Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001259
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59931/2024
LP/02615/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

FMR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, Counsel instructed by Lextel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a fifty seven year old citizen of Bangladesh. She appeals, with the permission of another First-tier Tribunal Judge, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor (the Judge) to dismiss her appeal against the refusal of her protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

Background
2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 15 October 2022 having been granted permission to do so, for the purpose of a two month visit to see her son Ahmed Hanif (Ahmed) and his family. She did not however leave the United Kingdom at the end of her visit and instead on 27 February 2023 she claimed asylum.
3. The appellant was not interviewed about her claim until January 2024. In that interview she said she feared the wife of another of her sons Minhaj Ahmed (Minhaj) who had demanded she pay £20,000 and threatened to imprison her or poison her if it was not paid. She also said that she feared the creditors of her family chicken farm who were harassing her and Minhaj in relation to a debt owed. She said that Minhaj had run away and that since her husband died in January 2022 she had no-one in Bangladesh to support her. She provided documentary evidence of a complaint about Minhaj made to the Police in Bangladesh by his wife, as well as GP notes that indicated she was suffering from hypertension, ischaemic heart disease and type 2 diabetes.
4. On 31 January 2024 the respondent issued a decision refusing her asylum claim. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was at risk from her daughter in law or from the creditors and considered that even if she were at risk, she could rely on protection from state agencies in Bangladesh or relocate to avoid those she feared. The respondent considered the appellant’s medical condition but found that the appellant could receive treatment in Bangladesh and that removal would not be incompatible with her rights under Article 3 or Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). The appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal on protection and human rights grounds.
5. In anticipation of her appeal the appellant served a bundle of evidence, including a witness statement in which she said that following the death of her husband in January 2022 she suffered a stroke and severe depression, that her condition has deteriorated and that since her arrival in the United Kingdom she has suffered from fatigue, depression and memory issues and is being cared for by Ahmed and his wife and children. The appellant submitted some of her GP records and the day before the appeal hearing she submitted further medical letters and partial GP records.
6. The appeal hearing took place on 17 November 2025. The appellant and Ahmed gave oral evidence in which they said that the appellant had intended to return to Bangladesh when she came to the United Kingdom but that there was no reliable support for the appellant in Bangladesh and that Ahmed and his family provide the appellant with essential support in the United Kingdom.

The Judge’s Decision
7. The Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal in a decision that was promulgated on 21 November 2025. In that decision at [17] the Judge did not accept the appellant’s “unsupported” claim that she feared the creditors of the family farm finding that it lacked credibility and that even if that claim were accepted there was no evidence of state involvement. The Judge found at [18] that the appellant would not be at risk from family of her daughter in law, referring to a paucity of evidence of such a risk and to a change in the political circumstances in Bangladesh since the claim was made. The Judge gave very little weight to the documentary evidence adduced noting inconsistent evidence about how the documents were obtained and limitations in the documentation itself (see [19]). In the light of these findings of fact the Judge concluded at [21] that the appellant does not fear persecution in Bangladesh and that there was no reasonable likelihood of her being at risk in Bangladesh. These findings have not been challenged.
8. At [20] the Judge referred to “a number of medical documents” submitted by the appellant “which indicate that the appellant has made extensive use of the NHS since her arrival [in the United Kingdom].” The Judge noted that there had been no claim that the appellant’s removal was incompatible with her rights under Article 3 of the Convention. The Judge referred to the appellant's oral evidence that she had received treatment in Bangladesh in the past, and found that there was no basis to conclude that she would be unable to receive treatment for her medical conditions in Bangladesh in the future. The Judge rejected the suggestion that Minhaj had run away and found that the appellant would “receive the necessary support” if she were to return to her home in Bangladesh.
9. At the end of [20] the Judge said the following which is of particular relevance to the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant:
The medical bundle of evidence, which was served on the day before the hearing, contains considerable evidence of medical care in the UK. The reports indicate that that (sic) she is able to mobilise in the house and had limited mobility outside, there is no evidence that she requires personal care. The appellant and her son are independent adults, the appellant may have medical issues, but the evidence does not suggest that she relies on her son for personal care. I am not satisfied that the relationship between the appellant and her son in the UK goes significant above (sic) usual family ties which would engage article 8 ECHR.
10. In the light of those findings of fact, at [22] the Judge concluded that the appellant had not established that a family life that engages the Convention. In the same paragraph the Judge recognised that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain on the basis of her private life. The Judge then added:
…It was submitted on her behalf that the medical conditions would amount to a barrier to her integration on return, but she had the majority of her conditions before she came to the UK, she is a citizen of Bangladesh, speaks the language, received medical treatment in the country and ran a business there.”
11. The Judge completed [22] of his decision by suggesting that if she were dependant on Ahmed as she claims, the appellant could return to Bangladesh and apply for entry clearance under the appropriate Appendix of the Immigration Rules. The appeal was then dismissed.

The appeal to this tribunal.
12. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the decision of the Judge on three grounds. In the first ground she argues that there was “a failure to engage with the argument that her marked decline in mental and physical health following her husband’s death meant the appellant was now emotionally and physically dependant on her son and his family”. In the second ground she argues that there was “an interconnected failure to take into account medical evidence when assessing whether dependency or family life exists in the circumstances; the finding that there is not family life to engage article 8 goes against the weight of the evidence and is inadequately reasoned.” The third ground of appeal is that “the findings in relation to no very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh rely on historic factors and fail to take into account her position now as a widow without family support who has suffered a rapid deterioration in health.”
13. When serving a consolidated bundle of evidence for this hearing, the appellant submitted further evidence which was obtained after the Judge made his decision and which she asked that I take into account. As Ms Ferguson acknowledged however, evidence that was not before the Judge could not assist in determining the question which I must consider namely whether the Judge made a material error of law when reaching his conclusion. I did not therefore admit the new evidence.
14. The respondent served a reply to the appellant’s grounds of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 opposing the grounds of appeal and arguing that there was no error of law in the Judge’s decision.
15. I heard helpful oral submissions from Ms Ferguson and from Ms Everatt after which I reserved my decision.

Analysis
Grounds one and two
16. Contrary to the complaint made in grounds one and two, it is in my judgment clear that the Judge did engage with the appellant’s argument that she was dependant on her son Ahmed and his family and equally that it is clear that the Judge took the medical evidence into account when doing so and before coming to the conclusion that there was no family life between the appellant and Ahmed and his family that engaged Article 8(1) of the Convention.
17. The Judge summarised the appellant’s submission that she was dependant on Ahmed and his family at [15] of his decision and in particular that it was “an article 8 ECHR claim based on the appellant’s relationship of dependency with her son in the UK”. It is apparent from this summary that the Judge correctly understood and recognised the claim being made. The appellant’s claim in ground one is that having correctly identified the issue to be determined, the Judge then failed to adequately engage with it. This is a difficult assertion to establish given that a court should be slow to infer that a relevant point has not been taken into account by a specialist tribunal (see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at [45]). The assertion also fails to recognise the significance of paragraph [20] of the Judge’s decision.
18. When the whole of [20] of the Judge’s decision is read fairly, it is clear that the Judge “engages with” the issue he had earlier identified at [15] but that he was simply not persuaded that the appellant is dependent on Ahmed and his family as claimed, and therefore was not persuaded that a family life which engages Article 8(1) of the Convention existed. The context for the Judge’s consideration of the issue is the findings of fact he sets out at the beginning of [20]. These include factual findings that the appellant would be able receive treatment for her conditions in Bangladesh, the appellant will be supported in Bangladesh by her son Minhaj, the appellant would be able to return to the home she left in Bangladesh.
19. The Judge then tackles the issues identified at [15] directly in the passage at the end of [20] which I have quoted at [9] above. Contrary to the second ground of appeal the Judge explicitly does take the medical evidence into account when doing so, referring first in that passage to the evidence that was served the day before the hearing and briefly summarising that evidence: “The medical bundle of evidence…contains considerable evidence of medical care in the UK. The reports indicate that that (sic) she is able to mobilise in the house and has limited mobility outside, there is no evidence that she requires daily personal care”.
20. Although brief, I am satisfied that this was an accurate summary of the medical evidence that was adduced, which largely consisted of appointment letters and incomplete summaries of accounts about the appellant that were given to doctors at various times by relatives of the appellant. It is true that in some of that medical evidence adduced there is reference to the appellant suffering from depression and of investigation into reported memory issues, which may have resulted from the depression. The Judge however refers to the appellant’s complaint of depression throughout his decision and was clearly aware of it and took it into consideration. It is also relevant that no evidence of a clinical diagnosis of depression appears to have been adduced, and in fact evidence of the relevant consultation with the appellant’s GP on 11 July 2025 at which the possibility of depression was discussed, was omitted from the evidence that was served (only pages 1-3 of a 10 page record from the GP was adduced).
21. Having identified and summarised the medical evidence, the Judge then considered that evidence before setting out his assessment of the evidence and consideration of the issue in the remainder of the passage quoted above: “The appellant and her son are independent adults, the appellant may have medical issues, but the evidence does not suggest that she relies on her son for personal care. I am not satisfied that the relationship between the appellant and her son in the UK goes significant above (sic) usual family ties which would engage article 8 ECHR.” Although it is again brief, this passage is unquestionably engaging with the argument that was pursued by the appellant.
22. I am not persuaded therefore that the Judge’s engagement with the issue was “inadequate” or that this reasoning for the Judge’s conclusion is inadequate, as appears to be suggested at the end of ground two. The brief reasoning identifies the test to be applied to resolve the disputed issue - whether there are additional elements of dependence between the appellant and Ahmed involving more than the normal emotional ties – and then determines that test by reference to the facts. Those facts as found by the Judge, included the fact that the appellant’s medical issues do not mean she relies upon her son for personal care. The Judge concluded in these circumstances that rather than being dependant on her son, the appellant and her son are independent adults. The conclusion therefore was that there are no such additional elements of dependency.
23. In summary, having considered the unfocused medical bundle of evidence served the day before the hearing (in which relevant pages of the appellants GP records were omitted), and having acknowledged the submissions made by the appellant concerning that evidence, the Judge reached the explicit conclusion that the evidence did not establish a family life that engages Article 8 of the Convention. The argument in grounds one and two that the Judge did not consider this issue or failed to consider medical evidence when doing so are not made out.
24. The majority of the submissions advanced in support of grounds one and two rather than focusing on the complaints made in those grounds, are in reality disagreements with the Judge’s conclusion and attempts to re-argue the appeal. Those submissions include “It is submitted her dependency is clearly indicated in the medical evidence “ and “It is submitted the evidence points strongly to the appellant being dependent on her family for daily care and supervision”. The hearing before the Judge however was the time for those submissions to be made and considered. That hearing was not a dress rehearsal but the first and last night of the show (see [114] of the judgment of Lewison LJ in Fage United Kingdom Ltd v Chobani United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 quoted in the immigration case of Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62). The Judge was the specialist tribunal who alone was the judge of the facts and his decision should be respected unless it is quite clear he misdirected himself in law (see [72] of the judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22). Whilst the appellant disagrees with the Judge’s decision it has not been established that the Judge erred in law and no reason to interfere with the Judge’s decision has been identified.
Ground three
25. Ground three argues that when considering the question of whether she would face very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh, the Judge failed to take account the appellant’s “position now as a widow without family support who has suffered a rapid deterioration in health”. The fundamental problem with this submission is that it does not reflect the factual position as found by the Judge. Whilst the Judge clearly had regard to the fact the appellant is a widow, her husband having died ten months before she came to the United Kingdom, the Judge found that the appellant would not be without family support in Bangladesh and that her medical condition was largely unchanged from when she was in Bangladesh. The Judge specifically rejected the suggestion that Minhaj had run away and left the appellant alone in Bangladesh (see [20]). Instead, the finding of the Judge at [20] was that “While she appellant is a widow, she was able to live in Bangladesh and obtain the necessary support and has a son living there.” Likewise, contrary to what is said in ground three about the appellant suffering a rapid deterioration in health, the finding of the Judge at [22] was that: “It was submitted on her behalf that he (sic) medical conditions would amount to a barrier to her integration on return, but she had the majority of her conditions before she came to the United Kingdom ”.
26. It was on the basis of these facts and not the alternative version of facts advanced by the appellant but rejected by the Judge, that the Judge went on to find that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration. He explained that conclusion at [22] stating that the appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, speaks the language, received medical treatment in the country and ran a business there. This reasoning was clearly adequate as it enables the appellant and this tribunal to understand why the Judge reached the conclusion that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Bangladesh. Again the appellant may disagree with that conclusion but she has not established that it involved the making of an error of law.
Conclusion
27. The grounds of appeal do not therefore identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Judge considered the claim that the appellant was dependant on her son Ahmed and his family and therefore shared a family life with them that engages the Convention, but on the evidence adduced found against the appellant. Likewise the appellant considered the claim that there would be very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh and on the evidence adduced found that there would not be. Those conclusions were reached after the Judge had already rejected the appellant’s claim that she fears ill-treatment in Bangladesh in findings that have not been challenged. Overall the Judge’s assessment of the evidence did not involve an error of law and there is no reason to interfere with his decision to dismiss the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

L:uke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 June 2026