Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001390
EA/01871/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

DAVID DADZIE DONKOR
(no anonymity order made)
Respondent

For the Appellant: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: no appearance

At: Field House on the 19 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Respondent is a national of Ghana who gives his date of birth as 24 June 2004. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal against a decision to refuse to grant him entry clearance under the EU Settlement Scheme as the son of Mr Richard Owusu Donkor, an EU citizen with rights of residence in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State now has permission to appeal against that decision.

2. This appeal was first listed for oral hearing before the Upper Tribunal on 20 July 2026 when the matter came before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Walsh. There was no appearance by the Sponsor, or any other representative on behalf of the Respondent, who remained in Ghana. Judge Walsh was anxious to ensure that the Respondent could participate in the appeal if he so wished, and so made the very fair decision to adjourn the proceedings. Judge Walsh took care to ensure that all of the available addresses/emails for the Respondent were clearly recorded on the court file, and directed that the hearing be relisted at a later date, with notices of hearing being sent to all the known contact points for the Respondent and his UK based Sponsor Mr Richard Owusu Donkor. This instructions were duly complied with by Tribunal staff on 22 July 2026. On the 30 July 2026 the notice of hearing sent to the Sponsor was returned to the Tribunal with the words “he does not leave at this address” written on the envelope. On the 5 August 2026 the court file records that emails sent to the Respondent /Sponsor also bounced back. On the day of the hearing no one appeared on the Respondent’s behalf. I considered whether the interests of justice required me to adjourn the hearing for a second time. I decided that they did not. The Tribunal has done everything it reasonably could do to enable the Respondent to take part in these proceedings. It is ultimately his responsibility to ensure that the contact details held by the Tribunal are accurate and up to date. I therefore proceeded to hear the submissions of the Secretary of State in the Respondent’s absence.

3. I have decided to allow the Secretary of State’s appeal and set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. My reasons can be briefly stated.

4. The case for the Respondent, upon application to the Entry Clearance Officer in Accra, was a simple one. He is the son of Mr Richard Owusu Donkor, and as such he is entitled to a family permit to join his father in the UK. The reason that this application was refused was equally simple: the ECO could not be satisfied that the Respondent is in fact the Sponsor’s son. The Respondent had supplied two items of documentary evidence in support of his application. The first was a birth certificate, which data verification checks conducted by the ECO showed to be non-genuine. The second was a DNA test result report purporting to show that the relationship between the applicant and sponsor was as claimed. To this document the ECO could attach little weight, because it failed to comply with various requirements set out in Home Office policy concerning matters such as identification and custody of samples etc. The ECO further considered that the Respondent had given inconsistent answers about his claimed father when questioned at interview.

5. When the Respondent appealed to the First-tier Tribunal he opted for the appeal to be determined ‘on the papers’. In its decision dated 30 January 2026 to allow the appeal the First-tier Tribunal gave the following reasons:

“9. The Appellant has provided a DNA Report dated 22 May 2023. The report from AlphaBiolabs in Warrington concludes that the Appellant is the son of the Sponsor Richard Owusu Donkor. The DNA conclusions were based on buccal testing of the Appellant and Sponsor with buccal samples collected by an independent sample collector.

10. I accept that the document verification report suggests that the Appellant provided a false document in making his application, however the DNA is conclusive that the Appellant is the Sponsors son and therefore the birth certificate provides little evidential value. I do not accept the Respondent’s argument that the DNA results are not reliable because the Appellant provided a copy of his Ghanian passport which would have had to have been obtained by providing his false birth certificate, therefore rendering the DNA evidence unreliable.

11. The DNA evidence is conclusive and even if the birth certificate is false there is no evidence to suggest the appellant knew this was a false document or that it has any impact on the DNA test carried out. It could also be possible that the birth certificate is genuine and that a mistake was made in verifying its authenticity.

12. In relation to the inconsistences in the Appellant’s interview on 2 October 2023, I find it difficult to assess as the Respondent has not provided a copy of the interview transcript itself. The bundle provided includes a summary with the Respondent’s notes and I therefore attach little weight to it. I find that any inconsistencies are not outweighed by the DNA evidence which proves they are related.

13. Because I have found that the appellant has established that he is the son of a relevant EEA national sponsor at the date of application, I am satisfied that he meets the requirements for leave under Appendix EU”.

6. The Secretary of State now complains, and I agree, that this analysis fails to engage with the ECO’s reasons for refusal.

7. The whole case for the Secretary of State was that the DNA test could not be relied upon because the veracity of the documents produced to establish identity was in issue. If the Respondent was prepared to produce a false document to the ECO, then careful consideration had to be given to whether the documents provided to AlphaBiolabs were real. When the First-tier Tribunal says “the DNA is conclusive that the Appellant is the Sponsors son and therefore the birth certificate provides little evidential value” this is not, with respect, strictly speaking true. The DNA may be conclusive evidence that the two people tested are father and son, but whether they were the (then) Appellant and his Sponsor is a matter that required some analysis.

8. In fairness to the First-tier Tribunal, I think it right to say that the refusal notice did not articulate this point very well:

“According to information available via the Ghanian Passport Office open source Online Passport application (mfa.gov.gh), to obtain a Ghanaian passport, the provision of a birth certificate is required. As the Ghanaian authorities have confirmed that the birth certificate you have submitted as evidence of your relationship is non-genuine, this Office is satisfied that the document you have used to verify your identity when submitting your DNA sample has been fraudulently obtained. As a result, this Office is further satisfied that the DNA evidence submitted in support of your relationship does not adhere to the Home Office guidance on the provision of DNA evidence, or the collection process, as outlined above.”

(my emphasis)

9. If, as this passage suggests, it was in fact the Respondent who supplied a document and a DNA sample, then the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning is perfectly logical. If he did both, and so did Richard Owusu Donkor, then the DNA test results could indeed constitute conclusive proof of the claimed relationship.

10. That said, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal should have gone on to consider the other possibility, and make a finding on whether or not it was in fact the Respondent who gave the sample. Further no findings are actually made on the ECO’s allegation about the birth certificate, a matter that the Respondent himself would no doubt like resolved.

11. For the reasons set out at my paragraph 2 above, I have some doubts about whether the Respondent or his Sponsor intend to have any further engagement with this matter, but Mr Terrell has very fairly invited me to remit this matter to the First-tier Tribunal, directing an oral hearing, thus giving the Respondent a further opportunity to present his case. I agree.

Decisions

12. The Secretary of State’s appeal is allowed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal set aside.

13. The decision in the appeal will be re-made following further hearing in the First-tier Tribunal by a Judge other than Judge Dodd.

14. There is no order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 September 2026