Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001506
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01982/2023
EU/57031/2024
LE/00037/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

CARMEL MUYONGE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs C Physsas, instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant it a citizen of Italy who has resided in the UK since 2015, when he arrived aged 13. The Appellant has a serious criminal history, including a conviction in 2022 wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, resulting in a sentence of three years’ imprisonment in a young offenders’ institution. That conviction, which relates to his stabbing his victim in the stomach with a knife, led to the Respondent’s decision to deport him, which led to the present appeal. He appeals with permission against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Neave (‘the Judge’) dated 11 January 2026. He was granted permission to appeal to this Tribunal on the basis that the Judge arguably failed to consider his relationship with his brothers, a speech and language therapy assessment, and / or various findings of Ms Roberts (forensic psychologist). While the Appellant is a national of Italy and raised various arguments regarding his rights as an EU citizen at first instance, none have been appealed and this decision solely concerns the Appellant’s deportation in the context of the UK Borders Act 2007 and associated legislation.
2. For the reasons given below, I dismiss the appeal.
Grounds of appeal
3. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal fall into three categories, all of which assert an error of law by the Judge in failing to give anxious scrutiny to and / or unreasonably considering the following points in the evidence:
a. The Appellant’s relationship with his brothers;
b. The speech and language assessment of 2019, which found that the Appellant had communication difficulties; and
c. The report of Ms Roberts, which was considered within the context of risk but her findings regarding the Appellant’s vulnerability and support structures were not considered within the proportionality assessment.
Findings
4. Relationship with brothers. Ms Physsas did not suggest that the Appellant enjoyed family life with his brother Gael, who is 23, but submitted that he does have family life with his younger brother, who is still a child, with whom the Appellant cohabited prior to his imprisonment. Her submission was that both brothers were in any event relevant to the analysis of the Appellant’s private life.
5. The question for the Judge was whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the matters set out in exception 1 of s. 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, meaning that the Appellant’s deportation would be a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 ECHR rights. That, as she correctly identified at paragraph 54 of her determination (citing HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, §5), required a holistic proportionality assessment of the rights of a potential deportee and his family, looking at whether there was “something more” (per Underhill LJ in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626), taking the case beyond the statutory Exceptions, which meant it satisfied the high threshold under s. 117C(6) of the 2002 Act.
6. The Appellant’s submissions in the First-tier Tribunal, as set out in his updated Appeal Skeleton Argument, contended that the Appellant “is very close to his family and it would be very difficult for him to be separated from them” (§34). His mother’s written evidence was that “his youngest brother is very attached to him”. Mr Ojo pointed out that neither of the Appellant’s brothers attended the appeal hearing in the First-tier Tribunal, although I note that Gael provided a witness statement which stated that he had visited Carmel twice in prison and they speak two to three times a week, with his evidence being that “He has told me that he needs my support to guide him through things like job applications and general tasks to help him live an independent life as he has been in prison during the time that he would normally have been starting to do those things and learning how they work. My support for him will be very important for him going forwards after he comes out of prison”.
7. I consider that the Judge adequately took into account the Appellant’s relationship with his family. At paragraph 46 she finds (on undisputed evidence) that the Appellant is in regular contact with his family “in particular with his mother and brother” (I presume, although the Judge does not make clear, that this refers to Gael, as that is what the evidence before the Judge shows). The Judge further considered his family ties at paragraph 55:
“[…] also take into account his family and private life here, and in particular his close relationship with his mother and the support that she provides him. However, the evidence did not in my judgment establish that their relationship is significantly closer than ordinary relationships between most adult children living outside the home and their parents, and in any event it is in my judgment straightforward to travel to Italy and to communicate with those who live there. The Appellant is an adult who is now living independently. He will in my judgment be able to maintain his family relationships and other friendships from Italy by way of visits from his family and friends (though I accept that these visits will necessarily be less frequent than they are now) and through other forms of communication, such as telephone and video calls.”
8. A judge is not obliged to deal with every piece of evidence in their decision (see eg Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48). I appreciate that neither paragraph specifically identifies the Appellant’s brothers by name nor attempts to make a detailed assessment of their relationship. However, it cannot be said that the Judge overlooked these relationships. She expressly refers to his family ties and makes findings on them which are consistent with the evidence before her. It therefore appears that the Appellant’s criticism of the Judge’s decision is in fact a disagreement as to the weight given to those relationships. Weight is of course paradigmatically a question for the trial judge and an appeal court should be extremely slow to interfere with a first-instance judge’s assessment. I see no grounds for such interference in this case. The Judge was aware of the Appellant’s family and considered his family ties in the court of her thorough determination. The fact that lengthier reasons could have been given does not mean that this reasoning contains an error of law.
9. Speech and language assessment. I do not consider that the Judge erred in failing to take into account the speech and language assessment, although the Appellant is correct that it does not feature in the determination. While I accept that anxious scrutiny applied in this case, I do not accept that there was an error of law in failing to refer to it expressly.
10. Ms Physsas explained at the hearing before me that the speech and language assessment had been referred to in oral submissions during the First-tier Tribunal hearing (it does not feature in the updated Appeal Skeleton Argument). It is not entirely clear what reliance was placed upon it before the Judge, but before me Ms Physsas pointed to the finding that the Appellant has difficulties remembering longer instructress and inferring meaning, which would impact on his ability to learn new information or complex skills as well as his ability to make and maintain relationships. The report recommends that those around the Appellant adapt the environment and modify their communication style and states that he would benefit from individual support.
11. I am not persuaded that the Judge was required to take this report into account as a matter of anxious scrutiny, and in any event consider that any error was not material. This report was an “initial assessment” which predated the Judge’s decision by more than six years. There was no updating evidence placed before the Judge, nor does the Appellant refer to communication difficulties in his written evidence. On any reasonable analysis, this is historic evidence showing some moderate communication difficulties falling far short of a disability or serious impairment.
12. It is the appellant's responsibility to identify the principal controversial issues and the Tribunal’s function is not inquisitorial, meaning it is not required to “comb through the documents and the evidence in search of potential points for either party” (AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370, §§89-90). While the report was referred to in oral submissions, any ongoing communication difficulties were not clearly evidenced or identified as an issue which the Judge was expected to determine. I therefore do not accept that it was an error of law for the Judge to omit specific consideration of the report from her determination.
13. In any event, I consider that any reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusions which the Judge did and so any error is not material. Against the exacting requirements of s. 117C(6) of the 2002 Act and the Judge’s other (unchallenged) findings, there is simply no basis on which any reasonable Judge would find that these historic and limited findings would make the difference between the Appellant’s appeal succeeding or failing.
14. Ms Roberts’ report. The Appellant relies upon Ms Roberts’ findings that (i) the Appellant has a range of protective factors in the UK, which he would not upon return to Italy, and (ii) the impact which a return to Italy would have on him given his traumatic experiences of kidnapping as a child. The Appellant also submits that Ms Roberts’ report is considered in the context of risk, not as part of the proportionality assessment.
15. Ms Roberts has prepared a lengthy and detailed report. The report is principally focussed on an assessment of the Appellant’s level of risk. She finds that he has a good range of protective factors, most of which are based in the UK. Ms Roberts notes that the Appellant suffers from nightmares about his kidnapping and that the experience was traumatising and very confusing for him. She records the Appellant’s report that this impacted on him, causing him to tend to be “cautious” and fearing a repeat. She recommends that he access his GP, although finding that his symptoms may not meet the diagnostic threshold for PTSD at this stage. She concludes that the Appellant is in need of support to move on from this period of his life.
16. As to (i), the relevant part of Ms Roberts’ analysis is at paragraph 8.0.4, where she explains that: “It is possible with no support and networks that he would struggle, and risk homelessness and poverty, which would be potential risk factors for deterioration of mental health”. I accept that possible homelessness and mental health deterioration were factors which were relevant to the proportionality assessment which the Judge had to undertake. I also accept that there is no specific reference to this particular section of Ms Roberts’ report in the judgment. However, I do not consider that this amounts to a failure to give anxious scrutiny or is otherwise a material error of law. Ms Roberts’ assessment is light-touch and predictive, essentially amounting to concerns about possible destitution, which are not based on any specific diagnosis or country expertise. The Judge adequately dealt with any concern about destitution in paragraphs 48-53, considering the Appellant’s knowledge and skills, his resilience, the legal structure in Italy, and his family support, especially his mother’s knowledge of navigating the Italian housing system. Against these unchallenged findings, I do not consider that the Judge was required by anxious scrutiny to give specific analysis to this part of Ms Roberts’ analysis. Anxious scrutiny does not necessarily require a Judge to “recite absolutely every point that could be made in the individual’s favour” but they must “be anxious to look for any factor that could potentially be significant in terms of materially contributing, alongside other factors, to tipping the scales in favour of granting the application”: R (CGW) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 858 (Admin), §23. I cannot see any basis on which this material could have tipped the scales in the Appellant’s favour, when weighed alongside the rest of the Judge’s findings and analysis.
17. As to (ii), I accept the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant’s submission does amount to mere disagreement with the Judge. The Judge expressly adverted to and considered the fact of the Appellant's kidnapping (at paragraph 51). In fairness to Ms Physsas, her submission before me was that the Judge did not engage adequately with this aspect of the evidence, and particular the findings of Ms Roberts. As I have noted above, the Judge was not required to refer specifically to every aspect of the evidence (and was plainly familiar with Ms Robert’s report). I cannot see anything in Ms Roberts’ report, including the specific paragraphs to which Ms Physsas refers, which called for more detailed reasoning or analysis by the Judge, or which would have materially altered the outcome in this appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 June 2026