Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001578
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/01055/2025
EA/00870/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

ISAAC ADEGBOYEGA
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr D. Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr L. Youssefian, Counsel instructed by Sam Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. Although this is an appeal by the Secretary of State, to avoid confusion, I shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”).
2. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of a FtT Judge (the “Judge”) promulgated on 18 February 2026, in which he allowed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim made in response to the decision to make a deportation order against him following the appellant’s sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment in April 2025. The appellant is a citizen of Germany born in September 2000. The appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since 2003.
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the papers and does not require verbatim repetition herein. The respondent’s decision refusing the appellant’s human rights claim is dated 28 August 2025.
4. In relation to the appellant’s offending, he was convicted on 25 February 2025 of possession with intent to supply Class A drugs and possession of an offensive weapon. The appellant was previously of good character and has no other criminal convictions.
5. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal was allowed by the FtT on human rights grounds for the reasons set out in the decision dated 18 February 2026.
The Decision of the FtT
6. I shall not set out the decision and findings in detail at this point in light of the discussion of the respondent’s grounds of challenge below.
7. The Judge identified the appellant as a “medium offender” and recorded that the issues in the appeal were whether the appellant could come within the private life Exception to deportation (section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA”); or, if not, whether there were “very compelling circumstances” for the purposes of section 117C(6) NIAA.
8. The Judge indicated at [19] that he accepted the appellant’s evidence in full in relation to his evidence on residence and his family in the UK, his education and work, and noted that his evidence was entirely consistent with all of the appellant’s other witnesses. The Judge found that the appellant had been lawfully resident in the UK for over half of his life at [21], that he was “socially and culturally integrated” into the UK at [22] to [26], and (having directed himself on the relevant law at [27] to [30]) that the appellant would face “very significant obstacles to integration” in Germany at [31] to [40]. Thus, the Judge found that the appellant satisfied the private life Exception to deportation.
9. The Judge proceeded to then address the very compelling circumstances test at [41] to [66]. He assessed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. In respect of the nature and seriousness of the appellant’s offending, the Judge did not accept that the public interest was reduced on account of the appellant's drug addiction being the motivation for his offending. The Judge conducted an assessment of the risk of reoffending, rehabilitation and remorse, the appellant’s immigration status, his family relationships and situation, and his length of residence in the UK. The Judge directed himself at [64] of the need for the appellant to demonstrate an exceptional case or a very strong claim indeed. Balancing the factors against the appellant and in his favour, the Judge found that there are very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case which outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The respondent raises two grounds of challenge:
1) Ground 1 – Failing to give adequate reasons for findings on social and cultural integration.
2) Ground 2 - Failing to give adequate reasons for findings on very significant obstacles.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal Judge Mahmood on 15 May 2026.
The Hearing Before Me
12. Mr Simpson confirmed that the respondent’s challenge was on the basis of an inadequacy of reasons and addressed the Judge’s findings on social and cultural integration, very significant obstacles to integration and very compelling circumstances. Mr Youssefian responded to the grounds relying upon the detailed Rule 24 response dated 8 July 2026. I do not rehearse the submissions made in detail except insofar as necessary in my reasoning below. At the end of the hearing, I indicated that I would reserve my decision which I now give together with my reasons.
Analysis and Decision
13. I have in mind throughout the need to exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the FtT. It is now well established that the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge could come to a different decision. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678), at [30]:
Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
14. When it comes to the reasons given by the FtT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FtT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25].
15. The issues that the FtT is deciding and the basis on which the FtT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27].
16. Judges sitting in the FtT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see A4 (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34].
17. It is of the nature of proportionality assessments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case and the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10, [2017] 1 WLR 1260, at [107].
18. It is important at the outset to focus on the nature of the respondent’s challenge to the FtT decision. This is a reasons challenge in respect of the key disputed issues. The respondent asserts that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons on social and cultural integration and very significant obstacles. The grounds do not assert that the findings reached were not reasonably available to the Judge on the evidence before the FtT. For the reasons set out below, I find that the Judge provided wholly adequate reasoning on all material matter in the detailed, careful and balanced decision.
Ground 1
19. The respondent challenges the adequacy of Judge’s reasoning in respect of the finding that the applicant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom for the purposes of section 117C(4)(b) NIAA. In Mr Simpson’s submission, the Judge failed to conduct a full holistic assessment of the issue of integration and failed to scrutinise the undated letter of a job offer provided by the appellant. The grounds submit that the Judge gave disproportionate weight to the length of the appellant's residence in the UK and gave weight to the appellant’s education and employment history which benefitted the appellant rather than society generally. The grounds submit that there is no evidence that the appellant has contributed to wider society and the culture of the UK.
20. At [19] of the decision the Judge found that the appellant had been resident in the UK since 2003 (when he would have been two or three years old), had been educated in the UK since his arrival until 2016/2017, had worked more or less full time for five years since 2018, and was granted settled status in 2019. The Judge found that these were strong indicators of integration. The Judge then proceeded to apply his findings in respect of the issue of integration at [22] to [25], recognising that a holistic assessment was required. The Judge appropriately directed himself on the relevant caselaw at [22].
21. As indicated by the Judge at [23], the respondent’s own position on integration in the refusal decision was unclear. The refusal decision states at [30] “It is accepted that you have limited socially and culturally integrated in the UK” but then refers to the appellant’s offending (and no other matter) being a factor which undermines the appellant’s claim of integration or that his presence is beneficial to the community or society. For the purposes of section 117C(4)(b) NIAA the Judge’s task was to determine whether the appellant was or was not socially and culturally integrated, rather than to ascertain degrees of integration.
22. At [24] the Judge addressed the appellant’s criminality and period of imprisonment in relation to the issue of integration, expressly stating that he had taken into account the relevant caselaw, including CI (Nigeria) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 (“CI (Nigeria)”). The Judge accepted that the appellant’s offending was not consistent with the principles of integration in the UK but stated that criminal offending does not per se mean that a person is not integrated in the UK.
23. At [25] the Judge sets out clear reasoning as to why the appellant’s conviction and imprisonment did not sever his integration in the UK. The Judge refers to the fact the appellant was strongly socially and culturally at the date of his offending and it was only his nationality that distinguished the appellant from his British peers. He was imprisoned for a period of less than one year during which time his friends and family continued to support him.
24. The leading authority on the question of whether the appellant’s criminal offending and period of imprisonment could sever his social and cultural integration is CI (Nigeria). As held at [62]:
62. Clearly, however, the impact of offending and imprisonment upon a person's integration in this country will depend not only on the nature and frequency of the offending, the length of time over which it takes place and the length of time spent in prison, but also on whether and how deeply the individual was socially and culturally integrated in the UK to begin with. In that regard, a person who has lived all or almost all his life in the UK, has been educated here, speaks no language other than (British) English and has no familiarity with any other society or culture will start with much deeper roots in this country than someone who has moved here at a later age. It is hard to see how criminal offending and imprisonment could ordinarily, by themselves and unless associated with the breakdown of relationships, destroy the social and cultural integration of someone whose entire social identity has been formed in the UK.”
25. The Judge’s finding that the appellant’s single period of offending and imprisonment did not sever his previously very strong integration in the UK was wholly in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s approach suggested at CI (Nigeria) and was cogently reasoned.
26. The question of weight was one for the Judge. The fact that the appellant has been resident in the UK since he was a young child is unarguably a significant factor. The appellant has been wholly educated in the UK, has a relatively extensive employment history for a person of his age, and a wide circle of friends and family in the UK. These are all significant factors which support the Judge’s fully reasoned finding that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.
27. The submission advanced in the written grounds regarding the lack of the appellant’s contribution to society is, I find, misconceived. The test is one of social and cultural integration rather than that of public service. The respondent refers to no authority to support the position that the appellant is required to demonstrate elements of altruism and public service to demonstrate integration. Rightly in my view, this was not a matter pursued in oral submissions before me.
28. I note that the Judge referred to the employment letter at [26], however, he did not make an express findings in relation to this evidence and it does not form part of his reasoning on the issue of integration which concluded at [25]. It is further noted in the decision that the respondent did not raise any challenge to this letter in FtT proceedings, although she seeks to do so now in the written grounds.
29. I accept Mr Youssefian’s submissions that the Judge’s treatment of the issue of social and cultural integration is unimpeachable.
Ground 2
Very significant obstacles to integration
30. Ground 2 principally challenges the Judge’s finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Germany, although the written grounds also advance some submissions in respect of the findings on the very compelling circumstances test. I shall address these distinct issues in turn.
31. In Mr Simpson’s submission the Judge failed to provide adequate reasoning in respect of his finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration into Germany for the purposes of section 117C(4)(c) NIAA. In his submission, although he was not seeking to make a direct comparison with the circumstances of the appellant in Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537, the Judge had made a similar error to that made by the FtT in Ackom in failing to provide adequate reasoning on this matter.
32. The grounds assert that in reaching the finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration, the Judge had failed to consider that data entry work may be available to him in Germany and that the appellant could develop his language skills without economic hardship. Further, in finding that there was no evidence that the appellant remains familiar with German culture, the respondent asserts that the Judge failed to take into account the fact the appellant’s mother is German and asserts that the Judge failed to take into account that Germany is a western European country that is not dissimilar to the UK.
33. In fact, although the appellant was born in Germany, his estranged father is from Nigeria and his mother is from Russia. The decision records that his mother gave evidence in Russian at the FtT hearing. In the circumstances, it must be questioned how much, if any, German culture the appellant has been exposed to since arriving in the UK as a very young child. There is no indication from the evidence before the FtT that the appellant’s family continued the culture of Germany in any respect.
34. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds at [31], the Judge unarguably considered the relevance of assessing the country of return and recorded that Germany is a highly developed industrialised economy, not far from the UK and part of the European Union.
35. The Judge acknowledged the relevance of the Court of Appeal decision in Ackom but stated that the case does not provide a factual precedent. This is correct and has not been challenged by the respondent. In fact, the respondent’s written grounds make no reference to Ackom and the respondent has not raised a rationality challenge in respect of the Judge’s finding on this issue. My focus is therefore on whether the Judge provided adequate reasoning for the respondent to understand why he found the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration.
36. The Judge correctly focused on addressing the question of whether the obstacles he had identified would prevent or seriously inhibit the appellant’s integration in terms of understanding how life in German society is carried on, and his capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private life.
37. A significant part of the Judge’s reasoning was in respect of the appellant’s ability to learn German. The appellant left Germany aged two or three years of age. I pause to note that this is a point of distinction with the appellant in Ackom who had left Germany aged seven. Had the appellant left Germany at the older age of seven, he would have undoubtedly had more exposure to the German language than he has had, at an age when the brain is receptive to learning language, as well as a period of time in the German education system, albeit at a primary or pre-school level. The refusal decision states at [31] that “It is noted that you previously lived with your family during your formative years, and you would have been exposed to your inherited culture, lifestyle and traditions as German nationals”. The Judge found at [37] that there was very little evidential basis for the respondent’s claim that the appellant remains familiar with German culture and notes that he would have no family in Germany to help with integration.
38. Although expressly accepting the evidence that English is widely spoken in Germany, the Judge found that speaking German is an important component of building up a meaningful private life and that it would take the appellant “some significant time” to become reasonably fluent in the language.
39. The Judge found that it more than likely that the appellant would find it very difficult to find work in Germany for a significant period given his criminal record and the language barrier. He went on to reason that works remains a key issue to “meaningful integration”.
40. In respect of integration, the Judge stated that central to the test will be whether the appellant will be “enough of an insider”. Taking into account the appellant’s lack of familiarity with German culture and the language, his lack of support from friends and family in Germany, and the difficulties the appellant would face in securing employment, the Judge found that the appellant “will be very much an outsider for a very significant period “at [38].
41. I emphasise that there has been no rationality challenge in the grounds or in submissions before me challenging whether it was open to the Judge to reach this finding. The only issue is whether it is adequately reasoned. I find that the Judge provides clear and adequate reasoning on this issue whilst acknowledging relevant aspects of Ackom. In essence, the Judge found that in the absence of any family and friends in Germany, the centre of any potential integration would be the appellant’s work, from which, if he could secure work, he may, over time, develop a social circle. The difficulties the Judge identified in the appellant finding work due to the language barrier and in view of his criminal record, would thus directly impact on the appellant’s ability to become an insider and build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private life.
42. The respondent’s assertion that the length of the appellant's residence in the UK was a determinative factor in finding that there are very significant obstacles is not made out. Length of residence is referenced at [37] only as part of the factual matrix explaining why the appellant has had "no significant involvement with German society or culture since the age of 3". It explains the absence of cultural ties, but the Judge does not substitute this for a full analysis of the likely obstacles the appellant would face and why. The Judge’s reasoning was clearly expressed and rested upon a plurality of factors as identified above. The decision demonstrates that the Judge engages with the correct legal framework, and explains precisely why the obstacles were found to be very significant.
43. The assertion made in the grounds that the Judge failed to consider that data entry work may be available to the appellant, the appellant’s mother’s German nationality, and the similarity between German and British life, were not matters raised by the respondent at the FtT hearing, as is apparent from the refusal decision, the respondent’s review and the decision. The latter points in any event were addressed by the Judge. In relation to the potential for data entry work, I find in accordance with Lowe v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62 that this was not a matter the Judge was required to determine.
44. The respondent’s challenge to the Judge’s finding in relation to very significant obstacles is, I find, not made out. This being the case the remaining submissions made under ground 2 in relation to very compelling circumstances are academic. The Judge sustainably found that the appellant satisfied Exception 1 to deportation. As a ‘medium offender’ it was not necessary to additionally find that there were very compelling circumstances. The Judge proceeded to consider this issue as a ‘fallback finding’. The fact that he did so does not in anyway, I find, undermine the safety and validity of his findings in respect of Exception 1.
Very compelling circumstances
45. Although this issue is academic in view of my findings in respect of Exception 1, I find that the Judge also provided adequate reasoning in relation to the matter of very compelling circumstances.
46. In a detailed and balanced proportionality assessment, the Judge expressly noted the strength of the public interest in deportation at [42] to [44], rejecting a number of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. He addressed the submissions made in respect of the risk of reoffending and rehabilitation, acknowledging that these were matters which did not carry “great weight” in the balancing exercise. The weight to attach to the length of the appellant’s residence in the UK was a matter for the Judge. No rationality challenge has been raised in relation to this. The Judge considered the appellant’s residence in the UK since the age of three to be “very significant”. He considered this in accordance with relevant caselaw at [55] to [59], including Sanambar v SSHD [2021] 1 WLR 3847 at [49], and found that the appellant had a very powerful private life claim at [60] based on the length of his residence and extent of his integration in the UK. The Judge was entitled to attach the weight that he did to the appellant’s residence in the UK, and provided adequate reasoning for why he did so.
47. In accordance with established caselaw, the Judge conducted a full proportionality assessment clearly recording the weight he attached to matters weighing against the appellant and those in his favour. The Judge expressly refers to the need for an exceptional case or for a very strong claim in order to demonstrate very compelling circumstances at [64]. I am wholly satisfied that the Judge provided adequate reasoning for his conclusion that the appellant met the requirements for the very compelling circumstances test if it were not the case that he satisfied the requirements of Exception 1. The Judge conducted a multi-factorial and holistic proportionality assessment in line with that envisaged by Underhill LJ in Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626 at [62], and endorsed in Kapikanya. The submission in the grounds that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasoning for how the appellant met the threshold of very compelling circumstances is without substance.
48. The Judge’s Article 8 assessment was conducted within the correct legal framework, applying the correct legal principles. The Judge conducted a careful, balanced and fully reasoned analysis and there is no merit in the respondent’s assertion that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

49. It follows from what I have said that I am not satisfied that the grounds of appeal are made out in any respect. The decision of the FtT is not vitiated by any material error of law and must consequently stand.

Notice of Decision
The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands

S. Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 October 2026