Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001258
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50332/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

J N
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Lee, instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Uganda born in 2002. She appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes (the judge) dated 13 November 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse entry clearance under paragraphs FRP 6.1 and FRP 6.2 of Appendix Family Reunion of the Immigration Rules.
2. On 11 January 2023, the appellant applied for entry clearance which was refused on 20 December 2023. The appellant seeks to enter the UK to join her mother, the sponsor, who came to the UK as a student in 2018 and was granted refugee status in November 2021.
Appendix Family Reunion
3. The relevant Immigration Rules (the Rules) are
“FRP 6.1. The applicant must:
(a) be under the age of 18 at the date of application or, if they are aged 18 or over, the
decision maker must be satisfied there are exceptional circumstances (as set out in FRP 6.2.); and
(b) have formed part of the family unit of P before P left the country of their habitual
residence in order to seek protection; and
(c) must meet the independent life requirement for a dependent child in Appendix
Children.

FRP 6.2. Where the applicant is aged 18 or over on the date of application the decision-
maker must, when considering whether there are exceptional circumstances,
consider all relevant factors including:
(a) whether the applicant is dependent on the financial and emotional support of
P or P’s partner; and
(b) whether the parent or parents the applicant depends on is in the UK, or
qualifies for family reunion or resettlement and intends to travel to the UK; and
(c) whether or not the applicant is leading an independent life, has no other relatives to provide financial or emotional support, and whether they can access support or employment in the country in which they are living and whether they would likely become destitute if left on their own.

FRP 7.1. Where an applicant does not meet the requirements for a partner under FRP.4.1. or for a child under FRP.5.1. to FRP 6.2., the decision maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would make a refusal of the application a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application’.
Judge’s findings
4. The respondent conceded in the respondent’s review that the appellant was part of the sponsor’s family before the sponsor left Uganda and came to the UK. In summary, the judge found that the appellant lived with the sponsor until she was about 4 years old. She then lived with her grandmother and her cousins and that was the position even when the sponsor was living in Uganda. The appellant would see the sponsor every weekend, holidays and other times when she was not at school. The sponsor left Uganda and came to the UK when the appellant was 15/16 years old and there was no other change in her living arrangements which still continue.
5. It was the appellant’s evidence that she graduated from university and has not been able to find a job. She remains financially supported by the sponsor. The appellant complains that the environment with her grandmother and cousins is not pleasant and she feels isolated. They do not talk and her grandmother is said to resent the sponsor for remaining in the UK. There was no medical evidence and the judge did not accept that medical support for mental health issues was not available in Uganda. The sponsor has been coaching the appellant via WhatsApp messages to assist her in her search for work.
6. The judge accepted the appellant was unhappy in her current situation and found that there was little supporting evidence about the long-term involvement of the sponsor in the appellant's life and upbringing. There was no evidence from the appellant's grandmother and it had not been shown that the current arrangements could not continue. The judge was not satisfied that the domestic circumstances in Uganda were as claimed by the appellant and sponsor. The judge found that it was the sponsor’s decision that the appellant should live with her grandmother and cousins at the age of 4 and further separation was brought about by the sponsor's decision to come to the UK to study when the appellant was 15/16 year old.
7. The judge found that the appellant is accommodated and is not living alone. He concluded that the evidence did not show that the circumstances were harsh let alone unjustifiably so. The appellant was supported by and maintains contact with the sponsor. Her circumstances were not unsuitable or unsustainable and the evidence did not show that there is a risk of destitution. The judge found that appellant did not meet the provisions of the Immigration Rules for admission as an adult child of a refugee and the circumstances did not justify a grant of leave outside the Rules under Article 8.
Submissions
8. Mr Lee relied on his skeleton argument dated 29 June 2026 and submitted that the Immigration Rules were clear as to the process of decision making and the judge had erred in law in only considering whether there were unjustifiably harsh consequences without first considering whether there were exceptional circumstances under FRP 6.2. Further the matters set out in that paragraph were examples of exceptional circumstances and not requirements which the appellant had to satisfy. The judge should only go on to consider unjustifiably harsh consequences under FRP 7.1 if he found there were no exceptional circumstances under FRP 6.2. The judge erred in law in conflating the two tests.
9. Mr Lee submitted that the judge did not go through the relevant rules in sequence and did not set out the test that he was applying. It was not clear that the judge was not following the respondent’s approach and was considering whether the appellant satisfied the requirements of the Rules. The judge had to consider all relevant factors including the examples given in the Rules. The respondent’s concession that the appellant was part of the sponsor’s family unit in Uganda was not referred to in the judge’s decision and the judge also failed to take into account the material factors listed in [23] of the grounds.
10. Mr Simpson submitted that the judge had erred in law in failing to make a finding on whether there were exceptional circumstances, but given the factual matrix, that error was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. There was a lack of evidence of the long term involvement of the sponsor and evidence that the appellant’s grandmother and cousins were providing support. The appellant was not destitute and there was insufficient evidence to show that she could not obtain employment.
11. Mr Simpson submitted the judge found that the appellant’s circumstances did not give rise to harsh consequences and those arrangements could continue. Had the judge considered exceptional circumstances, he would have concluded that the factual matrix did not support such a finding. The facts at [23] of the grounds were not material given the lack of evidence of current contact and support and long term support in the past. The appellant’s circumstances were not exceptional such that she should not be treated as an adult. She was not so dependent on the sponsor that she cannot support herself and there were relatives in Uganda who provided her with support.
Conclusions and reasons
12. Notwithstanding the respondent’s concession that the appellant was part of the sponsor’s family unit in Uganda, the appellant still had to establish exceptional circumstances under FRP 6.1(a). The judge’s failure to refer to the fact that the appellant satisfies FRP 6.1(b) was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal.
13. The judge considered the matters listed at [23] of the grounds. The sponsor’s intention to return to Uganda, had she not claimed asylum, did not undermine the judge’s factual findings in respect of the appellant’s living arrangements. The judge considered the consequences of the sponsor’s grant of asylum and its effect on the appellant in Uganda. The judge did not fail to take into account material factors in his assessment.
14. I agree with Mr Lee that the test to be applied is whether there are exceptional circumstances under FRP 6.1(a) and that the matters listed in FRP 6.2 are examples of exceptional circumstances which the judge can take into account. I find that the judge not only considered those examples but also took into account the appellant’s evidence about the consequences of the sponsor’s asylum claim and the appellant’s current circumstances in Uganda. The judge found that the appellant had other relatives who provided her with support and she was not destitute. The judge took into account all relevant matters.
15. It is apparent from [5] and [6] of the decision, where the judge refers to the respondent’s case, that the judge was aware of the relevant Immigration Rules and that the test to be applied under the Rules was one of ‘exceptional circumstances’. The failure to set out the Rules in the decision does not amount to an error of law.
16. At [16] of the decision, the judge found that the appellant did not meet the provisions of the Immigration Rules for admission as an adult child of a refugee and the circumstances did not justify a grant of leave outside the rules under Article 8. I am satisfied the judge considered FRP 6.1 and 6.2 before considering FRP 7.1.
17. Unfortunately, the judge failed to specifically state that, on the facts of the appellant’s case, there were no exceptional circumstances under FRP 6.2. I am of the view that the judge found there were no exceptional circumstances at [16] in finding that the appellant could not satisfy the Immigration Rules. The judge could have expressed himself better, but there was no material error of law in his decision.
18. In any event, any failure to make a specific finding under FRP 6.2 was not material to the decision to dismiss the appeal because the judge’s factual findings are not capable of supporting a finding of exceptional circumstances such that the appellant, although an adult, should be granted admission as a dependent child.
19. Given the exceptional circumstances test is not made out, the judge properly considered FRP 7.1 and whether the refusal of entry clearance would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or the sponsor in breach of Article 8. The judges finding that this elevated threshold was not met was open to him on the evidence before him.
20. I find there was no material error of law in the judge’s decision of 13 November 2025 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2026