceived.
15. In his assessment of the appellant’s integrative links with the UK, I am satisfied that the judge lost sight of the litany of offending, of escalating seriousness, over a prolonged period. The correct approach to this question was explained by the Court of Appeal in Binbuga (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551; [2019] Imm. A.R. 1026 where Hamblen LJ said this at [57]-58]:
[57] Similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumption by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law. Membership of a pro-criminal gang shows a lack of such acceptance. It demonstrates disdain for the rule of law and indeed undermines it.
[58] Social and cultural integration in the UK connotes integration as a law-abiding citizen. That is why it is recognised that breaking the law may involve discontinuity in integration. As was found in the Bossade case at [55]:
"…his history of offending (repeated robbery) betokens a serious discontinuity in his integration in the UK especially because it shows blatant disregard for fellow citizens. ….. We also agree with Mr Jarvis that even when not in prison the claimant's lifestyle over the period when he was committing offences was manifestly anti-social….. We have to decide whether he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK in the present. He is now 29. Whilst his recent acceptance of the reprehensible nature of his criminal conduct is an important factor, we consider the negative factors we have just mentioned indicate that his history of criminal offending broke the continuity of his social and cultural integration in the UK and he has not regained it. This means that currently he has not shown he is socially and culturally integrated."
16. While the judge noted the appellant’s most recent pattern of offending of serious violence, he did not adequately address the overall backdrop of offences referred to by the respondent in the grounds of appeal. This revealed prolific and serious offences which began when the appellant was a child and continued without meaningful interruption well into adulthood. He had committed multiple offences of dwelling burglary, robbery, assaults of varying degrees of seriousness, possession of class A drugs with intent to supply and possession of knives, all committed before the index offences. The judge considered the extent of the appellant’s social and cultural integration between [33]-[36]:
[33] I find that the fact that the Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom his entire life is a significant factor in his favour.
[34] Although 8 years have elapsed, I am able to place little if any weight on the time between the Appellant's sentence for the Index offence and the date of the Appeal as the Appellant has been in custody during that time, has committed a further serious offence while in custody and has been subject to a number of prison adjudications. Although I do take into account that the Appellant is older and therefore more mature, the passage of time is neutral in terms of this appeal.
[35] I accept the Appellant's account of his family situation within the United Kingdom. Both his parents are resident here, as is his brother. Letters in support talk of a wider extended family of uncles, Aunts and cousins. While none of the family attended to give evidence in support, I see no reason to doubt this evidence where it goes to the family within the United Kingdom. This is a significant factor in the Appellant's favour.
[36] Following this, I accept that the Appellant has solid social, cultural and family ties within the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding his convictions and prison sentence I accept that both immediate and extended family have not disowned him but continue to provide practical and emotional support. This is a significant factor in the Appellant's favour.
[Underlining added]
17. The above analysis does not begin to do justice to the lengthy catalogue of serious and escalating offences over the course of 15 years. I have found it impossible to reconcile the judge’s limited assessment, by merely noting that he had taken account of the convictions, with the importance of such background as identified in Binbuga. The assessment of social and cultural integration in the UK is not lawfully complete.
18. The judge’s decision involved several material errors of law. I set aside the decision. Given the extent of the flaws in the judge’s assessment of this appeal, it would not be appropriate to preserve any findings of fact.
Disposal
19. The respondent invited me to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal for remaking in the event of the appeal being allowed, as it has. The appellant urged me to remit the matter to the FtT.
20. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:    
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:     
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or     
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.    
21. It appears to me to be fair and just to remit this matter to the FtT because of the scope of fact-finding which remains to be undertaken. The appropriate forum for such a broad factual assessment is the FtT on remittal. 
Notice of Decision 
The judge’s decision involved material errors of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety and preserve no findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to a different judge of the FtT to hear the appeal de novo. 

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2026