Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001369
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60145/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

ST
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. M Murphy, Counsel, instructed by Kilby Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 11 January 2026 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 12 January 2024 to refuse his protection claim made on 17 May 2022. Permission to appeal was granted solely in respect of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. For the reasons set out at [23] – [62] this appeal is dismissed.
Anonymity Order
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.
Background
4. The appellant is an Albanian national. He entered the UK by lorry in April 2022 and claimed asylum on 17 May 2022.
5. The basis of the appellant’s claim was firstly that he would be at risk of persecution/serious harm if returned to Albania as a target of a blood feud between his family and the Barishta family.
6. Secondly, the appellant, who was accepted as having been trafficked to work on a cannabis farm, claimed he would be at risk of being re-trafficked if returned to Albania.
7. The essence of the appellant’s claim under article 8 of the ECHR is that he has a child in the UK born on 12 July 2024 from a one time sexual encounter with the child’s mother. The appellant has not been in any type of relationship with his child’s mother who is a Greek citizen with pre-settled status in the UK. The appellant sees the child once or twice a week in a coffee shop or a park. The appellant claimed that it is in the best interests of the child to be raised by both parents but they cannot return to Albania together as they are not a family unit, and therefore it is in the child’s best interests for the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom.
First-tier Decision
8. At [31] to [40], the First-tier Tribunal Judge (FtTJ) set out their findings, dismissing the appellant’s protection claim both as a target of a blood feud and as a potential victim of re-trafficking. As permission to appeal was not granted in relation to these findings, the detail thereof will not be rehearsed here.
9. In respect of article 8, the FtTJ found that the appellant did enjoy family life with is daughter [48]. They went on to consider whether the interference with family life resulting from the respondent’s decision to remove the appellant was proportionate in order to maintain effective immigration control.
10. Having heard evidence from both the appellant and the child’s mother, at [49] the FtTJ summarised the following facts concerning the appellant’s relationship with his daughter:
• The appellant sees his daughter weekly
• At the time of the appeal, the child was 18 months old
• The appellant does not take part in any decision making in respect of the child
• The appellant does not undertake any daily care giving tasks
• The appellant does not provide any financial support for his daughter
• The appellant sees his daughter only in public places and does not care for her either in his home or in the child’s home
11. The FtTJ also observed at [49] that the appellant “has no information and showed no interest in finding out who the child lives with or whether she has a relationship with her mother’s current partner.” The FtTJ recorded at [45] that the appellant said in evidence he had no information as to who the child lives with when asked whether the child lived with her mother’s partner.
12. In respect of the child’s mother, the FtTJ stated at [50] that she and the appellant are not going to live together and she is in relationship with someone else about whom she was reluctant to share details. The FtTJ observed that it was unclear, given the mother’s relationship, how she would facilitate an on-going relationship between the appellant and his daughter in the future.
13. At [51] the FtTJ set out the balancing exercise undertaken, considering the public interest in immigration control on one side and the impact of the appellant’s removal on the child and the appellant on the other.
14. The FtTJ found that the removal of the appellant would not have a significant impact on the child, would not undermine her best interests and would not represent a disproportionate interference with the article 8 rights of the appellant and his child. In reaching this decision the FtTJ noted the following factors:
• The appellant’s contact with his child could be maintained through visits to Albania or Greece
• The child’s young age
• All of the child’s care is provided by her mother
• The appellant’s lack of financial support to the child
The Grounds of Appeal
15. In granting permission to appeal on article 8, the FtTJ observed that the application for permission was very difficult to follow and rightly reminded the appellant of Nixon [2014] UKUT 00368 at [6]: applications must clearly identify the alleged errors of law. This has been recently re-emphasised by the Upper Tribunal in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC).
16. As noted in the grant of permission, the grounds as drafted do not identify “errors of law” but rather take the form of a narrative complaint. The particular matters with which issue is taken are, in sum:
a. The FtTJ erred in taking into account a perceived ambiguity around future contact between the appellant and his child due to the mother’s current relationship as this was not put to the child’s mother in her evidence.

b. The FtTJ erred in failing to undertake a holistic assessment of the evidence, including the mother’s belief that continued contact with the appellant was in the child’s best interests and that he was the child’s only father figure, and instead focused on adverse considerations, such as the appellant’s lack of financial support, in isolation from the wider evidence.
17. In granting permission, the FtTJ identified arguable errors of law summarised as follows:
a. failure to consider the evidence as a whole, noting in particular the appellant’s weekly contact with the child

b. irrelevance of /failure to give reasons for taking into account the child’s young age

c. failure to engage with the mother’s evidence as to the appellant’s relationship with the child and the fact she gave the child his surname

d. undue weight placed on the child living with her mother and the appellant’s lack of financial contribution, noting that the appellant was not in a relationship with the child’s mother and had no lawful immigration status, limiting his practical ability to support the child.

e. undue weight placed on the fact that the appellant and the mother would not live together in the future

f. irrelevance of /failure to give reasons for taking into account the reluctance of the child’s mother to disclose details of her current partner.
The Hearing
18. I had before me a composite bundle consisting of 171 pages including the respondent’s Rule 24 response. Both Mr. Murphy and Ms. Clewley confirmed they had seen entire contents of the composite bundle.
19. Mr. Murphy accepted the comments by the FtTJ regarding the state of the grounds of appeal as submitted. He did however go on to rely on the original grounds as well as adopting the challenges identified in the grant of permission.
20. Upon hearing submissions and in order to identify the actual errors of law relied on and put a structure around them, I summarised the following with which Mr. Murphy agreed:
a. Procedural unfairness/irrationality: the judge erred in finding it was unclear that the mother could not say how the appellant’s relationship with his daughter would be sustained.
i. This was not specifically put to the mother and it was thus procedurally unfair to take this point into account Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455
ii. In the absence of the mother’s evidence on this point, the only inference to be drawn is that the mother would continue to promote contact as she had done previously and it was not open to the judge to speculate otherwise

b. The FtTJ failed to consider/give sufficient weight to material facts:
i. The appellant is the only father figure for the child.
ii. The mother’s desire for the relationship between father and daughter to continue

c. The FtTJ erred in taking into account irrelevant considerations/placing undue weight on the following facts:
i. That the appellant is not providing financial support
ii. That the appellant and the mother are not cohabitating
iii. The age of the child
21. Ms. Clewley relied on and amplified the respondent’s Rule 24 response.
22. I have taken the submissions of Mr. Murphy and Ms. Clewley into account in making my decision, but I do not rehearse them here. I will refer in the discussion below to the aspects of those submissions I consider to be material.
Discussion and Findings
23. In considering whether the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles of appellate restraint set out in Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 [2-4] and Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26].
24. I have further taken into account what was said by Lord Justice Underhill in Herrera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 412 at [18] in respect of the appellate jurisdiction:
It is trite law that in performing an assessment of that kind different judges may reasonably reach different conclusions. Appellate tribunals must always guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors, particularly if first tribunal had the advantage of hearing oral evidence.
25. The appellant’s challenge is, at its core, directed to the balancing exercise undertaken by the First-tier Tribunal Judge in the assessment of proportionality. Accordingly, I have reminded myself of the well-established principles as to the importance of structured decision making and the balance sheet approach Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60; TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.
26. As consideration of the best interests of the child is central to the appellant’s appeal, I have taken into account the principles derived from the key authorities ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State v Home Department [2011] UKSC 4; Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74, EV (Philippines) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 874; and CAO v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 32.
27. I note that, as highlighted in MK India (Best interests of the child) [2011] UKUT 00475 (IAC), balancing the best interests of children in an article 8(2) proportionality assessment is a fact-sensitive exercise:
23. There is in our view a fourth point of principle that can be inferred from the Supreme Court's judgments in ZH (Tanzania). As the use by Baroness Hale and Lord Hope of the adjective "overall" makes clear, the consideration of the best interests of the child involves a weighing up of various factors. Although the conclusion of the best interests of the child consideration must of course provide a yes or no answer to the question, "Is it in the best interests of the child for the child and/or the parent(s) facing expulsion/deportation to remain in the United Kingdom?", the assessment cannot be reduced to that. Key features of the best interests of the child consideration and its overall balancing of factors, especially those which count for and against an expulsion decision, must be kept in mind when turning to the wider proportionality assessment of whether or not the factors relating to the importance of maintaining immigration control etc. cumulatively reinforce or outweigh the best interests of the child, depending on what they have been found to be.

24. The need to keep in mind the "overall" factors making up the best interests of the child consideration must not be downplayed. Failure to do so may give rise to an error of law although, as AJ (India) makes clear, what matters is not so much the form of the inquiry but rather whether there has been substantive consideration of the best interests of the child. The consideration must always be fact-sensitive and depending on its workings-out will affect the Article 8(2) proportionality assessment in different ways.
28. I now turn to consider the individual grounds of appeal.
Did the FtTJ’s decision involve procedural unfairness and/or irrationality
29. Mr. Murphy argued that the child’s mother had not been asked in evidence about future contact arrangements between the appellant and the child. Therefore, Mr. Murphy submitted, it was procedurally unfair for the FtTJ to conclude that there was uncertainty around future contact and factor that into their proportionality assessment. He further argued that in the absence of evidence on this matter, the only inference to be drawn was that the status quo would continue.
30. Ms. Clewley submitted firstly that the burden is on the appellant to evidence what was or was not put to a witness. In any event, she submitted, it was reasonable for the FtTJ to find and take into account uncertainty around how, if at all, the relationship between the appellant and the child would be promoted in the future. The appellant’s skeleton/grounds specifically refers to tension in her current relationship as a result of the existing contact arrangements. She submitted that it was open to the judge to infer that this tension may impact on future contact arrangements.
31. Mr. Murphy accepted that a transcript had not been requested nor had the appellant’s legal team put into evidence counsel’s note of evidence from the FtT proceedings.
32. In considering this ground of appeal, it is essential to return to the actual words of the decision at [50]:
it was not clear to me how the mother intended to facilitate this long-term within the context of her current relationship given her reluctance to permit questions about the nature of that relationship or how it will accommodate on-going involvement of the appellant (emphasis added).
33. On my reading of this passage it appears that the FtTJ recorded that the mother was asked but declined to answer questions about how her current relationship would allow for the future involvement of the appellant. Whilst that is semantically different from direct questions as to whether contact would cease or change, in my judgement it goes to the same substantive issue, that is how, if at all the appellant will continue to be involved with his child.
34. If I am wrong and there was in fact no evidence on this point, I find it significant that FtTJ considered the issue of future contact at [50] in the context of the submission that it is in the child’s best interests to be brought up by both parents.
35. In my judgment, it is relevant to consider factors which may impact upon whether the child would in fact be “brought up” by both parents, even if the appellant were to remain in the UK. As will be seen, given the limited nature of their current relationship it may be questionable whether the appellant could properly be said to be “brining up” the child. Assuming that the appellant could be said to be bringing up his daughter, the mother’s oral evidence and the appellant’s own grounds of appeal make clear that the mother’s relationship was under stress as a result of the current contact arrangements.
36. In my judgement, the FtTJ was entitled to draw an inference that this tension may impact on future arrangements for the appellant to be involved with and spend time with his daughter. It follows that I find it cannot be said that the continuation of the current arrangements is the only inference to be drawn on the evidence before the FtTJ.
37. Ultimately, and in any event, the issue is immaterial given that it was the current family time arrangements that the FtTJ took into account in the balancing exercise, stating at [51]:
On the other side of the balancing exercise, I have considered the impact on both the child and the appellant of the appellant returning to Albania. I understand if the appellant leaves the United Kingdom then he will not be able to see his daughter as regularly he does currently..
38. For the above reasons I find no procedural unfairness or irrationality as averred or at all.
Did the judge fail to give weight to material facts
39. Mr. Murphy argued that FtTJ failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant is the only father figure the child knows.
40. In my judgment there is no merit in this challenge. Many children are raised very successfully by single mothers in the absence of their birth fathers or “father figures.” This was not an issue raised by the child’s mother herself. Again the limited nature of the appellant’s relationship with his daughter raises questions as to the relevance of this argument. In any event, the import of the appellant’s relationship to the child is that he is her actual father and as such is central to her identity. There is no dispute that their relationship should be maintained and promoted, the issue is how that is achieved, balancing the child’s best interests and the maintenance of immigration control.
41. Mr. Murphy further argued, as set out in the skeleton/grounds, that the FtTJ failed to take into account the mother’s oral evidence that she could not afford to travel to Greece to facilitate travel.
42. The FtTJ did not reference this evidence in concluding at [51] that in-person family time could be arranged on an ad hoc basis in Greece or Albania. Whilst there is not an agreed note from the hearing, Ms. Clewley did not challenge the assertion that this evidence was given and therefore I proceed on the basis that this was the mother’s oral evidence before the FtT.
43. A generous interpretation of the FtTJ’s decision is that a meet-up in Greece or Albania is possible, in the sense that there is no evidence of a legal impediment to it. However I accept that it would have been better for this point to be addressed directly.
44. However, it is clear to me that the appellant’s ability to have ad hoc contact was not a factor that tipped the balance in the FtTJ’s proportionality assessment. Reading the decision as a whole, it is clear to me that it was the factors defining the nature and quality of the appellant’s relationship with his child to which the FtTJ attached the most weight.
45. I therefore find that the failure of the FtTJ to reference the mother’s stated inability to fund travel to Greece is not a material error of law.
46. Mr. Murphy submitted that the FtTJ did not take into account the fact that the child’s mother fully supported the appellant having an ongoing relationship with their daughter; demonstrating her support by providing a statement and attending to give evidence before the FtT. He argued, adopting the arguable error raised in the grant of permission, that the mother further evidenced her commitment to their continued relationship by giving the child his surname.
47. Ms. Clewley submitted that in considering the mother’s support for the appellant’s relationship with the child it was important to take into account that she did not seek any kind of support from him in raising the child, including financial support. Ms. Clewley referred to the mother’s statement in which she said that she gave the child the appellant’s surname as it is not in keeping with tradition for the child to have her surname. As such, Ms. Clewley argued, this cannot be taken as evidence of the mother’s wish for the appellant to have an ongoing relationship with his daughter.
48. In my judgment, the FtTJ’s decision does not disclose a failure to engage with the mother’s evidence of her commitment to maintaining the relationship between the appellant and his child. I find that the FtTJ properly considered the substance of the mother’s evidence as to the nature and quality of that relationship. On her written and oral evidence, the relationship between the appellant and his child was limited by the boundaries she has established and with which the appellant willingly complies. I do find it significant that the mother chose to state explicitly the reason for giving the child appellant’s surname which is completely unrelated to the appellant’s relationship with the child.
49. Accordingly I do not that the FtTJ failed to take into account or place appropriate weight material facts. Weight is a matter for the FtTJ and in my judgement there is no irrationality as to the FtTJ’s treatment of these factors.
Did the judge err in taking into account irrelevant facts
50. Mr. Murphy submitted that the age of the child, the fact of the parents not cohabitating and the appellant’s lack of financial support were irrelevant considerations taken into account by the FtTJ or alternatively factors on which the FtTJ placed undue weight.
51. Ms. Clewley argued that these were matters relevant not to the best interests of the child but to the depth of the relationship between the appellant and his child which was relevant to the proportionality assessment.
52. In my judgment, the strength and quality of the appellant’s relationship with the child is obviously relevant to the overall balancing exercise. The stronger the bond between parent and child, the greater a removal would likely interfere with family life which may tip the balance away from removal.
53. With respect to age, logically, the older a child and the longer she has had a parent regularly in her life, the greater the attachment between the child and their parent is likely to be. Age is therefore, in my judgment, clearly a relevant factor to take into account.
54. The fact that the parents are not and will not be cohabitating is arguably less relevant than age to the nature and quality of parental relationship, but cannot, in my judgment, be said to be irrelevant. The regularity with which a child sees their parent is a factor which is capable of informing the strength of the bond between them.
55. Financially supporting a child is obviously not a necessary condition to demonstrate the depth of a parent/child bond, and it is right to say the appellant had limited means for doing so. However, again, I find this cannot be said to be an irrelevant factor. Contributing in some way financially is capable of evidencing commitment to a child. More significantly in this case, however, is the mother’s explicit statement that she did not seek any financial or any other type assistance. Her statement evidences her clear intention to remain the sole carer for the child, choosing to raise her independently, and boundary the appellant’s relationship with their child.
56. In sum, in the instant case the child was only 18 months old and saw her father weekly in a public place in the presence of her mother, carrying out no caring tasks, making no decisions and not contributing financially. That is self-evidently an entirely different level of relationship to that of a parent who is a constant presence in the child’s life and sharing in parenting decisions and daily caring tasks. These are all, therefore relevant factors the FtTJ was entitled to take into account.
57. For the avoidance of doubt, given the relevance of these factors and again, weight being a matter for the FtTJ, I do not find that the FtTJ placed undue weight on any of these factors.
58. Furthermore, these factors were not the sole matters informing the FtTJ’s assessment of the relationship between the appellant and his daughter. Ms. Clewley, in her submissions, pointed to the FtTJ’s observation that the appellant did not know whether his daughter was living with her mother’s partner, further suggesting a limited relationship. Mr. Murphy said this matters not as the child’s mother was clear in her evidence that she was not living with her partner.
59. In my judgment, however, Mr. Murphy’s submission misses the point. The relevant issue is the appellant’s lack of curiosity or concern about who his child was living with, which I agree, demonstrates the limited nature of the appellant’s relationship with his child.
Conclusion
60. In summary, it is clear to me that the FtTJ properly conducted the article 8 (2) proportionality assessment, balancing the public considerations in Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 with the best interests of the child to which I find he gave substantive consideration, carefully weighing up all the relevant factors. I note in particular that the FtTJ at [49] states that in taking account of the child’s best interests they looked at the situation “from her perspective.” In my judgment, this is evident when holistically considering the FtTJ’s analysis.
61. In my judgment each of the areas of challenge in fact represent a disagreement with the FtTJ’s decision rather than disclosing errors of law. For the reasons set out above, I find that the decision of the FtTJ is one that was open to them on the evidence and the facts as they found them to be.
62. Accordingly I find that the decision discloses no material error of law and dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
63. The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

M Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 July 2026