Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001252
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61739/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS

Between

H.D.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Khan of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and her child are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant or her child. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Beg, dated 8 December 2025, dismissing the Appellant's appeal against the decision of the Respondent dated 15 April 2024, on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The grounds of challenge to the Upper Tribunal relate to the human rights claim. The refusal of the appeal on protection grounds is not challenged before me. Accordingly, in rehearsing the background, I place particular emphasis on those matters that relate to the Article 8 claim.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Vietnam born on 6 May 1991. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 5 May 2002, entering pursuant to a visit visa, which would have conferred six months' leave to enter. She became an overstayer.
4. On 17 March 2023 the Appellant claimed asylum. Her protection case was advanced over the course of the application, and the appeal before the First-Tier Tribunal, on grounds of religion and imputed political opinion. The application for protection was refused for reasons set out in a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter (‘RFRL’) dated 15 April 2024. Except for accepting the Appellant's name, date of birth, and nationality, the Respondent did not accept any material part of the protection claim.
5. In respect of Article 8, amongst other things, the RFRL noted that the Appellant did not meet the eligibility requirements under the ‘partner route’ of Appendix FM; she was not married or in a civil partnership and had not provided sufficient evidence to show that she had been living with a partner in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years before the date of application. It was also noted that she did not have a child in the UK.
6. In this latter regard, the Appellant had informed the Respondent that she was pregnant: e.g. see the letter of representations dated 18 March 2024, just prior to the first substantive asylum interview.
7. The substantive interview was conducted in two parts, seemingly because of time limits. The pregnancy was discussed in the first part of the interview held on 19 March 2024. An expected due date of 6 June 2024 was given. The father was said to be a recognised refugee from Vietnam. However, the Appellant denied that he was a partner, characterising him as a ‘boyfriend’, and stating that they did not live together.
8. Subsequent to the refusal of the Appellant's claim, the Appellant was indeed delivered of a daughter on 3 June 2024.
9. In the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant failed to file a bundle or skeleton argument in accordance with the timetable set by the Tribunal. This resulted in the Respondent filing a Review on 17 September 2025 without the benefit of having seen any development of the Appellant's case since the date of refusal. In such circumstances the Respondent’s Review essentially relied upon the contents of the RFRL.
10. The Appellant uploaded an Appeal Bundle and Appellant’s Skeleton Argument (‘ASA’) on 1 December 2025. An amended ASA was uploaded on 2 December 2025. The first ASA did not make any submissions in respect of Article 8. The amended ASA included the following paragraphs:
"5.16 Refusal breaches Article 8 family life. The appellant has a British citizen child born 3 June 2024; witness statement para 4. The appellant is looking after the child and the father is visiting regularly. It is not reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK.
5.17 Proportionality favours the appellant: Public interest in removal is low given her genuine claim and family circumstances (Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11)."
11. The Appellant's witness statement in the Appeal Bundle is signed on 26 November 2025. It says this in relation to her domestic circumstances at paragraph 4:
"I am currently single. I gave birth on 3rd June 2024 to my daughter. The child's father has indefinite leave to remain. My daughter is a British citizen. He is involved in my daughter's life. He comes to visit her sometimes."
12. No other information in respect of the Appellant's private life in the UK was set out in her witness statement.
13. Copies of the daughter's birth certificate and passport were included in the Appellant's First-tier Tribunal appeal bundle. There are also a number of documents in relation to the status of the daughter's father. These are preceded in the bundle by a document that, in its entirety, states:
"I [father's name] make this statement in support of [the Appellant’s] application for asylum. I give consent to us using my documents for her appeal matter.
I confirm I have a child with her [name of child]."
14. That document contains a signature and is dated 9 January 2025. That is a date almost 10 months prior to the appeal witness statement of the Appellant, and 11 months prior to the appeal hearing.
15. Before the First-Tier Tribunal, the Appellant gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter. No other witnesses were called.
16. I have already indicated that the appeal was refused on protection grounds, and no challenge has been made by the Appellant in this regard. Whilst in such circumstances it is not necessary for me to go into any fine detail in respect of the basis of the protection claim, in my judgment, it is nonetheless relevant to note the following.
17. The Judge, who had had the benefit of hearing directly from the Appellant, found the Appellant's narrative of events in Vietnam to lack credibility, and expressly found that some aspects had been fabricated: e.g. see paragraph 24 of the Decision and Reasons. Indeed ultimately, the Judge rejected the core elements of the Appellant's protection claim, including in respect of her professed faith (paragraphs 35 and 46). She also found that the Appellant had been contradictory in claiming to have lost contact with her family (paragraph 37). It was also found that the Appellant had produced a document purportedly from the Vietnamese Police that could not be relied upon as evidence of the truth of its content (paragraph 40). Similarly, the contents of a letter from the Appellant's brother were rejected (paragraph 41).
18. These findings are set out carefully and cogently, and stand unchallenged.
19. The First-Tier Tribunal's consideration of Article 8 is set out at paragraphs 48-60 of the Decision. Appropriate reference is made to statute and case law amongst those paragraphs: Mr Khan very fairly acknowledged, as indeed do the Grounds of Appeal, that the Judge's recitation of the relevant jurisprudence, whether by reference to statute or case law, was entirely adequate, and no criticism is made of any such recitation. The criticism, rather, is focused upon whether the self-directions were actually followed.
20. The key findings in respect of the Article 8 decision are these. At paragraph 48:
"… she has lived all her life [in Vietnam] and is educated to degree level. Her parents and brother live in Vietnam and she has a home to return to. She speaks Vietnamese and is familiar with the culture and system of that country. I find that she would be able to operate as an insider in Vietnamese society."
21. At paragraph 53:
"The appellant's daughter was born on 3 June 2024. Her father was granted refugee status on 30 October 2019. In evidence the appellant said that their relationship ended in May or June 2024, around the time that her daughter was born. I find that there is no credible evidence before me that [the father] has contact with his daughter and provides financially for her. There are no photographs of him with his daughter. There is no documentary evidence of contact or financial support."
22. Paragraphs 57 to 60, the concluding paragraphs of the Decision are in these terms:
"57. I find that it is in the child's best interest given her young age, to remain with her mother who is her primary carer. I find that she would be able to live in Vietnam with her mother because her main focus at this age is a caring parent. The appellant has a home to return to with her family where she would be able to raise her child.
58. The child has not yet started nursery or made any friends outside of the home. I find that she would be able to have access to education in Vietnam as her mother did. The appellant has a degree in accountancy and would have an advantage in the job market so that she could financially support her daughter. The child would also have the support of her grandparents and uncle in a cultural and family environment.
59. I find that Article 8 family life is engaged because the appellant has family life with her daughter. Their relationship is genuine and subsisting. However, I find that that family life can continue in Vietnam. It would be reasonable to expect the child, who is aged 1, to leave the United Kingdom with her mother.
60. The appellant also has private life in the United Kingdom. However, that private life was established at a time when the appellant's immigration status was precarious. Taking into account section 117B(5) her private life must be accorded little weight. I find that she would be able to re-establish a private life in Vietnam. She would also be able to keep in contact with any friends in the United Kingdom from Vietnam."
23. The challenge in this case is focused on the ‘family life’ aspect and, in particular, the position of the child, rather than the Appellant's own freestanding private life as considered at paragraph 60 of the Decision.
24. The application for permission to appeal sets out six grounds of challenge. Permission to appeal was granted on 13 March 2026 by First-Tier Tribunal Judge CJ Williams. In material part the grant of permission is in these terms:
"2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in her consideration of the reasonableness of the appellant's child, a British Citizen, leaving the United Kingdom. Although the grounds are interdependent, ground three complains the Judge erred in finding the appellant's child did not have contact with her father.
3. The statement in the appellant's bundle from the child's father does not provide any detail and it is unsurprising the Judge reached the finding she did in respect of that statement. I do note however that the appellant's statement dated 20 November 2025 asserts the father is involved in the child's life and comes to visit her.
4. It is arguable the Judge failed to consider this evidence or that she did not provide adequate reasons for rejecting it.
5. All of the grounds focus on the Judge's findings as they relate to the position of the appellant's child, and so whilst the appellant might seek to distil those arguments, I do not restrict the grant of permission."
25. I pause to observe that Mr Khan indicated that there was no specific distillation of the grounds, and each of the grounds was explored in due course during the hearing before me.
26. The Respondent has filed a rule 24 response dated 26 March 2026 resisting the challenge.
27. The first two grounds of challenge, as set out in the application for permission to appeal, are not directly related to the issue of contact with the father identified as of particular interest in the grant of permission to appeal. These two grounds are focused upon the issue of the child's circumstances and the question of the statutory test under section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act.
28. It is acknowledged in Ground 1 that the judge appropriately directed herself on the law at paragraphs 55 and 56 of the decision, wherein reference was made to the cases of AB (Jamaica) & Anr [2019] EWCA Civ 661, and the Upper Tribunal case of SR (Subsisting parental relationship - s.117B(6)) Pakistan [2018] UKUT 00334: see Grounds at paragraph 5.
29. It is worth noting the Judge's summary of AB (Jamaica) at paragraph 55 which is in these terms:
"… the focus on Section 117B(6) is solely on the child and that there is no justification for reading the concept of reasonableness so as to include a consideration of the conduct and immigration history of the parents as part of an overall analysis of the public interest."
30. What is argued in Ground 1 is that the Judge failed to follow that self-direction because she made reference to the circumstances of the mother if the mother were to return to Vietnam. I find no merit in this ground.
31. It is adequately clear that in referring to the mother's circumstances, in particular at paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Decision, the Judge was doing so with a particular focus on the child. The mother's circumstances were inevitably relevant to the welfare of the child. For example, had this been a case where the evidence had suggested that the mother would not have been able to provide a home and care for her child in the event of return to Vietnam, that would be a relevant consideration to the child-focused question of whether or not the child could be expected to leave the UK. In the same way, the fact that the mother would be able to provide a home and care and support, and would have a network around her to further that goal, was essentially a part of the child-focused evaluation of the question of whether or not it was reasonable to expect the child to depart.
32. I do not find that the Judge fell into the error contended in Ground 1.
33. Ground 2 does not add anything of substance to Ground 1. It effectively merely restates the principles to be gleaned from ZH (Tanzania) [2011] UKSC 4, and section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and otherwise in substance asserts a disagreement with the outcome of the appeal. In my judgment, it is adequately clear that the Judge had the jurisprudence clearly in mind in making her decision. ZH (Tanzania) is cited at paragraph 51, and express reference is made to the child's best interests at paragraph 57.
34. Ground 3 is the particular ground that caught the attention of Judge Williams when granting permission to appeal. However, as is identified in the Respondent's Rule 24 response, the ground as pleaded focuses upon the statement from the Appellant's father rather than the mother's appeal witness statement. The Grounds do not make any pleading in respect of the Appellant’s statement. It is Judge Williams in granting permission to appeal who has raised an issue in respect of the contents of the Appellant's statement.
35. So far as the father's statement is concerned, I can find nothing to undermine the Judge's evaluation at paragraph 53 to the effect that it did not provide evidence of continuing contact with his daughter. The statement, it is suggested in the Grounds, acknowledges paternity and demonstrates active engagement in the child's welfare and legal position, as well as there being no relinquishment of parental responsibility.
36. I do not accept that on any reading of the father’s statement it can be interpreted to support a conclusion contrary to that found by the Judge. It is entirely silent on the fact, nature, or extent of any contact with the daughter. The Judge appropriately identifies that there was a complete absence of any other supporting evidence, such as by way of financial provision or even photographs. The Respondent points out in the Rule 24 response that it is a striking feature of this case that the father did not attend the appeal hearing - something that might reasonably have been expected if he had a genuine and continuing interest in the welfare of his daughter.
37. I conclude that Ground 3, as drafted, is without merit.
38. As regards the modification of that ground suggested in the grant of permission, I have already referred to the passage in the Appellant's witness statement where she made reference to continuing contact with the father. That mere assertion – strikingly lacking in any particular detail - does not run contrary to the Judge's observation that there was no documentary evidence of contact or financial support, including a complete absence of photographs.
39. It seems to me that this point really turns on the Judge's observation at paragraph 53 that:
"I find that there is no credible evidence before me that the father has contact."
40. That reference to the absence of credible evidence, has to be read in the context of the entire Decision. The Judge had found in comprehensive terms, that the Appellant was an entirely unreliable witness, who had also produced documentary evidence of no evidential value in the course of her protection claim.
41. I accept Mr Khan's observation that an Article 8 claim is different from a protection claim - but it does not mean that the particular witness - in this case the Appellant - was any different. She is a common factor in both aspects of the case. I find that it was entirely open to the Judge in substance to consider that her written or oral testimony was not in and of itself reliable and/or credible and something more was required by way of supporting evidence. To that extent, even if the precise passage in the witness statement is not directly addressed, in substance, in my judgment, the decision is adequately clear: the Judge was not prepared to accept the Appellant's testimony at face value – and especially so in circumstances where it would have been reasonable to expect some supporting evidence such as photographs, evidence of financial support, a witness statement from the father speaking as to contact, and his attendance to support such statement.
42. I also accept the substance of paragraph 6 of the Rule 24 response in this context: that the very fact that the Judge was considering the issue of contact indicated that she clearly had it in mind that contact was being asserted - otherwise there would have been no particular need to address the issue. The only assertion of contact was in the Appellant’s witness statement; accordingly it is adequately implicit that the Judge had the Appellant’s assertion in this regard in mind.
43. Ground 4 of the grounds is not pursued by Mr Khan. It raises an issue in respect of the necessity of the father giving consent in order for the daughter to be able to leave the UK to relocate to Vietnam with her mother. Mr Khan very properly acknowledges that that argument was not raised before the First-Tier Tribunal, and in such circumstances it cannot avail the Appellant before the Upper Tribunal.
44. Mr Khan also does not seek to develop or amplify upon Grounds 5 and 6, which are essentially contingent upon a finding that the child continues to enjoy contact with her father. In circumstances where I find that Ground 3 does not succeed, Grounds 5 and 6 cannot avail the Appellant.
45. For the reasons given, I find that the challenge brought by the Appellant to the Decision of Judge Beg in respect of the human rights claim fails.

Notice of Decision
46. The Decision of Judge Beg contains no material errors of law and stands.
47. The Appellant's appeal remains dismissed.

The above is a corrected transcript of ex tempore reasons given at the conclusion of the hearing.

I. Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 May 2026