Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001348
First-tier Tribunal: PA/67878/2023
LP/00052/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS

Between

K A
(Anonymity decision made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms D Revill, Counsel instructed by Solomon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal following a hearing on 28 November 2025 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Iraq claimed, in summary, that he was at risk of persecution by the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Forces) – Hash Al-Shaabi following an incident at the garage where he worked on 23 September 2019.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Juss in a hearing on 28 November 2025. The Judge found that the Appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of serious harm on a return to Iraq and that his return would not place the United Kingdom in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Michaels granted permission to appeal on 16 March 2026 in the following terms:
The grounds assert that the Judge erred in that he: (1). Misdirected himself in law and in the assessment of plausibility and credibility; (2) Failed to give adequate reasons and misapplication of country guidance; (3) Failed to give adequate reasons for adverse findings; (4) Failed to assess the claim ‘in the round’.
Grounds1 and 2 raises an arguable error, Ground 3-4 amount to a disagreement with the Judge’s findings. The scope of permission is restricted to the first two grounds.
The hearing
5. Ms Revill relied on the grounds. Referring to ground 1 she said that in finding that the Appellant was not at risk the Judge had substituted his own view without considering the country context. At paragraph 24 in referring to the Appellant as a “mere mechanic” who as such would not be of adverse interest there was no reference to any objective evidence. Whereas the Judge is allowed to use ‘common sense’ the Appellant had been accused of causing an accident and it was not a common-sense inference that he would not be of interest. This was a rejection based on implausibility without rationale. The rule 24 response at paragraph 8 mischaracterises what the decision says. In respect of ground 2 the Judge has not given adequate reasons for his finding that the Appellant was in contact with his family. Certain aspects of his account were accepted so he has some credibility and some reasoning is required.
6. In response Mr Sheikh said the Judge had not misdirected himself in law. Referring to paragraph 23 of the decision the Judge accepts the Respondent’s reading of the background evidence finding that the PMF is not in control and this was not in dispute at the hearing. It was Mr Vokes, representing the Appellant, who was being speculative in his submission that the KRI now have an earnest request from the PMF and that they will not “quibble over the life of a mere mechanic”. The common-sense point is that the Judge does not have to place weight on speculation by the Appellant. There is no perversity in the Judge’s decision. In respect of ground 2 questions 41-45 of the asylum interview record show that the Appellant had a passport and ID card issued in Ranya. He says he has no contact with his family because he doesn’t want to put them in danger and does not want anyone to know where he is. It was open to the judge at paragraph 26 not to believe that he was not in contact with his family.
Findings – Error of Law
7. In my judgment the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shows no material error of law. The substance of ground 1 is that the Judge adopted an incorrect approach to credibility by rejecting a central part of the Appellant’s account on the basis of speculative reasoning and assumptions about plausibility rather than assessing the evidence holistically. This cannot be made out. The Appellant’s claim was based on a straightforward one-off event. He and a colleague had changed the brake pads of a PMF vehicle. Shortly thereafter the vehicle crashed killing one of its occupants and injuring others. One of the injured occupants returned to the garage, shot and killed the Appellant’s colleague and attempted to kill the Appellant. The Appellant escaped and two days later with the help of his parents fled the country. He fears that the PMF have a continuing adverse interest in him because they believe that the workmanship of the Appellant and his colleague was defective causing the vehicle’s brakes to fail resulting in the death and injury of PMF members. The judge found firstly that the PMF were not in control of the Appellant’s home area (which was accepted) and secondly that the PMF would not make a request to the KRI for the handover of someone of the Appellant’s status.
8. In my judgment this was a reasonable and fair conclusion to reach with no indication of perversity. The PMF are not in control of the Appellant’s home area. There was an accident resulting from his work as a mechanic in Kirkuk resulting in a personal revenge attack. For the Judge to find at paragraphs 23 and 24 that a person described by his own advocate as a “mere mechanic” would not be the subject of a surrender request from the PMF to the KRI is entirely reasonable. The grounds and Ms Revill’s submission refer to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 warning against reliance on inherent probability in asylum cases. HK v SSHD is of course commonly quoted in cases where a challenge is made to a judge’s findings on credibility. Whilst HK v SSHD does indeed warn against reliance being placed on “inherent probability” in asylum cases it also approves the Awala v SSHD [2005] CSOH 73 guidance that the fact finder is entitled to rely
“on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is or is not plausible”
although this should be
“considered within the context of the applicant’s social and cultural background”.
The Judge has, in my judgment, considered the background evidence, noted that the PMF are not in control of the Appellant’s home area and the nature of the incident that has caused adverse interest, noted the Appellant’s status and reached the common-sense conclusion that the Appellant does not face adverse interest in his home area. In doing so the Judge has taken into account of the Appellant’s evidence and that he is unaware of any adverse interest since he left Iraq and indeed on his evidence has not sought to enquire whether such adverse interest exists.
9. The second ground is without any reasonable foundation. It is asserted that the Judge’s findings that the Appellant remains in contact with his family, that they had assisted him to flee Iraq and that he had deliberately chosen to distance himself from them were made without any engagement with the evidence. In fact, it was the Appellant’s evidence that his parents, his elder sister and her family and his younger brother all live in Iraq (witness statement paragraph 13.) That his parents are currently living in Iraq and that he also has a paternal uncle and aunt living in Iraq (para 15). That his family faced a lot of harassment by the police who frequently visited asking about him (paragraph 45). That his parents arranged for him to leave Iraq (paragraph 48). In this context the Judge’s finding at paragraph 26 of the decision “that the Appellant can reasonably contact his family members in order to obtain a CSID document” is unimpeachable. Indeed, the Appellant made no suggestion that he was unable to contact his family members, it was his clear evidence that he had chosen not to do so even though he knew where they were.
10. I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain an error of law material to the decision to dismiss this appeal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

30 June 2026