Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001221
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55190/2024
LH/00835/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

Serhii VALIHURSKYI
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms A Jones of Counsel

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Raymond, dated 15 January 2026, allowing an appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 29 April 2024.
2. Although before me the Secretary of State is the appellant, and Mr Valihurskyi is the respondent, for the sake of consistency with the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal I shall hereafter refer to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and Mr Valihurskyi as the Appellant.
3. The ‘Decision and Reasons’ of the First-tier Tribunal is not quite 2 pages long. When the formal parts of the Decision - the title, the fee award, the signature - are discounted, the text of the ‘reasons’ is less than a single page. It comprises 16 sentences over 10 paragraphs.
4. It is the Respondent’s position that the reasons are inadequate: the Grounds plead that the Decision fails to engage with the issues raised in the refusal and the Respondent’s Review; it is submitted that there has been a failure to address the requirements of Appendix PL of the Immigration Rules, a failure to make any findings on Article 8 of the ECHR, and no consideration of the public interest requirements under Part VA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
5. The Appellant has filed a Rule 24 response. It is, amongst other things, argued that the Decision is “an admirably concise determination”. It is suggested that there was little dispute on the facts that required resolution, and that there was no controversial proposition of law or other legal dispute that required analysis; moreover, there is no requirement to recite relevant jurisprudence in respect of Article 8.

Discussion and Analysis
In the premises…
6. In circumstances where a Decision is essentially written for the parties and not the general reader, there is no absolute requirement to rehearse the background facts, which the parties may be assumed to know. However, the extent to which it may become necessary to set out some evidence and findings of fact will depend on the particular issues in the case: for example, if a particular fact is in dispute, or if particular facts need to be rehearsed because of their relevance in informing the analysis of the extent to which the case meets a particular legal test.
7. Nor is there an absolute requirement to rehearse relevant jurisprudence. A First-tier Tribunal Judge may be assumed to know the law, and does not have to demonstrate it by lengthy recitation. Of course, if there is a dispute between the parties on the law, or if a novel legal proposition is advanced, it may be necessary to set out analysis of legal principles.
8. However, even without recitation of the relevant legal principles, it is reasonable for the parties to expect that the Decision and Reasons document will demonstrate that the decision was reached by applying the relevant legal principles to the particular facts of the case. The parties may legitimately expect - in so far as it is an issue between them – an explanation as to why an appellant did or did not satisfy a relevant legal test.

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. In order to consider the adequacy of the First-tier Tribunal’s reasons in this particular case, it is convenient to set out something of the Decision itself.
10. Insofar as the Decision makes reference to the background facts, the following is apparent from paragraphs 2-7.
(i) The Appellant’s immigration status: he has been present in the UK unlawfully following illegal entry in 2013.
(ii) The immigration history of the Appellant’s wife and child: that they had been the beneficiaries of Ukraine Scheme residence permits from 30 June 2022 in the case of the Appellant’s wife, and 28 June 2022 in the case of the Appellant’s son, valid until December 2024. (I pause to note that although at the time of the appeal hearing there was no evidence of any extension beyond December 2024, the Respondent seemingly took no adverse issue in this regard. The Respondent’s Grounds of Appeal herein confirm that leave to remain under the Ukraine Scheme has now been extended to 2 December 2026.)
(iii) The Appellant’s wife and son were working in the UK.
(iv) The Appellant and his family had lived as a unit in Ukraine, and were again living as a unit the UK.
11. Insofar as the Decision makes reference to the position of the parties, I note the following:
(i) The Appellant’s case does not appear to be articulated beyond the contents of paragraph 3: “The Appellant is fearful of the situation in the Ukraine and does not want to return there but he has made no asylum application”.
(ii) The Respondent’s case does not appear to be articulated beyond the contents of paragraph 8: “The Respondent in their refusal contends that the Appellant can be returned to the Ukraine, whilst his wife and son continue with their limited leave in the UK”.
12. The Judge’s decision, and the entirety of the ‘reasoning’ part of the decision is at paragraph 10:
“I find by reference to the burden and standard of proof applicable that unduly harsh results would follow for the family unit to be disrupted in the exceptional circumstances which have led to it being reconstituted in the UK.”

Background: the application and the Respondent’s decision
13. The Appellant’s application for leave to remain in the UK was made on 14 August 2023. It was his case that he had entered clandestinely from France on 22 February 2013. However, no meaningful information was offered in his application – or subsequently in his appeal documents - as to why he had left Ukraine, or why he had come to the UK unlawfully, or how he had spent his time and/or supported himself whilst in the UK.
14. The application of 14 August 2023 was expressly made on private life, NOT family life, grounds. The application form specifies “Private Life Route”, and includes the comment “I am not applying as a family member – I am only applying on the basis of private life in the UK”.
15. A supporting letter of representations dated 19 September 2023 from the Appellant’s solicitors articulates the basis of the application in these terms:
“We make this human rights submission for our client’s leave to remain in the UK, on the basis of his fear of return to his country (Ukraine) due to ongoing war and instability of the country now and for future and for him being a man of conscription age which includes anyone between the age of 18 and 60.”
16. Whilst in this letter of representations there is reference in general terms to “Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life)”, and it is stated that he lives with wife and son, the focus of the letter is exclusively upon risk on return, which is expressed as a fear of the war with Russia including the risk of conscription. In legal terms, these matters are presented as relevant to Article 8, rather than the Refugee Convention, ECHR Articles 2 and 3, or the principles of humanitarian protection.
17. Subsequent to this, on 17 April 2024, there was contact from the Respondent regarding the possibility of claiming asylum. The Appellant declined to pursue such a route.
18. The application was refused for reasons set out in a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter (‘RFRL’) dated 29 April 2024. In summary:
(i) In respect of ‘family life’, the Appellant was not eligible to apply under the Immigration Rules as a partner or parent because he did not have a relevant relationship with a person of required immigration status. (It may well be that it was in recognition of the lack of any such eligibility that the application was made on private life, rather than family life, grounds.)
(ii) The application was refused under Appendix Private Life, in particular because the Respondent was not satisfied that the Appellant had shown there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Ukraine (paragraph PL 5.1(b)).
(iii) The Respondent was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances which would render the Appellant’s removal a breach of Article 8 because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for him, a relevant child or other family member. In considering this issue, amongst other things:
(a) It was the Respondent’s case that the Appellant’s wife and child could live independently, in which context it was noted that they had lived apart from the Appellant for a substantial period whilst he was present unlawfully in the UK and they were still in Ukraine;
(b) Emphasis was placed on the Appellant being “an immigration offender”.
19. Notwithstanding the refusal of his application, the RFRL also included an indication that the Appellant was not to be removed at the present time. Indeed, this in part informed the reasoning in respect of Article 8 family life. I note the following:
(i) “No decision has been taken to remove you from the UK at this time and therefore it is considered that you have not evidenced that this decision will be a breach of your Article 8 family life.”
(ii) “You do not qualify for permission to stay within the United Kingdom. You are currently living in the UK without permission. You will not be removed from the UK at this time due to the current conflict in Ukraine, however you remain liable to removal. You will receive a separate notice if a decision is taken to remove you from the UK at a later date.
You are able to voluntarily leave the United Kingdom and return to Ukraine, or alternatively Ukrainian nationals are able to make an application for leave to remain in another European country under the Temporary European Directive.”
20. It may be seen that the application and decision included the following characteristics: the Appellant had a poor and unexplained immigration history; his wife and child had lived independently of him at least between the date of his arrival in the UK (February 2013) and their arrival under the Ukraine Scheme (June 2022); the Appellant did not rely upon family life in his application; the focus of the application was the circumstances the Appellant would face in the Ukraine – specifically the war with Russia and the possibility of conscription; the Appellant had declined to make any sort of formal protection claim.
21. It was also a very particular feature of the decision that the Respondent, whilst not granting leave to remain, did not propose to remove the Appellant. As such there was no proposed action on the part of the Respondent that would separate the Appellant from his wife and child. This was expressly factored in to the Respondent’s Article 8 consideration to the effect that there was no interference with family life in consequence of the Respondent’s decision.

The issues in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
22. The Appellant’s Skeleton Argument (‘ASA’) of 26 August 2024 offered a Case summary in these terms:
“2. The Appellant has a fear of breach of Article 3 ECHR, a generalised risk of violence in Ukraine, and there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Ukraine under Appendix PL.
3. The SSHD accepts he cannot return to Ukraine. It is a breach of Article 8 in such circumstances to refuse leave in the UK.”
23. It may be seen that the summary does not focus on family life. The issues relate to the circumstances the Appellant might face in Ukraine, and the extent to which that might avail him under Article 3, or by reference to interference with his private life. The potential circumstances of the family in Ukraine are not raised - presumably because it was not contemplated that the Appellant’s wife and child, who had been granted leave, would quit the UK. Nor was any specific issue raised in the summary concerning the impact on family life in the event of the Appellant returning to Ukraine whilst his wife and child remained in the UK. (Yet, ultimately, it was the impact on the “family unit” that was at the core of the Judge’s reasoning at paragraph 10 of the First-tier Tribunal Decision.)
24. The ‘Issues in the Case’ were identified at paragraph 11 of the ASA in these terms:
“(I) Article 3 ECHR;
(II) very significant obstacles to integration;
(III) Article 8 in the UK.”
25. Further to this, I note that paragraph 14 of the ASA raised the issue of conscription in respect of both the Appellant and his son. It was also asserted that the Appellant was a conscientious objector: this had not previously been raised in the course of his application; his appeal witness statement of 22 August 2024 at paragraph 11 makes an assertion to the effect that the Appellant is “a conscientious objector of the war between Ukraine and Russia”, but goes into no details as to the basis of such a stance – for example whether the Appellant is as a matter of personal conscience opposed to armed conflict generally, or whether there is something particular about the Ukraine–Russia conflict to which he is morally opposed. Be that as it may, Ms Jones told me that any reliance upon the notion being a conscientious objector was abandoned before the First-tier Tribunal.
26. As regards the fact that the RFRL indicated that the Respondent was not presently proposing to remove the Appellant, the ASA said this at paragraphs 20-22:
“20. It is submitted that the reasons for refusal letter is confusing and confused. It states that the Appellant will not be removed to Ukraine at the moment, but also states that removal would not amount to a breach of Articles 2, 3 or 8. The actual likelihood of a breach of Articles 2 or 3 is not, however, considered.
21. The Appellant is unable to return to or be returned to the Ukraine. In the circumstances, it is submitted that he should be granted some form of at least temporary leave to remain in the UK otherwise there would be a risk of a breach of his rights under Article 8.
22. As it is accepted he cannot be removed there, he should be granted the privacy and dignity to establish some form of Article 8 life in the UK, including being able to support himself.”
27. In my judgement the Article 8 submission in this regard can be characterised as recognising the lack of disruption to family life inherent in the Respondent’s position of not pursuing removal, and submitting that a respect for the integrity of the Appellant’s protected private life – his ‘privacy and dignity’ - would proportionately require a formal grant of leave.
28. The Respondent’s Review of 12 November 2024 acknowledged the Schedule of Issues to be as identified at paragraph 11 of the ASA.
29. The Review otherwise, amongst other things: placed reliance upon the contents of the RFRL; took issue with the Appellant’s claim to be a conscientious objector; suggested that insofar as the Appellant might be raising matters better suited to a protection claim, he should withdraw his appeal and formally make such a claim; highlighted the absence of any explanation regarding the circumstances of unlawful entry to the UK, and the absence of information regarding presence in the UK since the claimed entry; re-emphasised that the Appellant had voluntarily lived apart from his wife and child for a sustained period of time, and as such all had experience of maintaining family life when separated by international borders.
30. Notwithstanding the written identification of issues between the parties by way of the ASA and Review, Ms Jones - who had appeared before the First-tier Tribunal – told me that aspects of the written arguments were abandoned by the Appellant, such that the live issues before the First-tier Tribunal were narrower. I have already noted above that I was told the issue of conscientious objection was not pursued; I was also told that the Article 3 argument was abandoned. Mr Sheikh did not seek to gainsay this.

My analysis
31. The Appellant’s Rule 24 response, at paragraph 11 suggests this:
“The sole issue was that identified by the judge; the balance of Article 8 in all the circumstances whereby the Appellant’s family life was reconstituted in the exceptional circumstances pertaining to Ukraine.”
32. I invited Ms Jones to show me where the Judge had identified this to be an issue in the appeal, and more particularly where the Judge had identified this to be the sole issue in the appeal, and where the Judge had explained the basis of such identification given the issues identified in the ASA and the Review (notwithstanding the abandonment of some such issues by the Appellant). Ms Jones response was in substance to submit that the Judge had by implication identified this to be the sole issue, and that such implication arose from the wording of the concluding paragraph of the Decision. That will not do.
33. I have noted above the passages in the Decision that on their face appear to articulate the position of the parties: “The Appellant is fearful of the situation in the Ukraine and does not want to return there but he has made no asylum application”; and “The Respondent in their refusal contends that the Appellant can be returned to the Ukraine, whilst his wife and son continue with their limited leave in the UK”. There is no greater analysis of the opposing positions of the parties. When considered in the context of the exchange of written submissions, these passages represent a gross oversimplification. In particular – but not exclusively – the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal completely fails to identify, or otherwise engage with, the circumstance of it not being proposed to remove the Appellant. This circumstance requires very careful consideration as it goes to establishing the framework of any Article 8 analysis. Paragraphs 20-22 of the ASA recognised as much - and identified that the Appellant’s Article 8 case might only amount to asserting that his privacy and dignity demanded a grant of leave to give him an element of stability in the UK in circumstances where it was not currently proposed to pursue removal. Ms Jones very properly acknowledged that the First-tier Tribunal Judge did not deal with this issue at all.
34. I find that the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal is in fundamental error for failing properly to identify the issues between the parties, and also thereby failing to identify the parameters of the appeal.
35. Paragraph 19 of the Rule 24 response is in these terms:
“The Respondent, reading the determination, does know why she lost. That is because in the unusual circumstances of the Ukraine situation, whereby the Appellant’s wife and son were lawfully living in the UK and the Appellant was not, it would be unduly harsh for him to be refused leave to remain under Article 8.”
36. Putting aside for a moment the fundamental difficulty of the Judge not properly identifying the issues in the appeal, the Decision is still devoid of adequate reasoning. In my judgement, whilst the Respondent might understand from paragraph 10 of the Decision that the Judge was minded that there would be ‘unduly harsh results’, it is neither apparent on what basis such a conclusion was reached, or what those ‘unduly harsh results’ were thought to be.
37. Within the narrow basis upon which the Judge determined the appeal – bearing in mind there is no reasoning process set out beyond the single sentence of paragraph 10 – the Respondent does not know why she lost. And nor do I.
38. I find that the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal is also fundamentally flawed because of an inadequacy of reasoning.
39. For completeness: I have noted the Respondent’s reference at paragraph 16 of the Grounds to the contradiction between the decision to allow the appeal, and the wording of the Fee Award – “I have dismissed the appeal but make no fee award given the exceptional circumstances which led to the family being reconstituted in the UK, at a time when the Appellant was in the UK unlawfully”. I do not accept this is a signifier of a lack of ‘anxious scrutiny’, as pleaded by the Respondent. It seems to me that it is a simple slip, perhaps from careless use of a template. In so far as a reason is given for not making a fee award, it is be noted that no such reason is required in circumstances where an appeal is dismissed because there is no jurisdiction to make such an award. Accordingly, the fact that an explanation for making no fee award was given, is consistent with the notion of the appeal being allowed. In any event, the ‘fee award’ portion is not formally part of the decision itself, and nothing therein constitutes a relevant finding in respect of the substance of the appeal.

Re-making the Decision
40. The deficiencies of the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal are such that in my judgement neither party has had a fair and proper consideration of their respective cases. Although it might be said that there is little factual dispute between the parties, it seems to me that the actual parameters of the appeal will require some further discussion and argument, and this will impact upon the extent to which evidence regarding the country situation might be required, and the nature and extent of the personal evidence to be presented and considered on appeal.
41. In all such circumstances in my judgement it is not appropriate to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal. The appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
42. The Decision of Judge Raymond is vitiated for error of law, and is set aside.
43. The decision in the appeal is to be re-made before the First-tier Tribunal by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Raymond, with all issues at large.

I. Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 June 2026