Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001471
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01090/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

31st July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

HDC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Zapata Besso, Counsel instructed by MHA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Angola, born in 1986. He entered the United Kingdom as a child and has lived here for most of his life. He appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Dhanji, promulgated on 1 December 2025, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim in the context of deportation.
2. The First-tier Tribunal had before it an extensive evidential record. The appellant’s offending history included a number of convictions between 2002 and 2016, culminating in the index offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, for which he was sentenced on 10 October 2016 to seven years’ imprisonment.
3. The appellant was treated before the First-tier Tribunal as a vulnerable appellant. The issues included the section 72 certificate, Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR. In relation to Article 8, the central issue was whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation for the purposes of section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis on a limited basis. Permission was granted on Ground 1, concerning whether the judge misunderstood the evidence as to the risk posed by the appellant at the date of hearing, given the weight placed on that element when assessing the public interest in deportation. Permission was also granted on Ground 2, concerning whether the judge gave adequate reasons for concluding that the appellant’s inability to speak a relevant Angolan language or dialect would not prevent him from finding employment in the construction industry. Permission was refused on Ground 3 and Judge Jarvis went on to say it is not arguable that Dr Singh’s views were not considered.
5. There is no appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on the Article 3 health claim at paragraphs 41 to 49 of its decision. Those findings are preserved.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. The judge found that the index offence was a particularly serious crime. He then considered whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption that he constituted a danger to the community.
7. At paragraph 38, the judge recorded that the appellant had not reoffended since the index offence, had undertaken courses which demonstrated a genuine interest in rehabilitation, had complied fully with licence conditions, and that his probation officer, Natalie Clay, assessed his risk of serious harm to the public, children and known adults as medium and to staff as low. The judge understood that assessment to be as at September 2025.
8. At paragraph 39, the judge concluded that, in light of the seriousness of the index offence, the appellant’s lengthy history of offending, and the fact that he was still assessed as posing a medium risk of serious harm to the public, he had failed to show that he no longer presented a danger to the community.
9. In the Article 8 assessment, the judge found that there was a very significant public interest in deportation. At paragraph 61, he took account of the appellant’s rehabilitation, compliance with probation, reduced risk and absence of further offending. At paragraph 62, he found that, given the seriousness of the index offence, the past offending and the fact that the appellant was still assessed as posing a medium risk of serious harm to the public, the public interest in deportation remained very strong.
10. The judge found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. He also found that there were plainly obstacles to integration in Angola, including the appellant’s long absence from Angola, lack of family or support network there, lack of a family home, and inability to speak Portuguese or Bantu languages spoken there. However, the judge concluded that those obstacles were not very significant, including because the appellant was capable of finding work in Angola in the construction industry despite the language barrier.
11. The judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
Grounds of Appeal
12. Ground 1 contends that the judge made a material mistake of fact and failed to assess the appellant’s current criminal risk. The appellant submits that Ms Clay’s evidence was not that the appellant remained at medium risk as at September 2025. Rather, the evidence was that, at the point of licence expiry on 25 April 2023, the appellant was assessed as a medium risk of serious harm to the public, children and known adults and a low risk of serious harm to staff. The appellant argues that the judge wrongly treated a 2023 assessment as a 2025 assessment and failed to decide whether the risk had reduced further by the date of hearing.
13. The appellant submits that the error was material because the finding that he remained a medium risk fed directly into the section 72 assessment and the Article 8 proportionality exercise, particularly the judge’s conclusion that the public interest in deportation was very strong.
14. Ground 2 contends that the judge failed to consider the evidence holistically and gave inadequate reasons for finding that the appellant could find work in the Angolan construction industry despite the accepted language barrier, his lack of social and cultural ties in Angola, and the psychiatric evidence. It is submitted that the conclusion was irrational or inadequately reasoned.
15. The respondent resisted the appeal. In broad terms, the respondent submitted that the judge directed himself appropriately, was entitled to attach weight to the seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s offending history and reached findings which were open to him on the evidence. In relation to Ground 2, the respondent submitted that the challenge was no more than disagreement with a fact-sensitive assessment.
Discussion
Appellate approach
16. I direct myself that the correct approach to assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision was explained by Brooke LJ in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 and I note the examples he sets out at [9].
17. I remind myself at the outset that there must be appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. As recently endorsed in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688, I acknowledge the approach in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 set out at [72].
18. In HA (Iraq) the Supreme Court emphasised the need for caution before interfering with the decision of a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The tribunal is the judge of the facts and its decision should be respected unless it is clear that it has misdirected itself in law. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned, the appellate tribunal should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account. Reasons are not to be read as if they were a statute.
19. For serious offenders, section 117C(6) requires a full proportionality assessment, weighing the interference with Article 8 rights against the public interest in deportation. The public interest is very strong, but the assessment remains fact-sensitive and must consider all relevant circumstances collectively.
20. HA (Iraq) also confirms that rehabilitation and reduced risk of reoffending are relevant to the proportionality assessment. Positive evidence of rehabilitation, and evidence capable of supporting an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to reoffend, may carry some weight. That weight will vary from case to case.
21. It follows that, where a judge treats an outdated risk assessment as a current risk assessment, and that assessment is given real weight in evaluating danger to the community and the strength of the public interest in deportation, the mistake may be material.
22. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 which was recently set out and approved by Lady Justice Falk in Alexander Isaac Hamilton v Mark Colin Barrow (1), Claire Michelle Barrow (2) and Matin Welsh (3) [2024] EWCA Civ 888 and also by Green LJ in Hafiz Aman Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 [26]. The latter emphasised that;
“the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30]”
23. It is helpful to set out the guidance given in Volpi by Lord Justice Lewison;
i. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
ii. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
iii. The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iv. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
v. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
vi. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vii. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.[2]
Ground 1: risk at the date of hearing
24. I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in law in relation to Ground 1.
25. The judge was required to assess whether the appellant continued to present a danger to the community at the date of the hearing. That was also relevant to the Article 8 proportionality assessment because the degree of current risk, while not the only component of the public interest, is a material component of the weight to be given to public protection.
26. The judge’s reasoning shows that he proceeded on the basis that the appellant was assessed by probation as a medium risk of serious harm as at September 2025. That was not an accurate understanding of the evidence. The relevant evidence from Ms Clay is an email dated 26/09/2025 (Appeal bundle page 183). She stated; ”[A] has asked me to confirm his risk level at the point of his LED; I can confirm that [A] was assessed as a Medium Risk of Serious Harm to the Public, Children and Known Adults and a Low Risk of Serious Harm to staff”. This was confirmation that the risk assessment was made at the end of the appellant’s licence on 25 April 2023. By the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, that assessment was approximately two and a half years old.
27. That error was not merely peripheral. As submitted by Ms Zapata Besso, the judge expressly relied on the appellant being “still assessed” as a medium risk when finding that the section 72 presumption had not been rebutted. He then carried that assessment into Article 8. At paragraph 62, the judge again referred to the appellant being “still assessed” as posing a medium risk of serious harm to the public when concluding that the public interest in deportation was very strong.
28. The judge did take account of the appellant’s rehabilitation, absence of offending since 2016, compliance with licence, and the reduction in risk when compared with earlier assessments. However, the reasoning does not show that he undertook the necessary assessment of current risk for himself, appreciating that the probation assessment was not a current 2025 assessment. Nor does the decision engage with the appellant’s submission that the trajectory of compliance, non-offending and rehabilitation might support a conclusion that the risk had reduced further since April 2023.
29. The error is material. It cannot be said that the judge would inevitably have reached the same conclusion on the section 72 danger assessment or on the Article 8 proportionality balance had he correctly understood the evidence. The seriousness of the index offence and the appellant’s wider offending history would plainly remain powerful public interest factors. However, HA (Iraq) requires a holistic proportionality assessment in which rehabilitation and current risk may carry weight. The judge’s mistaken understanding of the currency of the risk assessment affected the calibration of the public interest side of the balance.
30. I therefore find that the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law in relation to Ground 1.
Ground 2: employment in Angola and very significant obstacles
31. I do not accept that Ground 2 discloses a material error of law.
32. The judge accepted a number of matters favourable to the appellant: that he had left Angola as a young child; that he had lived in the United Kingdom for most of his life; that he had no family home or support network in Angola; that he did not speak Portuguese or Bantu languages spoken there; and that he would face obstacles to reintegration. The judge also had regard to the medical evidence, including Dr Singh’s report and the tinnitus evidence [53].
33. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant could, despite those obstacles, find work in Angola was an evaluative factual conclusion. It was based on evidence that the appellant had worked in construction in the United Kingdom, that he had a vocational history, and that no reliable evidence had been placed before the Tribunal to show that jobs were not available in Angola. That conclusion may be viewed as robust. It may even be thought harsh given the extent of the obstacles the judge accepted. But that is not the test on an error of law appeal.
34. As set out in [23] above, the issue is whether the conclusion was legally perverse, inadequately reasoned to the point of error, or one that no reasonable judge, properly directing themself, could have reached on the evidence. I am not satisfied that this high threshold is met.
35. The judge was entitled to attach significance to the appellant’s past employment in construction and to his general capability for work. The judge was also entitled to find that the language barrier and absence of immediate support would make employment and integration difficult, but would not necessarily make them impossible or create very significant obstacles within the statutory test. The conclusion was fact-sensitive and fell within the range of lawful findings open to the First-tier Tribunal.
36. I note that in the permission to appeal Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis expressly states in paragraph 5 that it is not arguable that the Judge failed to have adequate regard to the view of Doctor Singh because he refers to it both in the context of there not being evidence of treatment in Angola and also that the family could provide him with financial support. Ms Zabata Besso submits that the judge was directed to the specific points raised by Dr Singh both in the skeleton argument and in submissions. She says that the expert listed factors that would have affected employment and no finding was made on such barriers. She submits it as an error of law not to consider Dr Singh's findings.
37. Irrespective of the right to argue this specific point given Judge Jarvis permission comments, I do not accept that the judge ignored Dr Singh’s report. The judge expressly referred to the psychiatric evidence and accepted the diagnosis. He did not accept that the appellant had shown that treatment would be unavailable or inaccessible in Angola. While the grounds and oral submissions identify parts of the report which could have supported a more favourable finding for the appellant, the judge was not required to set out every passage of the evidence or to deal separately with every submission. The reasons, read as a whole, were adequate to explain why he was not persuaded that the obstacles reached the very significant threshold.
38. In the context of material deprivation, the judge expressly refers to Dr Singh's evidence at paragraph 53 which he says he has borne in mind when concluding that the appellant was capable of work. Furthermore, when directing his attention to very significant obstacles, the judge overtly refers back to his findings of facts, including paragraph 53, which includes a reference to Dr Singh's evidence. He expressly refers to the evidence again at paragraph 71 when finding that the appellant would be capable of finding work.
39. In the Grounds and in oral submissions it is argued that the judge failed to explain how he concluded that the appellant could work despite the language barrier. In my judgment, paragraph 11 of the Grounds does not identify an error of law. The challenge is, in substance, an invitation to re-argue the factual evaluation undertaken by the First-tier Tribunal. Applying the approach in Volpi v Volpi, an appellate tribunal must not interfere with findings of fact unless the conclusion was one that no reasonable judge could have reached. The judge is assumed, absent compelling reason to the contrary, to have considered the whole of the evidence, and the fact that every item of evidence or every step in the reasoning is not set out does not mean that it was overlooked. Nor is a determination to be subjected to narrow textual analysis or treated as if it were a statute. Here, the judge identified the relevant obstacles, including the appellant’s lack of Angolan language skills, absence of a support network, lengthy absence from Angola and health difficulties, but was entitled to weigh those matters against the evidence of the appellant’s previous work in construction and his broader capacity for employment. The conclusion may have been expressed shortly, and fuller reasons might have been given, but the reasons were adequate to explain why the judge was not satisfied that the language barrier would prevent the appellant from finding work. The conclusion was not rationally insupportable and was one open to the judge on the evidence.
40. Ground 2 is therefore refused. It amounts, in substance, to a disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s evaluation of the facts. The decision on this issue was not perverse and was not a decision that no reasonable judge could have made.
Conclusion
41. The appeal succeeds on Ground 1 only. The First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law by misunderstanding the evidence as to the currency of the probation risk assessment and by failing to undertake an adequate current assessment of danger to the public at the date of hearing. That error materially affected both the section 72 assessment and the Article 8 proportionality exercise.
42. The appeal fails on Ground 2. The judge’s conclusion on the appellant’s ability to work in Angola and the related very significant obstacles assessment was an evaluative finding open to him on the evidence. It was not perverse.
43. Based on this conclusion, the relevant background section at paragraphs 2 to 5 is not challenged and is preserved. The section 72 certificate section, at paragraphs 34 to 40, is set aside.
44. There is no appeal against the Article 3 health claim. The findings and conclusions at paragraphs 41 to 49 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision are preserved.
45. As I have dismissed Ground 2, the material deprivation section, at paragraphs 50 to 55, is preserved.
46. The public interest section within the Article 8 analysis, namely paragraphs 60 to 62, is set aside.
47. There is no dispute as to the approach taken by the judge at paragraphs 63 to 67, and those paragraphs are preserved.
48. As Ground 2 is dismissed, the judge’s analysis and findings in relation to very significant obstacles, at paragraphs 68 to 74, are preserved.
49. Because the material error of law plays a part in the proportionality exercise, the section of the decision dealing with proportionality from paragraphs 75 to 83 is set aside.
50. Because the material error affects the assessment of current danger and the Article 8 proportionality exercise, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside to that extent. The appeal will require remaking on the outstanding issues. The parties should be prepared to address the Tribunal on any further directions, including whether updated evidence is required on current risk, rehabilitation and proportionality.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision is set aside to the extent identified above.
Ground 2 is dismissed.
The appeal is to be remade on the outstanding issues concerning the section 72 danger assessment and Article 8 proportionality.
The appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21/07/2026