Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001305
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65845/2024
LP/04087/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

AK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, Counsel instructed by Londinium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 1 December 2025. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh and claimed a right to remain in the UK on asylum, humanitarian protection, Art 3 ECHR medical grounds and Art 8 ECHR private life grounds.
2. The appellant claimed to be involved with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and as a result to face a threat due to his political opinion. He has been in the UK since 2009 and has made two previous applications to the respondent, which were refused by the respondent and which were unsuccessful on appeal.
3. The appellant’s current appeal was refused by the FtT and the appellant appeals to the Upper Tribunal with leave granted on one ground, namely that it is arguable that the FtT failed adequately to address material factors in the appellant’s human rights claim, in particular arguably failing sufficiently to factor into the overall assessment the evidence of Dr Karim that stable housing and family support were important to the appellant’s mental health, but that the appellant was unlikely to receive significant family support in Bangladesh.
4. I heard submissions from both parties and reserved my decision.
5. The ground on which permission to appeal is granted is itself split into arguments surrounding the Art 3 health claim, and the Art 8 private life claim. The focus of the appellant’s case in the UT – it was submitted – was on the Art 8 point.
6. On the Art 3 claim, the appellant asserts that the FtT failed to consider the need for treatment beyond medication, namely the need for stable housing and family support, regular reviews, and in-person support which was found by the FtT at [73] to be critical for the appellant’s well-being.
7. I note that the FtT considers the financial support available from the appellant’s brother at [72]. The FtT goes on at [73] to assess that the appellant’s brother’s role is critical to the appellant’s wellbeing, and that the appellant’s brother would pay for medication if he returned to Bangladesh.
8. The FtT gives reasons for disregarding the report of Dr Karim in so far as it speaks to self-harm and suicide, and I find the FtT was entitled to do this for the reasons given. The appellant accepts that it was open to the FtT to find that the expert cannot comment on treatment in Bangladesh.
9. The evidence of Dr Karim with regards to receipt of adequate treatment for the appellant’s condition were he to be removed speaks primarily to their affordability and availability in urban areas. I consider it appropriate therefore that he FtT has concentrated on the question of financial support from the appellant’s brother. Dr Karim makes reference to an absence of robust support systems, but this is in the context of financial support. There is passing reference to ‘barriers to access’ in the expert report, which I do not judge the FtT needed to address given its fleeting appearance.
10. I find that the FtT has properly considered the evidence in support of the Art 3 health claim and was entitled to come to the conclusions that it did, on the evidence presented to it, for the reasons that it gave.
11. I turn to the submissions surrounding the FtT’s treatment of the Art 8 claim. The appellant argues that the FtT’s approach to proportionality falls into error because the FtT acknowledges the appellant will face “significant obstacles” [89] and that his ill health makes him “particularly vulnerable” [87], but concludes that the public interest outweighs this without (says the appellant) adequately explaining why the consequences of removal do not amount to “unjustifiably harsh consequences”.
12. The appellant submits that the FtT, at [88-89] (where the FtT finds that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration) the FtT ignores the findings at [80-81] that the appellant lacks family support in Bangladesh from his sister and there is limited to no assistance available from his nephew.
13. I am not persuaded by the appellant’s submissions that these findings about a lack of available support at [80-81] are not then imported into the assessment on the availability of support and to ability engage with engage with society if removed to Bangladesh at [86-88]. The determination of the FtT does not read as if these are separate sections within the determination – the FtT is recounting some of the evidence, making findings of fact, giving self-direction on the law and coming to a conclusion. There is no need to repeat the start of that arc of assessment at the end of the assessment. I judge it is clear that the FtT had the entirety of the relevant evidence and findings in mind when coming to a conclusion.
14. I find that the FtT has identified obstacles and properly assesses whether they are very significant. The FtT was entitled to decide the case as it has and has not erred in law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 December 2025 does not contain an error of law. The decision stands.

D Cotton

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 September 2026