Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001269
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/03750/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIBI

Between

EF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: None (the appellant appeared as a litigant-in-person)
For the Respondent: Ms Dolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Egypt. He obtained permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge LK Gibbs and A Beech (‘the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)’), promulgated on 17 November 2025, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 19 September 2023 refusing his protection and human rights appeal.
Background to the appeal
2. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 August 2022 and claimed asylum on 18 December 2022. He claimed to fear persecution in Egypt following an altercation with his cousin, who later died from his injuries. The appellant claimed that his uncle, the father of the deceased, was an influential figure who would ensure the appellant would be convicted of murder on any re-trial (the appellant maintained that he acted in self-defence) and that the appellant would come to harm.
3. According to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision the respondent accepted the appellant’s identity, nationality, that he was involved in a land dispute with his cousin, and that the appellant was convicted and sentenced in absentia for his assault on and the subsequent death of his cousin. The respondent did not accept that the appellant's uncle has political influence and considered that the appellant was fleeing prosecution for a criminal offence rather than persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. His asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights claims were all rejected.
The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision
4. The appellant was legally represented before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC). His barrister accepted that there was no Refugee Convention reason and that the appellant's claim therefore rested solely on humanitarian protection grounds. No reliance was placed on article 3 ECHR in relation to medical issues or prison conditions, and no argument in respect of article 8 ECHR was pursued.
5. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) found the Egyptian authorities’ decision to prosecute the appellant was a legitimate response to the appellant’s actions. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) noted that the appellant produced no evidence, to the applicable standard, to displace the background evidence identified in the respondent’s decision that convictions in absentia in Egypt were not ‘real’ convictions or sentences and that they were more like legal place holders, and that the appellant’s conviction would not treated as a final conviction as it would be subject to retrial under the law amended on 17 January 2024. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) rejected the appellant’s claim that his uncle wielded political influence such as to render the prosecution one that was politically motivated and to prevent the appellant from having a fair re-trial. This was because of inconsistencies in the appellant’s account relating to his uncle’s rank and the absence of evidence from the appellant’s lawyer in Egypt that could reasonably be expected to have been available. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that this was a case of persecution rather than legitimate prosecution. Nor was there said to be evidence that the appellant would face unfair, disproportionate, or discriminatory treatment on return. The appellant’s claim that his family home was destroyed, leaving his wife and children homeless, was rejected because he did not mention this in his asylum interview and stated that his family were “safe and well”. Furthermore, despite claiming the matter was reported to the authorities, he has produced no supporting evidence. The appeal was dismissed.
The challenge to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision and the grant of permission
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision. By this time the appellant was no longer legally represented. The grounds of appeal contended that:
(1) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) failed to consider the appellant’s core case by reference to his uncle’s claimed rank and that the uncle could still have asserted political influence;
(2) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) unreasonably relied on generic country information regarding convictions in absentia and retrials without assessing the appellant’s individual circumstances or whether those safeguards would realistically be available given the alleged influence of his uncle and the family dispute underlying the case;
(3) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) erred by relying on the appellant’s failure to obtain evidence from Egypt without considering the practical difficulties of doing so, and by impermissibly treating the absence of corroboration as a significant adverse credibility factor;
(4) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) erred in rejecting the appellant’s claim that his family home was destroyed and his family rendered homeless, based solely on its omission from his asylum interview and the absence of supporting evidence;
(5) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) materially errored by considering only the risk of state prosecution and failing to assess the risk posed by the appellant’s uncle’s family, and the availability of effective state protection;
(6) the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) erred in law by failing to apply the correct standard of proof (“reasonable degree of likelihood”).
7. On a renewed application directly to the Upper Tribunal Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted permission on Ground 5, finding it arguable that, although the Tribunal concluded the appellant faced prosecution rather than persecution by the Egyptian state, it failed to consider whether he nevertheless faced a real risk of harm from his uncle following the death of his cousin. The Upper Tribunal Judge also noted what he considered to be a ‘Robinson obvious’ point (R (Robinson) v SSHD [1998] QB 929) relating to a failure by the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to consider whether prison conditions in Egypt would breach the appellant’s article 3 ECHR rights. Judge Hoffman was not persuaded by the remaining grounds and would otherwise have refused permission, but he did not restrict the grant of permission.
The hearing in the Upper Tribunal
8. There was initially no attendance by the appellant. The Notice of Hearing had been sent to the postal address provided by the appellant in his IAUT1 form, and to the email address provided in the same form. The Upper Tribunal did not have a telephone contact number for the appellant. Inquiries made of Ms Dolan indicated that the postal address and email address held by the respondent for the appellant differed to those provided in the UTIAC1 form. According to Ms Dolan the respondent was informed of the appellant’s change of address on 21 May 2026. A letter returned to the Upper Tribunal suggested that the appellant had moved from this address on an earlier date.
9. Ms Dolan helpfully provided a telephone contact number held by the respondent and the appellant was contacted by the clerk and attended the hearing later that day. He informed the clerk that he had instructed solicitors but could not recall the name of the firm, and that he had been told not to attend the hearing.
10. At the outset of the hearing the appellant was asked questions by the panel via the Arabic interpreter. He claimed a friend called Ahmed Syed helped him complete the IAUT1 form. Some of the appellant’s answers were far from satisfactory. He implausibly claimed that the email address contained in the IAUT1 form may have been an old email address of his (we do not find it likely that the appellant would not recognise his older personal email address) and that his friend may have used this email address. The appellant said that he had been living in his new address (in Shepherds Bush) since September 2025 and could provide no explanation for why he did not update the Upper Tribunal following his change of address. This is particularly surprising given that he would have been at his new address at the time of the appeal hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC). The appellant claimed he became aware of the ‘error of law’ hearing on either 16 or 17 July 2026 via his friend – the same person who completed his IAUT1 form, and was told by his friend that he need not attend the hearing as the Upper Tribunal “will take their own decision.” The appellant stated that he was not legally represented before the Upper Tribunal as he could not afford solicitors fees, which sits in contrast to the information he provided to the clerk during the phone call. Based on the information gleamed at the outset of the hearing we suspect that someone is conducting the appellant’s litigation on his behalf, although we can put it no higher than that.
11. The appellant indicated that he was ready to proceed with the ‘error of law’ hearing. He made no application to adjourn the hearing. The grant of permission was translated for the appellant’s benefit, and he was given an opportunity to comment upon and expand the grounds of appeal. He maintained that his uncle was a general in Egypt (this is to be contrasted with his claim in his asylum interview where he said his uncle was a brigadier in the police, and his claim in oral evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) that his uncle was a lieutenant in the army). When asked about his barrister’s position in respect of prison conditions in Egypt the appellant maintained that they were bad, and he then claimed to have a heart palpitation condition. No evidence of the same had been provided to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC). He thought his barrister may not have advanced a claim under article 3 ECHR based on prison conditions because the barrister may have had a stronger point.
12. We heard submissions from Ms Dolan that were translated for the appellant’s benefit in respect of each of the grounds of appeal. The appellant provided a response to Ms Dolan’s submissions which we have considered. We reserved our decision.
Discussion
13. Judge Hoffman did not consider there to be any merit in the grounds other than ground 5 (see above). We nevertheless consider each ground in turn.
14. The 1st ground essentially contends that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was not entitled to reject the appellant’s claim concerning the scope and nature of his uncle’s influence for the reasons they gave. We disagree. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) were unarguably entitled to note the discrepant evidence given by the appellant relating to his uncle’s alleged rank in either the police or the military. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) additionally noted that the appellant had instructed a lawyer in Egypt and that it was reasonable to expect the appellant to have contacted the lawyer to confirm the uncle’s rank. This was an approach rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) for the brief but clear reasons given. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC)’s findings relating to the uncle’s alleged rank and scope of influence must also be considered in the context of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)’s other findings, including the rejection of the appellant’s claim that his family home had been destroyed by his cousins (see below). The challenge in ground 1 is not made out.
15. The 2nd ground contends that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) unreasonably relied on generic country information in respect of convictions in absentia and the possibility of re-trials. To the extent that the 2nd ground relies on the alleged influence of the appellant’s uncle on the likelihood of the appellant being denied a fair re-trial, this is covered by our conclusions in respect of the 1st ground. We have found that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was entitled to conclude that the appellant’s uncle was unable to materially influence the past or any future criminal prosecutions in Egypt. We additionally find that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was entitled to rely on the appellant’s failure to produce any evidence undermining the background evidence identified by the respondent in her decision. As the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was entitled to rely on the evidence identified by the respondent we find that the 2nd ground is not made out.
16. The 3rd ground is undermined by the evidence of communication between the appellant and his family and his lawyer in Egypt. There was no material evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) that the appellant encountered any significant difficulty in communicating with those present in Egypt. Moreover, whilst there is no requirement for corroborative evidence in this jurisdiction, the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) is entitled to take into account the absence of evidence that would reasonably be expected to be available. There was no apparent reason why the appellant would not be able to communicate with his Egyptian lawyer, and the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was reasonably entitled to assume that the lawyer would be able to confirm the claimed rank of the appellant’s uncle. This ground is not made out.
17. Contrary to the assertion in the 4th ground, the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was unarguably entitled to conclude that the appellant’s bare assertion concerning the burning down of his family home was not made out. It was open to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to find the omission of any mention of this event in the appellant’s interview undermined the veracity of his assertion. Further, the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was entitled to expect the appellant to have been able to provide independent supporting evidence of the destruction of the family given his ability to communicate with his family in Egypt and the significance of the claimed event. This ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with a conclusion rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) for the reasons given.
18. Judge Hoffman considered it arguable that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) failed to consider any risk posed to the appellant from his uncle even if the uncle did not wield political influence. The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was however advanced on the basis that the appellant would face a politically influenced trial or re-trial. For the reasons given above the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was entitled to conclude that the appellant failed to demonstrate to the requisite lower standard of proof that his uncle was capable of asserting such a degree of influence. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) concluded that the appellant would face legitimate prosecution rather than persecution. The appellant has not identified any background evidence suggesting that the Egyptian authorities would be unable or unwilling to provide to the appellant a sufficiency of protection to the requisite standard (Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489). We consequently find that the 5th ground is not made out.
19. We deal briefly with the 6th ground. The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) was demonstrably aware of the appropriate standard of proof (see [7]) and unarguably applied that standard to the assessment of the appellant’s factual assertions and to the assessment of future risk.
20. Judge Hoffman considered that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) may have erred in law by failing to consider whether there was a real risk that the appellant may be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to article 3 ECHR by reference to the prison conditions in Egypt. Although not raised as a ground of appeal judge Hoffman considered this may be a ‘Robinson obvious’ point. A point will be ‘Robinson obvious’ if it is relevant to whether the refusal of a protection claim or the dismissal of a protection appeal could lead to a breach of the obligations under the Refugee Convention but the point was not argued before the respondent or a First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge. The ‘Robinson obvious’ principle is narrow and limited to points of refugee law which favour a person who claims to be a refugee and which are ‘obvious’ and arguable with ‘strong prospects of success’. The principle exists to ensure the UK complies with its obligations under the Refugee Convention (although we are satisfied the principle extends to the UK’s obligations under article 3 ECHR as well). If there is an obvious point of refugee law or article 3 ECHR law favourable to the appellant that does not appear in the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision then permission should be granted.
21. We are not however satisfied that the ‘Robinson obvious’ point arises in this particular appeal. This is because the appellant’s barrister specifically confirmed that he was not advancing the appeal on the basis of article 3 ECHR prison conditions (see above at [4]). The issues before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) had been narrowed at the commencement of the hearing and the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) could not be expected to determine an issue that was expressly removed from its consideration (see AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370 for a recent authoritative consideration of the importance of procedural rigour and the ‘Robinson-obvious’ principle).
22. We have nevertheless considered the background material relating to prison conditions in the ‘Country Policy and Information Note – Egypt: Opposition to the state (December 2023)’, which was the extant relevant CPIN at the date of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)). Although paragraph 16 of the CPIN report paints a poor picture of conditions generally there is no clear assessment of whether general conditions breach, or are at real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR. Much appears to depend on the nature of the facility (military or civil) and whether the prison is incarcerated for political reasons. Nor have we been able to identify any relevant judicial authority relating to prison conditions in Egypt. In these circumstances we are not satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) erred in law in failing to consider prison conditions under the Robinson obvious principle.
23. We are not satisfied that the decision discloses a mistake of law requiring it to be set aside.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 July 2026