Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001537
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61300/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LINDSLEY

Between
JA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Theilgaard, of Counsel, instructed by GigaLegal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born in March 1995. He came to the UK in 2022 as a Tier 4 student migrant and claimed asylum on 10th January 2023. The appellant’s appeal against the decision of 17th April 2024 refusing him permission to remain on protection and human rights grounds was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge after a hearing on the 2nd December 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 6th May 2026 on the basis that it was arguable that the First-tier judge had erred in law when assessing the credibility of the evidence without reference to the fact that the appellant was treated as a vulnerable witness and by failing to assess the reliability of the court-related documents lawfully. It is noted that the political situation in Bangladesh has changed since the appellant made his asylum claim but it is observed that if the appellant were found to be credible issues of prison conditions might still be relevant.
3. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside. The appellant makes an application to admit new evidence under Rule 15(2A) but it was accepted by Ms Theilgaard that this could only be relevant to remaking and not to the issue of error of law.
Submissions – Error of Law
4. In the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions from Ms Theilgaard it is argued, in short summary, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law as follows.
5. Firstly, it is argued, that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to take the appellant’s vulnerability into account when assessing credibility. The First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant was a vulnerable witness due to his GP records and previous account of mistreatment, and thus on account of his stress and anxiety, and so reasoning was, it is argued, required to be recorded in the decision when considering if discrepancies or any lack of clarity in his account were attributable to his vulnerability when assessing credibility in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance. This position, it is argued, is echoed in AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. It is argued that inconsistencies and implausibilities found to be relevant to finding the appellant’s claim lacked credibility, for instance in relation to the timing of the asylum claim or when the appellant was aware of the charges or the arrest warrant and which documents he brought to the UK, ought to have been considered in light of the appellant’s vulnerability given that the inconsistent events took place in a time period covered by trauma for the appellant. The appellant’s credibility was high-lighted as an issue in the appellant skeleton argument. Credibility was central to the appeal, and so this is argued to be a material error.
6. Secondly, it is argued that there is an error of law in the assessment of the evidence relating to the appellant’s criminal proceedings in Bangladesh which were part of the 14 separate documents relating to and supportive of the appellant’s history put forward in this appeal. At paragraph 12 of the decision the First-tier Tribunal finds that different headers and different addresses on the letter from the appellant’s Bangladeshi lawyer meant they were inconsistent when in fact all three came from Judge’s Court, Sylhet. Further there was a failure to take into account the additional evidence about legal proceedings in Bangladesh in the form of the FIR and Court orders in the hearing bundle. Whilst the expert report verifying these documents was not given weight that did not mean the documents themselves should not have been assessed at all, and consideration also should have been given to whether in the particular circumstances the respondent should have verified the documents given that the process in the CPIN at Annex A could have led to the conclusion that they could easily have been verifiable, although it was accepted in oral submissions that the exceptional duty to verify the documents, arising from QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33, was not put to the First-tier Tribunal.
7. Thirdly, it is argued, that there are errors in the consideration of the issue of very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh. It is argued that as low level political activity was accepted and some sur place activity in the UK that this may itself have been found to be a cause of very significant obstacles to integration. This is because it is accepted at paragraph 33 of the decision that there is still some politically motivated violence from non-state actors.
8. No Rule 24 was filed by the respondent, but Mr Nappey opposed the appeal and made oral submissions which in short summary were as follows. With respect to the first ground, it is argued that there is no evidence that the appellant’s vulnerability could have affected his evidence giving as there is no reference to memory problems or trauma in the GP notes. Therefore, in accordance with Khan v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 148 no material procedural unfairness arises as there is no link between the appellant’s mental health problems and his ability to give evidence or respond to cross examination. In addition, the reasons for the appellant lacking credibility go beyond matters which arise from inconsistencies in cross-examination into issues of a lack of reasonably obtainable verification and a failure to provide the full Facebook download as required by XX (PJACK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23. With respect to the second ground, as commented in the grant of permission, this ground is essentially just a disagreement with the findings of the First-tier Tribunal. There are reasons given for the rejection of the verification report, and then the documents are considered in their own right, with a detailed examination of the documents said to emanate from the lawyer and detailed reasons for rejecting them as unreliable. Ultimately good reasons are given, at paragraph 29, for the rejection of the documents which were not just related to doubts about the appellant’s evidence. With respect to the third ground, it is argued that this ground is essentially parasitic on the other two grounds which are not made out. All factors raised in the appeal are considered when concluding that the appellant would not have very significant obstacles to integration at paragraph 39 of the decision. Further there are major problems for the appellant showing any materiality in this contended error given that the BNP is now in power in Bangladesh and the appellant was simply found to be a low-level supporter of this party.
9. At the end of the hearing I informed the parties that I found that the First-tier Tribunal had not erred in law and would set my reasons out in writing, which I now do below.
Conclusions – Error of Law
10. I note that the numbering in the decision starts again at the findings section, so I refer to the numbers of paragraphs up to the findings section simply by the number and paragraphs from the findings section onwards as the number plus a section.
11. With respect to the first ground the First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant was a vulnerable witness at paragraph 8 of the decision. When the First-tier Tribunal directs itself with respect to credibility at paragraph Findings 1 this issue is not specifically mentioned, but there is reference to there being a global assessment and consideration of all relevant circumstances in the round. I find that it should be assumed that vulnerability was part of this global assessment. When it comes to the assessment of credibility, which is based in part on inconsistencies with respect to dates and the order of events when the appellant was leaving Bangladesh, there is no specific mention of mental health difficulties or vulnerability being considered as an explanation but this is also not raised as a reason for any inconsistencies/ implausible explanations in the appellant skeleton argument or indeed in the appellant’s statement, which records stress, anxiety and fear and flash-backs to jail at paragraphs 24 and 25 but does not state these have led to any issues arising in retelling the history or answering questions as in the giving of evidence. The GP notes also do not reference memory problems or trauma but instead record stress, anxiety, anger, fear low confidence and apathy. I find that the First-tier Tribunal has not erred in law as argued in this ground as the appellant’s mental health issues were considered as part of the global assessment and there was no need for more specific consideration of them when assessing a lack of credibility due to inconsistent evidence as there was no evidence or argument in the witness statement, GP notes or the appellant skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant’s mental health condition could cause him to give confused evidence.
12. With respect to the second ground the letters from the attorney, Mr Hossain, not only have different addresses but as set out at paragraphs Findings 12 to 16 of the decision, also have different names and different headers, and further the appellant said his lawyer did not communicate via email but an email address appears on one of the letters. There are also additional anomalies. An update from Mr Hossain is provided on the same day as a hearing but does not include the outcome of this hearing; there is no reference to the claimed lawyer, Mr Hossian, being a lawyer or providing a professional address on the identity document for him provided by the appellant; and there are clearly gaps in the corroboration process for the documents carried out in the report of Mr Choudhury, which is not found reliable, and this is not challenged in the grounds. I find therefore that it was unarguably lawfully open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the attorney documents were not reliable and should not be given weight.
13. With respect to the second ground and the issue of the court documents and FIR, it is found that the verification of Mr Choudhury was not in line with the process set out in the CPIN, as per paragraph Findings 18 of the decision, and so the report is given little weight. This, as I have just recorded, is not challenged in the grounds of appeal. The First-tier Tribunal does then go on to directly consider the documents themselves. At paragraph Findings 29 of the decision the documents are given little weight for four reasons: there is no valid verification of them as genuine; some of the documents, such as the attorney letters, are problematic as inconsistent between themselves for the reasons set out in the decision; false documents or genuine documents with false information can easily be obtained in Bangladesh; and there are inconsistencies between the appellant’s evidence and the documents. This is an approach which I find discloses no error of law.
14. With respect to the third ground, the Article 8 ECHR appeal and very significant obstacles to integration, the fact that the appellant will not be at real risk of serious harm as a result of his political difficulties is factor which leads the First-tier Tribunal to find that he will not have very significant obstacles to integration at paragraph Findings 39 as part of a lawful wholistic assessment. At paragraph Findings 31 onwards the consequences of the accepted low level BNP involvement are considered along with the sur place UK activities, and with unarguably sufficient reasoning it is concluded that the appellant would not be at any real risk of serious harm as a result. Whilst it is accepted that at the point in time of hearing that “politically motivated violence from non-state actors continues to occur”, it is not found that this is likely to happen to low level activists such as the appellant. There is no error in not balancing political difficulties for the appellant given it had been found that there was no likelihood of him being a victim of them. Since the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the party the appellant supports, the BNP, has won an election suggesting that any very small generalised risk of political violence would have reduced and that the consideration of this factor could not amount to a material error under any circumstances.
Decision:
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
2. I uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

Fiona Lindsley

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th July 2026