Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001458

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65435/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

MN
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Turner, instructed by Imperium Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 16 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan, born on 21 March 1995. He arrived in the UK on 28 January 2023, having travelled from Pakistan on a student visa. He claimed asylum on 13 November 2023. His claim was refused on 16 April 2024. He appealed against that decision.

3. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that from 2016 he lived in Kabul with his family and that he was kidnapped by the Taliban in Afghanistan in March 2021 because he was working for Afghan Union Transportation and Logistics (AUTL), a company which had associations with the USA. He claimed to have worked for AUTL as an inventory management systems officer, responsible for inputting data. He claimed that he managed to escape from the Taliban the next day. He came to the UK on a student visa issued in Pakistan. In October 2023 his mother told him that the Taliban had kidnapped his father in order to ascertain his whereabouts but was released after 24 hours. He claimed asylum because he feared that he would be killed by the Taliban as he had escaped from their captivity.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, did not accept that he was kidnapped by the Taliban because he was working for the AUTL and did not accept that his father was kidnapped by the Taliban. The respondent noted that AUTL was still operating in Afghanistan and was a large company, and considered that the appellant had failed to give a reasonable explanation as to why he would have been targeted specifically by the Taliban just because he worked for the company. The respondent did not find that the appellant had given a reasonable explanation for why the Taliban had not found him between March 2021 and his exit to Pakistan in December 2022 if they were looking for him. The respondent noted further that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence as to his whereabouts when he was taken by the Taliban. The respondent therefore did not find the appellant’s claim to be credible and considered that he would be at no risk on return to Afghanistan. It was not considered that he fell into a risk category as an ordinary office worker. The respondent considered that the appellant’s removal to Afghanistan would not breach his human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 5 February 2026. The judge noted that the appellant’s evidence was that after escaping from the Taliban he went to his friend’s house in Kabul and hid there and that his friend obtained a visa for him to travel to Pakistan, that he could not travel there until December 2021 as the border was closed, and that he lived with his brother in Pakistan until he left on a student visa and came to the UK. The judge noted that the appellant had produced two documents from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the first of which was dated 1 March 2021 and stated that he had escaped custody and there was an order for his capture and execution, and the second dated 1 October 2023 stating that his father had been released by the Taliban due to poor health. The judge also noted that the appellant had a diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder.

6. The judge considered that the appellant had been inconsistent in the date he left Afghanistan to travel to Pakistan, stating initially in his two asylum interviews that it was December 2022 but later in his statement that it was December 2021, and that he had failed to give a credible explanation for the inconsistent account. The judge noted further that, until the entry and exit stamps in his passport were put to him, the appellant had failed to mention that he had returned to Afghanistan on a number of occasions, and considered that his repeated trips back to Afghanistan showed that he was not at risk from the Taliban. The judge considered further that the fact that the Taliban had not contacted the appellant’s brothers in Afghanistan also showed that they were not interested in him. The judge gave limited weight to the letters from the Afghan government as they pe-dated his claim but had yet had not been mentioned in his interviews. The judge concluded that the appellant was at no risk on return to Afghanistan. With regard to Article 3, the judge noted the appellant’s diagnosis of mental health problems and the fact that he was self-harming and had suicidal ideations, and was satisfied that he was a “seriously ill person”. However, the judge concluded that the appellant’s return to Kabul would not be in breach of Article 3, given that his mental health condition appeared to be due to the fact that could not see his family and due to his outstanding asylum claim. The judge considered that the appellant would no longer have that issue if he returned to Afghanistan since he would have the support of his family and he could access mental health treatment in Kabul if required. The judge considered that the appellant’s removal to Afghanistan would not be in breach of Article 8 and accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal on a renewed application, on four grounds. Firstly that the judge had failed to consider the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence in the context of his mental health and in the context of him being a vulnerable witness. Secondly, that the judge had failed to consider the reason for the appellant’s returns to Afghanistan, namely out of financial necessity, and had engaged in speculation when asserting that the Taliban could have monitored the appellant’s banking and passport use. Thirdly, that the judge had failed to engage with background country evidence when concluding that the appellant’s ability to obtain a passport undermined his claim and when considering the timing of his kidnapping. Fourthly, that the judge had made speculative findings as to the appellant’s mental health improving on return to Afghanistan and had failed to assess the practical reality of him accessing effective treatment in Afghanistan, and that the judge had failed to consider the appellant’s mental health in the context of Article 8.

8. The respondent produced a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.

9. The matter came before me for a hearing. Both parties made submissions.

10. Mr Turner relied upon the case of AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 in submitting, with regard to the first ground, that the judge had failed, when making her adverse credibility findings, to consider the impact of the appellant’s vulnerability on his evidence and had failed to apply the presidential guidance note for vulnerable witnesses. He submitted that the case of Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 148 relied upon by the respondent in her rule 24 response was no answer to that. The judge had found the appellant to be a seriously ill person in relation to his mental health, with suicidal ideation, yet she had failed to consider that when relying upon inconsistencies in his evidence. Mr Turner submitted, for ground two, that the judge had failed to address the reason why the appellant had returned to Afghanistan, namely to sort out financial matters, and ought to have undertake a proper evaluation in that regard. She had speculated when considering that the Taliban could have monitored the appellant’s bank account, when there was no evidence to suggest that that was something the Taliban could do. She had also speculated about the Taliban’s systems in regard to passport checks. As for ground three, Mr Turner submitted that the judge’s findings at [11] and [31] questioning the appellant’s kidnapping prior to the Taliban’s takeover ignored the country situation in Afghanistan whereby the Taliban controlled large swathes of the country and exercised control well before its official takeover. With regard to ground four, Mr Turner submitted that the judge, having found that the appellant was a ‘seriously ill person’, had failed to grapple with the country evidence as to the lack of psychiatric care in Afghanistan and the stigmatisation of people with mental health problems in that country. Mr Turner submitted that the judge had also failed to give proper consideration to Article 8. The decision was therefore unsafe and needed to be set aside.

11. Mr Diwnycz, in his submissions, relied upon the respondent’s rule 24 response and the refusal of permission in the First-tier Tribunal. He added that the judge had properly grappled with the appellant’s mental health at [40] onwards and was entitled to consider that, given the reasons for the deterioration in his mental health stated by his GP, his mental health would improve if he was back with his family. Mr Diwnycz pointed out that there was no psychiatric report and therefore the judge only had the GP report before him in that regard.

12. In response, Mr Turner submitted that it was pure speculation to say that the appellant would be better if he was with his family. The judge had not properly taken into account the implications of the appellant being a seriously ill person and she had made speculative findings in ignorance of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan.

Analysis

13. In so far as Mr Turner sought to rely upon an application made under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules and further evidence of the appellant’s mental health condition, that was not evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and cannot be taken into account when considering whether she erred in law in her decision. The judge’s decision has to be assessed on the evidence which was available to her at the time.

14. I do not accept that the judge made any errors in her decision. She was clearly aware of the appellant’s mental health issues, referring to the matter at the beginning of her decision at [8], engaging in a detailed assessment of the evidence in that regard from [40], noting at ]17] that the appellant’s mental health was relevant to the issues to be determined by the Tribunal, and at [18] specifically referring to the joint presidential guidance and confirming that the appellant was being treated as a vulnerable witness. There is no basis for concluding that the judge then failed to take that into account when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account and when relying upon the inconsistencies in his evidence.

15. Mr Turner submitted that the decision in Khan was no answer to the challenge in the grounds concerning the appellant’s vulnerability, and that the relevant guidance was set out in AM. However the case of AM was considered in full in Khan, where the Court held that the real issue was one of procedural fairness, stating at [48] that “the question will be whether the First-tier Tribunal has acted in a way which means that the appeal has not been fairly and justly dealt with or, to put it more simply, whether there has been procedural unfairness which materially affects the decision.”. The Court held at [38] that “the whole tenor of the Guidance Note, therefore, is directed towards ensuring that the proceedings before First-tier Tribunals enable individuals to participate effectively so that their evidence is properly understood and properly assessed. That is not consistent with treating the Guidance Note as if it were intended to lay down a set of free-standing legal obligations, viewed in the abstract and divorced from the actual conduct of proceedings.”

16. In this case, the appellant was clearly given a full opportunity to participate effectively and to present his evidence at the hearing, and to explain any concerns arising out of his evidence. As in Khan at [52], there was no proper basis for concluding that his mental health condition “did affect, or might have affected, the decision-making process in some way”. There is no evidence to suggest that the First-tier Tribunal misunderstood, or failed properly to assess, the impact of the appellant's mental health issues and there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant was unable to give evidence effectively because of his mental health issues and that his mental health impacted upon his ability to give evidence. Certainly the grounds have not suggested that there was. The grounds failed to specify in what respect the appellant’s mental health affected the evidence he gave or explained the inconsistencies arising in his evidence. The grounds simply make generalised assertions. They fail to identify any procedural unfairness arising in the decision-making process before the First-tier Tribunal and they fail to show why the judge was not entitled to draw the adverse conclusions that she did from the appellant’s inconsistent evidence. In the circumstances there is nothing of any merit in the first ground of appeal.

17. The second ground is, likewise, without merit. That ground relates to the judge’s findings about the appellant’s returns to Afghanistan. The judge found at [26] to [29] that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence about when he left Afghanistan and how many times he had returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan, as well as about his movements upon his return and the level of contact he had with his family. She provided proper reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation for the inconsistencies and for drawing the adverse conclusions that she did from those inconsistencies and discrepancies in the evidence. In so far as the grounds assert that the judge failed to engage with the correct legal question, namely whether the appellant’s return to Afghanistan negated a well-founded fear of persecution in that country, that was precisely the question she addressed at [30]. Contrary to Mr Turner’s submission, the judge had full regard to the reasons given by the appellant for returning to Afghanistan, namely to visit the bank and sort out his family’s financial affairs, but was entitled to conclude that that was not a proper explanation for returning to Afghanistan. She found at [30] that the appellant’s repeated trips to Afghanistan and his public outings on his return using his own passport as identification were not the acts of a person in fear of their life. That was a conclusion fully and properly open to the judge. There was nothing unduly speculative in the judge considering the likelihood of the appellant’s presence becoming known to the Taliban by his passport being checked and stamped at the border and by the Taliban being alerted through his banking transactions. As the judge made clear at [31], such a finding was consistent with the appellant’s own evidence about the level of access the Taliban had to various systems. In the circumstances the judge was fully and properly entitled to draw the adverse conclusion that she did from the evidence of the appellant’s journeys between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

18. The challenge in the appellant’s third ground is somewhat difficult to understand. It appears to criticise the judge for doubting the appellant’s claim to have been kidnaped by the Taliban prior to the official take-over of the country in August 2021 on the basis that the Taliban exercised control of large parts of the country prior to that date. Yet that was precisely what the judge acknowledged at [31], when finding it lacking in credibility that the appellant’s friend would obtain a passport for him in August 2021 if he was genuinely being pursued by the Taliban when, on his own evidence, the Taliban had been active in Afghanistan prior to taking power in August 2021. In so far as the grounds refer to the judge’s findings at [11] in that respect, [11] was simply the judge’s summary of the respondent’s refusal decision. The judge’s adverse findings on the credibility of the appellant’s account of his kidnapping in March 2021 were based upon other concerns, namely the inconsistencies and discrepancies in his evidence, his repeated returns to and extended stays in Afghanistan, and the fact that his brothers had not been contacted by the Taliban despite the references in the country evidence to the Taliban targeting family members. Those were all reasons upon which the judge was perfectly entitled to make the adverse credibility findings that she did. Ground three is therefore also of no merit.

19. The fourth ground asserts that the judge erred by making speculative findings as to the appellant’s mental health improving on return to Afghanistan. However the judge undertook a detailed assessment of the medical evidence and had regard to the evidence from the appellant’s GP, from [36] to [43] and [48] to [49], noting the medical opinion that the appellant’s mental health issues arose in particular as a result of his uncertain immigration status and from not being able to see his family, and that his family was a protective factor. It was on that basis that the judge found at [50] that the appellant’s mental health would likely improve if he was back with his family in Afghanistan. The judge’s findings were accordingly based upon the evidence before her and were not speculative as the grounds assert. The judge, furthermore, made her findings in the context of the background country evidence relating to medical treatment available in Afghanistan, with reference to the stigma attached to seeking mental health support, considering that evidence in detail at [45] to [47]. Having given careful consideration to the medical evidence, the judge applied the relevant legal test in considering Article 3 and reached a conclusion which was fully and properly open to her. Although not specifically citing the appellant’s medical issues in her Article 8 assessment, it is clear that the judge factored that into her proportionality assessment by way of her reference at [57] to the overall picture of his circumstances as she had found them to be, and her reference to the difficulties he would face on return to Afghanistan. There is therefore also nothing of merit in ground four.

20. For all these reasons I do not accept that the judge made errors of law in her decision. On the contrary, her decision is a detailed and comprehensive one, based upon a full and careful assessment of all the evidence and with cogently reasoned findings, applying the correct standard of proof and appropriate legal tests. The conclusions reached by the judge were fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her. Her decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

21. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 June 2026