Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001474
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63134/2023
LP/10668/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

VVT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms R Chapman, Counsel instructed by Reeves & Co
For the Respondent: Dr S Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 10 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant or his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. We have continued the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations under Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case.
Introduction
2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He claimed asylum in the UK on 29 May 2021. His protection claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 19 December 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
3. The appellant claims that, whilst working in Qatar, he made several payments to help former LTTE members who were disabled and destitute. When one of the ex-LTTE members was arrested in Sri Lanka, the authorities became interested in the appellant. Threats were made to the appellant’s wife and family in Sri Lanka. Due to his uncertain status in Qatar, the appellant fled to the UK and claimed asylum.
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Sarwar on 12 November 2025.
5. Judge Sarwar dismissed the appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 19 December 2025.
6. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge. These were rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. However, on renewal to the Upper Tribunal, by decision dated 7 May 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan granted permission on the following terms:
This is a borderline decision because many of the judge’s findings were likely to be open to him to make. However, it is just arguable that despite having set out the weaknesses in the evidence the judge’s findings at [51] and thereafter might have lacked some clarity as to how much weight was in fact put on those documents. It is at least arguable that inadequate findings might have been made to explain his overall rejection of the account. This would then impact on the assessment of the individual circumstances for the purpose of assessing the appellant’s sur place activities with reference to the relevant country guidance, which arguably lacked a structured approach. Although the other grounds are far weaker, I will not limit the grant of permission. It might be that on a more detailed consideration of the decision no error of law is disclosed, but the grounds are sufficiently arguable to merit consideration at a hearing.
7. Thus, the matter came before us to determine whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
8. Ms Chapman relied on the grounds. She focussed on Grounds 1, 2 and 3, making no reference to Ground 4.
9. Ms Chapman submitted that the Judge failed to clarify the weight to be given to the documents submitted. It is clear the Judge believed that the documents had some substance but his findings at [51] were unclear. She submitted that the arrest warrant would have been positively determinative of the appeal if accepted but there is no idea of the weight given to the documents by the Judge and the documents were not factored into the overall risk assessment.
10. Ms Chapman submitted that the Judge erred in his approach to the country information. She referred to various sections of the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note, Sri Lanka: Tamil separatism, Version 9.0. August 2025 (CPIN) to illustrate her argument that the Judge failed to reference the correct information.
11. In relation to the appellant’s sur place activities, Ms Chapman submitted that the Judge failed to apply the Country Guidance case of KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC).
12. Dr Ibisi relied upon the Rule 24 Response. She submitted that the Judge’s findings were well-reasoned. She submitted that the Judge had considered all the documents, the country evidence and the Country Guidance. Dr Ibisi submitted that the Judge had considered the documents and had found them to be unreliable. She submitted that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s core claim should be rejected was sustainable.
13. In response to questions from us, Dr Ibisi submitted that the implication was that the Judge gave little weight to the documents. She highlighted that the Judge made a decision as to the reliability of the documents and did not place weight on the documents as there were concerns about all the documents.
14. Dr Ibisi accepted that if an error of law were found on Ground 1, then this infected the whole decision.
15. Ms Chapman briefly responded. She stated that the Judge did not pull together his conclusions and make a clear finding. She submitted that the weight given to the documents in the final assessment is unknown and the documents are of crucial importance.
16. After hearing the submissions, we reserved our decision.
Discussion and Analysis
17. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, we have reminded ourselves of the following principles.
18. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).
19. We take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge’s findings are “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.
20. We also remind ourselves that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
21. We have carefully considered the Judge’s decision in the round, bearing the above guidance in mind. However, we find that the decision is not sustainable and must be set aside.
22. We consider that Ground 1 relating to the Judge’s consideration of the documents was the key material issue. If an error were found in Ground 1, then the parties agreed that the whole decision would need to be set aside.
23. The Judge considered the documents from [45] to [50], before reaching his conclusions on the documents at [51].
24. In [50] the Judge recorded the appellant’s evidence that he had nothing to do with the procurement of the documents. The appellant’s wife had instructed a lawyer in Sri Lanka and the appellant’s UK solicitors then liaised directly with the Sri Lankan lawyer. We note that before the Judge were a copy of the Sri Lankan lawyer’s Bar Association card and copies of email correspondence between the appellant’s UK solicitors and the Sri Lankan lawyer. On their own some of the findings indicated that the Judge was not impressed with the evidence.
25. It is the Judge’s ultimate conclusions regarding the documents (contained in [51]) that, as identified by Judge Canavan in the grant of permission, are problematic. In our judgment, the conclusions at [51] demonstrate that the Judge erred in law. We hesitated to come to this view noting the case law in respect of appeals requires us to show due respect to the expertise of the first instance judge and because the the structure of the Judge’s decision was set out well save for [51].
26. The Judge noted what he considered conflicting content in the documents and the fact that the appellant’s inability to explain why some of the documents were in English caused him “some concern.” The Judge then stated that he was “not satisfied that the documents can be relied upon without reservations”, before he concluded that he approached the documents “with caution” and attached “due weight to them.”
27. These findings in relation to key documentary evidence have caused us to hesitate. We have reflected on Dr Ibisi’s submissions that we can infer what the Judge meant at [51]. We conclude that it is not possible to know what weight the Judge ascribed to the documents in his overall assessment of the claim.
28. The documents purport to demonstrate a police investigation, court proceedings and an arrest warrant against the appellant. If these documents were found to be reliable, then the Country Guidance indicates that the appellant would be at real risk on return (headnote 18 of KK and RS states “Only those against whom there is an extant arrest warrant and/or a court order will appear on the stop list. Returnees falling within this category will be detained at the airport.”).
29. We conclude that the Judge appeared to dilute his earlier findings at [51]. By introducing the reservations that he did and the way that he introduced them at [51]. Weight was a matter for the Judge, but the issue in this case is that it is not possible to decipher what weight the Judge applied to the evidence. The introduction by the Judge to terms such as “some concern” and “without reservation” called for a further explanation of what weight the Judge did ascribe to the documents.
30. Therefore, whilst the Judge did consider the documents, he missed the final step of saying what weight he applied to them. We conclude that in a protection claim with the sensitivities it raises, noting the Country Guidance, it was incumbent upon the Judge to set out what weight was applied.
31. It was accepted by the respondent that if an error were found in relation to Ground 1, then this infected the whole decision, and it must be set aside. Thus, Grounds 2 and 3 (the only others argued before us) can be dealt with briefly.
32. Ground 2 relates to the Judge’s approach to the country evidence. We were taken to various parts of the CPIN by Ms Chapman. In our judgment the Judge placed reliance on a limited part of the CPIN and failed adequately to engage with other sections that were potentially material to the assessment of the appellant's claim.
33. Given the uncertainty surrounding the Judge's treatment of the documentary evidence, we are unable to be satisfied that the Judge's assessment of the country evidence formed part of a coherent and legally adequate evaluation of risk. We find that this does amount to an error of law.
34. Ground 3 relates to the appellant’s sur place activities for the TGTE. KK and RS considered the significance of the TGTE at [375] to [387] (summarised at headnote 6). In relation to sur place activities headnote 8 of KK and RS is also material. The Judge at [57] referred to the appellant’s activities for the TGTE as being “in a more personal capacity.” It is not clear what the Judge meant by that phrase.
35. However, there was no further analysis of the appellant’s sur place activity and whether this would place the appellant at real risk on return to Sri Lanka. We find that the Judge failed adequately to engage with the appellant's sur place activities and their significance under KK and RS. This amounts to an error of law
Conclusion
36. We conclude that that Grounds 1, 2 and 3 succeed, and we find that the decision is legally flawed and must be set aside.
37. We have carefully considered the issue of disposal. The credibility findings, treatment of the documentary evidence, assessment of country evidence and evaluation of the appellant's sur place activities will all require reconsideration. The extent of judicial fact-finding required is such that remittal is appropriate. Thus, applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), given the issues and the extent of fact-finding that will be required, we are satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, Manchester for a de novo hearing on all issues.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11 August 2026