Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001489
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/53075/2024
LP/04268/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SA
(Anonymity ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ball of counsel instructed by Internations Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Bangladesh appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (“the Judge”) dated 6 January 2026 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then it will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal by way of a decision dated 11 March 2026.
4. On a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan in a decision sealed on. The Learned Judge said as follows when granting permission to appeal:
“Although the judge gave cogent reasons in para. 21 of the decision for not agreeing to adjourn the hearing, I am (just) persuaded by the submissions in para. 5 of the grounds (in particular paras. 5a and 5b), that, despite the appellant’s history of non-compliance, it is arguable that the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing as a consequence of the judge refusing to adjourn the hearing and therefore the decision is undermined by procedural unfairness.”
The Hearing Before Me
5. I was provided with a 555 paged bundle.
6. Mr Ball referred to the 6 grounds of appeal drafted by his instructing solicitors, but he said that the real issue was procedural fairness. He said that “there were 3 things”. Firstly, that the Appellant’s brother had passed away due to a stroke. He said that this extended beyond a reasonable period of grief. The Appellant was entitled to work for 20 hours per week. Secondly, there was a fluid and dynamic situation in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina had resigned in 2024 and there was a period of uncertainty and what it meant for BNP members. It was submitted that the Appellant had been taking steps to see what efforts were being made in Bangladesh to see if it was safe for him to return. Thirdly, said Mr Ball, there was the issue of conduct and that by the Appellant’s former solicitors. They are called Legit Solicitors. He said that firm had dropped the Appellant as a client the day before New Years Eve. On 2nd January 2026 the Appellant had submitted a detailed written application for an adjournment and he had sought 4 weeks and to have the benefit of a bundle. Mr Ball said that application had been refused by a legal officer at the First-tier Tribunal but had not properly considered the issues.
7. I heard from Mr Simpson at this stage to gauge his views in reply. He said that the real question was whether there was an error of law in the Judge’s decision. He said that on 30 December 2025, the Appellant’s previous representatives, Legit Solicitors, wrote to the First-tier Tribunal to come off the record. They indicated that despite repeated attempts to contact the Appellant and obtain instructions, that they were unable to do so. In particular, they were unable to obtain instructions to finalise the Appellant’s appeal bundle and to prepare a skeleton argument. They were unable to confirm whether the Appellant was to be legally represented at the substantive hearing or not. In the absence of instructions, they were unable to continue to act; to comply with case management directions or to assist the Tribunal further. They therefore ceased to act for the appellant.
8. Mr Simpson said he “fully opposed” the appeal and so I heard further from Mr Ball. I had been referred to paragraph 41 of the Judge’s decision which said in part:
41. As noted above, the appellant had almost 2 years in which to gather and submit further evidence in support of his appeal having known that the same was refused by the Home Office. During that time however he produced nothing. He was consistently in breach of the tribunal’s directions and non-compliant. He found to provide instructions to his representatives. The appellant before me shorter claim that he needed just 2 weeks to produce further evidence in support of his appeal. In the light of the appellant’s previous actions, I this to be a cynical attempt on the appellant’s behalf to frustrate the appeal process and I appellant’s failure to produce documentation and late adjournment request to be damaging to his credibility.
9. Mr Ball said that this meant that the Judge did not find the Appellant to be credible because of this. Mr Ball said that grounds 4 and 5 could be taken together. He said that a higher standard of reasoning was required because the Judge had gone beyond the previous reasons for refusal.
10. Mr Ball said that ground 6 dealt with the Court of Appeal decision in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department because of the change of government in Bangladesh. The Awami league had fallen. He said though that the issue was one of fairness. Mr Ball said that there was a Rule15(2A) application for the admission of documents such as the FIR, but those would be relevant if an error of law was found to exist.
11. Mr Ball said that the Appellant’s new solicitors had come on board some 3 to 4 months ago.
12. In reply Mr Simpson said that in respect of the loss of legal representation whereas it was being suggested that the situation was not of the Appellant’s own making, that was not correct. He said that some reasoning had been provided in submissions today but one of the key documents for the Judge was the case management order. This was referred to by the Judge at paragraphs 3 and 4 of his decision. The Appellant had been able to present his documents. Even with the loss of his brother, the Appellant was able to instruct solicitors in August 2025. Mr Simpson said that the Appellant had his key documents 5 months before the hearing and it remained unclear why those documents were not provided. Mr Simpson said that the explanation provided today was not explained as it was before. Mr Simpson said it did not appear that it was a finance issue as to why the documents had not been translated. Nor he said was there a health issue.
13. Mr Simpson took me through the Judge’s decision at paragraphs 19 to 21.
14. Mr Simpson relied on the Rule 24 response which had stated as follows:
“2. The respondent opposes the appellant’s appeal.
3. The respondent submits that grounds 1-3 and 5 are interlinked. There was no procedural unfairness in refusing the appellant’s adjournment request.
4. The appellant stated in making his adjournment request that he needed further time to obtain documents for his case. The appellant lodged his appeal on the 5th February 2024, against a decision made by the SSHD on the 31st January 2024. The appellant had almost two full years to obtain documents before the 5th January 2026, when the matter was heard.
5. The appellant was given extensive opportunities and grace in order to obtain documents prior to the matter being listed. The respondent emphasises the appellant’s repeated failure to comply with directions, as set out below.
6. Directions to produce the relevant documents to be relied upon were issued on the 22nd October 2024, with a deadline of the 11th December 2024. Further 30 directions were issued on the 27th February 2025, with a deadline of the 13th March 2025. On the 14th July 2025, the appeal was listed for a case management hearing in the following terms: a. “Due to the continuing non-compliance with Tribunal directions, this appeal has been listed for a Case Management Appointment (CMA) on DATE: 15 August 2025 TIME: 10am LOCATION: Taylor House, 88 Rosebery Avenue, London, EC1R 4QU (via CVP). This will be conducted face to face. The representative will be expected to inform the Tribunal of the following at the CMA: 1. the reasons for the continued failure to comply with directions; 2. what steps have been taken to prepare the evidence to date; 3. any significant obstacles encountered in preparing the evidence and what has been done to overcome these; 4. the timetable for providing the ASA/Bundle without further delay; 5. to show cause why an order for costs should not be made against the representative in respect of the otherwise unnecessary CMA.”
7. Subsequent to the case management hearing on the 15th August 2025, directions were issued with a deadline of the 28th August 2025.
8. The respondent acknowledges the case management order dated 15th August 2025. It is noted that this records an assertion on behalf of the appellant that he has been impaired and unfit to engage meaningfully with his asylum claim since February 2025. It does not state that this had been adequately evidence and accepted by a Judge. Furthermore, it states that that the legal representatives had by then received the fundamental documents. As a consequence of that hearing the appellant was afforded further time, until the 28th August 2025. The order does not record that the appellant’s representatives stated at the case management hearing that this extension would be unsuitable because the appellant continued to be unfit to meaningfully engage or give further instructions.
9. The grounds point to no medical evidence or otherwise before the Judge Cohen to support the position that the Appellant has been unfit to provide instructions, obtain documents upon which he wishes to rely, or meaningfully engage with his claim between the CMR and the hearing because of acute grief and mental trauma. Furthermore, there was also no evidence that the Appellant was now 31 sufficiently recovered by the 5th January 2025 hearing date that he could effectively prepare the case and instruct legal representation in the requested 4 week adjournment period, and thus that the adjournment would be effective.
10. In light of this background and the solicitor’s statement that they could not continue to act as they had made repeated attempts to contact the appellant and obtain instructions, the respondent submits the appellant being without representation cannot be said to be through circumstances not of his own making.
11. In respect of ground 4, the respondent submits this amounts to mere disagreement. There is no legal error in making alternative findings. The Judge gave clear reasons for finding that, on the issues in dispute, the appellant’s claim was fabricated.
12. It is unclear that any Article 3 claim could have succeeded on the facts of this claim, in light of the rejection of the protection limb. The grounds are incorrect at paragraph 16(c) in stating Article 8 claims are to be determined to the lower standard.
13. Turning finally to ground 6, as previously stated, there is no internal inconsistency in the Judge making alternative findings, and to do so suggests no uncertainty in the determination. Nonetheless, any criticism of alternative findings cannot be said to be material unless the core findings can be impugned. Judge Cohen clearly conducted a fact specific assessment, which was naturally limited by the appellants failure to produce evidence as directed.”
15. Mr Simpson said that Ground 1 did not show a material error of law because the Judge had to consider all factors. He said that Ground 2 was entirely parasitic on Ground 1. He said that Ground 3 which related to non compliance could be explained for February 2025 but not for the period from August 2025 to 2026. He said that there had been wilful and cynical conduct by the Appellant. In respect of Ground 4 he said that JCK had been followed at paragraphs 46 to 48 and reaffirmed at paragraph 51. He said that in respect of Ground 5 this had been dealt with at paragraphs 38 and 42 of the Judge’s decision. Ground 6 referred to unspecified discrepancies but Mr Simpson said that the Judge had provided cogent and sufficient reasons.
16. In reply Mr Ball said that his instructing solicitors apologised for not sending in documents sooner. He had been instructed the Friday before and the view taken originally was that it was just an Error of Law hearing and documents were therefore not submitted.
17. At page 539 the former solicitors stated:
“Despite repeated attempts to contact the Appellant and to obtain full and settled instructions, we have been unable to do so. In particular, we have been unable to obtain complete instructions to finalise (a) the Appellant’s appeal bundle and (b) the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument, and we have been unable to confirm whether the Appellant wishes to be legally represented at the forthcoming substantive hearing. In the absence of instructions, we are unable to continue to act, to comply with case management 539 directions, or to assist the Tribunal in furthering the overriding objective. Consistently with our professional obligations, we have therefore ceased to act.”
18. I had reserved my decision.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
19. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
20. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
21. It is necessary to consider the Judge’s decision. In view of the grounds of appeal, I do so at some length.
22. The first thing to note is that Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant was asylum was on 30 January 2024. The Appellant having made his application to the Secretary of State as long ago as 6 October 2022, having entered the UK as a student on 21 May 2022. The Judge considered the procedural history and noted the following at paragraphs 19 and 20:
“19. The appellant and his previous representatives were non-compliant in respect of the tribunal’s directions and did not serve a skeleton argument or appellant’s bundle despite numerous requests and specific directions. A case management order was made on 15 August 2025 following the appellant’s non-compliance to follow directions issued on 1 December 2024 and 27 March 2025. It was noted that the tribunal had not received any correspondence from the appellant’s representative since 6 March 2025. Further directions were given therein which the appellant again failed to comply with.
20. On 30 December 2025, the appellant’s previous representatives, Legit Solicitors, wrote to the tribunal to come off the record. They indicated that despite repeated attempts to contact the appellant and obtain for unsettled instructions, that they were unable to do so. In particular, they were unable to obtain instructions to finalise the appellant’s appeal bundle and prepare a skeleton argument. They were unable to confirm whether the appellant was to be legally represented at the substantive hearing or not. In the absence of instructions, they were unable to continue to act; to comply with case management directions or to assist the Tribunal further. They therefore ceased to act for the appellant.”
23. The Judge then dealt with the issue in respect of the adjournment as a preliminary issue at paragraph 21 of his decision. The Judge said:
“The appellant attended the appeal hearing in person. He asked for an adjournment in order to obtain further documentation in support of his appeal and instruct representatives. Mr Mahdi opposed the adjournment. I refused the same. I noted that the appellant had been non-compliant with directions dating back to December 2024. He had ceased to give his previous representatives instructions leading to them removing themselves from the records. His application was refused in January 2024 which meant that he had 23 months in which to obtain documentation in support of his appeal but had not done so. In these circumstances, having regard to the Procedure Rules and the overriding objective, I found that the appellant had wilfully and repeatedly failed to comply with directions issued to him and opportunities available to him in order to further his appeal over the course of an almost 2 year period. In these circumstances, I did not find that granting an adjournment was justified, fair or proportionate in all the circumstances.”
24. The Judge went on to consider the written and oral evidence after referring to the correct burden and standard of proof. Importantly, the Judge went on to make findings in the alternative. He said at paragraphs 47 and 48 as follows:
“47. Even if I accepted that the appellant had been involved with his claimed party in Bangladesh, I note in any event that there has been a sea change in the political landscape in Bangladesh. The former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, fled the country and the Awami League were removed from power. There is an interim government comprising a coalition of political parties but not including the Awami League. The Awami League have now been banned from the country. I note the recent case law, including the Court of Appeal decision in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812 that it was not considered that even BNP activists were at risk upon return to Bangladesh in the current political climate.
48. I find that even taking the appellant’s asylum claim at its high point, that based on the significantly changed country situation including the fact that the Awami League no longer hold any power in Bangladesh, I do not find that BNP members or supporters currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh due to their political allegiances or activities.”
25. In respect of Article 8 and human rights matters, the Judge concluded:
“Having regard to my findings above, I find that the appellants’ circumstances are not sufficiently serious and that the appellants’ case is not amongst the small proportion of cases that the Supreme Court anticipated would be allowed under Article 8 of the ECHR in Agyarko. The appellant has not substantiated his claim under Article 8”
26. Ground 1 raises issue of procedural fairness. I agree with the Appellant that it is necessary to look at what occurred through the lens of procedural fairness and to put to one side the merits of the case when doing so. The decision in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC) has been correctly cited by the Appellant.
27. In my judgment, the Appellant’s submissions are hopeless. The Appellant knew since 15 August 2025, some 5 months before the hearing, that he was required to comply with the directions for the hearing. I reject the submission, if it is being made, that the Procedure Rules and/or case management orders can be somehow diluted so much that they become virtually meaningless. That is so whether a party is represented or not. I am well aware of the difficulties that litigants in person face and I am aware of the Equal Treatment Bench Book and that there must be some acknowledgement of that, but the case law is also abundantly clear that even in public law cases, including immigration cases, there cannot be so much relaxation of the rules so as to mean that there are no rules. Procedural rigour is necessary.
28. In any event, the Appellant was legally represented in August 2025 and until the end of December 2025. I am sorry for the Appellant’s loss, but I reject the Appellant’s argument that because his brother had died in February 2025 due to a stroke then that grief and mental trauma caused the Appellant not to be able to deal with the collection of evidence from Bangladesh and the like. It was not a day or two that the Appellant had to deal with matters. The Appellant’s brother died in February 2025. The case management order was in August 2025. The Appellant had solicitors and they had reminded the Appellant that he must provide them with the instructions. Indeed, there is reference to the documents being in the former solicitor’s possession. It was therefore some 11 months since the Appellant’s brother’s death and some 5 months since the case management directions. In a jurisdiction in which all know that deadlines are short, it was imperative that the Appellant dealt with this appeal in a proper manner. I reject any suggestion that the Appellant did not know he had to deal with matters timeously. The Appellant would have known how swiftly immigration cases have to be dealt with and even if he did not, his former solicitors had been chasing him to comply.
29. The Judge reached an unimpeachable decision in respect of this matter and heard from the Appellant before refusing the adjournment. The Appellant had a scrupulously fair opportunity to present his case via an interpreter. Even if the Judge had not seen the adjournment application beforehand, the Judge conducted a fair and open minded approach. The fact that the Judge refused to adjourn the matter against a backdrop of such serious breaches of the Procedure Rules and of the case management orders does not mean that somehow there is a procedural error. For me to find a procedural error in this case would mean that no application for an adjournment could ever be refused because it would always be an error of law. That would be an absurd situation and which is what the grounds really contend for.
30. Ground 2 is, as Mr Simpson, said entirely parasitic on Ground 1. There was no procedural error in the failure to adjourn and so there is nothing to Ground 2 which contends that there was a “bootstrap error” by failing to adjourn but expecting evidence. The Judge’s findings were clear, were unarguably open to him and are cogently reasoned. The Judge was entitled to come to the decision which was reached and did not inappropriately consider the supporting evidence in isolation. The Judge considered the anxiety and referred to it and, in any event, as is clear from the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in OM v SSHD, the Joint Presidential Guidance is guidance only.
31. As the Judge said at paragraph 41, the Appellant had almost 2 years to produce his evidence. The grounds are therefore disingenuous to contend that the failure to provide an adjournment was the reason why the documents were not available. The orders for the documents were made in August 2025. That was following earlier delays by the Appellant. The Appellant failed to comply with the Upper Tribunal’s orders. He did so at his risk.
32. Ground 3 is also parasitic on Ground 1. The Judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that the Appellant’s appalling non-compliance with the directions was cynical and wilful. The Appellant knew what he had to provide and he had been in the country since 2022. The hearing was in January 2026. The directions were made in August 2025 after a request for extra time to do so. In a jurisdiction where it is known that Appellants sometimes seek to extend their stay in the UK when knowing they have no right to do so, the Judge was perfectly entitled to consider that yet another delay by the Appellant in this case as being cynical and wilful.
33. The suggestion that the Appellant’s former solicitors failed to consider the Appellant’s claimed mental state is unevidenced, but in any event, I simply do not accept that it is made out in the submissions or evidence presented to me. The Judge was entitled to make the findings that he did.
34. Ground 4 contends that section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was not correctly applied, but this is wholly incorrect because the Judge referred at paragraph 32 to section 32 and also to the binding caselaw. The Judge unarguably correctly applied the same thereafter.
35. Ground 5 contends that there was a failure to have regard to material evidence and that there was inadequate reasoning. In reality this is just a repetition of the earlier grounds, but in any event, even if the adjournment application of 2 January 2026 was not placed before the Judge, then that was the fault of the Appellant too because he should have provided the Judge with a copy of it. In any even though, the Judge scrupulously fairly had considered the application for an adjournment and reached an impeachable decision that this matter had to proceed in view of the appalling delays to date. The sub-paragraphs add nothing to the Appellant’s grounds and are hopeless.
36. Ground 6 suggests that the Judge misapplied the Court of Appeal’s decision in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812 and that there was a “failure to conduct an individualised risk assessment”. Regrettably this ground is also disingenuous. What the Judge actually said was as follows:
“Even if I accepted that the appellant had been involved with his claimed party in Bangladesh, I note in any event that there has been a sea change in the political landscape in Bangladesh. The former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, fled the country and the Awami League were removed from power. There is an interim government comprising a coalition of political parties but not including the Awami League. The Awami League have now been banned from the country. I note the recent case law, including the Court of Appeal decision in MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812 that it was not considered that even BNP activists were at risk upon return to Bangladesh in the current political climate.
48. I find that even taking the appellant’s asylum claim at its high point, that based on the significantly changed country situation including the fact that the Awami League no longer hold any power in Bangladesh, I do not find that BNP members or supporters currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh due to their political allegiances or activities.”
37. I do not know why the Appellant’s solicitors failed to cite in their grounds of appeal that the Judge said, “Even if I accepted that the Appellant had been involved with his claimed party” and “I find that even taking the appellant’s asylum claim at its high point”. If the Appellant’s solicitors failed to cite the above to deflect from the very poor chances of success, then that is to be deplored.
38. It is abundantly clear that the Judge said that even if the Appellant’s case was taken at its highest, then in view of the Court of Appeal’s recent judgment in MU v Secretary of State, this Appellant’s case could not succeed in any event.
39. As the Court of Appeal said in MU v Secretary of State, it will be an uncommon case that can now succeed bases on the fear of the Awami League.
40. Therefore, in the circumstances despite Mr Ball having made submissions of a high quality, I conclude that there is no procedural or other error of law in this case. The Appellant’s case was considered with scrupulous fairness and the grounds, even taken at their highest show nothing of any substance when analysed.
41. The law is well settled that as an appeal judge I must not lightly interfere with the expert First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision.
42. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.
43. The effect is that the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights stands.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds stands.

11 September 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber