Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001316
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65056/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
27th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Spurling of Counsel, instructed by Hunter Stone Law.
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 9 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge J M Dixon and First-tier Tribunal Judge Dodd promulgated on 28 November 2025 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 1 December 2023 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s protection claim dated 22 July 2020.
BACKGROUND
2. The Appellant left Bangladesh by air on 3 July 2012 and travelled to Dubai where he remained until 2020. On 8 August 2015 the Appellant applied for a family visit visa to enter the UK, which was refused on 10 August 2015 and on 18 February 2020 the Appellant applied for a private household visa which was issued on 20 February 2020.
3. On 27 February 2020 the Appellant entered the UK and on 22 July 2020 the Appellant claimed asylum. On 1 December 2023 the Appellant’s application was refused (“RFRL”). It is against this decision that the Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”).
4. In summary, it was the Appellant’s case before the FTT that he was a member of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”), having joined the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (“BJCD”) student wing in 1999. The Appellant claimed that he became the General Secretary of the BJCD Sylhet City Corporation Ward No 22 in 2002 and that he was the Organising Secretary of the BNP in UAE until 2020.
5. The Appellant claimed that in November 2008 he was arrested by the Rapid Action Battalion (“RAB”), that a false case was filed against him and that he was held in prison for 11 months. The Appellant claimed that he was then released on bail and that two further false cases were filed against him in 2011.
6. The Appellant claimed that after he fled to Dubai on 3 July 2012, in his absence he was convicted of firearms offences and sentenced to 10 years. The Appellant claimed that if returned to Bangladesh he would be arrested, tortured and killed on account of his political opinion.
FTT Decision of FTIJ JM Dixon and FTIJ Dodd dated 28 November 2025
7. At paragraphs [6] and [7] of the FTT Decision the FTT identified the following agreed matters in dispute:
Whether the Appellant came to the adverse attention of the authorities in Bangladesh; being detained and being the subject of the false charges against him (including being sentenced in absentia). The Respondent’s position is that even if he did come to the adverse attention in this way, he can nonetheless neutralise any risk by remedying his situation and invoking legal procedures to have the false charges rescinded and the sentence quashed. Mr Vokes indicated that even if that option is open to the Appellant, it would on any view take time to do and in the meantime (pending resolution) there is a real risk of persecution on the basis of the sentence in absentia which would be activated.
Mr Vokes confirmed that the Appellant does not rely on sur place political activity in the UK as an independent basis of claim. Rather, he relied on that as supportive of his profile.
8. In dismissing the Appellant’s appeal, the FTT made the following findings:
11. I have taken into account all of the evidence and submissions even where not expressly referred to. As Mr Vokes accepted, in reality the Appellant’s claim depends on whether he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities which in turn depends on what I make of the documents upon which he relies to show there are false cases (including a conviction and sentence in absence),
12. I do not attach any significant weight to the documents on which the Appellant relies to demonstrate that he has come to the attention of the authorities in Bangladesh. I accept that they may well relate to false proceedings which have been instigated in Bangladesh. The respondent has not challenged the expert report of Mr Saqeb Mahbub of 21 May 2024 [435-522] who has confirmed, apparently from enquiries, that the false cases upon which the Appellant relies have in fact been instigated. On this basis I accept that the appellant has demonstrated the existence of the legal cases.
13. However, I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated even to the lower standard of proof that the legal proceedings relate to him. The two FIRs, the arrest warrant and the court judgement are all in another name as opposed to the Appellant’s actual correct name. The Appellant's answer to this is simply that that name is an alias, and he was known by that alias in political circles. I do not accept this explanation.
14. In the first place, I do not find it credible that the false charges would not have been brought in the Appellant's correct name. I recognise that the Appellant’s case is that they are false charges and that, by implication, it does not matter whether they are brought in his correct name. But there is no good reason, I find, as to why the charges, even if false, should not have been brought in his correct name with his alias in brackets. This, I find, would be the natural and obvious course. I also note that the Appellant’s age is wrong in respect of the FIRs: the 8 November 2008 one has his age as 27 though he would have been 30 and the FIR of 2011 puts him at 28 though he would have been 33 at the time. I do not accept that such mistakes would have been made because they are false cases. The discrepancy as to age further casts doubt on the FIRs relating to him. Moreover, in cross- examination, when challenged on the discrepancy in relation to the name, the Appellant indicated that he has Facebook posts which make reference to his alias. This appeared to reinforce his point that the alias is the name by which he is known for political purposes. This claim as to Facebook evidence however has not been supported by any evidence. Mr Vokes was not able to point to any such evidence. This assertion in the absence of supporting evidence undermines the Appellant’s credibility. I also note that in his screening interview the Appellant was asked whether he had ever used any other names, and he said that he had not. Asked about this in cross-examination he said that he had not properly understood the question. I do not accept this: the question was straightforward and he did not raise with those interviewing him that he did not understand. Indeed, at the end of the interview he said that he had understood all of the questions [962]. This also undermines his credibility. I find it very surprising that the document from the lawyer, Iqbal Ahmed, [266] does not explain the use of an alias. I attach little weight to the documents at [171-173]. None of them support the Appellant’s claim as to the use of an alias for political purposes. They refer in unspecified terms to ‘false charges’ and that at 173 indicates that the authorities are ‘constantly’ coming to his home which is not what he himself asserts. I found the Appellant’s evidence as to the ongoing case to be unpersuasive. He said that he has a lawyer in respect of that but there is no corroborative evidence from the lawyer confirming the state of the ongoing case. The Appellant said he had correspondence from the lawyer on his mobile phone, but it has not been provided. Factoring in the caution applying to the lack of corroborative evidence I find that here such evidence (letter from the lawyer acting for him in relation to live proceedings in Bangladesh) would be reasonably available if it exists and the lack of it undermines the Appellant’s credibility. I do not attach any weight to the statement from the Appellant’s wife or mother (translations at [287-290 and 299-303] given that they have not been tested in cross-examination.
15. In light of the above I do not find that the Appellant has come to the adverse attention of the authorities as claimed such that he was detained and has false charges against him. Mr Vokes accepted that having been politically active in and of itself would not put him at real risk. Even if the Appellant was detained in 2008/09 I do not find that he would be at risk on return on that basis: his case has been advanced on the basis that the false cases and conviction in absence are the basis for the ongoing real risk.
Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal
9. In grounds of appeal settled by Hasad Chowdhury dated 11 March 2026, the Appellant advanced three grounds of appeal, which are summarised at paragraphs [2] as follows,
The central error in the determination is that the Tribunal accepted that the Bangladeshi criminal proceedings existed but failed to properly assess the extensive documentary evidence linking those proceedings to the Appellant, instead relying on speculative assumptions about how fabricated political cases would normally be recorded and treating discrepancies in name and age as determinative without evaluating the cumulative documentary evidence identifying the Appellant through consistent paternal details, family declarations, photographic material and independent corroboration.
10. In summary, ground one argues that the FTT failed to cumulatively assess evidence of the Appellant’s use of multiple identities, which it is said linked him to the court documentation, and erred in departing from the SSHD’s case, which did not dispute that the Appellant was SA.
11. The ground argues that the court documents identify the defendant as RAS and his father as AB and that there was evidence before the FTT demonstrating that the Appellant was known to use the identity of RAS and evidence before the FTT that his father was AB.
12. Under ground two the Appellant argues that the FTT unlawfully speculated as to how fabricated political cases in Bangladesh are drafted and as such erred when finding “no good reason” why court proceedings would not be brought in the Appellant’s real name.
13. Under ground three the Appellant argues that the FTT failed to assess the Appellant’s consistent explanation for his use of an alias.
14. In a rule 24 reply dated 13 May 2026, the SSHD disputed that the FTT materially erred and argues that ground one was mere disagreement; that the FTT did consider the evidence cumulatively; and that the FTT did not improperly introduce an identity issue in circumstances where it was agreed by the parties that the central issue was whether the Bangladeshi legal proceedings related to the Appellant. In respect of ground two, the SSHD argues that it was open to the FTT in the round to rationally infer that court proceedings would not be brought against an alias without referring to the Appellant’s real identity. In respect of ground three, the SSHD argues that the FTT did in fact consider the Appellant’s explanation for using a false identity and gave sustainable reasons for rejecting the same.
15. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judges pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
16. At the outset of the hearing the representatives confirmed that they both had the stitched Upper Tribunal hearing bundle before them consisting of 681 pages (“SB”) and a rule 24 reply dated 13 May 2026.
17. I then heard submissions from Mr Spurling followed by Ms Everett.
DISCUSSION
Ground One
18. In submissions, Mr Spurling first took me to the Judgment at SB [49] which identifies the defendant as RAS and then SB [56], where the judgment identifies the father of RAS as AB. I was then taken to the wife’s affidavit at SB [68], which states that the Appellant is also known as RAS; the mother’s affidavit at SB [80] which states that the Appellant is also known as RAS, and identifies the Appellant’s father as AB; the Shyamal Sylhet news report at SB [117], which refers to the father of RAS as AB and a judgment against RAS; the local Chairman’s letter at SB [211], which states that the Appellant is known as RAS and that his father is AB; the BNP letters evidencing RAS’s purported role as General Secretary of the BJCD in Ward 22 of Sylhet; and the concluding questions to the AIR, where the Appellant states that his political name is RAS.
19. Mr Spurling submitted that the FTT did not consider this evidence holistically; failed to take into account the newspaper report; and fundamentally failed to take into account the evidence of BA’s paternal link to both the name of the Appellant and RAS, which ran throughout the documentary evidence.
20. Mr Spurling further argued that whilst the FTT record that the SSHD did not dispute the expert evidence of Mr Mahbub and clearly accepted the expert evidence that there were legal cases instigated against RAS, the FTT failed to have regard to the expert’s findings at SB [299], concerning the use of aliases in political circles,
30.1 It is very common in Bangladesh for individuals to goo by nicknames which do not appear in their official identifying documents such as passport, birth certificate, National Identity Card, driving license, etc. Usually in Bangladesh, these nicknames are given to some people who are involved in a party politics to separate them from the other people who are involved in the same party politics with the identical name. The political nicknames remain unofficial and even used in newspapers and official documents to identify the respective person.
30.2 Mujibur Rahman Chowdhury is a Bangladeshi politician, and he is a member of the Parliament of Bangladesh who represents the Faridpur-4 constituency. Besides his official name, he is known widely as Nixon Chowdhury and even media of Bangladesh identifies him though his unofficial name.
30.3 Joynal Abedin is a Bangladeshi Nationalist Party politician and former member of Parliament of Bangladesh who represents the Feni-2 constituency. Press media uses his unofficial name, VP Joynal to mention him in their articles and news. He is currently the advisor to the Chairperson of BNP. He was elected in 1988, 2001 and 2008. His unofficial name, VP Joynal is used widely in newspapers. The use of the unofficial name in Bangladesh is so prevalent that in a bail-hearing proceedings, which is to be taken place on 29 January 2024, instead of using the official name of Joynal Abedin, the cause list of the Supreme Court mentioned his unofficial name, VP Joynal.
30.4 the present President of Bangladesh is Mohammad Shahabuddin. However, he is known widely by the unofficial name, Shahabuddin Chuppu, so much so that even international media house Al Jazeera referred to him using his unofficial name.
30.5 Tarique Rahman, who is Bangladeshi Politician, who has been holding the chairman position of BNP since February 2018. BNP’s leaders and activists and general people of Bangladesh know him better as Tareq Zia, even though the last name Zia is not a part of his name at all. Consequently, even the press and newspapers often refer to him by his unofficial name as well.
21. In reply, Ms Everett conceded that the FTT did not refer to this expert evidence at [30.1] – [30.5] when finding that the court documents did not relate to the Appellant and stated that she could see the force in the Appellant’s argument. However, argued Ms Everett, weight was a matter for the FTT, and the Tribunal do not need to refer to all the evidence.
22. When considering this rebuttal argument, I am mindful of the well-settled appellate principles in Volpi 2022] EWCA Civ 464 at paragraphs [2(iii)] and [2 (iv)],
An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial.
The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
23. When considering the FTT Decision, I note first that the FTT state at [11] that they have taken all of the evidence into account. At [12] the FTT accept that the court papers in the bundle relate to real legal proceedings in the light of the expert evidence but nonetheless “do not attach any significant weight” to the documentation. At [13] the FTT explain that this is because to the lower standard of proof, the Appellant has not evidenced that the judgment, FIRs and warrant relate to him because they are in the name of RAS.
24. At [13], the FTT record the Appellant’s explanation for the different name in the documentation as “he was known by that alias in political circles”. However, the FTT reject this explanation and then set out their reasons for doing so at [14].
25. The FTT reason first that it is not credible that false charges would be brought in a false name and find “no good reason” why charges would not have been brought in the Appellant’s real name with the alias in brackets.
26. However, as set out above, I find it clear that the expert evidence at [30.3] of the report provides an example of when an alias was used to identify a political defendant in court proceedings. I find that the FTT does not engage with this part of the expert evidence. I find the suggestion of the FTT that there is “no good reason” why charges would be brought against the Appellant in his alias indicates that the expert evidence regarding the use of aliases and the evidence of court proceedings identifying a defendant in his alias at [30.1] – [30.5], has not been taken into account.
27. In this regard, I am mindful of the Presidential guidance in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC), which states that,
The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder's overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome.
28. Given that the FTT do not criticise the expert evidence and accept the report’s finding that the court papers refer to real legal proceedings, I find it was incumbent upon the FTT to explain why, in the light of the country evidence of aliases in court proceedings, they nonetheless found “no good reason” for charges being brought against the Appellant in his purported alias.
29. The FTT then note that there is an age discrepancy between the Appellant’s age and the age recorded in the FIRs. This reasoning is not challenged, and I find that it was clearly an inconsistency that the FTT was entitled to take into account when assessing the reliability of the Bangladesh legal documents.
30. The FTT then draws an adverse inference from the Appellant’s failure to provide Facebook evidence that refers to the alias. This finding is also not challenged.
31. The FTT then notes that the Appellant confirmed in his SCR that he had not used any other names and that when asked about this in cross examination, the Appellant claimed that he had not understood the question. The FTT find that this undermines the Appellant’s credibility. This finding is also not challenged before me.
32. However, the FTT then apportioned little weight to the lawyer’s letter (see SB [47]) on the basis that it does not explain the use of an alias for political purposes, and finds that the documents at AB [171 – 173] carry little weight (which Mr Spurling clarified were the BNP letters to be found at SB [213] – [215]) because they do not support the Appellant’s claim “as to the use of an alias for political purposes”. The FTT then gives no weight at all to the affidavits of the Appellant’s wife and mother, singularly upon the basis that there was no cross examination.
33. Whilst I note that the lawyer letter refers to his instruction to verify cases against RAS and identifies the Appellant’s birthday, and the BNP letters also identify the Appellant’s birthday whilst purporting to confirm the alleged political profile of RAS (which is analogous to the Appellant’s claimed profile), none of these documents expressly allege that RAS and the Appellant are the same person. However, the affidavits of the mother and wife do, and the mother’s affidavit also confirms that AB is her husband. As such, I agree with Mr Spurling that when the FTT impugned these documents for the reasons given, there is nothing to suggest that the FTT were alive to the thread that ran throughout the evidence, including the judgment, which identified AB as the father of the Appellant and RAS. Equally, I find nothing to suggest that the FTT considered this thread in the documents in the round with the expert evidence relating to the use of aliases in political circles or the use of aliases in court proceedings.
34. Accordingly, I find that it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to explain why the expert evidence and this paternal relationship thread was not relevant to the credibility of these documents or why when considered holistically, the evidence did not lead the FTT to the contrary conclusion that the Appellant was the RAS in the judgment.
35. Accordingly, I find compelling evidence within the decision demonstrating that the FTT failed to take into account expert evidence on the use of aliases and evidence of a paternal thread in the documentation.
36. When considering the materiality of this error I am mindful of the test affirmed by Laing LJ at [43] of ASO (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282,
whether 'it is clear on the materials before [the F-tT] any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion'
37. Whilst I recognise that the FTT made several unchallenged adverse credibility findings against the Appellant, I am not satisfied that any rational Tribunal would inevitably have concluded that the Appellant was not RAS on the evidence before the FTT.
38. Accordingly, I find that the FTT Decision discloses a material error of law that permeates the entire credibility assessment, such that the Decision must be set aside.
39. For completeness, whilst ground one also argues that the FTT erred in departing from the SSHD’s case, which did not dispute that the Appellant was SA, I find this argument without merit.
40. As set out at [7] of the FTT decision, the agreed issues in the appeal included whether the Appellant was the subject of false charges. Contrary to Mr Spurling’s submission that the Appellant did not know he would have to put up evidence relating to a different identity, I find it plain that he evidently did, as this issue was addressed in the affidavits and expert evidence. I find the suggestion in the ground that the FTIJ went behind the SSHD’s concession that the Appellant was SA is difficult to understand in circumstances where the FTT made no adverse finding to this effect. Equally, whilst the ground correctly notes that the SSHD raised no issue with the Appellant’s use of an alias, this is nothing to the point as the SSHD at no point accepted that the defendant in the judgment was the Appellant. The burden of proof was at all times on the Appellant to demonstrate that the court documents related to him, the fact that the documents identified a defendant with a different name to the Appellant was an evidential inconsistency that the Appellant clearly knew that he had to address.
Ground Two
41. In relation to ground two, as considered above, I find that the FTT materially erred by failing to take into account the expert evidence when finding “no good reason” for the court proceedings not to have been brought in the Appellant’s real name.
Ground Three
42. In relation to ground three, as set out above, the FTT clearly considered the Appellant’s explanation for the existence of a different name in the legal documents at [13] and rejected this explanation for the reasons given at [14]. However, as found above, the FTT materially erred when assessing the Appellant’s explanation when failing to take into account the expert evidence and evidence of a paternal link to the Appellant and RAS.
CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
43. For these reasons, I find that that the FTT materially erred when failing to take into account the expert evidence and the evidential thread that ran throughout the documents of AB’s paternal link to the Appellant and RAS. I find that this error permeates the entire credibility assessment such that the Decision must be set aside in its entirety with no findings of facts preserved.
44. Whilst Mr Spurling invited me to preserve the FTT’s findings in relation to the expert evidence at [12] in the absence of the SSHD challenging the report before the FTT, I decline to do so. The difficulty with preserving these findings is that the material error in the Decision includes the FTT’s failure to consider the entirety of the expert report. As such, to preserve limited findings in such circumstances would bind the hands of a future Tribunal in its assessment of the expert report in its entirety. In this regard, although I note that the SSHD did not dispute the expert report before the FTT, I am nonetheless mindful of Volpi at [4], which confirms that,
Even where expert evidence is uncontroverted, a trial judge is not bound to accept it: see, most recently, Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1442, [2022] 1 WLR 973
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge JM Dixon and First-tier Tribunal Judge Dodd dated 28 November 2026 involved the making of a material error of law.
2. I set aside the Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge JM Dixon and First-tier Tribunal Judge Dodd in its entirety, with no findings of fact preserved.
3. I remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge JM Dixon and First-tier Tribunal Judge Dodd.

D. Clarke
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 August 2026