Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001562
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63960/2023
LP/07848/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MMS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not Represented
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her son are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her son. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a 42 year old citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. She appeals with permission granted by another First-tier Tribunal Judge against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sweet (the Judge) to dismiss her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the issue for me is whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

Background

2. The appellant came to the United Kingdom as a visitor on 7 December 2019 together with her son, who at that time was 20 months old. Having arrived, on 17 January 2020, she claimed asylum.

3. A screening interview (SCR) with the appellant was conducted in October 2020 and it was not until a further two years had passed, that on 6 December 2022 a full asylum interview (AIR) with the appellant was held. In that interview the appellant explained that she married her husband in July 2011 and that after three months of marriage he began assaulting her. She told her parents about the abuse and reported it to the local police who did nothing about the abuse because she was married to the perpetrator. She described the abuse becoming more serious and more frequent leaving her with severe back pain. She took out a “Protection Order” and tried to leave her husband, however he would contact the police and accuse her of stealing from him. She said that her husband’s uncle is a police officer and that bribes could be paid to the police in Trinidad.

4. The appellant explained that the couple’s son was born in February 2018 but the violence continued. The appellant said that in October 2018, with the help of a friend she managed to leave her husband with her son, and went to stay with her cousin. Despite this, she said the abuse would continue when she saw her husband to facilitate his contact with their son. One such incident she described involved the appellant and her son being dragged across the road by her husband after a contact session. The appellant said that she reported that incident to the police who wrote up her complaint but did nothing about it. The appellant said her husband continued to contact her and threaten her when she was living with her cousin and so in December she came to the United Kingdom to visit her aunt intending to seek help. The appellant said that she feared being killed by her husband if she returned to Trinidad and that the police in that country were unwilling to help her.

5. At the time of the AIR the appellant provided documents in support of her claim including (i) an extract from the Magistrates Court in Trinidad confirming that in January 2019 there were competing applications for the custody of the appellant’s son and an interim contact order was made providing for contact between the appellant’s husband and son, (ii) medical evidence of the appellant’s attendance at the Emergency Department of San Fernando Hospital in Trinidad on 21 October 2018 and on 24 November 2018, (iii) medical evidence of the appellant attending an eye clinic on 11 February 2019, (iv) photographs of injuries to the appellant.

6. On 24 November 2023 the respondent issued a decision refusing the appellant’s protection and human rights claims. In that decision it was accepted that the appellant is from Trinidad and Tobago and that she “faced adverse attention from [her] husband…during [her] marriage”. It was not accepted however that she had a well-founded fear of persecution in the future as there are laws and a functioning and effective police force in Trinidad to provide her with protection from her husband and she could relocate within Trinidad to avoid persecution from her husband. The private and family life of the appellant and her son and the best interests of the appellant’s son were considered but the respondent concluded that interference with the private and family life would be proportionate as the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain and it would be in the best interests of the appellant’s son to return to Trinidad with his mother.

The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

7. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal raising protection and human rights grounds of appeal. She subsequently submitted evidence in support of her appeal by uploading it to the online case management system, including (i) a photograph of a complaint she made about five police officers in Trinidad on 18 January 2019, (ii) a photograph of a chart showing the number of murders in Trinidad and Tobago between 2014 and 2022, (iii) a photograph of a message from “Topstone Solicitors” saying they are not taking on appeals, (iv) Foreign Office advice on travelling in Trinidad and Tobago, (v) a 2022 Human Rights Report about Trinidad and Tobago, (vi) a letter of support from the “Lead Elder” of Christ Central Church in Surrey, (vii) An article from The Guardian about Trinidad, (viii) a photograph of a chart comparing the level of crime in Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, (ix) an “argument” from “a journalist in Taiwan” about violence in Trinidad, (x) an article “Domestic Violence in Trinidad & Tobago Lifetime Experiences – A Preliminary Enquiry.”

8. The appellant’s appeal was listed to be heard at the hearing centre in Newport on 17 December 2024. The day before the hearing an application was submitted via the online case management system (MyHMCTS) by “Flashpoint Legal Ltd” although there was no attempt to update MyHMCTS to record the appellant as being represented . The application said that Flashpoint Legal were assisting the appellant and that payment had been made for an expert to prepare a report. The application requested the hearing be adjourned to enable further evidence to be submitted. On 17 December 2024 the appellant attended the hearing unrepresented and said that she had drafted a witness statement which was with Flashpoint Legal Services. She repeated the request for an adjournment which was unopposed by the respondent. First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon granted an adjournment,. He issued directions that the appellant upload evidence on which she intends to rely as well as an Appeal Skeleton Argument by 14 January 2025 and made directions for the subsequent consideration of that evidence by the respondent thereafter. He directed that the appeal be heard at the Hatton Cross hearing centre on the first available date after 11 February 2025.

9. On 16 January 2025 Flashpoint Legal emailed the Tribunal stating that they were the appellant’s legal representatives and asking for more time to serve an expert report and case bundle. The Tribunal responded to the email requiring Flashpoint Legal to provide a Letter of Authority to confirm they were acting on the appellant’s instructions or alternatively to update MyHMCTS to reflect the fact they are the appellant’s instructed representatives. As far as I can ascertain, Flashpoint Legal did neither and no further evidence was submitted on behalf of the appellant.

The Hearing before the Judge

10. The hearing of the appellant’s appeal took place on 1 December 2025. The appellant attended that hearing unrepresented. The respondent was represented by a Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO). In anticipation of the appeal before me, I have had the opportunity to listen to the recording of that hearing. What follows is a summary of events at the hearing as revealed in that recording.

11. The hearing began at 10:03 am. The Judge introduced himself and identified that the appeal was against the respondent’s decision to refuse asylum. The Judge then asked the appellant questions about her arrival in the United Kingdom on a visit visa and where she has lived since arriving. The Judge summarised the “unfortunate domestic troubles” he had read about in the papers the appellant had faced in Trinidad before she came to the United Kingdom and confirmed that the appellant claimed asylum shortly after her arrival. The Judge explained that him having asked a “few introductory questions” to “set the scene” the HOPO would ask the appellant questions and he would then hear from the appellant and the HOPO “about what your arguments are” before he would reserve making a decision.

12. The HOPO was then invited to question the appellant. Approximately five minutes into the questioning the appellant interrupted to say that she had been expecting to be represented at the hearing, explaining that she had paid “an attorney” money and the representative was supposed to come for the hearing but had not attended and she could not be contacted. Having asked for the name of the attorney and where she practiced and been told that the representative knew about the hearing, the Judge said “OK we’ll just continue” and invited the HOPO to ask any further questions, noting “I think the papers are pretty complete”.

13. In answer to questions from the HOPO the appellant said her husband had tried to kill her and her son by pulling them across a busy road. The appellant described making complaints to the police and getting a restraining order but said the police did not take action and did not enforce the restraining order. The appellant said that she had made complaints about the police officers involved and had not heard a response to those complaints when she left Trinidad. The appellant explained that having left her husband she stayed with her cousin but her husband continued to threaten her, attended her cousins house and paid police money to bribe them to attend the cousins house and conduct searches. It was put to the appellant that she had not mentioned receiving adverse attention from the police in Trinidad when she was interviewed and she answered that she said mentioned it in the AIR.

14. The HOPO put it to the appellant that she had come to the United Kingdom with the intention to claim asylum and she answered that she had not. At this point the Judge asked the appellant about the SCR which records that the appellant said that she came to the United Kingdom with the intention of claiming asylum and the appellant said that was not what she had said in that interview, explaining that she had said that she came to the United Kingdom knowing she needed help but did not know about asylum and that it was her aunt’s friend in the United Kingdom who had later suggested she claim asylum.

15. The HOPO asked the appellant about her work and why she had not divorced her husband, to which the appellant replied that she could not do that from outside Trinidad. The HOPO then asked the appellant about her parents and she replied that her father had died before she left Trinidad and her mother died after she left Trinidad. The HOPO put it to the appellant that this was inconsistent with what she said in interview and took her to Q123 in that interview in which she had said she told her parents about the abuse she suffered from her husband. The HOPO asked “why are you saying a different thing now” to which the appellant replied that she was not saying something different, that she was asked many questions in the interview before Q123, which was a question asking about events before her father died.

16. At the end of the cross examination the Judge explained to the appellant that the HOPO would put forward his argument why the appeal should not be allowed and that “you will have the final say and can then talk to me.”

17. The HOPO made submissions suggesting that the appellant’s credibility was doubtful and that she had not been candid about her reasons for coming to the United Kingdom, asserting an inconsistency between what the appellant said in the SCR and her evidence at the hearing. The HOPO also submitted that the appellant had given contradictory evidence about her parents passing away. The HOPO argued that the appellants credibility was further undermined by her failure to mention her intention to claim asylum when she applied for a visit visa and her failure to claim asylum sooner having arrived in the United Kingdom. The HOPO then made submissions about the sufficiency of protection in Trinidad, arguing that the appellant had not shown that she would not be able to receive adequate protection. The HOPO made submissions in relation to the appellant’s Article 8 Convention rights, arguing that it was in her son’s best interests for him to be with both parents, referring to the factors identified in section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and arguing that interference with the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom would be proportionate.

18. The Judge then invited the appellant to make submissions, identifying that the respondent had not accepted her account, had not accepted that she could not receive protection in Trinidad and had not accepted that she could not relocate within Trinidad. The appellant said that Trinidad is a small country and that while a lot of people do not like to work, she has always believed in work. She said that since coming to the United Kingdom she has volunteered with a number of charities, she wants to work and contribute to society and is thankful for the help she has received.

19. The Judge then explained to the appellant that he had noted everything that had been said and he would take into account all that had been said, and the documents before providing a written decision. The Judge then released the appellant and concluded the hearing.

The Judge’s Decision

20. The Judge promulgated his decision two days later on 3 December 2026. In the first 13 paragraphs of the decision the Judge summarised the appellant’s claim, the respondent’s reasons for refusing it and the appellant’s grounds of appeal. At [14] the Judge refers to the directions that were made by Judge McMahon and stated “Halfway through her oral evidence today she confirmed that her representatives (Brenda Samuel) had not participated at that hearing or at today’s hearing.”

21. At [15] – [21] the Judge records what he says was the appellant’s further evidence given at the hearing. At [19] the Judge comments on one aspect of that evidence:

19. She said that when she came to the UK, she did not intend to claim asylum, having come here with a visit visa. Yet in her screening interview (3.1), she stated that her purpose to come to the UK was to claim asylum.

22. At [22] the Judge records that he heard submissions on behalf of the respondent and from the appellant noting “No skeleton argument had been filed on behalf of the appellant.”

23. The Judge’s reasoning is contained in paragraphs [23] – [25] which, since they are brief, it is convenient to set out in full:

23. The burden of proof is on the appellant and the standard of proof is the lower standard of proof, as this case pre-dates the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The appellant’s claim for asylum is for a non-Convention reason. There is documentary evidence of the assaults which the appellant’s husband, [R S], had carried out on the appellant, for example there is a police report of 14 January 2019, and there are medical reports of February 2019. There is a court custody agreement dated 22 January 2019 in respect of her husband having access and visitation rights to their son, [R], who was born on 7 February 2018, and therefore is nearly aged 8. However, the appellant gave contradictory evidence as to her motive in coming to the UK, she delayed claiming asylum and she has not engaged a lawyer in Trinidad and Tobago to seek a divorce from her husband and/or to pursue her assault claims through the courts.

24. I am satisfied, for reasons set out in the refusal letter and the Home Office review, that the appellant can seek the protection of the authorities and can relocate. I am reinforced in this view by the contents of the COIR of 17 May 2024 confirming the state protection which is available to victims of domestic violence in the form of NGOs and shelters. Her cousin still lives there and can provide further support. With her qualifications and work experience, she can resume suitable employment.

25. In respect of any family or private life, it is not disproportionate for her to return to Trinidad and Tobago, with her young son. Immigration control is in the public interest and little weight should be given to any private life while her immigration status was precarious or unlawful (Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s.117A/B).

24. The Judge accordingly dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

The appeal to this Tribunal

25. On 24 March 2026, the appellant was granted permission by another First-tier Tribunal Judge to appeal against the decision of the Judge on five grounds: (i) Procedure Unfairness – Failure to afford a fair hearing, (ii) Apparent bias and Pre-Determination, (iii) Failure to Consider Material Evidence, (iv) Failure to consider whether the appeal had a real prospect of success and (v) failure to properly consider the best interests of the child.

26. Permission having been granted, this tribunal issued a direction that the respondent “file and serve a response to the grounds of challenge relating to the conduct of the hearing”. In reply the respondent served a response to the grounds of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 resisting grounds (i), (ii) and (iii) by reference to the Judge’s written decision and arguing that the appellant had not explained how she was prevented from presenting her case. The response argued that ground (iv) was misconceived and that contrary to ground (v) the Juge gave brief but cogent reasons concerning the best interests of the appellant’s son at [12] of his decision

27. The hearing was then listed before me and arrangements were made to obtain the recording of the hearing before the Judge which as previously stated I listened to prior to the hearing before me. Unfortunately, steps were not taken to arrange for the parties to have the same opportunity to listen to the recording in advance of the appeal hearing which took place before me.

28. At the outset of the hearing I indicated to the parties that I had had the opportunity to listen to the recording of the hearing before the Judge and that I had concerns about the fairness of that hearing. I provided the parties with the opportunity to listen to the recording but Ms Everett indicated that she did not need to do so and that having heard my concerns she conceded that the hearing before the Judge was procedurally unfair and that the decision would have to be set aside. For the reasons I set out in the following paragraphs, I am satisfied that was a correct concession to make, that the procedure adopted by the Judge was not a fair one and therefore that the decision of the Judge must be set-aside in its entirety.

Legal Framework

29. The appellant’s grounds of appeal include distinct assertions of both procedural unfairness because it is claimed the Judge failed to afford her a fair hearing (grounds one) and apparent bias because it is claimed that the Judge’s approach demonstrates his apparent bias or pre-determination (ground two).

30. As the Supreme Court identified in Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23 it is important to distinguish between these two complaints. In his judgment in Serafin v Malkiewicz Lord Wilson considered the judgment of Hildyard J in M&P Enterprises (London) Ltd v Norfolk Square (Northern Section) Ltd [2018] EWHC 2665 (Ch) noting the approach taken in that case meant that the complaint of bias and the complaint of an unfair trial: “required appraisal from different perspectives for, while the fairness of a trial required objective judicial assessment, the appearance of bias fell to be judged through the eyes of the fair-minded and informed observer”.

31. This Tribunal (UTJs Rimmington and Stephen Smith) summarised the position in Elais (fairness and extended family members) [2022] UKUT 300 (IAC):

The test for establishing unfairness differs from determining the presence of the appearance of bias. Whether a hearing was fair is an objective judicial decision either the hearing was fair, or it was not. By contrast, the question of whether there is the appearance of bias is determined by asking whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased

Bias
32. In Serafin v Malkiewicz Lord Wilson assumed the definition of bias first given by Leggatt LJ as he then was at [17] of Bubbles & Wine Ltd v Lusha [2018] EWCA Civ 468 was correct. That definition is:

“Bias means a prejudice against one party or its case for reasons unconnected with the legal or factual merits of the case

Unfairness of a trial
33. Lord Wilson continued at [40] of Serafin v Malkiewicz to describe the judgment of Denning LJ in Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 as the leading authority on inquiry into the unfairness of a trial. In that judgment Denning LJ said at page 63:

In the system of trial which we have evolved in this Country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at large, as happens, we believe, in some foreign countries. Even in England, however a judge is not a mere umpire to answer the question “How's that?” His object, above all is to find out the truth, and to do justice according to law;

34. At [46] of his Judgment in Serafin v Malkiewicz Lord Wilson recognised that ,while no authority had been cited in which the conduct of the trial was alleged to have been unfair towards a litigant in person, “The appearance of a litigant in person presents the court with well-known challenges” and commented that “Every judge will have experienced difficulty at trial in divining the line between helping the litigant in person to the extent necessary for the adequate articulation of his case, on the one hand, and becoming his advocate on the other.”

35. The complaint in each of the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraphs was that the trial was unfair because the approach taken by the Judge involved too many interventions and interruptions. As Lord Wilson’s comments above indicate however, a trial may equally be unfair where, when dealing with a litigant in person (LIP), the Judge acts solely as an umpire in the manner deprecated by Denning LJ, and fails to help the LIP, to the extent necessary for the adequate articulation of their case.

36. Lord Wilson referred in Serafin v Malkiewicz to the advice in the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book (ETBB) for Judges who are faced with divining the line between helping a litigant in person to articulate their case and becoming their advocate. Chapter 1 of the latest July 2024 edition of the ETBB which was updated in February 2026, is entitled “Litigants in person and lay representatives” and it provides “many practical suggestions …for enabling LIPs to participate fully in the court process” whilst recognising that they are just suggestions. The Chapter is comprehensive and should be considered by a Judge each time they hear a case involving a LIP. The following extracts however are of particular relevance to this case:

“16. The challenges faced by LIPs often stem from their lack of knowledge of the law and court or tribunal procedure. They tend to:
… Be ill-informed about ways of presenting evidence
….Be Unable to understand the relevance of law and regulations to their own problem, or to know how to challenge a decision that they believe is wrong.
…..

Ways to help
18. The aim is to ensure that LIPs understand what is going on and what is expected of them at all stages of the proceedings. This means ensuring that:
• the process is (or has been) explained to them in a manner that they can understand.
• They have access to appropriate information…
• they are informed about what is expected of them in ample time for them to prepare and comply
• wherever possible, they are given sufficient time for their needs.
….

Holding the confidence of both sides
19. Judges must be aware of the feelings and difficulties experienced by LIPs and be ready and able to help them with the court process, especially if a represented party is being oppressive or confrontational.
….

21. The key is to maintain a balance between assisting and understanding what the LIP requires, while protecting their represented opponent against the challenges that can be caused by the LIP’s lack of legal and procedural knowledge.

22. LIPs Commonly feel at a profound disadvantage. The aim of the judge should be to ensure that the parties leave with the sense that they have been listened to and had a fair hearing- whatever the outcome.
….

Difficulties at the hearing and how to help
59. Basic conventions and rules need to be stated at the start of a hearing by the judge:
▪ Introduce those present. Explain their roles, and how the judge should be addressed.
▪ Explain the procedure and timing of the day.
▪ ….
▪ Inform the LIP that they should ask for clarification if anything is unclear and request breaks if they require them.
▪ Clearly state the purpose of the hearing and issue(s) to be decided.
▪ …..
……
67. At the end of their evidence, LIPs should be asked if they have said everything they need to, and they should be reminded that this is their last opportunity to give evidence

37. It is the increasingly common position that a First-tier Tribunal Judge hears a protection appeal where the appellant is a LIP and the respondent is represented by a HOPO. The above authorities identify that, although the role of the Judge remains to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, it is insufficient for the Judge in that situation to passively act as the umpire during the hearing before deciding those issues. The Judge’s object of doing justice according to the law will involve the Judge assisting the LIP to adequately articulate their case but without becoming the LIPs advocate. This may be a challenging line to tread but it is fundamental to a fair hearing. Careful consideration of the ETBB will help the Judge to perform this task.

38. Lord Wilson identified in Serafin v Malkiewicz that it is not generally the practice of appellate courts to invite the Judge to comment when determining whether a hearing before the Judge was fair, if a transcript or recording of that hearing exists. This places upon the appellate court a requirement to analyse the evidence punctiliously when considering a claim of unfairness.

Application of the Law to this Appeal.

39. In my judgment it is abundantly clear having listened to the recording of the hearing that took place before that Judge that: (1) the Judge did not demonstrate an apparent bias against the appellant (so ground two is not made out) but (2) the appellant did not receive a fair hearing (so ground one is made out). In these circumstances it is not necessary to consider the other grounds advanced by the appellant because applying Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) the fact the appellant has been deprived of a fair hearing means that the matter must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

No Bias
40. Having listened to the recording of the hearing with care I could not detect anything that took place before the Judge that suggested the Judge had a prejudice against the appellant or her case for reasons unconnected with the legal or factual merits of the case. The Judge was courteous towards the appellant and said nothing that would suggest such a prejudice. Whilst the hearing was conducted quickly, there was nothing that suggested the Judge was prejudiced against the appellant or her claim of asylum or that the Judge would make his decision on the basis of anything other than his consideration of the evidence.

41. Applying the law as identified above, the complaint made in ground two that the fair-minded observer would conclude that the Judge made his decision without considering all the evidence, is in practice a complaint about the fairness of the hearing that took place, which is what I turn to consider next.

Not a fair hearing
42. For a number of reasons, it is clear on listening to the recording of the hearing that the Judge did not help the appellant as a LIP to adequately articulate her case. In fact it is apparent that the actions of the Judge in a number of respects prevented or hampered the appellant in her attempt to articulate her case. As a result the Judge was not able to do justice according to the law. I identify those reasons in the following paragraphs.

43. Although the Judge identified himself and the fact he was hearing an appeal against the decision to refuse the appellant asylum at the beginning of the hearing, he did not at that time or subsequently, identify the HOPO, explain the procedure that would be followed, inform the appellant that she could ask for clarification or breaks, or identify the issues that had to be decided. Had the issues been identified the appellant would have had clarity about the case she was answering and the matters she needed to concentrate on when giving evidence and making submissions.

44. Instead, at the outset of the hearing the Judge summarised the appellant’s “unfortunate domestic troubles” and began asking her about her entry to and stay in the United Kingdom. The Judge’s description of these as a “few introductory questions” to “set the scene” indicate that these were not questions designed to help the appellant to articulate her case and that the applicant was in fact provided with no opportunity to do so by way of evidence in chief before the Judge then immediately invited the HOPO to cross examine her. The appellant was deprived therefore of the opportunity to advance her case before the Judge by giving evidence in chief.

45. The significance of the appellant being deprived of the opportunity to give evidence in chief is especially acute because the appellant had not adduced a witness statement, so there was no account from the appellant before the Judge other than the transcripts of the SCR and the AIR which the respondent had adduced as part of her case. The Judge made no enquiries with the appellant about why she had not provided a statement and did not raise with appellant the apparent non-compliance with the directions that had previously been issued for the submission of evidence. With no witness statement having been adduced and the appellant only being asked introductory questions to set the scene, there was no opportunity given to the appellant to advance her case in the hearing before she was cross examined by the representative for the respondent.

46. These failures were compounded when the appellant tried to interrupt her cross examination to say that she had paid for an “attorney” and had been expecting to be represented. The Judge’s response to the appellant’s attempt was cursory, it did not give the appellant an opportunity to seek an adjournment and still did not include any enquiry into the absence of any evidence following the direction being issued. Instead the Judge simply said “OK we’ll just continue” inexplicably remarking that “I think the papers are pretty complete”. It is apparent therefore that even when she sought to raise concerns during the hearing, the appellant was still not assisted to articulate her case.

47. The cross examination of the appellant was also in several respects unfair, with the HOPO putting to the appellant asserted contradictions and inconsistencies in her evidence that were simply not correct, without intervention or actions from the Judge to help the appellant. In one such example, the HOPO put to the appellant that she had not mentioned receiving adverse attention from the police in Trinidad in her AIR, an assertion that was incorrect because as the appellant had mentioned such attention at Q134 of the AIR. The appellant tried to explain that she had mentioned this in her AIR and sought to explain this by reference to documents she had adduced, however the Judge interrupted saying “just wait for the next question.”

48. In another example of the unfair questioning, it was put to the appellant that she had said in her SCR that she decided to claim asylum when in Trinidad and that she intended to claim asylum when she entered the United Kingdom. Whilst this question reflected the record of the SCR, it did not acknowledge the appellant’s attempts to correct that record in the AIR. At the beginning of her AIR, when asked if she was happy with the written contents of the SCR, the appellant had replied “no” and said “when you asked if I came to claim asylum I just wanted help I didn’t know about the asylum process it was my aunt’s co worker who told me about the asylum process. He told me the day after I arrived in the United Kingdom after he picked me up from the airport” Fairness required that this was acknowledged when the appellant was cross examined about her intentions when coming to the United Kingdom. However only the SCR record was put to the appellant in isolation and without the context of her correction in the AIR. This was especially significant because the HOPO used the apparent contradiction to argue in submissions that the appellant’s credibility was doubtful and it was a feature of the evidence that clearly concerned who refers in his decision at [23] to contradictory evidence from the appellant about her motives for coming to the United Kingdom without acknowledging or addressing the appellant’s explanation in the AIR.

49. The most insensitive example of the unfair questioning of the appellant came when she was asked about her parents. The HOPO asked the appellant about her parents and when she said they were deceased, he her took her to Q123 of her AIR in which she was asked “did you tell your parents” and answered “yes”. The HOPO then put it to the appellant that she had not mentioned in her interview that her parents were deceased and “why are you saying a different thing now?” Neither the HOPO nor the Judge however referred to the appellant’s earlier answer to Q51 of the AIR in which she had explained to the interviewer that her parents had died, neither did the HOPO or Judge refer to Q122 which gave the specific context for Q123. In Q122 the appellant was asked if her parents were still alive at the time of a specific incident to which she replied yes, leading to Q123, did you tell your parents and the answer yes. The appellant’s answer to the cross examination, that she had told the interviewer that her parents were deceased was not investigated or clarified.

50. Given the deficiencies with the cross examination and the inaccuracy of some of the questions asked it is particularly significant that at the end of the cross examination the Judge did not allow the appellant and opportunity to address issues that were raised during that cross-examination. The ETBB suggests at [66] and [67] of Chapter 1 that it should be explained to LIPs that they will have the opportunity at the end of their evidence to add any extra thoughts on something which has been discussed during cross-examination and that when that time arises the LIP should be asked if they have said everything they need to and reminded that this is their last opportunity to give evidence. Had the Judge done this some of the mistakes made by the HOPO might have been corrected. Instead the Judge moved directly into hearing submissions.

51. In his submissions and based on his assertion that the appellant had decided to claim asylum before leaving Trinidad, the HOPO made the submission that section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 applied and the appellant’s credibility was undermined by her misleading an entry clearance officer into granting her a visit visa and failing to claim asylum immediately on arrival in the United Kingdom. This was not something the respondent relied upon in her decision letter. It was based at least in part on a further misunderstanding of the HOPO that there had been an application for and the grant of a visit visa before the appellant travelled to the United Kingdom. In fact as the appellant made clear at Q193 of her AIR, she did not apply for a visa because at the time the appellant travelled to the United Kingdom citizens of Trinidad did not need to do so. This misconception was not corrected. Neither was it made clear that the delay between the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom and her SCR was just one month.

52. When the appellant came to make her submissions she did not address any of the issues that needed to be resolved in order to determine her protection appeal. Instead she made submissions about her work ethic, her volunteering and her desire to contribute to society. In the most glaring example of the Judge’s failure to help the appellant articulate her caser, rather than invite the appellant to address the HOPO’s submissions about her credibility, the question of whether the authorities in Trinidad would offer her sufficient protection or whether she could relocate within Trinidad to avoid her husband, the Judge simply said that he had noted everything and would take it into consideration before making his decision. It is impossible to understand how the Judge could properly consider the appellant’s case without any submissions or evidence in chief from the appellant on the relevant issues.

53. For all these reasons, the procedure adopted by the Judge was unfair. It did not enable the appellant as a LIP to articulate her case and it was insufficient to enable the Judge to fulfil the objective of doing justice according to the law.

54. At [44] of Serafin v Malkiewicz Lord Wilson found that because the complaint of procedural unfairness did not relate to the judge’s ultimate judgment, an intricately constructed and beautifully written judgment by the trial Judge could not redeem the failures of procedure in the hearing. Likewise, in this case the decision ultimately written by the Judge is of little relevance to the central issue in this appeal namely the fairness of the hearing. It is noteworthy however that the decision provides very little explanation of the Judge’s reasoning and does not engage with the documentary evidence about Trinidad that had been adduced by the appellant. It is also noteworthy that the only reference in the decision to the best interests of the appellant’s son came in the Judge’s summary of the respondent’s refusal at [12] of the decision. There appears to be no independent consideration of the child’s best interests and again the appellant was given no opportunity or assistance in the hearing to articulate her case about where those best interests lay.

55. The decision of the Judge must therefore be set aside and regrettably given the delay that has already occurred since the appellant made her claim for protection in 2020, the matter must be remitted for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal.

Directions for rehearing

56. The appellant told me that she is still under the impression that Barbara Samuels of Flashpoint Legal is her representative. The appellant said that she has paid money for the purpose of obtaining a country expert report and has drafted a witness statement which has been retained by Flashpoint Legal. As I explained to the appellant however the position as far as the Tribunal is concerned is that the appellant is a LIP, Flashpoint Legal having never provided a letter of authority or other response to the Tribunal. If the appellant is to be represented by Flashpoint Legal or any other legal advisor complying with the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 a letter of authority must be provided to the Tribunal.

57. The appeal will be relisted for hearing at the Hatton Cross Hearing Centre. The applicant must serve the evidence she intends to rely upon before that hearing. It should include a witness statement from the appellant in which she articulates her case. There may be evidence from others that the appellant would want to rely upon. All such evidence should be served in a paginated and indexed PDF document both on the Tribunal and the respondent. I direct that such a bundle is served by not later than 28 August 2026.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sweet contained an error of law and is set aside.

The appeal is remitted for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 July 2026