Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001523
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/72461/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

6th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Malik, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 3 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 7 January 2026, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim that he had assisted a Peshmerga fighter in the Iranian mountains and that his assistance had become known to the Iranian authorities. Since his arrival in the UK, the appellant has engaged in overtly political activity directed against the Iranian regime.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on five grounds of appeal several of which involved a considerable degree of overlap in challenging the cogency of the judge’s findings of fact which were said to have leaned heavily on unsupported speculation.

5. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I raised a ‘Robinson-obvious’ point and asked the parties to address me on whether the decision could stand in light of the point taken by the judge at paragraph [21] of the decision (see below). After hearing submissions, I indicated that I was minded to allow the appeal and would remit the matter to the FtT to be decided de novo. These are my reasons for coming to those conclusions.

Discussion

6. In R v SSHD, Ex parte Robinson [1997] Q.B. 929, the Court of Appeal considered the procedural difficulty which arises when a strong point of Refugee Convention law has not been taken by an asylum-seeker who could benefit from such an argument. Lord Woolf M.R. (as he then was) reached the following conclusion, at 945G-946D:

It is now, however, necessary for us to identify the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for the tribunal to grant leave to appeal on the basis of an argument not advanced before the special adjudicator, or for a High Court judge to grant leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal of leave by the tribunal in relation to a point not taken in the notice of appeal to the tribunal.

Because the rules place an onus on the asylum-seeker to state his grounds of appeal, we consider that it would be wrong to say that mere arguability should be the criterion to be applied for the grant of leave in such circumstances. A higher hurdle is required. The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, so far as the tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal on which leave to appeal is sought. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorised as merely "arguable" as opposed to "obvious." Similarly, if when the tribunal reads the special adjudicator's decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do. It follows that leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal by the tribunal to grant leave to appeal should be granted if the judge is of the opinion that it is properly arguable that a point not raised in the grounds of appeal to the tribunal had a strong prospect of success if leave to appeal were to be granted.

7. On my consideration of the papers, it appeared to me that there was obvious and serious flaw in the judge’s analysis of the appellant’s primary narrative account in support of his claim for asylum. At [21], the judge made the following observation:

The Appellant states that friends named Hedi and Luqman, who worked at the local hospital, assisted the Peshmerga by attending at the Appellant’s home to provide treatment. Luqman is a doctor. It is unlikely that they would have taken on the risks knowing that the injured man was Peshmerga. The Appellant has failed to provide any witness statements from them. He did not provide any credible reason for failing to do so under cross-examination. At interview the Appellant stated that their homes had not been raided, and he would not know this if he had not been in contact with them after leaving the country, yet the Appellant claims not to have continued any contact with them since departure. This is an inconsistency.

[Underlining added]

8. It is well-understood in this jurisdiction that there is no requirement for an appellant seeking asylum to corroborate his claim. If authority were needed for such a proposition, one need look no further than paragraph [77] of the judgment of Singh LJ in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713. This was not a case where the appellant had not produced readily available supportive evidence but was an adverse finding which hinged on the absence of narrative witness evidence from individuals who were resident in the country where the appellant claimed to fear persecution. Mr Tan could only point to the need to consider this passage in its proper context as one of a range of findings of fact which combined to underpin the rejection of the appellant’s credibility. The difficulty with this argument was that several of these additional findings turned on matters of plausibility disconnected from any articulated objective country background information. Examples are to be seen in the following parts of the decision:

a) Paragraph [17], where it was found that the injured Peshmerga could not plausibly have escaped the Iranian forces due to his injuries.

b) Paragraph [20], where it was found that the injured Peshmerga would not have been inclined to reveal his “identity and links”.

c) Paragraph [21] (copied above), where it was found that the appellant’s friends would not have been minded to help the injured man knowing he was a Peshmerga.

d) Paragraph [23], where it was noted that the journey the appellant took with the Peshmerga would likely have resulted in encounters with others.

9. I am satisfied that the judge was, at [21], plainly seeking out unrealistic corroboration from the appellant. This was not the only adverse credibility finding, but it was plainly one of importance when seen in context. In addition, the remainder of the credibility assessment was coloured by a range of unsupported and speculative plausibility findings which were unconnected to any objective country information about how such individuals might behave in these circumstances in Iran.

10. It was agreed at the error of law hearing that the sur place findings could not stand if the appeal succeeded on the strength of the challenges to the rejection of the core narrative account of the events which were said to have unfolded prior to the appellant’s departure from Iran.

11. The decision involved material and ‘Robinson-obvious’ errors of law. I set it aside without preserving any findings of fact.

Disposal

12. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides: 
 
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:  

(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or  
 
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. 
 
13. I have considered the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). However, the parties agreed that the broad range of fact-finding which remains to be undertaken is better conducted in the FtT. I agree that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

Notice of Decision

The decision involved material errors of law and is set aside. I do not preserve any findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to FtT to be decided de novo by a different judge.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 July 2026