Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001592
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04508/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

RE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms M Niami, Counsel instructed by Berkshire Law Chamber
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Moon and First-tier Tribunal Judge Queen (“the panel”) dated 10 December 2025.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan. He entered the United Kingdom on 18 August 2023 and claimed asylum the following day.
3. The appellant claims that he was employed as a journalist working for Mitra Television Network in Afghanistan from 9 July 2019 to 15 August 2021, which is the same day that the Taliban took control of Kabul. The appellant claims that he is at risk of serious harm from the Taliban because, during the course of his employment, he was involved in reporting on issues where views were expressed which were not aligned with the Taliban’s views and ideology. The appellant claims he was placed on a Taliban target list and that he feared for his life and went into hiding on 17 August 2021 before leaving Afghanistan on a date unknown and making his way to the United Kingdom. He states that he travelled through several countries including Iran, where he stayed for six months, Turkey, where he stayed for five months, and passed through Italy, Germany and France, where he stayed for two months. He then travelled via a small boat from France to the United Kingdom, arriving in the United Kingdom on 18 August 2023.
4. In a decision dated 1 November 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s account.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the panel on 1 December 2025. The appellant was not represented. He attended the hearing and gave evidence through a Pashto interpreter.
6. In a decision dated 10 December 2025, the panel dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The panel concluded the appellant was not a credible witness and that his account of working at Mitra Television News was not credible. They therefore rejected the appellant’s account to be at risk on that basis.
7. The panel concluded that there was no general risk to the appellant from the Taliban because there was nothing to indicate that individuals with the same characteristics as the appellant would be at risk of displacement or serious harm. The panel considered that the evidence relied on did not establish that there were very significant obstacles to reintegration in Afghanistan and that there were no other exceptional circumstances that would outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal relying on six grounds:
Ground 1: The panel failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation for not claiming asylum in other safe countries on his journey to the UK.
Ground 2: The panel failed to assess the appellant’s documentary evidence together with his oral evidence, witness evidence and country background evidence.
Ground 3: The panel failed to conduct a holistic assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
Ground 4: The panel failed to adequately address future risk.
Ground 5: The panel’s findings on humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3 followed on from credibility findings.
Ground 6: The panel failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation for failing to claim asylum, his explanations regarding employment documentation and the absence of corroborative evidence.
9. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission but it was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis considered that “there was arguable merit in the appellant’s assertion that the panel failed to give reasons for rejecting his explanation for not claiming asylum in other safe countries.” He considered that the other grounds lacked force, but granted permission on all grounds.
10. On 28 May 2026, the respondent filed a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 opposing the appellant’s appeal.
11. At the hearing I heard submissions from Ms Niama on behalf of the appellant and Mr Tufan on behalf of the respondent. I reserved my decision at the hearing, which I now give.
Discussion
12. In deciding whether the panel’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
13. In SM (section 8: judge’s process) Iran [2005] UKIAT 00116, the Upper Tribunal rejected the submission that the matters identified by section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 should always be treated as a the starting point in an assessment of credibility.
14. The Court of Appeal in JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878 confirmed that it is the duty of the judicial decision-maker in every instance to reach his own conclusion upon the credibility of the claimant. Section 8 was analysed at paragraph 21 of that decision, which states:
“Section 8 can thus be construed as not offending against any constitutional principles. It is no more than a reminder to fact-finding tribunals that conduct coming within the categories stated in section 8 shall be taken into account in assessing credibility. If there was a tendency of a Tribunal simply to ignore those matters when assessing credibility, they were in error: it is necessary to take account of them. However, at one end of the spectrum there may unusually be cases in which the conduct of the kind identified in section 8 is held to carry no weight at all in the overall assessment of credibility on the particular facts. I do not consider the section prevents that finding in an appropriate case. Subject to that, I respectfully agree with Baroness Scotland’s assessment when introducing the Bill of the effect of section 8: where section 8 matters are held to be entitled some weight, the weight to be given to them is entirely a matter for the fact-finder.”
15. In the decision the panel address section 8 prior to their discussion of the evidence. The panel consider the appellant's reason for not claiming asylum in Italy, Germany and France, which they record as being based “on several significant factors including a well-established Afghan community, familiarity with the English lifestyle and culture gained through British media, films, television, literature, and his professional experiences having been shaped by British journalistic values and practices.” The panel conclude that they do not consider this to be a reasonable explanation and therefore find the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in several safe countries affects his overall credibility.
16. For completeness, I cite the appellant’s explanation in its entirety as to why he did not claim asylum in the other safe countries. At paragraph 8 of his witness statement he stated that he respectfully did not agree with the Secretary of State’s assertion that his failure to claim asylum in other European countries undermined the credibility of his claim and states:
“My decision to seek asylum in the UK was based on several significant factors beyond my proficiency in English. The UK is home to a well-established Afghan community which offers cultural and emotional support that I would not have found elsewhere. My familiarity with the English lifestyle and culture gained through British media, films, television and literature made the UK a place where I felt I could best integrate and rebuild my life. Furthermore, as someone associated with media my professional experiences have been shaped by British journalistic values and practices, making the UK the most logical supportive environment for me to seek protection. These factors, combined with my ability to communicate effectively in English, gave me a sense of hope and security that I did not feel in other countries I passed through.”
17. The panel do not explain why they consider the appellant’s explanation is not reasonable. It is not clear whether they rejected or accepted the explanation and/or how it impacted on their assessment of whether the appellant was a credible witness.
18. The panel were obviously entitled to consider the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in the safe countries he travelled through on his journey to the UK, and the panel rightly noted that it was only one aspect of his credibility. However, I am persuaded that the panel approached the assessment of the appellant’s credibility through the prism of his failure to claim asylum in the safe countries.
19. I note that the panel did not refer to JT (Cameroon) or SM (section 8: judge’s process) Iran, nor did the panel direct themselves that even where section 8 applies, they were required to look at the evidence as a whole and decide which parts are more important and which less and that section 8 does not require the behaviour to which it applies to be treated as the starting-point of the assessment of credibility. I remind myself that the First-tier Tribunal can generally be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities, but I am satisfied that it is clear from the language of the decision that the panel erred in their approach to section 8.
20. I am satisfied that the panel’s approach to section 8 and treating it as their starting point infected their entire assessment of the appellant’s credibility and that therefore the entire decision needs to be set aside with no findings of fact preserved.
21. Accordingly, I am not required to address the other grounds put forward by the appellant.
Disposal
22. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) I have considered whether to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in Statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I am satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue and significant findings of fact will be re-made.
Notice of Decision
23. The decision of the panel contains a material error of law. Accordingly it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
24. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2026