Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001285
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/76274/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

ZH
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Draycott, instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 19 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity born on 13 July 2004. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claims.

2. The appellant arrived in the UK on 14 January 2024 by boat from France, having left Iraq on 24 November 2023 and travelled through Turkey and Germany, and claimed asylum the same day. His claim was refused on 6 November 2024. He appealed against that decision and his appeal is the subject of these proceedings.

3. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim, as originally presented to the respondent, is that his home town of Said Sadiq and its surrounding areas had been subjected to missile and drone strikes from Turkey and Iran and that he feared being injured or killed by the Turkish or Iranian militaries in the event of a future missile or drone attack in his area. His screening interview also records his claim that he had a dispute with his neighbour 20 days before he left Iraq which ended with his neighbour threatening his life, but he claimed in his subsequent SEF interview that that was not what he had said and that it was not part of his claim.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, considered that it did not engage the Refugee Convention and that it was based upon speculation that he could be injured or killed in the event of a potential future airstrike. The respondent noted that the appellant had not claimed to be of adverse attention from the Turkish or Iranian authorities or any authorities within Iraq, and considered that there was a sufficiency of protection available to him in any event and that he could also relocate to Baghdad, Basra, Erbil or Mosul. The respondent also referred to the appellant stating that he was not in possession of his CSID and that it remained in his home in Iraq and considered that he would be able to reach out to his family in Iraq who could provide him with his CSID upon his return. The respondent concluded therefore that the appellant was not at risk on return to Iraq and that his removal to that country would not breach his human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision on 12 November 2024. In his appeal reasons, uploaded on 17 September 2025, the appellant stated that he feared being returned to Iraq because of the risk to his life and safety in Said Sadiq from drone strikes which had already killed and injured people. He also responded to other parts of the refusal decision and referred to independent reports of drone strikes. The appeal reasons stated at the end that no supporting evidence was provided.

6. The respondent then produced a respondent’s review, uploaded on 21 October 2025.

7. The appellant’s appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Alis on 8 December 2025 (the date given in the judge’s decision of 26 September 2025 is wrong). The appellant appeared before the Tribunal in person, without a legal representative. He gave oral evidence before the judge through an interpreter. According to the record of proceedings which has now been produced, the judge asked the appellant a series of questions and the appellant was then cross-examined by the Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO). It transpired from the appellant’s evidence that he feared his father in Iraq and that that was an additional reason why he left the country. He claimed that his father was always forcing him to be a religious person and that he beat and tortured him when he was a child. He also claimed to have lost his INID card before leaving Iraq.

8. The judge found that the appellant’s claim did not engage the Refugee Convention and that he did not qualify for humanitarian protection on the basis of his fear of missiles. With regard to the appellant’s oral evidence about fearing his father, the judge noted that the appellant had failed to mention such a fear when he originally claimed asylum and that it was only in his third interview that he mentioned an unhappy childhood, and even then did not claim to be at risk of serious harm from his father. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim to fear his father for three reasons: because he had remained living in his father’s home until he left the country and his father had accommodated him and financially supported him; because in his interview he had given as his reason for not being in contact with his father that he did not have a smart phone; and because he had failed to provide evidence of his concerns prior to the appeal hearing. As regards documentation, the judge considered that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence about his identity documents, claiming previously to have left his CSID at home and not being able to obtain it because he was not in contact with his family, but at the hearing clarifying that he actually had an INID rather than a CSID and stating that he had lost the document two months before he left Iraq. The judge did not find the appellant’s evidence to be credible. He did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family and he considered that the appellant would be able to access his documents, but that even if he had lost his INID card he would be able to redocument himself, in accordance with the process set out in the October 2025 CPIN. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 11 December 2025.

9. The appellant sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision on the following six grounds: (1) that there was a material mistake of fact about his Iraqi ID document; (2) that there was procedural unfairness because his witness statement was not considered; (3) that the judge made unfair credibility findings arising from language and interpretation issues; (4) that the judge made speculative and unrealistic assumptions about his ability to contact his uncle; (5) that there was a misunderstanding of his evidence about his father and unfair criticism of when that was raised; and (6) that there was an unrealistic conclusion that he could re-obtain an INID based only on a theoretical process without considering his real circumstances.

10. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on limited grounds, on the second ground only, with the other grounds being considered to amount to a disagreement with the judge’s findings.

11. The respondent provided a rule 24 response opposing the appeal. The respondent stated that the grounds were not accompanied by the witness statement referred to by the appellant and that there was no other corroboration from any other source that there was an extant statement. It was considered, in any event, that it was difficult to see how any statement the appellant might have made could have impacted the outcome of the appeal.

12. A notice of hearing was issued on 11 May 2026, giving notice of the appeal listed for 19 June 2026. It appears that the appellant instructed his current legal representatives, Wilson Solicitors, on 15 May 2026. On 12 June 2026 Wilson Solicitors made an application to amend the appellant’s grounds, to expand upon ground 2 but also to add ground 1 in relation to the appellant’s identification card.

13. The amended grounds pleaded, with regard to ground 2, that there had been procedural unfairness in the First-tier Tribunal failing to take account of the appellant’s witness statement of 3 December 2025 which had been emailed to the Tribunal on 3 December 2025. It was asserted that as a result of the procedural unfairness the matter ought to be remitted for a de novo hearing. With regard to ground 1, the grounds asserted that the Tribunal had erred in fact or acted irrationally on holding that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence about his identity documents, when he had never previously claimed to have had a CSID card, but rather that was an erroneous assumption made by the respondent. It was asserted that that was a material matter given that the error as to the nature of the appellant’s identity card was the primary reason for the judge finding that the appellant had lost contact with his family, and that the absence of a national identity card meant that he would be at risk if returned to Iraq.

14. On the morning of the hearing, the appellant’s representatives uploaded a further amended grounds of appeal, adding a further ground to the procedural unfairness allegation, namely that the recently disclosed record of proceedings from the HOPO at the hearing on 8 December 2025 showed that the judge acted unfairly in intermittently cross-examining the appellant during his examination in chief, contrary to the decision in XS (Kosovo – Adjudicator’s conduct – psychiatric report) Serbia and Montenegro [2005] UKIAT 00093 IAT. It was asserted that the judge put seven inappropriate questions to the appellant.

“Q. You had a (SI) asking for basic details. You don’t mention about problem with your
Father. Why not mention?
A. When I first arrived, I mentioned it very briefly. I was a bit scared and a bit stressed
Q. You do not mention your father in the (SI)
A. There must be an issue. In the second interview, I told them that I never had an issue with
my neighbour. I only said about the drone strikes and the issue with my Father …
Q. Again in your substantive interview, you make no mention of your father being a problem. You say no contact because of his not having a smartphone. No mention of fear of father. Why not?
A. When they asked me I do not have contact with Father. I also said I had a problem with my Father and said he mistreated me …
Q. Any reason why your maternal uncle would not help you if you returned?
A. I don’t believe
Q. He paid around 10,000 dollars to help you. Why would he not help?
A. I just fled the country
Q. You arrived in UK on 14th Jan 2024. Why not claim asylum en route?
A. I was not in control of the journey. Smuggler controlled
Q. Fingerprinted anywhere?
A. No”

15. The matter came before me for a hearing. Mr Draycott explained that the Home Office disclosure of the HOPO’s record of proceedings, requested a month ago when the solicitors were first instructed by the appellant, had only arrived yesterday and that was why the further amended grounds had been submitted so late. I rose for some time for Mr McVeety to read the further amended grounds and consider his position. After a short period Mr McVeety advised me that he took a pragmatic view and was prepared to agree to the further amended grounds being admitted. In the circumstances I admitted the further amended grounds and permitted Mr Draycott to make submissions on the basis of those grounds.

16. I heard submissions from both parties.

17. With regard to ground 2, which was the ground upon which permission had originally been granted, Mr Draycott submitted that it was not now disputed that the appellant had produced a witness statement that he had emailed to the Tribunal on 3 December 2025. He had been told by the Tribunal to upload it on to the portal, but he had been unable to do that. Mr Draycott relied upon the principles in Ghira (R 25 – AIP – Fairness) [2025] UKUT 00350 (IAC) in regard to the additional safeguards that should be applied in the case of an appellant in person and submitted that the legal officers should have assisted the appellant in uploading his statement and the judge should have enquired as to whether there was a statement. Mr Draycot also relied upon the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book of July 2024 (‘ETBB’) which explained the process for dealing with litigants in person to ensure fairness. He submitted that there had been procedural unfairness in this case and that, in such circumstances, materiality was not of the same relevance as usual and the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo. He relied upon [26] of MM (Unfairness; E &R) Sudan [2014] INLR 576 and Serafin -v- Malkiewicz and others (2020) 1 WLR 2455 SC in that regard.

18. As for the additional procedural unfairness ground, Mr Draycott relied upon the case of XS (Kosovo) in submitting that judges should be reticent in asking questions prior to cross-examination as that could suggest dual cross-examination. He also relied upon Serafin which addressed the issue of litigants in person and referred to the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book, and he submitted that it had been unfair of the judge in the appellant’s case to have put questions to him which were acutely credibility related and which should have been put to him in cross-examination by the HOPO.

19. With regard to the first ground, Mr Draycott submitted that there had been an error of fact as the appellant had never mentioned having a CSID and the judge had therefore wrongly found there to be an inconsistency in his evidence. That was material because that had been the primary reason why the judge had rejected the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family. Mr Draycott relied upon the case of IA (Somalia) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 323 in submitting that a misdirection in law or in fact would be material if it could have made a difference. He submitted that it was impossible to say how the judge would have decided the case if he had approached the issue properly in a fair hearing. Given that the appellant had stated that he had a copy of his Iraqi passport on his phone it was feasible that he could be returned to Iraq. The issue of the documentation was therefore material and could be a reason for the appellant being at risk on return. The appeal should therefore be allowed and the case remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

20. With regard to ground 2, Mr McVeety accepted that the appellant’s statement was not in front of the judge at the hearing but did not accept that there has been procedural unfairness, in relation to either the absence of a witness statement or the conduct of the judge. With regard to the latter, and the reliance upon [20] of XS (Kosovo), he submitted that it was not impermissible for the judge to ask questions and that the questions asked did not show that the judge fell foul of the principles in that case. In fact the judge’s questions enabled the appellant to air what had been set out in his statement and gave him an opportunity to explain inconsistencies in his evidence. There was nothing controversial in the judge’s questions. The judge would have been criticised for making findings without putting matters to the appellant first. Mr McVeety submitted that if it was found that the judge’s questions amounted to a hostile cross-examination, then he would concede that the hearing was unfair, but he did not accept that that was the case. As for the matter of the statement not being before the judge, Mr McVeety submitted that there was nothing in the statement that the judge had not considered. The only new evidence in the statement was at [6] and [10] which were the very issues canvassed by the judge at the hearing, and that evidence was therefore considered by the judge. The caselaw relied upon by the appellant all raised the question of whether the appellant had been denied a fair opportunity to put his case, either by a failure to consider a document or otherwise, whereas all the points in the statement had been considered by the judge. As for ground 1, Mr McVeety accepted that the refusal letter was misleading in referring to the appellant having a CSID whereas he had never said that he did, but he submitted that the judge did not materially err in that regard as he considered the alternative of the document being an INID, at [37], and found that he would have access to the document, having rejected his account of difficulties with his family. Further, the appellant’s account of travelling internally in the KRI was inconsistent with his claim that he needed identity documents.

21. In reply, Mr Draycott submitted that the issue with the judge’s questions was that they were asked before cross-examination and that the judge strayed into cross-examining the appellant. He should have waited until after cross-examination. As for the matter of the appellant’s statement, materiality was not relevant as there was a duty on the judge to properly identify all the evidence and if he failed in that duty there was unfairness. It was irrelevant what difference the statement would have made based on its contents. As for the CSID issue, Mr Draycott submitted that the alleged inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about the nature of his identity card was the primary reason for the judge finding that the appellant could contact his family. It plainly could have made a difference if the judge had not made that mistake.

Analysis

22. I shall deal with the grounds in the order in which they were addressed by Mr McVeety, starting with the additional ground of appeal, namely the question of procedural unfairness in the judge’s approach/questioning of the appellant.

23. Mr Draycott relies upon the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book of July 2024 and the cases of Serafin and XS (Kosovo) in emphasising the safeguards necessary to ensure fairness when dealing with a litigant in person, and submits that the judge’s approach in putting inappropriate questions to the appellant prior to cross-examination was tantamount to that deprecated in those cases. He relies in particular upon [32] of XS (Kosovo) where the President of the Tribunal said that
“The questions should be asked after cross-examination has concluded except for clarification. Otherwise, there is an appearance of a dual cross-examination.”

24. However it is clear that the President, in making that observation, was not making any specific direction nor setting out any requirements in order for a hearing to be considered fair. His comments have to be viewed in the context of the overall concerns arising in that case. As is apparent at [15] and [16] of XS (Kosovo), the criticisms raised on behalf of the appellant in that case were, firstly, that before the appeal had begun at all the adjudicator had indicated strong scepticism as to the merits of the case, and secondly, that the way in which the questions were asked were hostile and sceptical. At [15] the case presented was that “there was a world of difference between enquiring neutrally about how a particular problem was going to be dealt with… and commenting that there was not much of a case or why were human rights being raised at all.” At [16] the submission was that “It was not so much that the Adjudicator had asked questions, it was rather that he raised them in a manner which was akin to a cross-examination asking leading questions in a hostile and sceptical tone; they were extensive questions and in part were interposed during the course of cross-examination by the Home Office Presenting Officer. They raised issues with which the Home Office Presenting Officer had not been concerned.”

25. There is nothing in those cases preventing a judge from asking questions of the appellant by way of clarification. On the contrary the cases recognise that there may be a need for a judge to ask clarifying questions. What is deprecated is a hostile approach, or perceived hostile approach, by a judge. There is no suggestion, however, that Judge Alis was hostile to the appellant and no reason whatsoever to believe that he was or could have been perceived to be. His approach did not come anywhere near to that of the adjudicator criticised in XS (Kosovo). The appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced in any way by the judge’s questions. I agree entirely with Mr McVeety that there was nothing controversial in the questions the judge asked. He started off by asking general background questions and it could be said that he was trying to put the appellant at ease by so doing. The judge was perfectly entitled to ask the appellant to clarify and give reasons for a failure to mention previously a matter that he raised at that point, namely the problems with his father. Indeed, as Mr McVeety properly observed, the judge may well have been criticised for later making findings on matters which had not been put to the appellant for his comments had he not done so. Further, the appellant was in fact being given an opportunity to raise and explain a matter upon which he was seeking to rely in his statement. In the circumstances I do not find any merit in the additional ground relied upon the appellant and do not accept that there was any unfairness in the judge asking the questions that he did.

26. That then leads on to the question of the appellant’s witness statement. It is not now in dispute that the appellant emailed his witness statement to the First-tier Tribunal on 3 December 2025 and was told to upload it to the MyHMCTS portal but did not do so, so that it was not amongst the documents before the judge at the time of the hearing on 8 December 2025. Mr Draycott appeared to be suggesting that there had been a duty on the legal officers in the First-tier Tribunal to assist the appellant in uploading his statement if he was not able to do it, given his status as an ‘appellant in person’ and, if not able to do so, the duty then fell on the judge to ensure all the documents were made available. However I do not find that there is anything in Ghira imposing such a duty. Ghira addressed the relevant duties to ensure that all principal contentious issues (‘PCIs’) were identified and aired, and in particular to avoid issues being overlooked owing to a request for a papers hearing. At [27] of Ghira it was made clear that “It is the duty of all parties, whether represented or not, to bring all relevant facts and information to the attention of the FTT, particularly matters relevant to the PCIs”. There was no reason, in the appellant’s case, for the judge to conclude that all the PCIs had not been identified. Furthermore the judge, at [7] of his decision, made clear that he had confirmed with the appellant that all documents were before the Tribunal. Although Mr McVeety indicated that he did not rely upon [7] of the judge’s decision as an indication of the appellant failing to take up an opportunity to raise his witness statement, and accepted that a litigant in person may not understand the question of the documents, it does seems to me that it would not be unreasonable to expect the appellant to have mentioned his statement at that point as it would have become apparent to him that the judge did not have it. I do not agree with Mr Draycott, therefore, that any unfairness arose in the Tribunal process in regard to the statement.

27. In any event, and that aside, I agree with Mr McVeety that the absence of the statement did not give rise to any procedural unfairness in the appeal process and cannot have disadvantaged the appellant in any way, as there was simply nothing in it which the judge had not considered. The judge already had before him the appellant’s “Appeal Reasons” document which the appellant stated was a statement in support of his appeal and which set out his claim, responded to the reasons of refusal and referred to background country evidence. The only parts of the witness statement that could possibly be considered as having raised new issues not already known to the respondent and to the judge were the references to the appellant’s problems with his father, at [6] and [10]. However those issues were raised and considered as a result of the questions asked by the judge.

28. It was Mr Draycott’s submission that that was a matter relevant to the question of materiality of an error of law, and that materiality was irrelevant in cases of unfairness. He relied upon the cases of MM and Serafin in that respect, submitting that it was sufficient that there had been unfairness arising from a document not being before the Tribunal, whether or not the document would have made a material difference to the outcome of the hearing. However there is a clear distinction between the principles set out in those cases and the issues arising in the circumstances and the context before me. In MM, as made clear at [24], the missing piece of evidence in that case was an important piece of evidence, the omission of which gave rise to the unfairness, irrespective of the overall merits of the case. In the case before me, the omission of the evidence did not give rise to any unfairness because it did not include anything which was not already before the Tribunal. The appellant was not deprived of a fair hearing. He was not denied an opportunity to present all of his evidence, as the evidence was already before the Tribunal. The argument for the respondent is therefore not one of materiality, but that there was never any procedural unfairness in the first place. I agree that there was no procedural unfairness. The second ground is accordingly not made out in either respect.

29. The first ground of appeal raises an error of fact on the part of the Tribunal at [35] and [36] of the judge’s decision. That error arose from the judge, in identifying an apparent inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence, relying upon the respondent’s erroneous reference in the refusal letter to the appellant’s identity card being his CSID, whereas the appellant had never specified the nature of his identity card in his interviews and statement. It was Mr Draycott’s submission that the mistake of fact was material and gave rise to a material error of law, as it formed the primary reason for the judge, at [36], rejecting the appellant’s evidence that he had lost contact with his family and that he was thus unable to obtain his INID card upon return to the KRI. Mr Draycott submitted that if the appellant’s claim as to the loss of contact with his family had been wrongly rejected, and he had indeed lost contact with his family, he would not be able to access his INID card and would therefore be at risk when trying to reach his home area without an identity document. However, whilst it is not disputed that the judge was misled by the refusal letter and as a result erred in fact when considering the appellant to have given inconsistent evidence about the nature of his identity card, it is not the case that that was his primary reason, or indeed a material reason, for making the adverse findings that he did about the appellant’s evidence in relation to family contact. The judge did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family because he did not accept his account of his fear of his father, for the reasons given at [32], because he had given an inconsistent account of what had happened to his identity card, for the reasons given at [35], and because his maternal uncle had funded his trip, as he said at [36]. Those were plainly proper reasons for the judge to conclude as he did. On that basis it was entirely open to the judge to conclude that the appellant could have access to his INID card or alternatively redocument himself in the event that the document was lost, as he found at [37] and [38]. The error of fact was therefore not at all material to the outcome of the appeal. The first ground is therefore also not made out.

30. For all these reasons I do not accept that the grounds identify any errors of law in the judge’s decision. The appellant had a full and fair hearing. His appeal was dismissed for reasons which were fully and properly explained in the judge’s decision and which were entirely open to the judge on the evidence before him. The judge’s decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

31. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 June 2026