Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001568
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66950/2024
LP/00107/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

MJT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ferguson, instructed by City Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 February 2026 dismissing his appeal on protection grounds.
2. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 5 June 2026. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the First-tier Tribunal did not err in law and I decline to set aside the Tribunal’s decision. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal stands.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Bangladeshi national. He arrived in the UK on 14 October 2022 and claimed asylum on 12 April 2023. His asylum claim was refused by the Respondent on 12 June 2024.
4. The Appellant appealed the refusal to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was originally listed for February 2025, but was adjourned because the Appellant did not attend; the Appellant supplied a letter from a private doctor stating that he was suffering from a fever and gastroenteritis and was unfit to attend work. The hearing was relisted for July 2025, but was adjourned on that occasion due to a late request for an interpreter and failure by the Appellant and his representatives to comply with the Tribunal’s directions. The hearing was relisted for a third time on 4 February 2026.
5. On 3 February 2026, the Appellant's representatives contacted the First-tier Tribunal stating that the Appellant was not able to attend the hearing as he had fallen from the stairs in his home and was suffering serious back pain, and requesting an adjournment. The request was accompanied by a medical certificate issued by the same private doctor who had provided the previous letter in February 2025. The certificate stated that the Appellant had been reviewed in the clinic on 30 January 2026 and diagnosed with severe acute low back pain, and that he was unfit to attend work until 10 February 2026.
6. First-tier Tribunal Judge Mace refused the application on the basis that the medical certificate did not state that the Appellant was unfit to attend the hearing, and that the Appellant's condition might have improved sufficiently since the Appellant had been seen by the doctor to enable him to join the hearing remotely. The Appellant's solicitors renewed the application, which was again refused by the judge.
7. The application to adjourn was renewed again at the hearing on 4 February 2026, which was before a panel. The panel offered the Appellant the opportunity to join the hearing remotely, which was declined. The panel refused the adjournment and the hearing proceeded in the Appellant's absence on the basis of submissions from both parties’ representatives. The panel dismissed the appeal.
8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 25 March 2026.
9. On 27 April 2026 the Respondent filed a Rule 24 response to the notice of appeal.
Basis of the appeal
10. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal on the following grounds:
a. Ground 1: The First-tier Tribunal had acted unfairly by refusing the Appellant's adjournment request;
b. Ground 2: The First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the documentary evidence was flawed;
c. Ground 3: The First-tier Tribunal had reached irrational credibility findings;
d. Ground 4: There had been inadequate assessment of the Appellant's sur place activity;
e. Ground 5: There had been inadequate assessment of risk on return.
Discussion and decision
Ground 1: refusal of the adjournment
11. Whether the First-tier Tribunal acted fairly by refusing the Appellant's adjournment request is an objective question for this Tribunal to determine for itself. The issue is not whether the First-tier Tribunal acted reasonably, but whether the decision to proceed in the absence of the Appellant was a fair one in the circumstances: Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC).
12. Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 provides that the Tribunal may proceed with a hearing in a party’s absence if it considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The power to proceed under Rule 28 must be exercised in a manner which gives effect to the overriding objective in Rule 2 to deal with cases “fairly and justly”, which includes “avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues” (Rule 2(2)(e)).
13. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Ferguson submitted that it was unfair for the First-tier Tribunal to refuse the adjournment. As the Tribunal had noted at §13 of the decision, the Appellant’s credibility was in issue. Although Ms Ferguson recognised the Tribunal’s observation that the basis of the Appellant’s appeal was impacted by the political change in Bangladesh, she submitted that his evidence was no less important to the outcome of the appeal. The Tribunal was required to make clear factual findings about the Appellant’s account of past events, because that affected the issue of risk on return and in particular whether the Appellant would still be at risk of prosecution on false charges.
14. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Pugh submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had not acted unfairly by refusing the adjournment. The Tribunal’s findings in the decision were materially those put by the Respondent in the refusal letter, so the Appellant had had the opportunity to respond to them in his written case. The Appellant had been aware of the hearing when he saw his doctor, but the medical evidence did not address why he could not attend the hearing, even by remote means.
15. Mr Pugh submitted that dealing with a case fairly must involve consideration of fairness to both parties. His skeleton argument cited a number of authorities on fairness and adjournments in other courts and tribunals, including Transport for London v O’Cathail [2013] EWCA Civ 21, Andreou v Lord Chancellor’s Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1192, Hall v Transport for London [2024] EAT 26, and Teinaz v London Borough of Wandsworth [2002] EWCA Civ 1040. Whilst recognising that in some cases an adjournment is required, he submitted that repeated adjournments may give rise to unfairness to the Secretary of State and that regard should also be had to other litigants waiting to have their appeal heard, who may be disadvantaged by repeated adjournments and loss of tribunal time.
16. Mr Pugh also referred to General Medical Council v Hayat [2018] EWCA Civ 2796, where the Court of Appeal considered an appeal arising from a disciplinary tribunal’s refusal to adjourn a hearing on medical grounds. At §37-41, the court addressed the requirements for medical evidence supporting an adjournment request, holding at §37:
“There are a number of authorities dealing with the nature and standard of the evidence necessary to found an application for an adjournment on the grounds of ill health. There must be evidence that the individual is unfit to participate in the hearing: see Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v Jaffery [2012] EWHC 724 (Ch) at [19]. That evidence must identify with proper particularity the individual’s condition and explain why that condition prevents their participation in the hearing: see Levy v Ellis Carr [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) at [36]. Moreover, that evidence should be unchallenged: see Brabazon-Drenning at [18].”
17. What fairness requires is context-dependent and the courts have recognised that in an asylum case the highest standards of fairness are required: SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284 at §8. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal did not act unfairly by refusing the adjournment.
18. First, it was not unfair for the First-tier Tribunal to take into account the previous adjournments and the substantial delay in hearing the appeal (§9). Whilst it would have been an error for the Tribunal to treat the procedural history of the case as the sole reason for refusing an adjournment which fairness would otherwise have required, that is not what the Tribunal did. It was not unfair, and was in accordance with the overriding objective, for the Tribunal to give greater scrutiny to the Appellant’s adjournment request and the evidence supporting it given the poor procedural history of the case and the substantial delay to date.
19. Second, the letter from the Appellant’s doctor did not meet the requirements identified in GMC v Hayat. Although the Appellant was aware of his forthcoming appeal hearing when he visited the doctor’s clinic, the doctor’s letter simply referred to the Appellant being unfit for work and did not explain why, despite having been able to travel to the clinic on 30 January 2026, the Appellant was unable to participate in the hearing on 4 February 2026 even by remote means. Whilst the medical evidence was not challenged, it did not provide sufficient explanation of why an adjournment was required on medical grounds.
20. Third, as the Tribunal noted at §13, whilst the Appellant’s credibility was in issue as to past events, the central issue of risk on return was substantially impacted by the changed political situation in Bangladesh. This was not a case in which the outcome of the appeal turned on whether the Appellant’s account of past events was credible. The Appellant was able to give evidence about his experiences in Bangladesh prior to his departure, but he was not able to give evidence about the risk of arrest and/or imprisonment on return as a result of the pending cases against him; that was a matter for expert and objective evidence. The Tribunal gave careful consideration to the expert report and gave it full weight, but noted (§50) that the report did not refer to recent changes in the judiciary and police, or to reports that politically motivated proceedings were being withdrawn. The Tribunal noted (§13) the absence of any updating evidence from the Appellant since July 2025. There was nothing unfair in the Tribunal’s findings, which were the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant would not be at risk on return; nor were they findings which the Appellant could have addressed through his oral evidence.
21. Fourth, the First-tier Tribunal concluded at §62 that the Appellant would not be at risk of persecution even if he were subject to politically motivated criminal proceedings. In light of that finding, which was made taking the Appellant’s evidence as to past events at its highest, there was no unfairness in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision to proceed in the Appellant’s absence.
Ground 2: Approach to the documentary evidence
22. The Appellant submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred at §41 in its approach to the Appellant’s documentary evidence by failing to give adequate or legally sustainable reasons for rejecting it. The Tribunal had wrongly relied on general country evidence about the prevalence of document fraud, without engaging with the specific evidence of the Appellant’s expert.
23. Those submissions mischaracterise the approach taken by the First-tier Tribunal. The panel did not simply reject the Appellant’s documents in light of the country evidence. Instead, the Tribunal gave detailed consideration to all of the Appellant’s documentary evidence, and accepted (§42) the expert’s evidence that the court documents appeared consistent with genuine documents. The Tribunal was however entitled to reject the Appellant’s documents for the reasons given at §43-49, which were (§43) the inherent unlikelihood of the date of the first police complaint, (§44) the subsequent delay in issuing the charges, (§45) the lack of evidence of steps taken by the Appellant or his lawyer to ascertain whether the charges had been withdrawn, (§46) the inconsistency in the Appellant’s behaviour in Facebook posting after a long period of inactivity, (§47) the unlikelihood of adverse interest arising from a single Facebook post by someone not in Bangladesh at the time, and (§48) discrepancies within the text of the second newspaper article, (§49) the lack of specific detail about the Appellant’s activities in the BNP certificates.
24. Reviewing the Tribunal’s decision as a whole, there was no error of law in the panel’s approach. The Tribunal considered the Appellant’s documentary evidence in the round but was entitled to reject it for the reasons given, which were entirely adequate to explain the panel’s conclusions.
Ground 3: Irrational credibility findings
25. The Appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal wrongly rejected the Appellant’s account on the basis of perceived implausibility regarding the issue of the police complaints, charge sheets and timing of the authorities’ reactions. Further, he contends that the First-tier Tribunal wrongly applied the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) when considering whether the Appellant had demonstrated that he feared persecution for a Convention reason.
26. HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, on which the Appellant relies, is authority for the proposition that it is improper for the First-tier Tribunal to reject an appellant’s account merely on the basis of plausibility. The First-tier Tribunal is however entitled to reject an account on the basis of reasonably drawn inferences, bearing in mind the social and cultural background: HK at §30. The Tribunal may also draw inferences from the absence of evidence where such evidence could reasonably have been obtained: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
27. When considering the evidence of the first police complaint, the First-tier Tribunal noted (§43) that the complaint was filed on the same date as the Appellant’s Facebook post which gave rise to it, but that the body of the complaint stated that there had been “a mixed reaction within the Bangladesh Awami League”. It was entirely open to the Tribunal to find that it was inherently unlikely that a police officer would have viewed a Facebook post, gauged the reaction of the Awami League and filed a complaint on the same day. Similarly, it was open to the Tribunal to find (§44) that the speed of issue of the complaint was inconsistent with the further 8 months taken to draw up charges against the Appellant. The Tribunal was entitled to reject the other documentary evidence for the reasons set out at §43-49 of the decision. None of those reasons amounted to a rejection solely on grounds of plausibility. There was no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s approach.
28. In relation to the second aspect of Ground 3 (the standard of proof), the Appellant’s asylum claim was one to which s32 Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied. The First-tier Tribunal therefore correctly directed itself at §17 by reference to the staged approach required and correctly applied the civil standard to the question of whether in fact the Appellant feared persecution and the lower standard of proof to the question of whether he would face persecution on return.
Ground 4: Inadequate assessment of sur place activity
29. The Appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal wrongly dismissed the Appellant’s evidence of his sur place activity as limited and opportunistic.
30. The First-tier Tribunal considered the Appellant’s sur place activity at §55-60 of the decision. The panel gave detailed consideration to the Appellant’s evidence and correctly directed itself, by reference to MAH (Egypt), that there was no requirement for corroborative evidence. On the evidence provided by the Appellant, the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the Appellant’s Facebook posts had limited to no public profile, and that they would not expose him to risk on return; similarly, the panel was entitled to find that the Appellant had attended one protest event on 23 July 2024 and that he would not be at risk as a result.
31. It was open to the First-tier Tribunal to find (§60) both that the Appellant’s sur place activity was limited in nature and that the timing of the activity gave the impression of opportunism. That was relevant to the HJ (Iran) question of whether the Appellant would continue to be politically active on return.
32. In any event, in light of the First-tier Tribunal’s finding at §60 that even if the Appellant were to continue his political activity on return he would not be at risk as a result, any error in the assessment of his activity was not material to the outcome of the appeal.
Ground 5: Irrational assessment of risk in light of the CPIN
33. The Appellant contends that the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to conduct a forward-looking assessment of risk, and instead wrongly relied on the December 2024 CPIN as determinative of the issue of risk on return. In particular, the Appellant submits that the prospect of reform, as outlined in the CPIN, did not guarantee the absence of persecution; the panel failed to consider whether the Appellant’s individual circumstances, as someone who had been convicted in absentia and sentenced to imprisonment, placed him at risk on return.
34. The First-tier Tribunal did not accept the Appellant’s case that he faced politically motivated criminal proceedings, but at §62-65 it nonetheless considered risk on return on the alternative scenario that he did face charges. The Tribunal recorded the Appellant’s evidence at §63. The finding at §64 that even if there were charges outstanding the Appellant would not be at risk as a result was not based exclusively on the CPIN, as the Appellant suggests, but also on other objective evidence.
35. The Tribunal was unquestionably assessing prospective risk, and in doing so was entitled to take into account the objective evidence before it demonstrating material changes in the police and judiciary, as well as evidence of politically motivated cases being dropped or withdrawn. Irrationality is a high threshold which is not remotely met in this case; the conclusion that the Appellant would not be at risk even if there were politically motivated charges against him was one which was open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence before it.

Conclusion
36. None of the grounds of appeal discloses a material error of law in the reasoning or conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal. I decline to set the decision aside.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2026