Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Oral Decision UI‑2026‑001189
UI‑2026‑001193
PA/01120/2024; PA/55048/2023
PA/01124/2024; PA/55053/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

RA and IM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr A Syed-Ali, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 the appellants are granted anonymity. No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I am giving this oral decision after hearing submissions from Mr Syed-Ali on behalf of the appellants and Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent. I continue the anonymity order that was made in the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”), for the reasons given in the FTT.
2. The first appellant is the second appellant’s mother. The appeal turns on the circumstances of the first appellant. I will refer to her in this decision as "the appellant."
Background
3. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who entered the UK and claimed asylum in 2021. She claims to face a risk of persecution in Bangladesh because (a) whilst Secretary of her local women’s branch of the BNP she was attacked by Awami League supporters and had to evade the police in Bangladesh before fleeing to the UK; (b) proceedings have been brought against her in Bangladesh because of her anti-regime Facebook activities in the UK; and (c) she faces a politically motivated charge of disorderly conduct and attacking a police officer.
4. In July 2023 the respondent refused the appellant’s claim. The appellant appealed. Her appeal came before judge of the FTT Isaacs (“the judge”). By a decision issued on 4 December 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals against this decision.
Decision of the FTT
5. The judge accepted that the appellant had the position in the BNP she claimed, as well as that she had been attacked by Awami League supporters as she claimed. The judge also accepted her account of evading the police. The judge made an explicit finding that the appellant suffered persecution because of her political beliefs.
6. The judge accepted that a legal complaint has been made against the appellant in Bangladesh because of her Facebook posts, which were said to defame the then Prime Minister and the Awami League government. The judge also accepted that the appellant had been charged, along with multiple others, of a politically motivated crime that alleged she had, amongst other things, been involved in assaulting police officers.
7. The judge found, however, that because of the fundamental change in circumstances in Bangladesh the appellant does not face a risk of persecution or serious harm. Weight was attached to the respondent’s Country policy and information note: political situation, Bangladesh, December 2024 (“the CPIN”), where the assessment of risk states that BNP members and supporters are unlikely to face persecution from the state and that there is, in general, effective state protection from rogue state actors and non-state actors.
8. The judge considered an expert report adduced by the appellant by Dr Sakib, where the opinion was expressed that the appellant faces an ongoing risk. The judge attached no weight to the report. Detailed reasons explaining why no weight was attached to the report are set out in the in paragraphs 22 to 26 of the decision and summarised in paragraph 27, where it is said:
"In summary, I do not find the expert established why this particular appellant would face greater risks than any other BNP member should she return to Bangladesh. He had not addressed a conflicting point of view as evidence in the CPIN. He had extracted or extrapolated selected information from the sources he relied upon, when a reading of the full source presented information that undermined his conclusions. I did not find the reports in general was helpful, and I afforded it no weight."
9. The judge considered the risk arising from the Facebook charges in paragraphs 29 – 30 of the decision. The judge found that the appellant would not face a risk because (a) the case against her had not progressed (b) it was clear that it was politically motivated and (c) politically motivated cases are gradually being withdrawn. The judge stated in paragraph 30:
"I assume the appellant has not made any enquiries to see whether she is one of the 100,000 people who has now had cases against them withdrawn."
10. The judge similarly found that there was no longer a risk from the charge for attacking a police officer. The judge found that the appellant was in the UK when the alleged offence occurred and, therefore, it would be plain that this was politically motivated. The judge again referred to politically motivated charges being withdrawn in Bangladesh.
Grounds of Appeal
11. There are five grounds of appeal. In his submissions, Mr Syed-Ali focused on the first three but made clear that all grounds were being pursued. I am grateful for both his and Mr Parvar’s helpful oral submissions.
12. Ground 1 advances three distinct points. First, it is argued that there was a failure to consider and apply paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules1. Second, it is contended that the judge did not assess localised risk. Third, it is claimed that it was procedurally unfair to assume the appellant had not enquired as to whether the cases against her had been withdrawn without first putting this to the appellant.
13. Ground 2 argues that the judge erred by referring to a single verification report when there were two verification reports, one for each of the two charges that the appellant faces. It is also argued in this ground that the judge speculated about the cases against the appellant being withdrawn when the verification reports indicate they were extant.
14. Ground 3 submits that the judge did not undertake an adequate assessment of whether there has been a durable and significant change in Bangladesh. It is argued that the judge failed to engage with parts of the CPIN that indicate that the police remain politicised and that some Awami League officials remain in place.
15. Ground 4 argues that it was not open to the judge to attach no weight to the expert report.
16. Ground 5 argues that, when considering article 8 ECHR, the judge failed to adequately and sufficiently assess whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles integrating in Bangladesh.
Ground 1
17. I am not persuaded by any of three points raised in this ground. First, the decision is plainly in accordance with paragraph 339K, as the judge identified a good reason to consider that the persecution the appellant had previously suffered would not be repeated. The good reason is that there has been a change of regime in Bangladesh and the party that subjected the appellant to persecution (the Awami League) is no longer in power.
18. Second, it is contended that the judge failed to assess “localised risk”. However, neither the grounds nor Mr Syed-Ali in his submissions identified any evidence that was before the judge concerning risk in the appellant’s local area. The judge took into account the evidence in the CPIN about the fundamental country-wide change and there is nothing in the decision to indicate that the judge failed to appreciate that circumstances may differ in different locations.
19. Third, it was not procedurally unfair for the judge to state that he assumed that the appellant had not enquired as to whether she was one of the 100,000 people whose cases had been withdrawn2. The appellant clearly knew that an issue that needed to be addressed was that there had been a change of regime in Bangladesh and that there had been a move towards withdrawing politically motivated claims. However, she did not adduce any evidence to show that she had recently enquired as to whether her case had been withdrawn. It was open to the judge, in the absence of such evidence, to find that the appellant had not made any such enquiry. In any event, nothing turned on whether or not the judge made an improper assumption because the relevant finding of the judge, which is unchallenged, is that there has been a trend of politically motivated cases being withdrawn. This is not the same as finding that the specific cases concerning the appellant had been withdrawn, which is not what the judge found.
Ground 2
20. The appellant adduced expert reports (referred to as verification reports) to verify the existence of the cases against her. Two reports were adduced – one pertaining to each of the cases. These indicate that, at the time the reports were made, the cases were extant. The reports are dated 30 July 2024 and 11 March 2025.
21. The judge referred in the decision to only one of the verification reports. I accept that this indicates that the judge may have overlooked the other report. However, this is immaterial because the existence of the cases was not disputed and therefore there was no need to consider the evidence adduced to verify that the cases had been brought.
22. The judge did not speculate that the appellant’s cases had been withdrawn. Rather, he found that, in general, politically motivated cases are being withdrawn. This finding is consistent with the objective evidence that was before the Tribunal. Moreover, and in any event, the judge gave cogent reasons why, in respect of each of the cases, the appellant would not face a risk even if the cases are still ongoing. In respect of the case concerning Facebook posts critical of the previous regime, the judge found that the appellant would be able to show that this was a case that was clearly politically motivated by Awami League supporters. In respect of the charge of assaulting a police officer, the judge found that, as the appellant was not in Bangladesh when the alleged offence occurred, she would be able to establish that the allegations were erroneous or maliciously motivated. It was, in my view, unarguably open to the judge – and not speculative – to find that, for these reasons, the appellant does not face a risk from the two politically motivated cases brought under the previous regime, even if those cases are still open.
Grounds 3 and 4
23. These grounds both concern the same issue, which is whether the judge’s finding on the change in risk faced by BNP activists was consistent with the objective and expert evidence before the FTT.
24. The opinion of Dr Sakib, as set out in his report dated 19 November 2025, was that:
“Given the institutional continuity, political volatility, and intensifying violence, [the appellant] faces a credible, ongoing, and serious risk of persecution from both state and non-state actors if returned to Bangladesh”
25. The judge considered Dr Sakib’s report in considerable detail and gave multiple reasons that explain why no weight was attached to it. This includes that Dr Sakib (i) made broad statements that do not correspond to the cited sources, (ii) supported an opinion about Awami League affiliated judges not providing a fair trial by referring to an article about reprisals against Awami League supporters, (iii) failed to engage with evidence he cited about reforms and improvement, and (iv) gave opinions that were speculative and generic.
26. The grounds do not address any of these reasons given by the judge and do not identify any reason why it was not open to the judge, for the reasons given, to not attach weight to Dr Sakib’s ’s report.
27. The CPIN includes a considerable amount of evidence relating to the change of regime and its implications. The assessment in the CPIN expresses the view that BNP supporters are unlikely to face a risk from the state or non-state actors and that there is, in general, sufficient state protection for them. Whilst the CPIN recognises that there remain serious issues, it notes the significant change which includes removal of Awami League loyalists in the police and a reduction in politicisation and pressure within the judiciary. It was, in my view, open to the judge to place significant weight on the evidence in the CPIN indicating that there has been a fundamental change in Bangladesh. For these reasons, grounds 3 and 4 are not made out.
Ground 5
28. This ground is very succinctly drafted and Mr A Syed-Ali did not advance any oral argument to elaborate upon it. The argument advanced in ground 5 concerns the finding that the appellant’s removal would not breach article 8 ECHR. It is argued that there was not a sufficient assessment of “very significant obstacles” and that the judge did not address whether the appellant would be able to continue participating in politics.
29. The judge stated in para. 33 that he found there to not be very significant obstacles for the same reason he found the appellant would not be at risk. This is, in my view, plainly sufficient. The appellant has lived nearly all of her life in Bangladesh, where she is familiar with the culture and language and where she has family (including her husband). The only reason she claimed she would face obstacles integrating was the persecution she feared. However, if there is not a well-founded basis for her to fear for her safety in Bangladesh (which is a finding the judge was entitled to make) it follows that she would not face significant obstacles integrating. Further, given the change of regime, plainly there is not a barrier to the appellant participating in politics. For these reasons, I am not persuaded there is merit to ground 5.
Notice of Decision
The grounds do not identify an error of law. The FTT decision stands.

D. Sheridan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 June 2026