UI-2026-001574 & Ors.
- Case title:
- Appellant name:
- Status of case: Unreported
- Hearing date:
- Promulgation date:
- Publication date:
- Last updated on:
- Country:
- Judges:
The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001574
UI-2026-001679; UI-2026-001680
UI-2026-001681; UI-2026-001682
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/70092/2024
PA/70100/2024; PA/70101/2024
PA/70105/2024; PA/70107/2024
LP/03444/2025
LP/03445/2025; LP/03446/2025
LP/03443/2025; LP/03447/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd of October 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
AD
A
B
C
D
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Ahmad, of no. 12 Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) that was set aside by the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal’s reasons for setting aside the FtT’s decision are contained in a decision dated 12 June 2026, which is included as an annex below.
2. The first appellant is a citizen of Albania born in 1987. She is the mother of the four other appellants, who were born between 2011 and 2018. The children’s protection and human rights claims arise out of the same factual matrix as their mother’s claim. I will therefore refer to the first appellant as “the appellant” to make this decision easier to read.
3. On 15 September 2025, the respondent’s Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) found that it was more likely than not that the appellant had been subjected to three “types of exploitation”:
(i) “Domestic servitude and forced labour in Albania – unknown start date until approximately 2010”
(ii) “Domestic Servitude in Albania – approximately 15/08/2010-August 2020”
(iii) “Sexual exploitation in Kosovo – approximately sometime in 2013 for 2 months and 1 week in 2022”
4. In accordance with the respondent’s published policy, the respondent has adopted these findings for the purposes of this appeal.
The extent of the accepted facts
5. The SCA’s decision does not set out the full details of the exploitation that the respondent now accepts occurred. I consider it right nonetheless to proceed on the basis that all of those details have been accepted. This is because on 12 June 2026, the Upper Tribunal directed the respondent to file a position statement “setting out her position on the appellant’s Refugee Convention and human rights claims in light of the facts accepted in the SCA’s decision of 15 September 2025”. In accordance with those directions, the respondent filed a position statement on 03 September 2026. She did not raise any criticisms of the appellant’s general credibility or reject any specific elements of her account of past events in Albania. Instead, the respondent’s position was that the issue before the Tribunal was the risk on return. This was also the position Mr Tufan took at the hearing before me, with one exception with regard to the appellant’s account of a previous interaction with the police.
6. Accordingly, I set out a summary of the accepted factual background on which I must base my decision.
7. The appellant is from Kukes. Her father was oppressive and controlling, and he arranged her marriage with her husband (“H”) in 2008. She and H married in 2010, and she lived with H’s family from their marriage until 2018. They lived together in a single room and the appellant was treated as a “slave”. She was forced to perform all of the domestic work for the family and was not given enough to eat. If she complained, the family would threaten to throw her out of the house and keep the children.
8. H is an alcoholic and had a gambling problem. He incurred significant debts to the leader of a powerful criminal gang in order to fund his gambling habit. I will call this man “Mr A”; this does not reflect his actual surname. H did not repay his debts, but Mr A could not target him directly, because he was normally working abroad. Instead, he targeted the appellant. Shortly after her marriage, men associated with Mr A came to the appellant’s marital home and seized her sewing machine. Then in 2013, four men who worked for Mr A raped the appellant in Kukes. They then took her to Prizren in Kosovo, where she was forced into sexual exploitation for two months. Her captors controlled her with beatings and threats to harm her children. The appellant says she was “unable to escape” but has not been asked for details of why her captors released her when they did.
9. The appellant returned to her martial home, but she continued to face demands from H’s creditors. At one point, she borrowed money herself to try to pay them off in part, but this only led to further indebtedness. In 2018, her in-laws asked her to leave the family home because of the persistent demands from H’s creditors. She and H have been separated ever since.
10. The appellant’s sister found accommodation for her and her children with a friend. The gang continued to demand repayment from her, however. In 2021, they threatened to kidnap her children, and in 2022, they forced her into sexual exploitation again. This second time, she escaped after one week with the assistance of a client who was disturbed when he saw bruises on her body. She fled to the UK with her children.
The issues before me
11. The SCA is not responsible for deciding whether a recognised victim of trafficking would be at risk on return to their home country, such that the SCA’s decision contains no concession on this issue. The issues before me are:
(i) Whether the appellant or her children would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Albania; and
(ii) Whether their removal to Albania would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8, either because there would be very significant obstacles to their reintegration in Albania (and they therefore meet the requirements of the immigration rules) or because their removal would otherwise be disproportionate.
12. The appellant says that she fears that she would be forced into exploitation by Mr A on return to Albania, or that he would target her children, as he has threatened to do in the past. She is particularly afraid for her 16-year-old daughter; as she said in her oral evidence, she does not want her to “live a life what’s happened to me”.
13. The appellant further says that she would have no access to family support. She has not spoken to her husband since 2018. She would be unable to rely on further help from her sister, who is not “financially stable” herself. The rest of her family have rejected her because of her history of sexual exploitation.
14. The appellant says that she suffers from nightmares, anxiety, depression and flashbacks, as well as heart irregularities caused by stress. She would be unable to support herself and her children due to her mental health problems and her overwhelming fear of Mr A. She would not seek help from the police because she does not trust them. She believes that they are corrupt and have ties to criminal gangs, including the gang run by Mr A. In addition, the one time she went to the police to ask for help, the officer she spoke to made it clear that he would expect sexual favours from her in return. She would now be reluctant to seek help from any man in Albania.
15. The respondent does not accept that the appellant would be at risk on return to Albania. The respondent’s current position is set out in her position statement of 3 September 2026 and Mr Tufan’s submissions at the hearing before me. The respondent submits:
(i) The appellant does not meet the criteria set out in the country guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) for being at risk of re-trafficking; in particular, Mr Tufan pointed to the appellant’s age;
(ii) Mr A has not tried to contact the appellant since 2022. This is an indication that he would be unlikely to target her in the future;
(iii) Moreover, Mr A targeted the appellant in connection with her husband’s debts. Because she has not been in contact with her husband since 2018, Mr A would know that he cannot put pressure on her husband by threatening or attacking her. Nor would Mr A continue to demand repayment from the appellant, because he would know that she is without funds;
(iv) State protection is, in general, available. It is not plausible that a police officer would have demanded sexual favours from the appellant, because Albania is seeking entry to the European Union; the real reason the appellant did not seek help from the police was that she was not genuinely in fear; and
(v) If Mr A had nationwide influence, there would be some independent evidence about him, but there is not. Internal relocation would therefore be safe. Internal relocation would be reasonable because the appellant speaks Albanian, has some education, is in good health and has previously been assisted by her sister.
The legal framework
16. The appellant claimed asylum in September 2022. My decision is therefore governed by the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act (NABA) 2022. This requires me to answer the five questions set out at section 32, and, in so doing, to apply the other relevant principles of interpretation of the Refugee Convention that are set out at sections 30-35.
17. In assessing the risk on return to the appellant, TD and AD remains the country guidance I must follow. In addition, both parties agreed that LR (Male VOTs) (CG) [2026] UKUT 00315 contains relevant updating evidence and guidance, because much of the material the Upper Tribunal considered did not distinguish between male and female victims of trafficking. Both of these decisions fully taken into account established legal principles about how to assess sufficiency of protection and the reasonableness of internal relocation, such that I do not consider it necessary to make separate reference to those principles in my decision below.
18. As reaffirmed in LR at Headnote [7], para. 339K of the Immigration Rules applies to former victims of trafficking. This means that I must take the appellant’s past experience of trafficking as a serious indication of future risk, unless there are good reasons to consider that it will not be repeated.
19. Finally, if I find that the appellant will be at risk of trafficking or other serious harm on return to Albania, I must also assess the causal link between that future risk and her past experience of trafficking: EAV v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1677. It is only if the history of trafficking is one effective reason for the future risk that the appellant is a refugee. LR at [64] (relying on K v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46).
Findings
20. TD and AD establishes that women who have been victims of trafficking into sexual exploitation form a particular social group in Albania and that women who have been trafficked in the past may, under certain circumstances, be at risk of re-retrafficking or other serious harm in the future. The respondent accepts that the appellant was trafficked into sexual exploitation twice in the past. It is therefore uncontentious that the appellant has a characteristic – her history of trafficking - that could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of her membership of a particular social group. The answer to the question posed at s. 32(2)(a) of NABA is clearly yes.
21. I find that the appellant does have a genuine, subjective fear of suffering re-trafficking or other serious harm from her traffickers in the future. Her evidence has been consistent on this point throughout. Her fear is also corroborated by the NHS records before me. These show that she was diagnosed with a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder in July 2023 and with PTSD in 2024 and was referred for trauma focussed therapy. In November 2025, she reported suffering from panic attacks. She has been prescribed sertraline, omeprazole and promethazine hydrochloride. The panic attacks in particular are a clear indication of ongoing fear.
22. The appellant said at her substantive interview that she “had a lot of problems with my heart in Albania, when I am happy or upset I faint”, and she repeated in her 2025 statements that she has a heart condition that is triggered by stress. According to the appellant’s NHS records, however, she underwent a series of tests related to her heart in 2025 and the results were normal. I conclude from this that her fear is strong enough to trigger significant psychosomatic symptoms.
23. I find that the answer to the question posed at section 32(2)(b) of NABA is also yes.
24. The next question before me is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would suffer the persecution she fears if she were returned to Albania. This is the question posed at NAB section 32(4)(a). Here, it is necessary to break down the three potential types of harm an accepted victim of trafficking may fear:
(i) Retrafficking by her former traffickers;
(ii) Reprisal by her former traffickers, for example, because she might be able to reveal incriminating information about them; and
(iii) Trafficking by someone else.
See: LR at Headnote [6].
25. By her own account, the appellant does not know much about the gang that trafficked her beyond what was considered common knowledge in Kukes. She does not say she has tangible information related to their operations that she could reveal. See: LR at [228] Nor, given her belief that the police are corrupt and her fear of men, would she be reasonably likely to denounce the gang to the authorities even if she did have such information. I therefore find there is no real risk of reprisal.
26. However, I do find that there is a real risk that she would be re-trafficked by Mr A and his gang. She has already been forced into sexual exploitation by them twice, on two occasions that were nine years apart. This may appear to be surprising, but it is accepted that this is what occurred. Mr Tufan submitted that Mr A would have no further interest in exploiting the appellant because his main target was her husband, and they are now long separated. However, they had already been separated for around four years by the time of the second exploitation. Mr Tufan also suggested that Mr A would no longer be interested in the appellant because she would obviously be unable to repay her and her husband’s debt. However, as Mr Ahmad rightly pointed out, when the appellant was unable to repay the debt, Mr A forced her to earn money for him through sexual exploitation. Her lack of access to cash was no barrier to exploitation.
27. I also take into account that LR establishes that it is “too simplistic to conclude that risk diminishes with time”: [230] In any event, it has only been four years since the appellant was last trafficked by Mr A’s gang. I do not take the gang’s failure to target the appellant in the UK as an indication that its interest in her has diminished, because nothing in the evidence before me suggests that they have transnational reach.
28. Finally, Mr Tufan relied on the appellant’s age as indicating that she would not be at risk of retrafficking, because in TD and AD, the Upper Tribunal gave weight to the expert evidence that gangs normally target women in their late teens and early twenties: [152]. However, according to the accepted facts, Mr A targeted the appellant for the first time when she was already 26, and for the second time when she was 35. Moreover, the gang made specific threats against her children, and her eldest daughter is now 16. This is a common age at which gangs target girls for sexual exploitation.
29. I therefore conclude that there is no good reason to consider that Mr A will not be interested in exploiting the appellant, or perhaps her eldest daughter, on return to Albania.
30. The answer to the question posed at section 32(4)(a) is yes.
31. The next issue before me is whether there is a reasonable risk that the appellant would not have access to effective state protection. This is the question posed at section 32(4)(b). According to AD and TD, sufficient protection against re-trafficking is generally available. However, there are a number of factors that may nonetheless indicate a real risk of re-trafficking for a particular individual. In both TD and AD and LR, the questions of effective protection and effective reintegration support are treated as intertwined: see, e.g. LR at [319], [330] This is because if the factors that led to exploitation in the first place are not addressed, this may make re-exploitation more likely.
32. TD and AD set out a number of factors that could place a woman at risk of re-trafficking in spite of the fact that sufficient protection is generally available. Having considered all of those factors, I identify the following individual characteristics that could, cumulatively, create a real risk of re-trafficking:
(i) I accept that the appellant’s family has strict traditional values and have disowned her because of her history of exploitation. This is consistent with her history of arranged marriage and with the fact that when she first left her husband’s family home, she went to stay with a friend of her sister. She did not return to her own family. It is also consistent with the independent evidence of the persistence of traditional values described in TD and AD and LR. She will therefore be returning to Albania with no family support;
(ii) There is no direct evidence of the appellant’s family’s social status and economic standing. However, I note that they arranged her marriage to a family in which she, her husband and her in-laws lived in one room and she said she did not have enough to eat (this aspect of her account is accepted). I conclude from this that her family were also of low social and economic status;
(iii) The appellant has no work experience outside the home, although she does know how to sew;
(iv) The appellant attended school until the age of 14, but her educational attainment is limited. This conclusion is based on her evidence before me. I had misread two letters from her children’s schools as describing the children as having two guardians, and I asked her about this. Rather than correcting my mistake, she was confused and explained that she had not read the letters because she could not do so. I conclude from the content of her answer and her evident bewilderment that it had not occurred to her to read the letters and that this betrays a limited engagement with written documents; and
(v) The appellant suffers from anxiety, depression, PTSD, panic attacks and psychosomatic heart problems; and
(vi) NHS records from November 2025 describe the appellant as socially isolated and spending most of her time “at home cleaning”.
33. I also find that the appellant has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to seek help for herself and her children effectively. She did not leave the abusive situation she was in after her marriage; she says this was because her in-laws had threatened to throw her out and keep custody of her children. She only left when she was forced to do so, after eight years of abuse. She was unable to escape her traffickers the first time they forced her into sexual exploitation. During the years in which she was being repeatedly harassed by Mr A, rather than seek police protection, she took out a large loan herself in an attempt to pay him off, which only compounded the problem. Finally, when she fled in 2022, she relied on a client whom, as she accepted at her asylum interview, she had no reason to trust. She explained, “I thought I would end this the right way or the wrong way. I would end this forever”.
34. The appellant’s personal history is likely to present additional barriers to her seeking assistance on return. The appellant describes an ongoing fear of men. This is plausible given her experience of being raised by a controlling father, entering into an arranged marriage in an abusive household and then twice being forced into sexual exploitation. It is corroborated by the account she gave to an NHS clinical psychologist in August 2024.
35. I also accept her account of seeking help from a police officer who demanded sexual favours from her. This is because when she was cross-examined by Mr Tufan about what had happened, she was evasive, saying that the police officer “wanted something from me” and that she knew what he wanted from his “way of communication” and from “the way he talked”. I consider that this evasiveness is likely to be an indication of the appellant’s shame, and hence of the truth of the account. If the appellant had invented the incident in order to bolster her claim, she would have had no reluctance to say explicitly what the police officer had wanted from her. Moreover, in TD and AD the Upper Tribunal noted that many women fear that they will need to “pay off” the police with sexual favours ([94]), and although the Tribunal was describing a widespread fear rather than a documented reality, it increases the plausibility of the appellant’s account.
36. I recognise that many women who have experienced sexual exploitation are likely to experience shame, a reluctance to seek assistance and a fear of men. The now well-established structures of reintegration support for women victims of trafficking in Albania (see, generally AD and TD and LR at [235]) are likely to be designed to respond to these barriers to engagement. I find, however, that there is a reasonable likelihood that this appellant will not have access to the necessary level of reintegration support. In the first place, the Albanian authorities are unlikely to know that she has been recognised as a victim of trafficking: LR at [258](a), such that she will need to request support, something she has a poor history of doing. Secondly, although accommodation in shelters is available, according to TD and AD at [46], children will usually be expected to share a room with their mothers. It is difficult to imagine that they will be able to accommodate the appellant and four children, particularly as the children are not small. They are now 15, 13, 10 and eight years old.
37. Even if the appellant were able to find a place in a shelter, her time there would be limited: TD and AD at [105]. I find that after leaving a shelter, the appellant would be at ongoing risk in her home area, where I find that it is reasonably likely that Mr A operates with impunity. The appellant describes him as well-known as a gangster in Kukes; the belief that her traffickers were affiliated with an organised crime group is consistent with the external evidence that both moneylending and trafficking are often carried out by such groups: LR at [202], [205]. She describes a 12-year campaign of threats, demands and, ultimately, exploitation carried out by men working for Mr A. The fact that Mr A was well known as a gangster for such an extended period of time suggests that he has been able to act with impunity. Moreover, she has given an accepted account of being harassed by him so often that her in-laws eventually asked her to leave their home, in spite of previously threatening her to prevent her from leaving. This suggests that they did not consider that seeking police protection would resolve the problem. Mr A’s impunity within the local area is also consistent with independent evidence of continuing corruption in Albania. LR: [290]-[295]
38. I therefore find that it is reasonably likely that sufficient state protection would not be available in the appellant’s home area.
39. There is no evidence that Mr A’s reach extends to Tirana or other large cities. The appellant has said little about Mr A’s contacts at the national level; she describes him as well known in Kukes. Nor is there any external evidence about him that could help establish his national profile, and the appellant bears the burden of proof. According to the guidance in LR, however, ‘Albania’s small geographical size, small communities and local networks means that relocation “rarely guarantees anonymity or safety’”. Newcomers draw attention and questions, even in larger cities, and this may lead to comments on social media that draw their persecutors’ attention to them. This could mean that an individual will be located by a determined persecutor even if that persecutor does not have access to state sources of information (such as police or voter records) in the area of relocation: [333]-[334]. Although the Upper Tribunal in LR found that newcomers attract less attention in larger cities, it was considering the case of male victims of trafficking into criminality. In the context of widespread male emigration to Europe, it is reasonable to expect that men returning from Europe are less likely to attract interest when they return from abroad and settle in a large city. The appellant, however, is a single mother of four children. I consider that she is more likely to attract attention and comment, particularly when the social attitudes towards single women and single mothers described in TD and AD are taken into account: [111]. This raises a reasonable likelihood that the appellant’s presence in another large city in Albania would eventually come to Mr A’s attention.
40. I therefore find that there is a real risk that the appellant would come to Mr A’s attention even if she relocated.
41. The final question is whether there is a real risk that the appellant would come to serious harm if she were located by Mr A, such that internal relocation would not be safe. I find that there is. It is reasonably likely that even if she received initial accommodation in a shelter, she would remain vulnerable after she left. Mental health provision is limited both within shelters (TD and AD at [100]) and outside them (LR at [276]; TD and AD at [110]). As a single mother and a former victim of trafficking into sexual exploitation, she will face some degree of social stigma, even in larger cities: TD and AD at [111]. As a single mother of four children with limited education and no experience of working outside the home, her employment prospects will be very limited (see, e.g.: TD and AD at [109]). She would have access to financial aid as a victim of trafficking, but this would be insufficient to meet her essential needs: LR at [239] On the other hand, she would be on a priority list for social housing and rent subsidies, and in spite of bureaucratic hurdles and limited supply, social housing might be available in Tirana: LR at [244]. She will have no support from her family. She lacks trust in the police, due to her personal experiences. She has been socially isolated for most of her life, either in a coercive and controlling home environment or as a victim of exploitation, and her most recent NHS records suggest that her social isolation is continuing. As Mr Ahmad pointed out, one theme of her evidence is that she will submit to almost anything if she believes she will protect her children by doing so, and she now expresses an increased fear for her eldest daughter because of her age. There is a reasonable likelihood that this combination of factors will create a real risk that she would be re-trafficked by Mr A. This is consistent with the finding in LR at [220] that “female VOTs [victims of trafficking] who are not rehabilitated may find that they have no choice but to submit to trafficking again in order to survive and / or prevent reprisals either to themselves or family members.”
42. I therefore find in answer to the question posed by NABA section 32(5) that there is a reasonable likelihood that internal relocation would not be available.
43. I further find that the appellant’s membership of a PSG would be one effective cause of her risk of re-trafficking. Many of the factors that make her liable to re-trafficking are long-standing, such as her family history, her limited education, her lack of work experience and her susceptibility to threats concerning her children. However, her mental ill health, her fear of men and her lack of trust in the police are all linked to her experiences of trafficking. These factors play a material role in putting her at risk of trafficking, because they contribute to her vulnerability and her unwillingness to seek protection. I therefore consider that the necessary causal nexus is established.
44. For these reasons, I conclude that the appellant is a refugee. There is also a real risk that she would be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment and forced labour in the form of sexual exploitation on return to Albania.
45. The article 8 claims of the appellant and her children were not the focus of the submissions before me. The family has now lived in the UK for four years. There is little evidence before me concerning the appellant’s private life, but the children are in school and I find that the older children are likely to have begun to establish meaningful ties outside the home. I therefore accept for the purposes of this appeal that the family has established some degree of a private life in the UK, and that their removal to Albania would constitute a significant enough interference with their private life to engage article 8.
46. It would clearly be in the best interests of the children to remain in the UK. I have not assessed the risk to the appellant on return to Albania to the standard of the balance of probabilities, which is the standard for an article 8 claim. I therefore do not rely carry forward all of my previous findings. Certain relevant facts have, however, been accepted by the respondent to that higher standard. These include the domestic situation the appellant lived in both in her family home and in her in-law’s home and the sexual exploitation to which she was subjected. Taking into account the evidence in TD and AD and LR, I find that it is more likely than not that the children would be returning to Albania with a mother who has been rejected by her family and would face significant social stigma. The children are not illegitimate and they might not be rejected by their wider families, but given that those families are more likely than not to reject their mother, this would put them in very difficult position.
47. I also find that the appellant is more likely than not to suffer from depression, anxiety, PTSD and panic attacks. This is recorded in her NHS records and entirely consistent with her history of trauma. I find on the basis of the evidence in TD and AD and LR that it is more likely than not that she would be unable to access sufficient mental health support. Her ongoing mental ill health will undermine her ability to care for the children. I also find that it is more likely than not that the appellant would struggle to find employment sufficient to support the family for the reasons given above, and that the financial support she might access from the state and NGOs would be insufficient.
48. It is therefore clearly in the children’s best interests to remain in the UK.
49. The children speak English but their mother does not, and the family is unlikely to be financially independent. These factors weigh against the family.
50. What tips the article 8 assessment strongly in the appellant’s favour is that I have found that the appellant is a refugee. There is nothing to suggest that she is excludable from the protection of the Refugee Convention, and therefore she is entitled to permission to stay under the immigration rules. Her children are entitled to permission to stay as her dependants. I must place considerable weight in the article 8 assessment on the effective maintenance of immigration control, and therefore the fact that the appellants are entitled to permission to stay under the immigration rules tips the article 8 balance in their favour.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, with reference to articles 3, 4 and 8 ECHR.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 September 2026
ANNEX
Error of law decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001574;
UI-2026-001679; UI-2026-001680
UI-2026-001681; UI-2026-001682
First-tier Tribunal Nos:
PA/70092/2024;
PA/70100/2024; PA/70101/2024
PA/70105/2024; PA/70107/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
AD
A
B
C
D
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: A. Alam, no.12 Chambers
For the Respondent: H. Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 11 Septmeber 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this case. It took into account the public interest in open justice but found it outweighed by the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, the sensitive matters raised in the first appellant’s account and the privacy interests of her children. I consider it is appropriate for the order to continue, for the same reasons.
2. The appellants are citizens of Albania. The first appellant was born in 1987 and is the mother of the four other appellants, who were born between 2011 and 2018. The children’s claims are entirely dependent on their mother’s, and therefore for ease of reference I will refer to the first appellant as “the appellant” throughout this decision.
3. At the heart of the appellant’s asylum claim is an account of having been kidnapped in Albania forced into sexual exploitation in Kosovo, first in 2013 and again in 2022. In a refusal decision dated 2 September 2024, a decision-maker in the respondent’s Asylum Children and Secondary Casework (“ACSC”) department rejected that account, finding it lacking in detail, internally inconsistent and implausible. On the same day, the appellant was referred into the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) so that the respondent’s Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) could come to its own decision about the truth of the appellant’s account. On 15 September 2025, while the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her asylum claim was pending, the SCA decided that it was more likely than not that her account was true.
4. At the hearing of the appellant’s appeal before the FtT on 8 December 2025, the respondent’s Presenting Officer (“PO”) maintained the position taken in the September 2024 refusal decision and asked the FtT to find that the appellant was not credible and had not been a victim of exploitation as she claimed. After hearing from the parties, the FtT allowed the appeal to proceed on that basis. The FtT ultimately agreed with the respondent’s decision-maker and the PO and dismissed the appeal. Both parties now say that this was unfair.
The history of the appellant’s appeal before the FtT
5. The appellant appealed to the FtT on 4 September 2024. The respondent submitted her bundle of evidence on 30 October 2024, and on 28 March 2025, she conducted a Respondent’s review and maintained her decision.
6. The appellant lodged her evidence and submissions with the FtT between July and December 2025. She uploaded her witness statement and skeleton argument on 22 July 2025, medical and country evidence in November 2025, and evidence about her children’s schooling in December 2025.
7. Meanwhile, on 23 July 2025, the respondent’s SCA found that there were reasonable grounds to accept that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery. On 15 September 2025, it found that there were conclusive grounds to accept that this was the case. Under the heading “Our decision”, the SCA wrote:
“We found the following types of exploitation occurred:
“Domestic servitude and forced labour in Albania – unknown start date until approximately 2010
“Domestic Servitude in Albania – approximately 15/08/2010-August 2020
“Sexual exploitation in Kosovo – approximately sometime in 2013 for 2 months and 1 week in 2022”
8. The appellant’s solicitors uploaded this decision onto MyHMCTS on 20 November 2025, together with the witness statement the appellant had submitted to the SCA, dated 5 September 2025.
9. The appeal then came before the FtT for full hearing on 8 December 2025. The FtT dealt with the conflict between the position taken by the respondent’s two decision-makers as a preliminary issue. It set out the chronology of the respondent’s inconsistent decisions and addressed the consequences of this as follows:
“14. The appellant’s solicitors uploaded the conclusive grounds decision to MyHMCTS in November, they did not, so far as I am aware, ask the Respondent whether her stance on the asylum appeal would change considering the now conclusive positive grounds decision from the CA or make submissions that it should.
“15. At the hearing [the respondent’s Presenting Officer] indicated that although there was a positive NRM decision, so far as the asylum appeal was concerned the Respondent’s position was as set out in the RFRL [the reasons for refusal letter of 2 September 2024] and it was not conceded that the appellant had been the victim of trafficking or that she had told the truth about her circumstances in Albania generally.
“16. Mr Alam said that he had not appreciated this would be the Respondent’s stance and that it was “irrational.” I asked [the PO] to take instructions to ensure that the Respondent maintained that the appellant was not credible. [The PO] did so and confirmed that the Respondent relied on MS (Pakistan) [2002] UKSC9 and, in short, would submit that it is for the Tribunal to make up its own mind about whether the appellant has been trafficked.
“17. After giving the [sic] Mr Alam time to consider MS he accepted that the judgement does not say it was only for the Tribunal to make up its own mind when the Respondent had made a negative conclusive grounds decision. Nonetheless the situation was unusual and unexpected, and he might wish to apply for an adjournment to give the matter more thought and there was also the question of childcare for the appellant’s children to consider. I indicated that I did not consider that time for more thought was likely to be a good reason to adjourn the final hearing. The appellant said that she had made arrangements for her children to be picked up from school and cared for. In the event Mr Alam, after taking instructions from the appellant did not pursue an application for an adjournment.”
10. The hearing proceeded. The appellant gave evidence and was cross-examined. In a decision dated 2 February 2026, the FtT dismissed the appeal. The section of the decision entitled “Analysis of Evidence and Findings” began with the issue of the respondent’s two contradictory decisions:
“27. When assessing the appellant’s credibility my starting point is any concession made by the Respondent. In this appeal there are conflicting conclusions reached (in theory) by one person about the credibility of the appellant’s claims to have been trafficked for sex work. This is not a satisfactory situation.”
11. The FtT then undertook a careful consideration of the effect of the SCA’s decision at [28]-[30]. It first considered whether it did not need to decide the issue of trafficking because, in light of that decision, it was no longer in dispute between the parties. It rejected this conclusion because it considered itself bound by MS (Pakistan) to decide the trafficking issue for itself. It directed itself that the Supreme Court had found that the SCA decision “must not be disregarded” but had observed that its “precise relevance” to a tribunal appeal was a “more difficult question”. It assessed the relevance of the SCA decision as follows:
“30. I have taken the positive conclusive grounds decision into account. I note that there is no reasoning in the decision, and I do not know what evidence was considered apart from (I assume) the witness statement made by the appellant in September 2024 [sic], I do not know if the appellant was questioned about anything in the statement or asked for more information. I do not know if the decision maker in the CA department considered their colleague’s reasoning in the RFRL or considered the appellant’s interviews. When it comes to the assessing the appellant’s case I take into account that a positive decision has been made someone acting on behalf of the Respondent, but as evidence that supports the appellant’s case or undermines the reasoning in the RFRL it carries very little weight.”
12. The FtT then proceeded to give its reasons for rejecting the appellant’s credibility, taking into account the medical evidence regarding her mental health, her statements at her screening and substantive interviews, her appeal statement and her oral evidence: [31]-[62]. It dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
The grounds of appeal
13. The appellant applied for permission to appeal. In her skeleton argument of 5 June 2026, she numbered her grounds from One to Four. Given the position taken by the respondent at the appeal before me, only Ground One remains relevant. This challenged the FtT’s decision to decide the trafficking issue for itself in spite of the SCA decision. This was said to be contrary to AM (Iran) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 2706 at [44] because the respondent had sought to withdraw a concession but had not been asked to explain why the concession was made, why it was mistaken and why it was now just and fair that she be allowed to withdraw it. This had been procedurally unfair because “The Appellant had notice of [sic] that the issues regarding her exploitation, which had been accepted at the higher standard were no[t] in dispute.” The FtT’s reliance on MS (Pakistan) was said to be misplaced, because in MS (Pakistan) there had been a negative SCA decision, not a positive one.
14. The FtT granted the appellant permission to appeal.
15. There was no Rule 24 response from the respondent.
The hearing
16. At the outset of the hearing before me, Ms Gilmour informed me that the respondent accepted that there had been an error of law and the FtT decision must be set aside. She explained that the basis for this concession was that the PO’s conduct of the appeal had been inconsistent with the respondent’s published policy, Assessing credibility and refugee status in asylum claims lodged on or after 28 June 2022. This states at page 49:
“Where an asylum claim is made by someone already accepted under the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) as a victim of modern slavery following a conclusive grounds decision, that finding, and the facts material to that decision, should be accepted for the purposes of the asylum claim, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.”
17. The respondent considered that it was unfair that the PO had not followed this guidance in the appeal before the FtT. I asked Ms Gilmour whether any unfairness might have been lessened by the fact that the appellant had prepared her evidence and witness statement in response to the reasons for refusal letter, in which the credibility of her account had been rejected. It could therefore be considered that she had prepared to meet the respondent’s case at the hearing before the FtT, in spite of the intervening SCA decision. I also drew her attention to the fact that the appellant had decided not to request an adjournment below. Ms Gilmore nonetheless maintained the concession. Taking into account the guidance in MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 00351 (IAC), I accepted it.
18. For the sake of completeness, I note that the respondent’s concession was on the fairness issue only. The respondent did not concede that MS (Pakistan) did not apply to positive trafficking decisions. Although I did not hear submissions from the parties on this issue, my preliminary view is that the Supreme Court’s decision in MS (Pakistan) rested on its interpretation of sections 82 and 85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the role of the tribunal in human rights appeals as set out in Huang v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11. There is nothing to suggest that the nature of the NRM decision, whether negative or positive, played any part in the reasoning.
19. The respondent having conceded that the decision of the FtT contained an error of law requiring it to be set aside, I so find.
20. Following Ms Gilmour’s concession, I heard submissions from the parties on the disposal of the appeal. It was agreed that the factual findings of the FtT should be set aside in their entirety. However, in light of the SCA decision and the respondent’s policy, it would be wrong to direct that the appeal be heard entirely de novo. The respondent’s position is now that the appeal should proceed on the basis of the SCA’s factual findings. Given the limited fact-finding that remained and the appellant’s desire for her family’s status to be resolved as quickly as possible, it was agreed that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
21. Ms Gilmour accepted that the respondent will now need to clarify her position on the appellant’s protection and human rights claim, taking into account the SCA’s findings. If the respondent’s position on these issues were not clarified prior to the resumed hearing, there would be a risk of further unfairness.
22. The directions below were agreed with the parties at the end of the hearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 2 February 2026 is set aside with no findings preserved.
The appeal will be retained for remaking before the Upper Tribunal.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 June 2026
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001574
UI-2026-001679; UI-2026-001680
UI-2026-001681; UI-2026-001682
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/70092/2024
PA/70100/2024; PA/70101/2024
PA/70105/2024; PA/70107/2024
LP/03444/2025
LP/03445/2025; LP/03446/2025
LP/03443/2025; LP/03447/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd of October 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
AD
A
B
C
D
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Ahmad, of no. 12 Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) that was set aside by the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal’s reasons for setting aside the FtT’s decision are contained in a decision dated 12 June 2026, which is included as an annex below.
2. The first appellant is a citizen of Albania born in 1987. She is the mother of the four other appellants, who were born between 2011 and 2018. The children’s protection and human rights claims arise out of the same factual matrix as their mother’s claim. I will therefore refer to the first appellant as “the appellant” to make this decision easier to read.
3. On 15 September 2025, the respondent’s Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) found that it was more likely than not that the appellant had been subjected to three “types of exploitation”:
(i) “Domestic servitude and forced labour in Albania – unknown start date until approximately 2010”
(ii) “Domestic Servitude in Albania – approximately 15/08/2010-August 2020”
(iii) “Sexual exploitation in Kosovo – approximately sometime in 2013 for 2 months and 1 week in 2022”
4. In accordance with the respondent’s published policy, the respondent has adopted these findings for the purposes of this appeal.
The extent of the accepted facts
5. The SCA’s decision does not set out the full details of the exploitation that the respondent now accepts occurred. I consider it right nonetheless to proceed on the basis that all of those details have been accepted. This is because on 12 June 2026, the Upper Tribunal directed the respondent to file a position statement “setting out her position on the appellant’s Refugee Convention and human rights claims in light of the facts accepted in the SCA’s decision of 15 September 2025”. In accordance with those directions, the respondent filed a position statement on 03 September 2026. She did not raise any criticisms of the appellant’s general credibility or reject any specific elements of her account of past events in Albania. Instead, the respondent’s position was that the issue before the Tribunal was the risk on return. This was also the position Mr Tufan took at the hearing before me, with one exception with regard to the appellant’s account of a previous interaction with the police.
6. Accordingly, I set out a summary of the accepted factual background on which I must base my decision.
7. The appellant is from Kukes. Her father was oppressive and controlling, and he arranged her marriage with her husband (“H”) in 2008. She and H married in 2010, and she lived with H’s family from their marriage until 2018. They lived together in a single room and the appellant was treated as a “slave”. She was forced to perform all of the domestic work for the family and was not given enough to eat. If she complained, the family would threaten to throw her out of the house and keep the children.
8. H is an alcoholic and had a gambling problem. He incurred significant debts to the leader of a powerful criminal gang in order to fund his gambling habit. I will call this man “Mr A”; this does not reflect his actual surname. H did not repay his debts, but Mr A could not target him directly, because he was normally working abroad. Instead, he targeted the appellant. Shortly after her marriage, men associated with Mr A came to the appellant’s marital home and seized her sewing machine. Then in 2013, four men who worked for Mr A raped the appellant in Kukes. They then took her to Prizren in Kosovo, where she was forced into sexual exploitation for two months. Her captors controlled her with beatings and threats to harm her children. The appellant says she was “unable to escape” but has not been asked for details of why her captors released her when they did.
9. The appellant returned to her martial home, but she continued to face demands from H’s creditors. At one point, she borrowed money herself to try to pay them off in part, but this only led to further indebtedness. In 2018, her in-laws asked her to leave the family home because of the persistent demands from H’s creditors. She and H have been separated ever since.
10. The appellant’s sister found accommodation for her and her children with a friend. The gang continued to demand repayment from her, however. In 2021, they threatened to kidnap her children, and in 2022, they forced her into sexual exploitation again. This second time, she escaped after one week with the assistance of a client who was disturbed when he saw bruises on her body. She fled to the UK with her children.
The issues before me
11. The SCA is not responsible for deciding whether a recognised victim of trafficking would be at risk on return to their home country, such that the SCA’s decision contains no concession on this issue. The issues before me are:
(i) Whether the appellant or her children would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Albania; and
(ii) Whether their removal to Albania would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8, either because there would be very significant obstacles to their reintegration in Albania (and they therefore meet the requirements of the immigration rules) or because their removal would otherwise be disproportionate.
12. The appellant says that she fears that she would be forced into exploitation by Mr A on return to Albania, or that he would target her children, as he has threatened to do in the past. She is particularly afraid for her 16-year-old daughter; as she said in her oral evidence, she does not want her to “live a life what’s happened to me”.
13. The appellant further says that she would have no access to family support. She has not spoken to her husband since 2018. She would be unable to rely on further help from her sister, who is not “financially stable” herself. The rest of her family have rejected her because of her history of sexual exploitation.
14. The appellant says that she suffers from nightmares, anxiety, depression and flashbacks, as well as heart irregularities caused by stress. She would be unable to support herself and her children due to her mental health problems and her overwhelming fear of Mr A. She would not seek help from the police because she does not trust them. She believes that they are corrupt and have ties to criminal gangs, including the gang run by Mr A. In addition, the one time she went to the police to ask for help, the officer she spoke to made it clear that he would expect sexual favours from her in return. She would now be reluctant to seek help from any man in Albania.
15. The respondent does not accept that the appellant would be at risk on return to Albania. The respondent’s current position is set out in her position statement of 3 September 2026 and Mr Tufan’s submissions at the hearing before me. The respondent submits:
(i) The appellant does not meet the criteria set out in the country guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) for being at risk of re-trafficking; in particular, Mr Tufan pointed to the appellant’s age;
(ii) Mr A has not tried to contact the appellant since 2022. This is an indication that he would be unlikely to target her in the future;
(iii) Moreover, Mr A targeted the appellant in connection with her husband’s debts. Because she has not been in contact with her husband since 2018, Mr A would know that he cannot put pressure on her husband by threatening or attacking her. Nor would Mr A continue to demand repayment from the appellant, because he would know that she is without funds;
(iv) State protection is, in general, available. It is not plausible that a police officer would have demanded sexual favours from the appellant, because Albania is seeking entry to the European Union; the real reason the appellant did not seek help from the police was that she was not genuinely in fear; and
(v) If Mr A had nationwide influence, there would be some independent evidence about him, but there is not. Internal relocation would therefore be safe. Internal relocation would be reasonable because the appellant speaks Albanian, has some education, is in good health and has previously been assisted by her sister.
The legal framework
16. The appellant claimed asylum in September 2022. My decision is therefore governed by the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act (NABA) 2022. This requires me to answer the five questions set out at section 32, and, in so doing, to apply the other relevant principles of interpretation of the Refugee Convention that are set out at sections 30-35.
17. In assessing the risk on return to the appellant, TD and AD remains the country guidance I must follow. In addition, both parties agreed that LR (Male VOTs) (CG) [2026] UKUT 00315 contains relevant updating evidence and guidance, because much of the material the Upper Tribunal considered did not distinguish between male and female victims of trafficking. Both of these decisions fully taken into account established legal principles about how to assess sufficiency of protection and the reasonableness of internal relocation, such that I do not consider it necessary to make separate reference to those principles in my decision below.
18. As reaffirmed in LR at Headnote [7], para. 339K of the Immigration Rules applies to former victims of trafficking. This means that I must take the appellant’s past experience of trafficking as a serious indication of future risk, unless there are good reasons to consider that it will not be repeated.
19. Finally, if I find that the appellant will be at risk of trafficking or other serious harm on return to Albania, I must also assess the causal link between that future risk and her past experience of trafficking: EAV v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1677. It is only if the history of trafficking is one effective reason for the future risk that the appellant is a refugee. LR at [64] (relying on K v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46).
Findings
20. TD and AD establishes that women who have been victims of trafficking into sexual exploitation form a particular social group in Albania and that women who have been trafficked in the past may, under certain circumstances, be at risk of re-retrafficking or other serious harm in the future. The respondent accepts that the appellant was trafficked into sexual exploitation twice in the past. It is therefore uncontentious that the appellant has a characteristic – her history of trafficking - that could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of her membership of a particular social group. The answer to the question posed at s. 32(2)(a) of NABA is clearly yes.
21. I find that the appellant does have a genuine, subjective fear of suffering re-trafficking or other serious harm from her traffickers in the future. Her evidence has been consistent on this point throughout. Her fear is also corroborated by the NHS records before me. These show that she was diagnosed with a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder in July 2023 and with PTSD in 2024 and was referred for trauma focussed therapy. In November 2025, she reported suffering from panic attacks. She has been prescribed sertraline, omeprazole and promethazine hydrochloride. The panic attacks in particular are a clear indication of ongoing fear.
22. The appellant said at her substantive interview that she “had a lot of problems with my heart in Albania, when I am happy or upset I faint”, and she repeated in her 2025 statements that she has a heart condition that is triggered by stress. According to the appellant’s NHS records, however, she underwent a series of tests related to her heart in 2025 and the results were normal. I conclude from this that her fear is strong enough to trigger significant psychosomatic symptoms.
23. I find that the answer to the question posed at section 32(2)(b) of NABA is also yes.
24. The next question before me is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would suffer the persecution she fears if she were returned to Albania. This is the question posed at NAB section 32(4)(a). Here, it is necessary to break down the three potential types of harm an accepted victim of trafficking may fear:
(i) Retrafficking by her former traffickers;
(ii) Reprisal by her former traffickers, for example, because she might be able to reveal incriminating information about them; and
(iii) Trafficking by someone else.
See: LR at Headnote [6].
25. By her own account, the appellant does not know much about the gang that trafficked her beyond what was considered common knowledge in Kukes. She does not say she has tangible information related to their operations that she could reveal. See: LR at [228] Nor, given her belief that the police are corrupt and her fear of men, would she be reasonably likely to denounce the gang to the authorities even if she did have such information. I therefore find there is no real risk of reprisal.
26. However, I do find that there is a real risk that she would be re-trafficked by Mr A and his gang. She has already been forced into sexual exploitation by them twice, on two occasions that were nine years apart. This may appear to be surprising, but it is accepted that this is what occurred. Mr Tufan submitted that Mr A would have no further interest in exploiting the appellant because his main target was her husband, and they are now long separated. However, they had already been separated for around four years by the time of the second exploitation. Mr Tufan also suggested that Mr A would no longer be interested in the appellant because she would obviously be unable to repay her and her husband’s debt. However, as Mr Ahmad rightly pointed out, when the appellant was unable to repay the debt, Mr A forced her to earn money for him through sexual exploitation. Her lack of access to cash was no barrier to exploitation.
27. I also take into account that LR establishes that it is “too simplistic to conclude that risk diminishes with time”: [230] In any event, it has only been four years since the appellant was last trafficked by Mr A’s gang. I do not take the gang’s failure to target the appellant in the UK as an indication that its interest in her has diminished, because nothing in the evidence before me suggests that they have transnational reach.
28. Finally, Mr Tufan relied on the appellant’s age as indicating that she would not be at risk of retrafficking, because in TD and AD, the Upper Tribunal gave weight to the expert evidence that gangs normally target women in their late teens and early twenties: [152]. However, according to the accepted facts, Mr A targeted the appellant for the first time when she was already 26, and for the second time when she was 35. Moreover, the gang made specific threats against her children, and her eldest daughter is now 16. This is a common age at which gangs target girls for sexual exploitation.
29. I therefore conclude that there is no good reason to consider that Mr A will not be interested in exploiting the appellant, or perhaps her eldest daughter, on return to Albania.
30. The answer to the question posed at section 32(4)(a) is yes.
31. The next issue before me is whether there is a reasonable risk that the appellant would not have access to effective state protection. This is the question posed at section 32(4)(b). According to AD and TD, sufficient protection against re-trafficking is generally available. However, there are a number of factors that may nonetheless indicate a real risk of re-trafficking for a particular individual. In both TD and AD and LR, the questions of effective protection and effective reintegration support are treated as intertwined: see, e.g. LR at [319], [330] This is because if the factors that led to exploitation in the first place are not addressed, this may make re-exploitation more likely.
32. TD and AD set out a number of factors that could place a woman at risk of re-trafficking in spite of the fact that sufficient protection is generally available. Having considered all of those factors, I identify the following individual characteristics that could, cumulatively, create a real risk of re-trafficking:
(i) I accept that the appellant’s family has strict traditional values and have disowned her because of her history of exploitation. This is consistent with her history of arranged marriage and with the fact that when she first left her husband’s family home, she went to stay with a friend of her sister. She did not return to her own family. It is also consistent with the independent evidence of the persistence of traditional values described in TD and AD and LR. She will therefore be returning to Albania with no family support;
(ii) There is no direct evidence of the appellant’s family’s social status and economic standing. However, I note that they arranged her marriage to a family in which she, her husband and her in-laws lived in one room and she said she did not have enough to eat (this aspect of her account is accepted). I conclude from this that her family were also of low social and economic status;
(iii) The appellant has no work experience outside the home, although she does know how to sew;
(iv) The appellant attended school until the age of 14, but her educational attainment is limited. This conclusion is based on her evidence before me. I had misread two letters from her children’s schools as describing the children as having two guardians, and I asked her about this. Rather than correcting my mistake, she was confused and explained that she had not read the letters because she could not do so. I conclude from the content of her answer and her evident bewilderment that it had not occurred to her to read the letters and that this betrays a limited engagement with written documents; and
(v) The appellant suffers from anxiety, depression, PTSD, panic attacks and psychosomatic heart problems; and
(vi) NHS records from November 2025 describe the appellant as socially isolated and spending most of her time “at home cleaning”.
33. I also find that the appellant has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to seek help for herself and her children effectively. She did not leave the abusive situation she was in after her marriage; she says this was because her in-laws had threatened to throw her out and keep custody of her children. She only left when she was forced to do so, after eight years of abuse. She was unable to escape her traffickers the first time they forced her into sexual exploitation. During the years in which she was being repeatedly harassed by Mr A, rather than seek police protection, she took out a large loan herself in an attempt to pay him off, which only compounded the problem. Finally, when she fled in 2022, she relied on a client whom, as she accepted at her asylum interview, she had no reason to trust. She explained, “I thought I would end this the right way or the wrong way. I would end this forever”.
34. The appellant’s personal history is likely to present additional barriers to her seeking assistance on return. The appellant describes an ongoing fear of men. This is plausible given her experience of being raised by a controlling father, entering into an arranged marriage in an abusive household and then twice being forced into sexual exploitation. It is corroborated by the account she gave to an NHS clinical psychologist in August 2024.
35. I also accept her account of seeking help from a police officer who demanded sexual favours from her. This is because when she was cross-examined by Mr Tufan about what had happened, she was evasive, saying that the police officer “wanted something from me” and that she knew what he wanted from his “way of communication” and from “the way he talked”. I consider that this evasiveness is likely to be an indication of the appellant’s shame, and hence of the truth of the account. If the appellant had invented the incident in order to bolster her claim, she would have had no reluctance to say explicitly what the police officer had wanted from her. Moreover, in TD and AD the Upper Tribunal noted that many women fear that they will need to “pay off” the police with sexual favours ([94]), and although the Tribunal was describing a widespread fear rather than a documented reality, it increases the plausibility of the appellant’s account.
36. I recognise that many women who have experienced sexual exploitation are likely to experience shame, a reluctance to seek assistance and a fear of men. The now well-established structures of reintegration support for women victims of trafficking in Albania (see, generally AD and TD and LR at [235]) are likely to be designed to respond to these barriers to engagement. I find, however, that there is a reasonable likelihood that this appellant will not have access to the necessary level of reintegration support. In the first place, the Albanian authorities are unlikely to know that she has been recognised as a victim of trafficking: LR at [258](a), such that she will need to request support, something she has a poor history of doing. Secondly, although accommodation in shelters is available, according to TD and AD at [46], children will usually be expected to share a room with their mothers. It is difficult to imagine that they will be able to accommodate the appellant and four children, particularly as the children are not small. They are now 15, 13, 10 and eight years old.
37. Even if the appellant were able to find a place in a shelter, her time there would be limited: TD and AD at [105]. I find that after leaving a shelter, the appellant would be at ongoing risk in her home area, where I find that it is reasonably likely that Mr A operates with impunity. The appellant describes him as well-known as a gangster in Kukes; the belief that her traffickers were affiliated with an organised crime group is consistent with the external evidence that both moneylending and trafficking are often carried out by such groups: LR at [202], [205]. She describes a 12-year campaign of threats, demands and, ultimately, exploitation carried out by men working for Mr A. The fact that Mr A was well known as a gangster for such an extended period of time suggests that he has been able to act with impunity. Moreover, she has given an accepted account of being harassed by him so often that her in-laws eventually asked her to leave their home, in spite of previously threatening her to prevent her from leaving. This suggests that they did not consider that seeking police protection would resolve the problem. Mr A’s impunity within the local area is also consistent with independent evidence of continuing corruption in Albania. LR: [290]-[295]
38. I therefore find that it is reasonably likely that sufficient state protection would not be available in the appellant’s home area.
39. There is no evidence that Mr A’s reach extends to Tirana or other large cities. The appellant has said little about Mr A’s contacts at the national level; she describes him as well known in Kukes. Nor is there any external evidence about him that could help establish his national profile, and the appellant bears the burden of proof. According to the guidance in LR, however, ‘Albania’s small geographical size, small communities and local networks means that relocation “rarely guarantees anonymity or safety’”. Newcomers draw attention and questions, even in larger cities, and this may lead to comments on social media that draw their persecutors’ attention to them. This could mean that an individual will be located by a determined persecutor even if that persecutor does not have access to state sources of information (such as police or voter records) in the area of relocation: [333]-[334]. Although the Upper Tribunal in LR found that newcomers attract less attention in larger cities, it was considering the case of male victims of trafficking into criminality. In the context of widespread male emigration to Europe, it is reasonable to expect that men returning from Europe are less likely to attract interest when they return from abroad and settle in a large city. The appellant, however, is a single mother of four children. I consider that she is more likely to attract attention and comment, particularly when the social attitudes towards single women and single mothers described in TD and AD are taken into account: [111]. This raises a reasonable likelihood that the appellant’s presence in another large city in Albania would eventually come to Mr A’s attention.
40. I therefore find that there is a real risk that the appellant would come to Mr A’s attention even if she relocated.
41. The final question is whether there is a real risk that the appellant would come to serious harm if she were located by Mr A, such that internal relocation would not be safe. I find that there is. It is reasonably likely that even if she received initial accommodation in a shelter, she would remain vulnerable after she left. Mental health provision is limited both within shelters (TD and AD at [100]) and outside them (LR at [276]; TD and AD at [110]). As a single mother and a former victim of trafficking into sexual exploitation, she will face some degree of social stigma, even in larger cities: TD and AD at [111]. As a single mother of four children with limited education and no experience of working outside the home, her employment prospects will be very limited (see, e.g.: TD and AD at [109]). She would have access to financial aid as a victim of trafficking, but this would be insufficient to meet her essential needs: LR at [239] On the other hand, she would be on a priority list for social housing and rent subsidies, and in spite of bureaucratic hurdles and limited supply, social housing might be available in Tirana: LR at [244]. She will have no support from her family. She lacks trust in the police, due to her personal experiences. She has been socially isolated for most of her life, either in a coercive and controlling home environment or as a victim of exploitation, and her most recent NHS records suggest that her social isolation is continuing. As Mr Ahmad pointed out, one theme of her evidence is that she will submit to almost anything if she believes she will protect her children by doing so, and she now expresses an increased fear for her eldest daughter because of her age. There is a reasonable likelihood that this combination of factors will create a real risk that she would be re-trafficked by Mr A. This is consistent with the finding in LR at [220] that “female VOTs [victims of trafficking] who are not rehabilitated may find that they have no choice but to submit to trafficking again in order to survive and / or prevent reprisals either to themselves or family members.”
42. I therefore find in answer to the question posed by NABA section 32(5) that there is a reasonable likelihood that internal relocation would not be available.
43. I further find that the appellant’s membership of a PSG would be one effective cause of her risk of re-trafficking. Many of the factors that make her liable to re-trafficking are long-standing, such as her family history, her limited education, her lack of work experience and her susceptibility to threats concerning her children. However, her mental ill health, her fear of men and her lack of trust in the police are all linked to her experiences of trafficking. These factors play a material role in putting her at risk of trafficking, because they contribute to her vulnerability and her unwillingness to seek protection. I therefore consider that the necessary causal nexus is established.
44. For these reasons, I conclude that the appellant is a refugee. There is also a real risk that she would be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment and forced labour in the form of sexual exploitation on return to Albania.
45. The article 8 claims of the appellant and her children were not the focus of the submissions before me. The family has now lived in the UK for four years. There is little evidence before me concerning the appellant’s private life, but the children are in school and I find that the older children are likely to have begun to establish meaningful ties outside the home. I therefore accept for the purposes of this appeal that the family has established some degree of a private life in the UK, and that their removal to Albania would constitute a significant enough interference with their private life to engage article 8.
46. It would clearly be in the best interests of the children to remain in the UK. I have not assessed the risk to the appellant on return to Albania to the standard of the balance of probabilities, which is the standard for an article 8 claim. I therefore do not rely carry forward all of my previous findings. Certain relevant facts have, however, been accepted by the respondent to that higher standard. These include the domestic situation the appellant lived in both in her family home and in her in-law’s home and the sexual exploitation to which she was subjected. Taking into account the evidence in TD and AD and LR, I find that it is more likely than not that the children would be returning to Albania with a mother who has been rejected by her family and would face significant social stigma. The children are not illegitimate and they might not be rejected by their wider families, but given that those families are more likely than not to reject their mother, this would put them in very difficult position.
47. I also find that the appellant is more likely than not to suffer from depression, anxiety, PTSD and panic attacks. This is recorded in her NHS records and entirely consistent with her history of trauma. I find on the basis of the evidence in TD and AD and LR that it is more likely than not that she would be unable to access sufficient mental health support. Her ongoing mental ill health will undermine her ability to care for the children. I also find that it is more likely than not that the appellant would struggle to find employment sufficient to support the family for the reasons given above, and that the financial support she might access from the state and NGOs would be insufficient.
48. It is therefore clearly in the children’s best interests to remain in the UK.
49. The children speak English but their mother does not, and the family is unlikely to be financially independent. These factors weigh against the family.
50. What tips the article 8 assessment strongly in the appellant’s favour is that I have found that the appellant is a refugee. There is nothing to suggest that she is excludable from the protection of the Refugee Convention, and therefore she is entitled to permission to stay under the immigration rules. Her children are entitled to permission to stay as her dependants. I must place considerable weight in the article 8 assessment on the effective maintenance of immigration control, and therefore the fact that the appellants are entitled to permission to stay under the immigration rules tips the article 8 balance in their favour.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, with reference to articles 3, 4 and 8 ECHR.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 September 2026
ANNEX
Error of law decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001574;
UI-2026-001679; UI-2026-001680
UI-2026-001681; UI-2026-001682
First-tier Tribunal Nos:
PA/70092/2024;
PA/70100/2024; PA/70101/2024
PA/70105/2024; PA/70107/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
AD
A
B
C
D
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: A. Alam, no.12 Chambers
For the Respondent: H. Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 11 Septmeber 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order in this case. It took into account the public interest in open justice but found it outweighed by the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, the sensitive matters raised in the first appellant’s account and the privacy interests of her children. I consider it is appropriate for the order to continue, for the same reasons.
2. The appellants are citizens of Albania. The first appellant was born in 1987 and is the mother of the four other appellants, who were born between 2011 and 2018. The children’s claims are entirely dependent on their mother’s, and therefore for ease of reference I will refer to the first appellant as “the appellant” throughout this decision.
3. At the heart of the appellant’s asylum claim is an account of having been kidnapped in Albania forced into sexual exploitation in Kosovo, first in 2013 and again in 2022. In a refusal decision dated 2 September 2024, a decision-maker in the respondent’s Asylum Children and Secondary Casework (“ACSC”) department rejected that account, finding it lacking in detail, internally inconsistent and implausible. On the same day, the appellant was referred into the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) so that the respondent’s Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) could come to its own decision about the truth of the appellant’s account. On 15 September 2025, while the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her asylum claim was pending, the SCA decided that it was more likely than not that her account was true.
4. At the hearing of the appellant’s appeal before the FtT on 8 December 2025, the respondent’s Presenting Officer (“PO”) maintained the position taken in the September 2024 refusal decision and asked the FtT to find that the appellant was not credible and had not been a victim of exploitation as she claimed. After hearing from the parties, the FtT allowed the appeal to proceed on that basis. The FtT ultimately agreed with the respondent’s decision-maker and the PO and dismissed the appeal. Both parties now say that this was unfair.
The history of the appellant’s appeal before the FtT
5. The appellant appealed to the FtT on 4 September 2024. The respondent submitted her bundle of evidence on 30 October 2024, and on 28 March 2025, she conducted a Respondent’s review and maintained her decision.
6. The appellant lodged her evidence and submissions with the FtT between July and December 2025. She uploaded her witness statement and skeleton argument on 22 July 2025, medical and country evidence in November 2025, and evidence about her children’s schooling in December 2025.
7. Meanwhile, on 23 July 2025, the respondent’s SCA found that there were reasonable grounds to accept that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery. On 15 September 2025, it found that there were conclusive grounds to accept that this was the case. Under the heading “Our decision”, the SCA wrote:
“We found the following types of exploitation occurred:
“Domestic servitude and forced labour in Albania – unknown start date until approximately 2010
“Domestic Servitude in Albania – approximately 15/08/2010-August 2020
“Sexual exploitation in Kosovo – approximately sometime in 2013 for 2 months and 1 week in 2022”
8. The appellant’s solicitors uploaded this decision onto MyHMCTS on 20 November 2025, together with the witness statement the appellant had submitted to the SCA, dated 5 September 2025.
9. The appeal then came before the FtT for full hearing on 8 December 2025. The FtT dealt with the conflict between the position taken by the respondent’s two decision-makers as a preliminary issue. It set out the chronology of the respondent’s inconsistent decisions and addressed the consequences of this as follows:
“14. The appellant’s solicitors uploaded the conclusive grounds decision to MyHMCTS in November, they did not, so far as I am aware, ask the Respondent whether her stance on the asylum appeal would change considering the now conclusive positive grounds decision from the CA or make submissions that it should.
“15. At the hearing [the respondent’s Presenting Officer] indicated that although there was a positive NRM decision, so far as the asylum appeal was concerned the Respondent’s position was as set out in the RFRL [the reasons for refusal letter of 2 September 2024] and it was not conceded that the appellant had been the victim of trafficking or that she had told the truth about her circumstances in Albania generally.
“16. Mr Alam said that he had not appreciated this would be the Respondent’s stance and that it was “irrational.” I asked [the PO] to take instructions to ensure that the Respondent maintained that the appellant was not credible. [The PO] did so and confirmed that the Respondent relied on MS (Pakistan) [2002] UKSC9 and, in short, would submit that it is for the Tribunal to make up its own mind about whether the appellant has been trafficked.
“17. After giving the [sic] Mr Alam time to consider MS he accepted that the judgement does not say it was only for the Tribunal to make up its own mind when the Respondent had made a negative conclusive grounds decision. Nonetheless the situation was unusual and unexpected, and he might wish to apply for an adjournment to give the matter more thought and there was also the question of childcare for the appellant’s children to consider. I indicated that I did not consider that time for more thought was likely to be a good reason to adjourn the final hearing. The appellant said that she had made arrangements for her children to be picked up from school and cared for. In the event Mr Alam, after taking instructions from the appellant did not pursue an application for an adjournment.”
10. The hearing proceeded. The appellant gave evidence and was cross-examined. In a decision dated 2 February 2026, the FtT dismissed the appeal. The section of the decision entitled “Analysis of Evidence and Findings” began with the issue of the respondent’s two contradictory decisions:
“27. When assessing the appellant’s credibility my starting point is any concession made by the Respondent. In this appeal there are conflicting conclusions reached (in theory) by one person about the credibility of the appellant’s claims to have been trafficked for sex work. This is not a satisfactory situation.”
11. The FtT then undertook a careful consideration of the effect of the SCA’s decision at [28]-[30]. It first considered whether it did not need to decide the issue of trafficking because, in light of that decision, it was no longer in dispute between the parties. It rejected this conclusion because it considered itself bound by MS (Pakistan) to decide the trafficking issue for itself. It directed itself that the Supreme Court had found that the SCA decision “must not be disregarded” but had observed that its “precise relevance” to a tribunal appeal was a “more difficult question”. It assessed the relevance of the SCA decision as follows:
“30. I have taken the positive conclusive grounds decision into account. I note that there is no reasoning in the decision, and I do not know what evidence was considered apart from (I assume) the witness statement made by the appellant in September 2024 [sic], I do not know if the appellant was questioned about anything in the statement or asked for more information. I do not know if the decision maker in the CA department considered their colleague’s reasoning in the RFRL or considered the appellant’s interviews. When it comes to the assessing the appellant’s case I take into account that a positive decision has been made someone acting on behalf of the Respondent, but as evidence that supports the appellant’s case or undermines the reasoning in the RFRL it carries very little weight.”
12. The FtT then proceeded to give its reasons for rejecting the appellant’s credibility, taking into account the medical evidence regarding her mental health, her statements at her screening and substantive interviews, her appeal statement and her oral evidence: [31]-[62]. It dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
The grounds of appeal
13. The appellant applied for permission to appeal. In her skeleton argument of 5 June 2026, she numbered her grounds from One to Four. Given the position taken by the respondent at the appeal before me, only Ground One remains relevant. This challenged the FtT’s decision to decide the trafficking issue for itself in spite of the SCA decision. This was said to be contrary to AM (Iran) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 2706 at [44] because the respondent had sought to withdraw a concession but had not been asked to explain why the concession was made, why it was mistaken and why it was now just and fair that she be allowed to withdraw it. This had been procedurally unfair because “The Appellant had notice of [sic] that the issues regarding her exploitation, which had been accepted at the higher standard were no[t] in dispute.” The FtT’s reliance on MS (Pakistan) was said to be misplaced, because in MS (Pakistan) there had been a negative SCA decision, not a positive one.
14. The FtT granted the appellant permission to appeal.
15. There was no Rule 24 response from the respondent.
The hearing
16. At the outset of the hearing before me, Ms Gilmour informed me that the respondent accepted that there had been an error of law and the FtT decision must be set aside. She explained that the basis for this concession was that the PO’s conduct of the appeal had been inconsistent with the respondent’s published policy, Assessing credibility and refugee status in asylum claims lodged on or after 28 June 2022. This states at page 49:
“Where an asylum claim is made by someone already accepted under the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) as a victim of modern slavery following a conclusive grounds decision, that finding, and the facts material to that decision, should be accepted for the purposes of the asylum claim, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.”
17. The respondent considered that it was unfair that the PO had not followed this guidance in the appeal before the FtT. I asked Ms Gilmour whether any unfairness might have been lessened by the fact that the appellant had prepared her evidence and witness statement in response to the reasons for refusal letter, in which the credibility of her account had been rejected. It could therefore be considered that she had prepared to meet the respondent’s case at the hearing before the FtT, in spite of the intervening SCA decision. I also drew her attention to the fact that the appellant had decided not to request an adjournment below. Ms Gilmore nonetheless maintained the concession. Taking into account the guidance in MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 00351 (IAC), I accepted it.
18. For the sake of completeness, I note that the respondent’s concession was on the fairness issue only. The respondent did not concede that MS (Pakistan) did not apply to positive trafficking decisions. Although I did not hear submissions from the parties on this issue, my preliminary view is that the Supreme Court’s decision in MS (Pakistan) rested on its interpretation of sections 82 and 85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the role of the tribunal in human rights appeals as set out in Huang v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11. There is nothing to suggest that the nature of the NRM decision, whether negative or positive, played any part in the reasoning.
19. The respondent having conceded that the decision of the FtT contained an error of law requiring it to be set aside, I so find.
20. Following Ms Gilmour’s concession, I heard submissions from the parties on the disposal of the appeal. It was agreed that the factual findings of the FtT should be set aside in their entirety. However, in light of the SCA decision and the respondent’s policy, it would be wrong to direct that the appeal be heard entirely de novo. The respondent’s position is now that the appeal should proceed on the basis of the SCA’s factual findings. Given the limited fact-finding that remained and the appellant’s desire for her family’s status to be resolved as quickly as possible, it was agreed that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
21. Ms Gilmour accepted that the respondent will now need to clarify her position on the appellant’s protection and human rights claim, taking into account the SCA’s findings. If the respondent’s position on these issues were not clarified prior to the resumed hearing, there would be a risk of further unfairness.
22. The directions below were agreed with the parties at the end of the hearing.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 2 February 2026 is set aside with no findings preserved.
The appeal will be retained for remaking before the Upper Tribunal.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
12 June 2026