Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001362
First-tier Tribunal No: EA/ 07592/2018
LE/03744/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

VERONICA NYARKO
(No ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Waheed, Counsel instructed by Wisemart Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J. Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Ghana. She appeals against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘Judge’) who, in a decision promulgated on 21 December 2025 (‘2025 Decision’), dismissed her appeal (‘2025 Appeal’) against the Respondent’s decision dated 15 June 2021 (‘2021 Refusal’) to refuse the Appellant’s application dated 15 February 2021 (‘2021 Application’) for pre-settled or settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (‘EUSS’) pursuant to Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules as confirmation of her right to reside permanently in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) as the family member of her former spouse Mamadou Baillo Barry, a relevant EEA citizen (‘Sponsor’).
2. Permission to appeal the 2025 Decision to the Upper Tribunal was granted by a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 17 March 2026.
Previous applications and appeals
2016 Decision
3. In March 2015, the Sponsor applied for a registration certificate to confirm his right of residence in the UK. The Appellant applied for a residence card as his unmarried partner (‘2015 Application’). The Sponsor and the Appellant claimed they had been living together since January 2012. The applications were refused by the Respondent on 3 August 2015 on the grounds that the Sponsor had not provided sufficient evidence that he had been exercising Treaty rights. The lack of evidence relating to the Sponsor’s exercise of Treaty rights meant that the Appellant’s application also was refused.
4. The Sponsor and the Appellant appealed the Respondent’s decision (‘2016 Appeal’). In a decision made on the papers dated 28 February 2016 (‘2016 Decision’) (CB, 452-454), a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal found that the evidence provided to the Tribunal was sufficient to show that the Sponsor had been exercising Treaty rights by working. Both applications were remitted to the Respondent for a new decision based on the accepted evidence and findings of fact.
5. On 27 April 2016, the Appellant was issued with a residence card.
2019 Decision
6. On 23 July 2018, the Appellant applied for a residence card (‘2018 Application’) as confirmation of her right to reside permanently in the UK on the basis that she had retained her right of residence after her divorce from the Sponsor.
7. The 2018 Application was refused by the Respondent on 27 November 2018 under Regulation 21(5) with reference to Regulations 10(5), 15(1)(f) and 7 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) (EEA) Regulations 2016 as amended. The Respondent found that Appellant had failed to provide a valid passport or national identity card as evidence of the Sponsor’s identity and nationality; she claimed to have been divorced from the Sponsor in April 2018 but there had been no mention of her marriage to that Sponsor in an unsuccessful 2014 application for a residence card as the unmarried partner of an EEA national, there was no mention of her marriage in her 2015 Application; the divorce certificate provided was considered to be a photocopy and therefore unacceptable to the Respondent; and she had not provided any evidence to support her claim that the Sponsor had left the UK.
8. The Appellant appealed under regulation 36 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the basis that the decision was not in accordance with the law, was contrary to the 2006 Regulations and the immigration rules and breached her rights as a former family member of an EEA national (‘2018 Appeal’).
9. In a decision dated 23 January 2019, (‘2019 Decision’) a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal considered whether the Appellant had retained a right of residence upon her divorce from the Sponsor, and whether that retained right of residence had become permanent by virtue of the regulations (at [13]).
10. The Judge noted at [14] that the Appellant produced with her application form what she claimed is an original divorce certificate from the Circuit Court of Ghana based at Kumasi which records that her marriage to the Sponsor was dissolved on 20 April 2018. She produced a further two copies of the divorce certificate, one black and white and one coloured, to show that the document was an original and not a copy. The copies were certified by William Boampong Esq, a Circuit Judge in Ghana. The Judge observed at [14] that he did not have any evidence before him that Mr Boampong was a Circuit Judge and authorised to certify the document as an original.
11. The Judge observed at [15] that the Appellant was granted a residence card on 27 April 2016 following the successful 2016 Appeal, on the basis that she was an unmarried partner of the Sponsor. The Judge continued at [15]:
“This indicates that even if she was married according to Ghanaian law, it was not a marriage accepted by the respondent or the Judge, if it was mentioned in [the 2016 Appeal], which the respondent claims that it was not. Given that it was not accepted that she was validly married, regulation 10(5) makes it quite clear that only spouse or civil partners will retain a right of residence upon divorce. The appellant has provided no evidence to show that she was married under English or any other law since she obtained her residence card and therefore, since she obtained it on the basis that she was an unmarried partner and not married to the [Sponsor], she cannot claim to have retained a right of residence upon her divorce.
In any event, her divorce was pronounced on April 20, 2018. The evidence which she has produced to show that [the Sponsor] was in employment is his P60 for 2018 which shows his employment up to April 5, 2018. I do not know when the petition for her divorce was made to the Circuit court in Ghana but, if it was after April 5, 2018, there is no evidence that the [the Sponsor] was exercising treaty rights after that date and therefore again she cannot succeed under regulation 10(5).”
12. In relation to whether the Appellant had obtained a permanent right of residence by virtue of residing with an EEA national, who exercised Treaty rights for a period of five years, the Judge found at [17] that she could not meet the requirements of regulation 15(1)(f) because as an unmarried partner of the Sponsor she had not retained her rights of residence following the divorce.
13. The Judge finally considered whether the Appellant could meet the requirements of regulation 15(1)(b) by virtue of having resided with an EEA national in accordance with the regulations for five years at [17]. The Judge concluded at [18] that as the Appellant was recognised as a family member of the Sponsor on 27 April 2016 when she was granted her residence card, she had not shown that the Sponsor had exercised Treaty rights for a continuous period of five years from the time she became a family member. There was no evidence of the Sponsor exercising Treaty rights after April 2018. Therefore, as the Appellant had only resided with the Sponsor in accordance with the regulations for two years, she could not meet the requirements of regulation 15(1)(b).
14. The Judge found that Appellant had not discharged the burden of proof and had not demonstrated that she met all the requirements of Regulations 10(5), 15(1)(b) or (f) for a permanent residence card, and dismissed the appeal (at [19]).
15. The Appellant became appeal rights exhausted on 7 February 2019.
2021 Application
16. With her 2021 Application, the Appellant provided evidence of her proxy marriage celebrated under Ghanian customary law on 15 July 2013 (‘proxy marriage’) and cohabitation with the Sponsor during their relationship. She also provided a divorce certificate issued by the Circuit Court of Ghana, Kumasi certifying that the marriage was terminated by divorce on 20 April 2018.
Reasons for Refusal Letter
17. In the Reasons for Refusal Letter (‘RFRL’) informing the Appellant of the 2021 Refusal Decision (CB, 253-254) the Respondent outlined why the Appellant’s marriage with the Sponsor was not accepted, and therefore she was found not to have met the requirements for settled status as a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen:
“You have applied to the EU Settlement Scheme with Mamadou Baillo Barry as your sponsor. You have previously stated that you are a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen on the basis that you were previously a spouse of a relevant EEA citizen. However, you have not provided sufficient evidence to confirm this. The reasons for this are explained below.
The certificate of divorce you have provided is not sufficient evidence that you were the spouse of an EEA citizen because you informed our offices during a telephone call on 02 September 2019 that you had never been married to your sponsor. Furthermore, it is noted that you applied for a residence card on 17 June 2014 and 02 March 2015 as an unmarried partner of your sponsor and there was no mention of your marriage. Nor was it mentioned during your appeal in 2016 even though the certificate you supplied states you were married on 15 July 2013. Therefore, the marriage is not accepted.
Therefore, you do not meet the requirements for settled status as a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen.
Administrative Review Decision
18. The Appellant applied for administrative review of the 2021 Decision. In her submissions in support of her application for administrative review, the Appellant stated that her marriage to the Sponsor was celebrated legally and recognised under Ghanaian Customary Marriage laws, and therefore the proxy marriage was valid.
19. In a decision dated 4 December 2023 (‘Administrative Review Decision’) (CB, 257-262) the Respondent found that the 2021 Decision was correct. The Administrative Review Decision referenced the Appellant’s 2018 Application for permanent residency, and the 2018 Appeal of the Respondent’s decision to refuse the 2018 Application which was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in the 2019 Decision.
20. In relation to the claimed proxy marriage, the Administrative Review Decision noted that the 2021 Application was not refused on the basis that the proxy marriage was not valid:
“Within your application for administrative review, you assert that the English case law on the validity of Ghanaian customary marriage in England and Wales is concise and unambiguous. You add that Ghanaian proxy marriage unequivocally stands to be recognised as valid by English courts and that the marriage to your ex-partner was celebrated legally and recognised under Ghanaian Customary Marriage laws.
You state that there are no requirements for both parties to a Ghanaian customary marriage to be Ghanaians in order to contract a valid proxy marriage and that neither is there any law forbidding Belgium nationals from contracting proxy marriages under the auspices of Ghanaian Customary Marriage laws. You add that you are Ghanaian and that your parents are Ghanaian. You further state that under Ghanaian Customary Marriage laws, it is not the registration of a proxy marriage matrimonial union that gives effect to the marriage. You add that it is by virtue of the fact that such a proxy marriage complies with customary practices of the particular traditional area of Ghana.
However, on review it is noted that your application has not been refused on the basis that your proxy marriage was not valid. Your application was refused as you did not provide evidence that you had participated in a proxy marriage and evidence to show that the marriage also met the requirements of Ghanaian Customary Marriage laws. Additionally, as highlighted above you have been provided ample opportunity to provide evidence that you have undertaken a proxy marriage, however you have failed to do so. You do not meet the definition of a spouse as defined within Annex 1 of Appendix EU which states that you must have been party to a marriage with a relevant EEA citizen and that the marriage is recognised under the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland or of the Islands. However, as you have not provided evidence of a legal marriage you have not shown that you meet this definition and so you cannot be considered to be a spouse as per the EU Settlement Scheme.
Within your application you make reference to the case laws, Yaotey v Quaye (1961) and McCabe v McCabe (1994) which are in relation to Ghanaian proxy marriages and the conditions to be met in order for a customary marriage to be considered valid. You assert that in your case, it has been established all the conditions prescribed by Yaotey v Quaye (1961) and McCabe v McCabe (1994) comply with the tenets of Ghanaian Customary Marriage law were all satisfied to the letter and spirit of the law, therefore going on the principle of lex loci celebrations, the party’s 15 July 2013 proxy marriage was valid under the English law abi nisio. You also raise the case law of Kareem (proxy marriages EU law) [2014] UKUT which highlights that proxy marriages can be accepted as valid if conducted under customary law. However as stated above, your application was not refused in relation to the validity of a proxy marriage. Your application was refused as you failed to provided evidence that you were the spouse of an EEA citizen and that you had undertaken a proxy marriage as claimed. Additionally, you have not provided any evidence to show that the claimed proxy marriage was undertaken or that it met the conditions of Ghanaian Customary Marriage law in order for it to be considered as valid.”
Respondent’s Review
21. The Respondent’s Review dated 25 October 2024 (CB, 446-447) identified in the ‘Schedule of issues’ “[w]hether the Appellant had demonstrated she is a family member who had retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with relevant EEA citizen.”
22. At [6] the Respondent stated her finding that were no grounds to overturn the 2025 Decision:
“[The Respondent] on conducting their (sic) review establishes that there are no grounds to overturn the decision to refuse. As a result, the grounds of the refusal are maintained. The [Respondent] continues to rely on the RFRL in its entirety. [The Appellant] has failed to provide sufficient evidence to confirm that [she] is a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen. Therefore, the [Respondent] can find no reason to differ from the consideration in the RFRL.”
2025 Decision
23. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from the Appellant who confirmed the content of her witness statement dated 1 October 2024, and from the Appellant’s friend, Mr Patrick Gyamfi, who confirmed the content of his witness statement dated 16 February 2025. Both the Appellant and Mr Gyamfi were cross-examined by the Respondent’s representative, and the parties made oral submissions.
24. The Judge noted at [5] that the parties’ representatives agreed that the sole issue for determination was whether the Applicant and Sponsor were married on 15 July 2013.
25. The Judge considered the documentary evidence on which the Appellant relied (at [8]). This comprised the documents registering the marriage of the Appellant and the Sponsor, including a statutory declaration of relatives of the couple dated 6 July 2021 confirming their customary marriage; the Appellant’s divorce petition and affidavit of 15 January 2018; the Sponsor’s affidavit of 16 March 2018 and answer to the petition of 27 March 2018, and the certificate of divorce dated 20 April 2018 (‘Ghanaian documents’). In addition, the Appellant relied on two proposal confirmation forms from Aviva Insurance prepared on 14 March 2014 and 1 April 2014 (‘Aviva documents’) regarding a life insurance plan, naming both the Appellant and Sponsor as beneficiaries and stating that the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor is “husband and wife”.
26. The Judge noted that it is for the Appellant to establish that the Ghanian and the Aviva documents are documents upon which the Tribunal can properly place reliance, and the Tribunal is “required to consider whether the documents are [ones] on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.” (at [9]).
27. In relation to the Ghanaian documents, the Judge noted at [10] that the Appellant did not give any details in her witness statement about how she sought the divorce in Ghana whilst residing in the United Kingdom. The Appellant did not state whether she was assisted by anyone in Ghana to prepare and file the documents initiating the divorce. Nor did she state how she obtained the Ghanaian documents to provide them to the Tribunal in support of her appeal (at [10]).
28. In relation to the Aviva documents, the Judge noted at [10] that there was no mention of these in the Appellant’s witness statement. The Appellant provided no detail about the circumstances surrounding the decision to enter into the policy, and there was no evidence of any payment of the premiums. The Appellant did not state how she located the Aviva documents to provide them to the Tribunal (at [10). Noting that the documents were “central” to the Appellant’s case, the Judge found “this lack of detail surprising.” Notwithstanding the content of the Aviva documents and their apparently contemporaneous nature, the Judge found that the lack detail undermined their reliability (at [10]).
29. The Judge also considered the various bank statements, payslips, tax and employment records, utilities bills, and tenancy documents produced by the Appellant. The Judge found that these documents did not support the contention that the Appellant and the Sponsor were married on 15 July 2013, or on any other date (at [11]).
30. The Judge observed that in his witness statement, Mr Gyamfi purported to confirm that the Appellant and the Sponsor were indeed married and then later divorced. However, Mr Gyamfi did not meet the Appellant until 2015, some two years after the marriage is said to have been formalised. The Judge noted that Mr Gyamfi did not explain in his statement the source of his knowledge of the marriage, other than to say that he visited the Appellant and the Sponsor at their home and spent time with them. In his oral evidence, Mr Gyamfi confirmed that he would meet with the Appellant socially, around once a month. The Judge concluded that Mr Gyamfi’s evidence about the marriage between the Appellant and the Sponsor should be given “very little weight” (at [12]).
31. The Judge considered that the “best evidence” of the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor is what the Appellant had said, and what had been said on her behalf, about the marriage in her previous applications for leave and in previous appeals to the Tribunal. The Judge noted that this evidence “is significantly closer in time to the date of the alleged marriage between the Appellant and the Sponsor and is not tainted by subsequent events, such as the breakdown of the relationship between them” (at [13]).
32. The Judge noted that in her 2015 Application, the Appellant applied for a residence card in the United Kingdom as the unmarried partner of the Sponsor. The 2015 Application was refused, and the Appellant appealed the decision. The 2016 Appeal was successful, and on 27 April 2016 the Appellant was issued a residency card as the unmarried partner of the Sponsor (at [13]) as she had stated in her 2015 Application.
33. The Judge observed at [14] that the Appellant’s explanation in her witness statement for her “failure to make any mention of her marriage to the Sponsor in her 2015 application and 2016 appeal” is set out “in surprisingly brief terms” considering “its centrality to this appeal.” The Appellant stated that she was introduced by a friend to an agent named ‘Malik’ to assist her with her 2015 Application. She gave Malik all her documents (including those relating to her marriage) and Malik made the application on her behalf. She said she relied on Malik to make the correct application. The Appellant acknowledged that it was “unfortunate” that the 2015 Application was completed incorrectly, but she should not be penalised for Malik’s error (CB, 27 [3]).
34. The Judge noted at [15] that in her statement the Appellant did not identify the friend who introduced her to Malik, and she gave no detail about Malik himself. She did not say where she met Malik nor how she contacted him. Nor did she state whether she paid Malik for his services, or whether she asked him to account for his failure to make the 2015 Application on the correct basis. There is no indication of whether the Appellant had asked Malik to give evidence in support of her position in this appeal, or whether she has taken any action against Malik in respect of the advice he gave her. The Judge found this lack of important detail “undermines the credibility of the Appellant’s account about the involvement of Malik in making the 2015 application on what is now said to be an incorrect basis.” (at [15]).
35. The Judge further noted at [16] that the Appellant had given no explanation for pursuing the 2016 Appeal and failing to mention her marriage to the Sponsor in those appeal proceedings. It was not in dispute that the Appellant represented herself in the 2016 Appeal, and there was no suggestion that Malik was involved. The Judge observed that whereas the Appellant stated in her witness statement that she “answered all questions based on our relationship as a married couple” (CB, 28 [7]), the 2016 Appeal was dealt with on the papers. The Judge noted that it was the Appellant’s responsibility “to formulate accurate grounds of appeal setting out the basis on which the refusal was challenged.” The Judge concluded that the Appellant’s failure to mention her marriage to the Sponsor in the 2016 Appeal undermined the credibility of the account that she had given in the current proceedings that she was married to the Sponsor in 2016 and had at that time been married to him for the previous three years (at [16]).
36. Having considered all the evidence in the round, and notwithstanding the documents before the Tribunal, the Judge was not satisfied on balance that the Appellant was married to the Sponsor on 15 July 2013 or at any other material time. She found that the lack of detail given by the Appellant and her “failure to provide any reasonable explanation for the different account that she gave in 2015 and 2016,” after the marriage is said to have been formalised, “fundamentally undermines her account” and the reliance that can be properly placed on the documents that the Appellant had provided (at [17]).
Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal
37. The Appellant sought to appeal on the following four grounds which she detailed in her Grounds of Application (GOA) dated 6 January 2026:
(1) Material misdirection in the assessment of documentary evidence
(2) Failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting contemporaneous corroborative evidence
(3) Irrational reliance on historic immigration applications and failure to consider the legal context of proxy marriages
(4) Unlawful treatment of witness evidence.
38. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds (CB, 11). In granting the appeal, the Upper Tribunal Judge stated:
“The grounds assert that the Judge erred in her approach to, and assessment of, the documentary evidence, that she failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting corroborative contemporaneous evidence, in her reliance on historical immigration applications, and in her treatment of the evidence of the witness.
The sole issue before the Judge was whether the Appellant was married on 15 July 2013. The absence of detail in her witness statement concerning the documents on which she relied was, arguably, insufficient grounds for rejecting her account, especially when some of the matters relied upon were not put to her during the hearing. The grounds are interlinked.
I accept that there is an arguable error of law in the manner in which the Judge treated the evidence in this appeal. Consequently, I grant permission to appeal. All grounds are arguable, given that they are inextricably linked.”
39. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 response (‘R24’) dated 2 April 2026 (CB, 12-13), and the Appellant filed a Rule 25 reply (‘A25’) dated 15 May 2026 (CB, 14-17).
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
40. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. The Tribunal had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant (‘CB’).
41. The Tribunal heard oral submissions from Mr Waheed for the Appellant, and Ms Isherwood for the Respondent, which have been fully taken into account together with the R24 and the A25.
Preliminary matters
42. Ms Isherwood drew my attention to the 2019 Decision which was not included in the CB. She realised that there were documents missing from the CB because of the reference in the 2025 Decision at [2] to the 470-page stitched hearing bundle, while the CB is 457 pages. Ms Isherwood located the 2019 Decision and sent it to the Appellant and the Tribunal.
43. Mr Waheed observed that the Respondent did not seek to rely on the 2019 Decision in the RFRL (CB, 253-254). It made no mention of the 2019 Decision, nor was there any reliance on the findings of 2019 Decision. There also was no mention of the 2019 Decision in the Respondent’s Review (CB, 446-447).
44. Mr Waheed explained that when the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument (‘ASA’) (CB, 21-24) for the 2025 Appeal was drafted, counsel was not alive to the 2019 Decision. Further, the Respondent did not seek to rely on the 2019 Decision in the 2025 Appeal. The Judge noted at [5] that the parties agreed at the hearing that there was a single issue for determination in the appeal. It appears the Judge was not aware of the 2019 Decision by service or submission and neither party sought to rely on it.
Appellant’ submissions
45. Mr Waheed informed the Tribunal that he was relying on the Appellant’s GOA (CB, 5-10) and A25, prepared by counsel, Adeel Malik, who is to be distinguished from ‘Malik’, the agent who assisted the Appellant with her 2015 Application.
46. Mr Waheed said that he departs from the written submissions of counsel Adeel Malik on behalf of the Appellant in one respect. This is in relation to the complaint about the agent ‘Malik’ in so far as when he made the 2015 Application on behalf of the Appellant and described her as ‘unmarried’ this was not an inaccurate description of her marital status because at that time the law did not recognise proxy marriages. The Appellant did not consider that she was married because, although she and the Sponsor were married under Ghanian customary law, she thought that to be legally married a church ceremony was required. It was only when the Appellant sought to separate from the Sponsor that she found out that she was in fact married, and she would need to obtain a divorce (CB, 428). This is why she did not previously mention to the Respondent that she was or had been married.
Ground 1 – Material misdirection in the assessment of documentary evidence
47. The Judge materially erred in law in her approach to, and assessment of, the documentary evidence relating to the Appellant’s marriage and divorce, as set out at [8] to [10] of the Decision (GOA [5]). The Judge erred in her approach to the assessment of documentary evidence and the irrational rejection of formally issued court documents on immaterial bases (A25 [2]).
48. The Appellant accepts the principles in Tanveer Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 439 (‘Tanveer Ahmed’) and contends that the Judge misapplied those principles (A25 [3]).
49. The Appellant relied upon a coherent and internally consistent body of Ghanaian documentation evidencing a customary marriage and subsequent divorce, including (GOA [6]):
(a) The Appellant’s divorce petition and supporting aﬀidavit dated 15 January 2018 (CB, 30-32).
(b) The Sponsor’s aﬀidavit dated 16 March 2018 and answer to the petition dated 27 March 2018 (CB, 34, 36-37).
(c) A certificate of divorce dated 20 April 2018 issued by the Circuit Court of Ghana, Kumasi (CB, 40).
(d) A statutory declaration dated 6 July 2021 of relatives of the Appellant and the Sponsor confirming their customary marriage together with the ID cards of the declarants (CB, 41-42, 44-45).
50. The Judge did not reject the Ghanaian documents on the basis of forgery, inconsistency within the documents themselves, or expert evidence undermining their authenticity. The Judge rejected the Ghanian documents primarily because the Appellant did not provide suﬀicient narrative detail as to how she pursued divorce proceedings from the UK, whether anyone in Ghana assisted her, and how she later obtained the documents (GOA [8]; A25 [4]).
51. Those matters are peripheral to the reliability of the Ghanian documents. They cannot rationally justify the rejection of a coherent body of mutually corroborative documentary evidence (A25 [5]). The absence of ancillary narrative detail does not rationally justify rejecting formally issued court documents, particularly where those documents are internally consistent and mutually corroborative (GOA [11]).
52. The Judge failed to engage with the fact that the Sponsor actively participated in the divorce proceedings, including filing sworn aﬀidavits, the divorce certificate emanated from a competent Ghanaian court, which materially supports the authenticity and reliability of the documents (GOA [10]), and no allegation of forgery or fabrication was advanced by the Respondent.
53. The Judge’s approach amounts to a material misdirection. The Judge failed to assess the Ghanaian documents for what they objectively demonstrate, and instead discounted them for peripheral reasons unrelated to authenticity, reliability, or legal validity. (GOA [9]). The Judge’s conclusion at [17] is therefore unsafe (GOA [12]).
54. In the 2019 Decision at [14], the Judge made no finding that the Ghanaian documents were unreliable or forged or legally invalid (GOA [7]). The Judge made observations about the documents, but no findings were made.
55. The R24 fails to engage with the central complaint in the Grounds, namely that the Judge substituted speculation about missing narrative detail for an actual assessment of the objective evidential value of the documents (A25 [6]).
56. Further, permission to appeal was expressly granted on the basis that the absence of such detail was “arguably insufficient grounds for rejecting her account”, particularly where some matters relied upon were not put to the Appellant during the hearing (A25 [7]).
Ground 2 – Failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting contemporaneous corroborative evidence
57. The Judge erred in law by failing to give adequate or lawful reasons for rejecting contemporaneous third-party evidence demonstrating that the Appellant and Sponsor held themselves out as husband and wife (GOA [13]).
58. The Judge noted at [8(b)] that the Appellant relied on the Aviva documents expressly describing the relationship as “husband and wife” (CB, 122-170) (GOA [14]). The Aviva documents are contemporaneous with the claimed July 2013 marriage date; created by an independent third party; and created prior to the 2015 Application and more than a decade prior to the 2021 Application. No issue was taken by the Respondent as to the authenticity of these documents. The Appellant was not cross-examined on them, and no allegation of fabrication or unreliability was made (GOA [15[-[16]).
59. The Judge discounted the Aviva documents on the basis that they were not mentioned in the Appellant’s witness statement, that there was no evidence of premium payments, and that the Appellant did not explain how she located them (at [10]) (GOA [17]; A25 [10]). None of those matters were put to the Appellant in cross-examination or otherwise raised during the hearing (A25 [11]). The Appellant could not reasonably have anticipated that adverse findings would be drawn from the absence of evidence regarding premium payments or document retrieval, particularly given the Respondent had not challenged authenticity; no allegation of fabrication had been made; the documents were plainly contemporaneous and independently generated; and the documents pre-date the current proceedings (A25 [12]).
60. The Judge relied on matters that were never put to the Appellant during her oral evidence. This approach was procedurally unfair. If the Tribunal intended to draw adverse inferences from these points, the Appellant was entitled to have them put to her so that she could provide an explanation. The failure to do so deprived her of a fair opportunity to address the concerns, contrary to established principles of procedural fairness and the requirement that credibility findings must not be based on untested assumptions (GOA [18]).
61. The Respondent’s reliance upon Hima v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 680 (‘Hima’) and Secretary of State For the Home Department v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 (‘Maheshwaran’) (R24 [6]) does not answer the procedural unfairness identified in the Grounds (A25 [8]). The issue is not whether a judge may reflect upon evidence after a hearing. The issue is whether adverse credibility findings were based upon matters never put to the Appellant, depriving her of any opportunity to respond (A25 [9]).
62. In any event, these matters do not undermine the probative value of the documents. The central issue is the nature of the Appellant’s relationship with the Sponsor, not the operation of the insurance policy. (GOA [19]). The Respondent’s submission at R24 [5], that “the nature of the relationship is” central, supports the Appellant’s case because that is precisely what the Aviva documents corroborate. (A25 [14]).
63. The Judge failed to consider that the Appellant could not reasonably have anticipated, at the time the documents were created, that they would later be required as evidence in the current proceedings (GOA [20]).
64. The contemporaneous nature of the Aviva documents is central to their probative value. The Judge failed adequately to engage with the fact that the documents recorded the parties as ‘husband and wife’ in 2014, shortly after the claimed marriage in July 2013, and long before the 2021 Application (A25 [13]). The Judge’s failure to engage with the substance and timing of this evidence constitutes a material failure to give reasons (GOA [21]).
65. The Appellant maintains that the Judge’s rejection of this evidence was procedurally unfair and inadequately reasoned (A25 [15]).
Ground 3 – Irrational reliance on historic immigration applications and failure to consider the legal context of proxy marriages
66. The Judge erred in law by treating the Appellant’s 2015 Application as an unmarried partner and the 2016 Decision as determinative of the factual issue of whether a marriage existed (GOA [21]).
67. The Judge described the 2015 Application and 2016 Appeal as “the best evidence” of the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor without considering the legal reality at the time (A25 [18]). In 2015 and 2016, proxy marriages were not generally accepted for EEA purposes following the decisions in Kareem (Proxy Marriages – EU Law) Nigeria [2014] UKUT 24 (‘Kareem’) and TA and Others (Kareem explained) Ghana [2014] UKUT 316 (‘TA’) (GOA [23]). That omission was material because it directly informed the adverse inference drawn against the Appellant for not earlier relying upon the proxy marriage (A25 [19]).
68. It was not until Awuku v Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘Awuku’) [2017] EWCA Civ 178, that the Court of Appeal overturned Kareem, and confirmed that the recognition of marriages is governed by domestic private international law and that proxy marriages valid by the lex loci celebrations are recognised in England and Wales. (GOA [24]). The Court of Appeal in Awuku held that there was no role for EU law in determining the validity of marriage, and that Kareem had wrongly displaced established domestic principles (GOA [25]). In that legal context, there was little practical purpose for the Appellant to rely on her proxy marriage in the 2015 Application, as such marriages were not being accepted for residence card applications at the time (GOA [26]). The Judge failed to consider this highly material context when drawing adverse credibility findings from the Appellant’s earlier applications (GOA [27]).
69. The Respondent’s submission at R24 [7] that the Kareem/Awuku point is “not now open” to the Appellant is unsustainable (A25 [16]). The legal context surrounding proxy marriages was directly relevant to the weight capable of being attached to the Appellant's earlier applications as an unmarried partner. The Grounds do not seek to raise a new factual case, but identify a material legal context which the Judge failed to consider when assessing credibility (A25 [17]).
70. The Respondent’s reliance at R24 [7] on Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) (‘Lata’) is misplaced. The issue before the Upper Tribunal is whether the Judge materially erred in law in the reasoning process. The legal framework applicable at the relevant time is plainly capable of informing that assessment (A25 [20]).
71. The representations of ‘Malik’ in relation to the Appellant being unmarried have to be considered in their legal context of what the law was at the time (Kareem) not what the Appellant herself believed. Malik’s representation that the Applicant was unmarried was correct, because she was not married according to Kareem. The Appellant’s belief was founded on a different basis, that that a church ceremony was required for a lawful marriage. Although the Appellant may not know the legal basis on which ‘Malik’ made the 2015 Application, counsel can make submissions in respect of this. The First-tier Tribunal should have knowledge of relevant jurisprudence and take this into account. The Judge would be cognisant of the earlier authorities and their implications, and she cannot make a decision in a jurisprudential legal vacuum.
72. The Appellant’s explanation that the 2015 Application was prepared by an agent named ‘Malik’ was dismissed by the Judge without proper consideration. The complaint is not merely that the Judge rejected the explanation. The complaint is that the Judge relied upon speculative credibility concerns without properly engaging with the Appellant’s circumstances, including that she was not legally represented in the 2016 Appeal; that the earlier proceedings were dealt with on the papers; that she did not give oral evidence in those proceedings; and that the historical legal context made reliance upon proxy marriage practically unattractive at the time (A25 [21], GOA [28]).
73. The Judge further erred procedurally by relying on a series of adverse credibility concerns without putting those concerns to the Appellant during her oral evidence. Fundamental fairness required that the Appellant be given an opportunity to respond to these matters before they were relied upon (GOA [29]). This failure amounts to procedural unfairness and further undermines the safety of the findings (GOA [30], (A25 [22]).
Ground 4 – Unlawful treatment of witness evidence
74. The Judge erred in law in her treatment of the evidence of Mr Gyamfi at [12] (GOA, CB, 9 [31]). The Judge failed to engage with the substance of Mr Gyamfi’s evidence beyond the fact that he had not witnessed the marriage ceremony (A25 [26]). The Judge discounted Mr Gyamfi’s evidence almost entirely on the basis that he met the Appellant in 2015 (GOA [33]). This reasoning is irrational. A witness is not required to have attended a marriage ceremony to give probative evidence as to whether a couple were married, particularly where the evidence concerns how the parties lived and held themselves out socially (GOA [34]). Mr Gyamfi's evidence was capable of corroborating how the parties presented themselves socially and domestically following the claimed marriage. The fact that he met the Appellant in 2015 did not render his evidence devoid of probative value (A25 [25]).
75. The Respondent at R24 [8] seeks to characterise this as a pure rationality challenge. That is an over-simplification of the Ground (A25 [23]). The complaint is not merely that the Judge attached little weight to Mr Gyamfi’s evidence. The Judge failed to consider Mr Gyamfi’s evidence cumulatively with the documentary evidence (GOA [35]). The Judge failed to consider his evidence alongside the contemporaneous Aviva documentation, the Ghanaian divorce documents, and the wider evidence of cohabitation and relationship history (A25 [27]). The Ground concerns a failure to conduct a lawful holistic assessment of the evidence rather than mere disagreement with weight (A25 [28]).
Respondent’s submissions
76. Ms Isherwood submitted that it is the Appellant’s responsibility to inform her legal representatives of previous proceedings. The 2019 Decision was uploaded on 4 October 2024 and was accessible to the Appellant’s representatives. Contrary to Mr Waheed’s submission, there is no evidence before the Tribunal that the representatives of both parties were aware of the 2019 Decision, but decided to narrow the issues to whether the Sponsor and Appellant were married.
77. In the 2019 Decision, the Judge referred at [14] to the divorce certificate and the copies the Appellant produced which are said to have been certified by the Ghanian Circuit judge. The Judge noted that there is no evidence that the Ghanian judge is a Circuit judge, and that he was authorised to certify the document as an original. This has not been addressed by the Appellant in this appeal.
78. In the 2019 Decision, the Judge noted at [15] that the Appellant was granted a residence card in April 2016 on the basis that she was an unmarried partner of the Sponsor. This has not been addressed by the Appellant in this appeal, other than in relation to ‘Malik’, about which no evidence has been provided. The Judge found that there was no evidence that the Appellant had married under English or any other law since she obtained her residence card, and therefore she was not married to an EEA national and could not claim to have retained a right of residence following her divorce.
Ground 1 – Material misdirection in the assessment of documentary evidence
79. Tanveer Ahmed requires the decision-maker to look at documentary evidence in the round. The Judge did just that by considering the provenance of the documents and their inconsistency with the Appellant’s earlier claims to have been an unmarried partner of the Sponsor (R24 [4]).
80. The Appellant’s GOA at [5]ff is merely a disagreement with the Judge’s findings because findings have been made in relation to the divorce certificate and its unreliability. The GOA at [10] does not refer to any evidence in the Appellant’s statement that it is claimed was not considered by the Judge at [10].
81. In relation to the Aviva documents, the Judge noted the absence of evidence in relation to payments made und the policy (at [10]). The Judge was entitled to make this finding. The Appellant was aware of the issues in the appeal.
Ground 2 – Failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting contemporaneous corroborative evidence
82. The Appellant’s GOA at [16] is worded as if the burden were on the Respondent to prove documents are unreliable, not on the Appellant to demonstrate that they are reliable (R24 [5]. As the GOA at [19] acknowledge, what is central is the nature of the Appellant’s relationship with the Sponsor, not the operation of the Aviva insurance policy (R24 [5]).
83. The Respondent relies on Hima at [51] for why the Judge was not obliged to mention these points to the Appellant at the hearing. The Appellant provided the documents in the hope that the Judge would find they supported her case. She could have foreseen the relevance of how she obtained them. Also relevant is Maheshwaran, which recognises at [3] that judges are allowed to ‘ponder’ on the evidence and make observations in judgments which occur to them after the hearing (R24 [6]).
84. Ground 2 is misconceived as the Judge considered the documentary evidence and witness statements and made findings that were open to her to make. In relation to the evidence of Mr Gyamfi, it was considered by the Judge, and she did not reject the evidence, but gave it very little weight at [12], which she is entitled to do.
Ground 3 – Irrational reliance on historic immigration applications and failure to consider the legal context of proxy marriages
85. This point is one which appears for the first time in the Grounds, so it is not now open to the Appellant to make: Lata at [31]-[34]. It is for the parties to put their case (Lata headnote 1, 4 and 7) and this was not done on behalf of the Appellant. In AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370 (‘AL’) the Court of Appeal at [6] expressly endorsed the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Lata.
86. This point was not raised in the Appellant’s ASA nor her witness statement, which addresses the applications she made as a durable partner rather than a spouse. If ‘Malik’ had these cases in mind when preparing the application, that tends to suggest detailed legal knowledge, which in turn only amplifies the Judge’s point at [15]. The Judge’s approach, noting the lack of attempt to trace or challenge him is in accordance with BT (Former solicitors’ alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004] UKIAT 00311 (R24 [7]). In the A25, the Appellant does not raise the new issue point, but states that the legal context needed to be considered. This was not in the ASA before the Judge or in the GOA or grounds.
Ground 4 – Unlawful treatment of witness evidence
87. This is a rationality challenge which is a high bar. It is plainly not irrational for the Judge to afford little weight to the evidence of someone who met a couple two years after their claimed marriage, and has not in detail explained how, in the absence of having witnessed the nuptials, they know that the couple are married and not merely cohabiting (R24 [8]). The evidence of Mr Gyamfi’s is said to corroborate the Appellant’s account. The Judge at [12] stated that she has given it little weight.
88. The Judge considered the ‘Malik’ point at [14]. The Appellant did not provide any detail about ‘Malik’, and this undermined the credibility of the Appellant’s account about the involvement of Malik in making the 2015 Application, on what the Appellant now claims to have be an incorrect basis (at [15]). In the 2016 Appeal the Appellant made no mention of her marriage to the Sponsor. She represented herself in the 2016 Appeal and Malik was not involved. This undermines the credibility of the account that she now gives that she was married to the Sponsor at this time, and had been so married for three years (at [16]). The Judge considered the Appellant’s witness statement and oral evidence, and the history of her applications, and it was open to her to make the findings.
89. The Respondent submits that the 2025 Decision contains no, or no material, error of law (R24 [9]).
Disposal
90. Mr Waheed submitted that because the Appellant had not had a fair opportunity to answer questions about the documentation, there may not be enough findings of fact for it to be retained in the Upper Tribunal. If the matter were remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, there could be a proper examination of the evidence which had not previously occurred.
91. Ms Isherwood submitted that whether the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal will depend on what error, if any, is found. The matter has been the subject of three appeals and an administrative review, and it is in the interest of the parties to bring it to a conclusion, and therefore it is desirable that it be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Decision on error of law
92. Having carefully considered the oral and written submissions made by the parties and the relevant parts of the 2025 Decision, I have concluded, for the reasons that follow, that the 2025 Decision does not contain a material error of law and shall stand.
93. When considering whether the Judge made a material error of law, I remind myself of the limited circumstances in which an appellate tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]:
“An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
i) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
ii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iii) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
iv) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ’s conclusion was rationally insupportable.
v) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
94. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
95. These principles were recently approved by Bean LJ in Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 at [20]-[21, and Dove LJ in MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at [36].
Ground 1 – Material misdirection in the assessment of documentary evidence
96. In Tanveer Ahmed, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) provided the following principles relevant to the approach to documentary evidence in asylum and human rights cases at [38]:
“1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”
97. In its decision, the IAT elaborated on these principles at [31]:
“It is trite immigration and asylum law that we must not judge what is or is not likely to happen in other countries by reference to our perception of what is normal within the United Kingdom. The principle applies as much to documents as to any other form of evidence. We know from experience and country information that there are countries where it is easy and often relatively inexpensive to obtain ‘forged’ documents. Some of them are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Some are ‘genuine’ to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Examples are birth, death and marriage certificates from certain countries, which can be obtained from the proper source for a ‘fee’, but contain information which is wholly or partially untrue. The permutations of truth, untruth, validity and ‘genuineness’ are enormous. At its simplest we need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true. They are separate questions. It is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is ‘forged’ or even ‘not genuine’. It is necessary to shake off any preconception that official looking documents are genuine, based on experience of documents in the United Kingdom, and to approach them with an open mind".
98. The IAT stated further at [35]-[36]:
“In almost all cases it would be an error to concentrate on whether a document is a forgery. In most cases where forgery is alleged it will be of no great importance whether this is or is not made out to the required higher civil standard. In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).
There is no obligation on the Home Office to make detailed enquiries about documents produced by individual claimants. Doubtless there are cost and logistical difficulties in the light of the number of documents submitted by many asylum claimants. In the absence of a particular reason on the facts of an individual case a decision by the Home Office not to make inquiries, produce in-country evidence relating to a particular document or scientific evidence should not give rise to any presumption in favour of an individual claimant or against the Home Office.”
99. In QC (verification documents; Mibanga duty) [2021] UKUT 33 (‘QC’) the Upper Tribunal provided the following guidance to the correct approach to documentary evidence adduced in immigration appeals at headnote 1:
“Verification of documents
(1) The decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 remains good law as regards the correct approach to documents adduced in immigration appeals. The overarching question for the judicial fact-finder will be whether the document in question can be regarded as reliable. An obligation on the respondent to take steps to verify the authenticity of the document relied on by an appellant will arise only exceptionally (in the sense of rarely). This will be where the document is central to the claim; can easily be authenticated; and where (as in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/11)), authentication is unlikely to leave any “live” issue as to the reliability of its contents. It is for the tribunal to decide, in all the circumstances of the case, whether the obligation arises. If the respondent does not fulfil the obligation, the respondent cannot challenge the authenticity of the document in the proceedings; but that does not necessarily mean the respondent cannot question the reliability of what the document says. In all cases, it remains the task of the judicial fact-finder to assess the document’s relevance to the claim in the light of, and by reference to, the rest of the evidence.”
100. Consistently with these authorities, it was for the Appellant to show that the documents on which she sought to rely could be relied upon. The burden did not lie with the Respondent to verify the authenticity of the documents, unless the limited circumstances identified in QC were present. The overarching question for the Judge was whether the documents could be regarded as reliable
101. Although the Judge did not cite Tanveer Ahmed, she approached the task of assessing the reliability of the documents consistently with the principles outlined in Tanveer Ahmed (at 9]). The Judge did not view each document in isolation in considering whether it was a document on which reliance should properly be placed. The Judge did not find that the Ghanaian documents were forgeries, and she was not required to do so. Having considered the evidence as a whole, including the documentary evidence on which the Appellant relied, and the information, or lack thereof about these documents in the Appellant’s witness statement, the Judge found that the documents were not reliable (at [10]). The Judge made this finding after looking at all the evidence in the round. I am satisfied that the Judge reached findings on the reliability and credibility of the documentary evidence on which the Appellant relied, including the Aviva documents, having considered the evidence in the round, and that she made findings that were open to her to make.
102. I am satisfied that the findings made by the Judge were open to her to make on the evidence before the Tribunal, and there is no error of law. It follows that I am not satisfied that Ground 1 is made out.
Ground 2 – Failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting contemporaneous corroborative evidence
103. In Hima, William Davis LJ, with whom the rest of the Court of Appeal agreed, made clear at [51]:
“Whether a failure to alert an appellant to an issue upon which the FTT proposes to rely in making its decision amounts to procedural unfairness will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. Where a party might reasonably expect the FTT to reach a view on a particular point, there generally will be no unfairness in the FTT not drawing attention to that issue. Thus, where inconsistencies are used to support a decision, it will not normally be necessary for the FTT to draw the attention of the parties to those inconsistencies: SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 . “
104. In Maheshwaran, Schiemann LJ in his reasons for judgment of the Court stated at [4]-[6]:
“Undoubtedly a failure to put to a party to litigation a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice. He must have a proper opportunity to deal with the point. Adjudicators must bear this in mind. Where a point is expressly conceded by one party it will usually be unfair to decide the case against the other party on the basis that the concession was wrongly made, unless the tribunal indicates that it is minded to take that course. Cases can occur when fairness will require the reopening of an appeal because some point of significance – perhaps arising out of a post hearing decision of the higher courts – requires it. However, such cases will be rare.
Where much depends on the credibility of a party and when that party makes several inconsistent statements which are before the decision maker, that party manifestly has a forensic problem. Some will choose to confront the inconsistencies straight on and make evidential or forensic submissions on them. Others will hope that ‘least said, soonest mended’ and consider that forensic concentration on the point will only make matters worse and that it would be better to try and switch the tribunal’s attention to some other aspect of the case. Undoubtedly it is open to the tribunal expressly to put a particular inconsistency to a witness because it considers that the witness may not be alerted to the point or because it fears that it may have perceived something as inconsistent with an earlier answer which in truth is not inconsistent. Fairness may in some circumstances require this to be done but this will not be the usual case. Usually the tribunal, particularly if the party is represented, will remain silent and see how the case unfolds.
The requirements of fairness are very much conditioned by the facts of each case. This has been stressed in innumerable decisions – see the many citations to this effect in Rees v Crane [1994] 2 AC 173. We have no doubt that the claimant’s submission is framed in terms which are far too wide and in words which are not to be rigidly applied to every situation. Whether a particular course is consistent with fairness is essentially an intuitive judgment which is to be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case – see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 per Lord Mustill at p.560D ...”
105. I am satisfied that there was no procedural unfairness in the Judge making adverse credibility findings and drawing adverse inferences on matters which were not put to the Appellant during her oral evidence.
106. The Appellant was clearly on notice that the issue of her claimed marriage to the Sponsor would be central to her case, and aware that the Judge would be required to make findings in respect of her relationship with the Sponsor. The Appellant was put on notice by the RFRL that the Respondent did not accept her claimed marriage to the Sponsor. The Appellant was also put on notice by the Administrative Review Decision that the 2021 Application was not refused on the basis of the validity of a proxy marriage. The Respondent’s Review at [6] reiterated that the Appellant had “failed to provide sufficient evidence to confirm that [she] is a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant EEA citizen.”
107. I am satisfied that there was no procedural unfairness in the Appellant not being given the opportunity to provide an explanation for matters which were the bases on which the Judge found her evidence unreliable. The Judge was entitled to discount the Aviva documents, including for reason that there was no evidence of any premium payments having been made, or of how the Appellant located the documents, in circumstances when the Appellant was clearly on notice that the nature of her relationship with the Sponsor was central to her case.
108. It follows that I am not satisfied that Ground 2 is made out.
Ground 3 – Irrational reliance on historic immigration applications and failure to consider the legal context of proxy marriages
109. The issue central to this Ground is whether the Judge materially erred in law in having regard to the Appellant’s previous immigration applications and failing to consider the legal context of proxy marriages.
110. The Judge stated at [13] that in her judgment the “best evidence” of the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor was what she had said, and what had been said on her behalf “in her previous applications for leave and in her previous appeals to this Tribunal.” The Judge’s references to “previous applications” and “previous appeals” indicates that the Judge was aware of the Appellant’s 2015 Application and subsequent 2016 Appeal, and apparently also the Appellant’s 2018 Application and subsequent 2018 Appeal. In neither of these Applications nor Appeals did the Appellant mention her proxy marriage. The 2018 Application was lodged and the 2018 Appeal was determined in the 2019 Decision after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Awuku in 2017. The 2018 Application was made and the 2018 Appeal was determined at a time when proxy marriages valid by the lex loci celebrations were recognised in England. In the 2019 Decision, the Judge found that there was no evidence that the Appellant had married under English or any other law since she obtained her residence card in 2016, and concluded that she was not married to an EEA national and could not claim to have retained a right of residence following her divorce (at [15]).
111. The Appellant’s previous immigration applications in 2015 and 2018, and the legal framework applicable at the relevant time, are plainly capable of informing the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account in the 2025 Appeal, that she was married to the Sponsor at the time [of the 2021 Application] and had been so married for three years” (at [16]).
112. The Judge did not refer specifically to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Awuku or to the Upper Tribunal’s decision Kareem, which was overturned by Awuku. However, as the Court of Appeal emphasised in Ullah at [26(v)], First-tier Tribunal judges “are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them.” I am satisfied that the Judge was aware of the legal context in which the Appellant’s previous Applications were made and the previous Appeals were decided, as there is nothing in the Judge’s reasons to suggest otherwise.
113. I am satisfied that the adverse credibility finding made by the Judge that informed her conclusion that she was not satisfied on balance that “the Appellant was married to the Sponsor on 15 July 2013 or at any other material time” (at [17]) was open to her to make. The Judge’s findings of fact and credibility are neither “plainly wrong” nor “rationally insupportable”: Volpi at [2].
114. I find that this Ground does not reach the standard for interference with findings of fact and credibility outlined in Ullah and Volpi. It follows that I am not satisfied that Ground 3 is made out.
Ground 4 – Unlawful treatment of witness evidence
115. This Ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and does not disclose a material error of law.
116. The Judge carefully considered the written and oral evidence of Mr Gyamfi (at [12]) in relation to the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor and determined that she would give it “very little weight”. The reasons given by the Judge for finding that Mr Gyamfi’s evidence did not support the Appellant’s claim that she and the Sponsor were married when Mr Gyamfi met the couple in 2015 and subsequently became socially acquainted with them, are clear and intelligible and provide a rational basis for the weight the Judge attached to Mr Gyamfi’s evidence.
117. It may be that a different Judge may have attached more weight to Mr Gyamfi’s evidence, but that is not to the point. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Volpi at [2(iii)], whilst a Judge must consider all the material evidence, the weight which he or she gives it is “pre-eminently a matter for [the Judge].” The Judge was entitled to give weight to the evidence that she considered appropriate (Volpi at [2(iv)]) and her balanced consideration should not be set aside unless it is “rationally unsupportable” (Volpi at [2(v)]).
118. Read fairly and as a whole, I am satisfied that the Judge considered all the material evidence, gave clear and intelligible reasons for the weight she attached to it, and reached findings that were rational and open to her.
119. It follows that I am not satisfied that Ground 4 is made out.
Notice of Decision
120. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 21 December 2025 which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Linda Kirk

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 September 2026