Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001526

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59233/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of June 2026

Before

PRINCIPAL RESIDENT JUDGE
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

OP
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Determined on the Papers Under Rule 34
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan. His appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse his protection claim as set out in a decision dated 12 March 2024 was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Green (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 29 January 2026.
3. The appellant applied for and was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 26 March 2026. In the decision granting permission to appeal, FtT Judge Kudhail said:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in law by: (a) the irrational treatment of accepted evidence concerning the Appellant's relationship; (b) the imposition of a high standard of proof regarding "emotional" testimony, and (c) the failure to take into account material documentary evidence.
3. I find the Judge’s findings at paragraph 41 are arguably inconsistent with his finding that the appellant is not gay. There is an arguable error of law.”
4. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted on all grounds.
The Error of Law
5. The respondent has filed a Rule 24 response dated 14 April 2026. The respondent states the appeal is not opposed. As the respondent concedes the error of law, I can deal with the error of law in short form.
6. I consider the respondent’s concession to have been properly made. In the decision refusing the application for international protection the respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality, but did not accept any other aspect of his claim. In particular, the respondent did not accept the appellant is gay or that he is of adverse interest to his family in Pakistan.
7. The judge identified the issues at paragraph [10] of the decision. The judge noted that if the appellant is gay, the respondent accepts that he cannot safely return to Pakistan and his appeal must succeed. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and SA. The judge set out an analysis of the appellant’s claim and findings as to the appellant’s sexual orientation at paragraphs [23] to [48] of the decision. At paragraph [41] of the decision, the judge said:
“I have considered carefully the evidence of SA. I accept that SA and the appellant are in a relationship and that they intend to marry. I also accept that SA gave his evidence sincerely and that there is no basis for finding deliberate dishonesty.”
8. The judge however went on to say that only limited corroborative weight could be attached to the evidence of SA, noting that SA is not an independent witness and that his own claim for international protection is based on his sexual orientation. The judge noted the protection claim made by SA has been refused by the respondent and is the subject of a pending appeal. The judge noted that SA therefore has a personal interest in the outcome of the appeal, reinforcing the need for caution when assessing the weight to be attached to his evidence.
9. Although the weight to be attached to any aspect of the evidence is a matter for the judge, it is difficult to understand what the judge meant at paragraph [41] of the decision in the context of what followed. The manner in which the judge’s decision is expressed is less than clear. I accept that the findings are expressed with insufficient clarity to enable the appellant to understand the basis on which the appeal was dismissed.
Disposal
10. As to disposal, there is a presumption that in the event that the Tribunal decides that the decision of the FtT is to be set aside as erroneous in law, the re-making of the decision will take place at the same hearing. I have determined the ‘error of law’ without a hearing because the error pleaded and upon which permission has been granted, is conceded by the respondent. The respondent has also conceded that the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the FtT for rehearing afresh in light of the errors identified. There can therefore be no prejudice to the appellant by my dealing with this appeal on the papers.
11. I have carefully considered paragraphs 7.1 to 7.3 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers, and the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 [2023] 4 WLR 12, and Begum (Remaking or Remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). I agree that this is a case where the effect of the error made by the judge has deprived the appellant of an opportunity for his case to be put forward and considered below, and that the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the FtT for hearing afresh.
Notice of Decision
12. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed.
13. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Green dated 29 January 2026 is set aside.
14. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for hearing afresh with no findings preserved.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Principal Resident Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 May 2026