Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001438
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00985/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

KEONE BECKER
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: No appearance

Heard at Field House on 1 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. Although this is an appeal by the Secretary of State, I shall refer to the parties as in the First-tier Tribunal. The respondent appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Dhanji (the judge) dated 16 February 2026 allowing the appellant’s appeal against deportation on human rights grounds.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Germany born on 11 December 2005. He entered the UK in 2009 when he was 4 years old. On 30 April 2024, the appellant was convicted of possession of a bladed article in a public place and sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment. On 2 September 2024, the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply class A drugs and sentenced to two years and four months’ imprisonment. On 16 January 2025, the respondent made a decision to deport the appellant.

3. The appellant did not attend the hearing and was not represented. I was satisfied he was aware of the hearing date from the correspondence from his solicitors and it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in accordance with Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal ) Rules 2008.

Judge’s decision

4. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge heard evidence from the appellant, his mother and his sisters. The judge found their evidence to be detailed and entirely consistent. He found that they were credible witnesses. The judge noted that there was some documentary evidence to support their oral evidence which was robustly challenged in cross-examination.

5. The judge found that the appellant’s mother moved to the United Kingdom in 2000 and has been working continuously as a chef, save for a two year period between 2005 and 2007 when she was in Germany. She had acquired the right of permanent residence. The appellant moved to the UK in 2009 and has lived here for 16 years. The judge concluded it was more likely than not that the appellant’s residence was lawful from the date of his entry and he had acquired the right of permanent residence on the basis of his mother’s continuous exercise of her Treaty rights. The judge found there was no evidence the appellant had applied for or had been granted leave to remain under Appendix EU and therefore he had been lawfully resident for 10 years and 6 months.

6. The judge found the appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and he was socially and culturally integrated. The judge gave “very careful consideration” to what was said by the Court of Appeal in Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537. The judge considered the opinion of the author of the OASys report and found that “the appellant presents as an immature 20 year old who has no experience of supporting himself, who is and always has been heavily reliant on his family, who has limited problem-solving skills and a history of poor decision-making and who is vulnerable to exploitation and being led astray by negative peer influences”. At [33], the judge reminded himself that Germany is an EU country where societal and cultural norms are not substantially different from those in the UK, where English is widely spoken and where there is a comprehensive system of social benefits.

7. The judge made the following findings at [34] and [35]:
34. However, Andrews LJ also made clear that in addition to the country of return in question,
“much will depend…on the…character of the individual concerned”. On my findings above, the Appellant presents as a vulnerable, immature young man with no vocational experience, relatively basic educational attainments, no experience of supporting himself independently and a track record of poor decision-making and thinking skills. In that context, the Appellant’s limited experience of life in and social ties to Germany and removal from the family network that is his protective factor are likely to cause him particular difficulties if he were to be deported to Germany.
35. I step back and conduct a holistic analysis of all of the relevant consideration before me, reminding myself of the high threshold that is posed by the “very significant obstacles to integration” test. Having done so, I am satisfied, on balance, that the Appellant’s character, as described at paragraph 34 above, alongside the other obstacles I have identified above, would prevent or seriously inhibit (see paragraph 49 of Ackom) the Appellant from understanding how life in the society in Germany is carried on and having a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, being able to to (sic) operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the Appellant’s private or family life. I therefore find, on balance, that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to his integration in Germany.

8. The judge concluded that the appellant met the private life exception in section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and allowed the appeal under Article 8 of the ECHR.

Grant of permission

9. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 7 May 2026 for the following reasons:
1. The appellant’s family in the UK can visit him regularly in Germany (given the ease of travelling to Germany) and can spend time with him there (as dual nationals they do not face any limitation on the time they spend in Germany). They can also continue to provide financial support to him. In the light of this, it is arguable that the judge gave insufficient reasons for reaching the conclusion that the “very significant obstacles to integration” test was satisfied in the circumstances of this case. Although the judge has clearly given Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537 careful consideration, it is arguable that the judge fell into a similar error to that which was identified in that case.
2. Although I do not restrict the grounds, I make the observation that the respondent’s other submissions are weak. The finding on lawful residence was made, primarily, on the basis of the evidence of the appellant’s mother about her employment history. The judge described her evidence as detailed and consistent, and noted she was robustly cross-examined. I cannot see why it was not open to the judge, who had the benefit of hearing the mother’s oral evidence in the context of all of the other evidence, to accept that the appellant’s mother was giving a truthful account of her employment history. In respect of social and cultural integration, the judge plainly took into account the appellant’s offending and the respondent’s submissions on this point appear to be no more than a disagreement.

Submissions

10. Ms Ahmed relied on the grounds and, given the grant of permission, she submitted the main ground of challenge was ground 3: “very significant obstacles to integration”. She submitted the judge’s interpretation of the OASys report was wrong and he missed the context of the author’s opinion. The judge failed to consider the appellant’s addiction to codeine and negative peer influences. Ms Ahmed submitted the judge had artificially selected a few points to create a picture that the appellant would be unable to integrate. The factors upon which the judge relied did not support his conclusion and he failed to give adequate reasons for his findings. The appellant had refused assistance with his well-being in prison when he knew that he might be deported. The judge’s finding that the appellant was immature was insufficient to support his finding that there were very significant obstacles to integration given the support from his family. It was not the case that the appellant was unable to function and it was not clear from the judge’s findings why a fit young man like the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Germany.

Conclusions and reasons

11. The judge accepted the oral evidence of the appellant, his mother and sisters as credible and found there was “some documentary evidence” to support it. The gaps in the documentary evidence were insufficient to undermine the judge’s credibility findings and it was open to the judge to find that the appellant’s residence in the UK was lawful. The grounds do not challenge the judge’s finding as to the appellant’s length of residence. There was no error of law as alleged in ground 1.

12. The judge took into account the appellant’s offending behaviour in finding that he was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The appellant has spent his formative years in the UK and has attended school. There was no error of law as alleged in ground 2.

13. The grounds do not challenge the judge’s factual findings at [30]. The judge made reference to relevant sections of the OASys report at [31] and gave adequate reasons for the weight he attached to the report at [32]. I am not persuaded by Ms Ahmed’s submission that the judge’s approach to that evidence was wrong. It is apparent from these paragraphs that the judge considered the appellant’s addiction to codeine and negative peer influences.

14. The judge took into account the context of the appellant’s offending behaviour and he adequately explained why the appellant’s character was relevant to his assessment of very significant obstacles to integration. The judge specifically found the appellant was vulnerable to exploitation and being led astray by negative peer influences. It is not the case that these factors would not be present in Germany.

15. The judge took into account all relevant matters and properly directed himself in law. His findings were open to him on the evidence before him and he gave cogent reasons for his conclusions. The respondent disagrees with the judge’s decision but that does not amount to an error of law.

16. I conclude there is no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 16 February 2026 and I dismiss the respondent’s appeal.

Notice of Decision

Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 September 2026