Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001296
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63043/2024
LP/12849/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

ZO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Harris-Hercules, Wortley Legal Consultants
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant or their family, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. I have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations under Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case.
Introduction
2. The appellant is a citizen of Kazakhstan. He arrived in the UK on 4 December 2022 on a temporary worker visa. He claimed asylum on 24 March 2023. His protection claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 8 December 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
3. The appellant claims that he borrowed a large sum of money from an illegal moneylender to fund his father’s surgery. The money disappeared from his bank account. The moneylenders demanded repayment and threatened the appellant. The appellant reported matters to the police and the Prosecutor’s Officer. The appellant was kidnapped and assaulted. The moneylenders filed a court case against the appellant.
4. The respondent did not accept any of the appellant’s account and refused his protection claim.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Mulholland on 29 October 2025.
6. The Judge did not find the appellant’s account to be credible. The Judge did not find the appellant to be at risk on return. Judge Mulholland dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
7. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge. These were rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. However, on renewal to the Upper Tribunal, by decision dated 29 April 2026 Judge Khan granted permission on the following terms:
3. Ground 1 submits that the judge misdirected herself regarding the definition of a Particular Social Group (‘PSG’) because at [9] the judge stated ‘the people the appellant fears (money lenders) have no immutable characteristics’. This ground is not arguable. It was for the appellant to prove to the required standard of proof that he was a member of a PSG, not for the judge to try and identify a relevant PSG for his claim to fall within. The appellant failed to indicate what group he might belong to.
4. Ground 2 submits that the judge conducted a flawed credibility assessment by conducting a flawed analysis whereby individual elements of the account were rejected in isolation of others rather than considering all the evidence in the round before reaching conclusions on credibility: Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367. I find this ground is arguable which in turn potentially undermines the findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Permission is granted on ground 2.
5. In light of permission being granted on ground 2 in respect of the adverse credibility findings, I also grant permission on grounds 3, 4, 5 & 6 which are related. Permission is refused on ground 1.
8. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Mulholland’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

The Hearing
9. Despite the Rule 24 Response and the appellant’s reply, it was agreed that Ground 1 did not have permission to proceed and so could not be considered. It was also accepted that the appellant had never put forward any positive argument that his claim came within the Refugee Convention, as could be seen by the Appeal Skeleton Argument that was before the First-tier Tribunal.
10. Ms Harris-Hercules relied upon the grounds of appeal on which permission had been granted (grounds two to six) and expanded on them.
11. It was submitted that the credibility assessment of the Judge was flawed. Ms Harris-Hercules submitted that the Judge’s findings related to immaterial matters and that they were inadequately reasoned. She submitted that the Judge considered the documents after having reached credibility findings and this breached the Mibanga duty.
12. Ms Harris-Hercules submitted that the Judge resorted to unlawful speculation as detailed at [19] of the decision. She further submitted that the sufficiency of protection and internal relocation consideration was inadequate as it relied upon the general country situation rather the appellant’s individual circumstances.
13. Mr Sheikh relied upon the detailed Rule 24 Response. He submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. He submitted that the credibility findings of the Judge were sustainable and adequately reasoned.
14. Ms Harris-Hercules briefly responded stating that credibility was at the heart of the appellant’s claim and that he had not had a fair assessment of his claim.
15. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.
Discussion and Analysis
16. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have reminded myself of the following principles.
17. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).
18. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge’s findings are “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.
19. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
20. The core of the appellant’s complaint about the Judge’s decision relates to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility. Ground 4 relating to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation is only relevant if the credibility findings are found to contain errors of law.
21. Having carefully considered the Judge’s credibility assessment and conclusions, I find that there is no error of law demonstrated by the grounds.
22. The appellant focussed on the duty expressed in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, which featured in the grant of permission. It was suggested that the Judge had reached conclusions as to the appellant’s credibility before considering the documents provided in support of his case. It was submitted that the Judge had undertaken a flawed fact-finding exercise. I reject this submission.
23. From [10] to [18] the Judge detailed aspects of the appellant’s evidence that were internally inconsistent or lacking any reasonable explanation and she found that these matters either damaged the appellant's credibility or meant little weight should be attached to that evidence. The Judge did not reach any conclusions as to the overall credibility of the appellant’s claim at this stage.
24. The Judge then considered the documents provided by the appellant at [23] to [26]. She assessed the reliability of the documents and assigned weight to the documents having considered issues relating to the documents themselves and the appellant’s evidence regarding the documents.
25. Then at [27] the Judge confirmed that she had considered all the evidence individually and together before reaching her conclusions as to the appellant’s claim.
26. The Judge’s fact-finding assessment was not flawed. She correctly followed the Mibanga duty and reached her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence.
27. Furthermore, the Judge did not find the appellant an incredible witness relying on peripheral or immaterial matters. The Judge considered all the core elements of the appellant’s claim and found that, for various reasons, the account was not credible. The Judge found the core of the appellant’s claim to not be credible and gave sufficient reasons for her findings.
28. The Judge’s observation at [19] is not unlawful speculation. It is an unnecessary observation in relation to the overall decision, but it is not a matter that demonstrates an error of law. Even if [19] were speculative, it played no material role in the Judge's overall assessment, which was founded upon numerous other credibility findings.
29. Furthermore, there is certainly no evidence of any reversal of the burden of proof as alleged in Ground 3.
30. The decision in various sections demonstrates that the appellant was given the opportunity to address matters which were in dispute. The appellant has not produced any evidence of what occurred at the hearing which might demonstrate that relevant matters were not raised with him.
31. I concur with Mr Sheikh that the relevant issues were all detailed at length in the respondent's decision letter in the credibility section and so the appellant had every opportunity to address these matters in his witness statement for the appeal.
32. Furthermore, the challenged findings arose from discrepancies already apparent on the face of the appellant's own evidence. They were not novel concerns raised for the first time by the Judge.
33. Overall, there is no procedural unfairness as asserted in Ground 5.
34. Ground 6 asserts that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for her decision. I reject this assertion. The Judge provided a detailed and well-reasoned decision considering all the evidence and providing sufficient reasons for her conclusions.
35. Finally, as detailed previously, Ground 4 is only material if the grounds challenging the credibility findings succeed; those grounds have been rejected. Therefore, as the Judge’s decision to reject the appellant’s credibility is lawful, then there is no need to consider the issues of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation.
36. I would note that the Judge’s consideration of these matters was brief and relied mainly on the general country information. However, as she had comprehensively rejected the appellant’s credibility and found that he was not at risk on return to Kazakhstan, then there was no requirement to consider sufficiency of protection or internal relocation at all. It is thus understandable that her consideration of these matters was brief.
37. The Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were plainly expressed in the alternative. Once the Judge lawfully rejected the material factual basis of the claim, any shortcomings in those alternative findings could not have affected the outcome and are therefore immaterial. Accordingly, even if Ground 4 were made out, any error would not be material to the outcome.
38. Overall, the grounds disclose no material errors of law. The Judge’s decision was detailed and comprehensive and gave more than sufficient reasons for reaching a legally sustainable conclusion.
39. Therefore, in conclusion, for the reasons above, I find the Judge has not made material errors of law in her decision and reasons.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination shall stand.

C R Cole

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 July 2026