Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001644
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67092/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NAIK KC

Between

MA
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sowerby, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal Judge Isaacs (the Judge) who dismissed his protection and human rights appeal following a remote hearing, in a decision promulgated on 1 February 2026, against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his international protection and human rights claims dated 11 June 2024.

Issues
2. The issues in this appeal are whether the Judge materially erred in law in reaching that decision and her rejection of the credibility of the appellant’s account by reference to her application of the principles in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC).

Factual and procedural summary
3. The appellant’s account was in essence that he had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his bisexuality on return to Pakistan.
4. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a national of Pakistan and his identity but rejected the credibility of his account that he is a bisexual man, nor that it was credible that his flatmate in the UK sent photographs of him to his family in Pakistan which resulted in threats to kill him by members of his family.

Grounds of appeal
5. The grounds of appeal submitted that the Judge had materially erred in law in relation to her findings in rejecting the credibility of the appellant’s account. It was asserted that the Judge failed to properly direct herself on the applicable legal framework, failed to engage with material evidence, reached findings founded on speculation and impermissible plausibility reasoning, and provided inadequate and/or incoherent reasons for central conclusions.
6. The grounds submitted in summary that the Judge erred in:
(i) failing to apply the correct standard of proof when assessing each stage of the appellant’s claim;
(ii) in failing to assess relevant evidence in the round when assessing credibility/failure to have regard to material evidence;
(iii) failure to properly apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010;
(iv) in placing too much weight on a lack of plausibility/inherent improbability;
(v) in engaging in speculation/making findings not based on evidence regarding technical matters;
(vi) in failing to give adequate reasons for rejecting the evidence of a witness; and
(vii) in failing to apply a structured approach to the assessment of article 8 of the ECHR.

Permission to Appeal
7. Permission to appeal was granted by Tribunal Judge Swaney on 7 April 2026 sitting in the First-tier Tribunal who stated that it was arguable that the judge fails to apply the approach set out in JCK v SSHD (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC), at paragraphs 12 and 13. In particular, the judge’s assessment at paragraphs 22 to 33 do not demonstrate the required structured approach, and it is arguable that she has rejected the appellant’s claim to be a bisexual man based on her finding that he is not credible, contrary to the warning given in paragraph 13 of JCK.
8. The grounds of appeal were not limited.
9. The respondent filed a rule 24 notice on 16 April 2026.

Legal Framework
10. The headnote in JCK states:
1. Sections 31-36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply in an appeal where the claim for international protection was made after 28 June 2022.
2.       In an appeal to which s32 NABA 2022 applies, the proper approach is to address each of the questions posed by the section expressly and sequentially.
3.       Question 1 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. In simple terms: is there a Convention reason?
4.       Question 2 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant "does in fact fear" such persecution.   This is the 'subjective fear' test.
5.       Questions 3-5 are matters of objective evaluation and must each be determined on the lower standard of proof: 'a reasonable degree of likelihood'. Is it reasonably likely that there is:
-           a risk of harm
-           an absence of state protection, and
- no reasonable internal flight alternative
11. The Tribunal there at paragraph 13 stated:
“The decision-maker is not required here to consider whether the characteristic, or imputed characteristic, has in fact attracted persecution, or whether it will do so in the future. The simple question is whether the claimant has a protected characteristic which could cause them to fear. In many cases this will be straightforward. Applicants fearing persecution because they have an outwardly obvious characteristic such as their gender or race will have little difficulty in discharging the burden of proving this matter on a balance of probabilities. Other, more opaque, characteristics could be more challenging to discern. Whether someone is gay, or holds a particular religious or political belief is not something that can be seen with the naked eye, or by making windows into souls.   It is something that must be evaluated on the evidence in the round, but care should be taken not to automatically reject, at this first stage, a claimed characteristic by reference to the overall credibility of the claim. The focus must be on the characteristics.   Thus in this case, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant is a Christian, and a member of the Herero tribe, even though he rejected the claim that he had suffered harm as a result. Put simply the question raised by s32(2)(a) is whether, taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason”.

Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
12. The appellant addressed his well-structured grounds of appeal which were set out in detail in writing. Mr Sowerby submitted that the determination is vitiated by material errors of law. The errors identified were discrete grounds and each ground identified the relevant point of law; isolated the essential legal or factual misdirection; and then explains why the error is material to the outcome.
13. As to Ground 1, he submitted that the Judge had erred in her approach in inadequately applying s.32 NABA 2022 (the split standard of proof) and had failed to demonstrate a structured sequential approach. Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 requires a structured, sequential split-standard approach. The Upper Tribunal in JCK confirms that Questions 1–2 (Convention characteristic and subjective fear) are determined on the balance of probabilities, whereas Questions 3–5 (objective risk, sufficiency of protection, and internal relocation) are determined on the lower standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Hence here whilst the Judge correctly directed herself at [12–13] as to the split-standard framework, the determination thereafter does not clearly demonstrate the structured sequential application of that framework. In particular, at [33] the Judge concluded that the Appellant has not established the “core of his claim on the balance of probabilities” and then proceeded directly to the determinative conclusions that he “does not…have a well-founded fear of persecution” and that “there is no risk to him should he return”. Those ultimate conclusions include an objective risk conclusion (“no risk on return”), yet the reasoning does not identify whether the Judge is stopping at stage 1 (Convention characteristic/subjective fear), or also determining stage 2 matters, and if so, on which standard. This is material because: the Judge’s operative conclusion includes an objective risk finding (“no risk on return” [33]) without a clear, structured application of the split-standard approach which the Judge self-directed at [12–13]. Further the lack of clarity as to how the split-standard framework was applied compounds the unfairness and unsafety of the outcome where the credibility reasoning is itself arguably infected by legal errors.
14. As to ground 2: he submitted that the Judge committed a Mibanga error in failing to consider material corroborative medical evidence in the round and failing to engage with key evidence. He submitted that credibility must be assessed holistically, weighing all evidence together. It is an error to reach adverse credibility findings and then treat corroborative/medical evidence as incapable of affecting that conclusion per Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367. Hence at [32] after she has already made adverse credibility findings at [24–31], the Judge dismisses the medical and other corroborative material in a brief, conclusory manner (UTI/HIV testing; photographs; attendance at gay clubs), in substance saying those materials do not address the credibility concerns already found. However, the Judge failed to engage with plainly material evidence in the Supplementary Bundle, including:
(i) NHS Talking Therapies letter (23 January 2026): records depression/anxiety treatment and contains a clinical risk formulation including: “Loss: family has rejected patient due to sexual orientation”.
(ii) GP record (21 November 2024): records sexual activity (“sexually active – UPSI…casual partner…no condom use”) and advice to book with a local sexual health clinic for full screening.
(iii) GP record (14 February 2025): “Started after intercourse”, with further sexual-health related testing/advice.
(iv) Barts Health GUM clinic results (29 April 2025): objective evidence of sexual health screening.
(v) Hotel booking (London Stratford, double room, May 2025). 6. Photographs depicting intimacy.
15. The Judge’s approach at [32–33] reflects a prohibited sequencing: adverse credibility first, followed by a short dismissal of corroboration, without demonstrating that the totality of corroborative evidence was weighed in reaching the credibility conclusion. This is material because the omitted/unanalysed evidence was capable of supporting the claimed LGBTQ social relationship narrative; and/or supporting the appellant’s account of family rejection (a core plank of his claim); and/or explaining aspects of presentation (late evidence/vagueness) through contemporaneous mental-health evidence (which intersected with ground 3). Clearly a lawful holistic assessment could rationally have produced a different credibility outcome.
16. In respect of Ground 3, Mr Sowerby submitted that the Judge had inadequately applied the Vulnerable Witness Guidance and failure to factor the appellant’s vulnerability into her credibility findings. The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 requires the Tribunal to identify vulnerability, consider how it affects the giving of evidence, and reflect this in the assessment of credibility. The Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 emphasised the need for proper engagement with vulnerability to ensure a fair assessment. Here at para 8, the Judge accepts that the appellant is a vulnerable witness and stated that she treated him as such. However the determination does not identify the nature of the vulnerability (beyond a general statement). Further it does not explain how vulnerability affected her evaluation of inconsistencies/vagueness relied upon heavily at [23–31]. The Judge’s observation that the appellant did not appear distressed during oral evidence was no substitute for a Guidance-compliant analysis, particularly where the Supplementary Bundle (as noted above) contained an NHS treatment summary recording pre-treatment PHQ-9: 18 and GAD-7: 14 and therapy ending one week before the hearing. The credibility findings relied on the appellant being vague, changing detail, and failing to provide evidence promptly. Those are precisely the kinds of matters requiring a Guidance-compliant analysis where there is contemporaneous mental-health evidence. Hence he submitted that the failure to undertake that analysis was capable of rendering the credibility findings unsafe and procedurally unfair.
17. In respect of ground 4, it was submitted that the Judge had adopted a legally flawed approach by her use of “plausibility”/inherent probability reasoning in assessing her evaluation of the appellant’s behaviour, including as to delay in claiming asylum, and with reference to his cultural context, contrary to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. There the Court of Appeal cautioned that reliance on “inherent probability” can be a dangerous factor in asylum cases, particularly where the fact-finder evaluates behaviour in an unfamiliar cultural context. Findings must be based on evidence and objective material, not assumptions about what is “likely” or how a person “would” behave. Here the Judge made multiple central findings driven by what the Judge considers a rational person would have done. At [24], where the Judge reasons that if the appellant knew bisexuality would be problematic (including by reference to not claiming asylum in Saudi Arabia), that it was not credible that he intended to return to Pakistan and “continue to live his life there” as a bisexual man. At [25–26], the Judge reasons that it is not credible the appellant would share his passcode with flatmates linked to his family, including the narrow observation that “it is not necessary to have a passcode to answer” a call. At [30], the Judge reasons it is not credible the appellant could not retrieve email evidence because password recovery is “normally possible”. These are plausibility-based adverse findings which depend substantially on the Judge’s assumptions about how a person in the appellant’s position should have acted. These plausibility findings are central to the rejection of the “outing” narrative and the claimed risk. They materially infected the credibility assessment and are arguably inconsistent with the caution against substituting inherent-probability reasoning for evidence-based fact-finding in asylum cases.
18. Mr Sowerby further addressed this under ground 5 as to the Judge’s speculation or unsupported technical assumptions about the appellant’s broken phone, data Loss, and IT Competence. He submitted that where a finding depends on specialised or technical matters, the Tribunal must not substitute speculation for evidence and must give rational reasons grounded in the evidence. The same caution in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 applies to assumption-driven reasoning in asylum fact-finding. Here at [28–30] the Judge made a sequence of adverse findings on the basis that: a phone dropped from a hand would not wipe all data; because the appellant was studying Computer Science, he should have been able to recover the data; and it was not credible that he could not access an old email account due to forgotten password and/or inability to reset it. None of these propositions was supported by technical evidence before the Tribunal. The reasoning also extends to speculation about what solicitors would have done without evidential foundation. These findings are treated as going to “the core” of the claim and were relied on to reject the appellant’s account of being outed and threatened. His submission was that if those findings were regarded as speculative or unsupported, then they are material to the Judge’s adverse credibility conclusion which is unsafe.
19. Mr Soweby further submitted under ground 6 that the Judge’s conclusion in rejecting as to the witness Ali Afzal’s evidence were irrational and/or inadequately reasoned. Judges must give adequate, rational reasons for rejecting witness evidence. Adverse credibility findings cannot rest on speculation about collusion or on stereotyped assumptions as to how a witness “should” have behaved (per HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 supra cautions against adjudication by inherent probability). At [31], the Judge rejects Ali Afzal’s evidence largely because his witness statement did not mention sexual intercourse but he only raised it in oral evidence, and because (as “a Pakistani man who has secured refugee status because of his homosexuality”) he “should have realised” the importance of including it. The Judge further reasons that while there was no opportunity for collusion after the appellant had given his evidence, collusion was “perfectly possible” before the appellant gave evidence. This reasoning is flawed because it rests on a stereotyped assumption about what this witness would necessarily appreciate and disclose in a formal statement; second it speculates about collusion without evidential basis; and third it does not properly engage with the context recorded by the Judge herself: the witness statement was prepared only two days before the hearing. The witness’s evidence was potentially corroborative of sexuality/relationship. The Judge’s approach to rejecting it is capable of being a material error because it directly supports the overall adverse credibility conclusion at [33].
20. As to Article 8 ECHR addressed under Ground 7, the appellant submitted that the Judge failed to apply the structured approach set out in R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27 when determining whether removal breaches Article 8. The staged questions must be addressed in sequence. Razgar recognises that Article 8 may be engaged by the foreseeable consequences of removal, including in appropriate cases consequences for mental health. Here at [34], the Judge stated: “I do not find that he enjoys any private life which engages ECHR Article 8(1)” principally on the basis that attendance at LGBT clubs was found to be a “construction” to bolster the asylum claim. That reasoning is arguably unlawful and/or irrational because first engagement under Article 8(1) is a low-threshold question. Second a person may have private life through residence, education, social ties and medical treatment even if the protection claim fails. The reasoning is circular: rejection of the asylum narrative is used to conclude there is no private life at all. Third, the determination does not demonstrate a structured Razgar analysis before concluding that Article 8(1) is not engaged. Further, the alternative proportionality reasoning at [35] (“pick up his life where he left off”) is inadequately reasoned in light of the evidence of NHS mental-health treatment and the accepted background that he has been in the United Kingdom since 2022. The Article 8 analysis is material because the Judge’s “no engagement” conclusion at [34] is itself arguably a legal misdirection. Further although the Judge conducted an alternative assessment at 35, that assessment is expressed at a high level of generality and does not demonstrate a properly reasoned proportionality evaluation against the evidence relied upon (including the mental-health evidence). Accordingly, the Article 8 conclusion is unsafe.
21. On that basis, the determination cannot safely stand the deficiencies are not peripheral, they go to the core credibility findings, the assessment of risk on return, and the Article 8 analysis. Individually and cumulatively, they render the decision unsafe and it should be set aside and remade.
Respondent’s submissions
22. The SSHD opposed the appellant’s appeal and relied on the rule 24 notice. The respondent submit that the Judge had directed herself appropriately. There are seven grounds of appeal. Judge J K Swaney has only engaged with ground 1, at [3] of the decision, and simply on that basis at [4] has concluded that the grounds of appeal disclose an arguable error of law.
23. Ground 1 complains that there is “Misdirection / Inadequate Application od s. 32 NABA 2022 (Split Standard of Proof) and failure to Demonstrate a Structured Sequential Approach.” Judge Swaney summarises this ground as: “failing to apply the correct standard of proof when assessing each stage of the appellant’s claim.” However the SSHD submitted that irrespective of how JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) [2024] UKUT 00100 may be understood, the terms of s.31-36 of Nationality and Borders Act 2022 are clear. Section 32 Article 1(A)(2): well founded fear, as is replicated at [7] of JCK is in thus terms:
32 Article 1(A)(2): well-founded fear
(1) In deciding for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention whether an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution is well-founded, the following approach is to be taken.
(2) The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities—
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958, Ravichandran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] Imm AR 97, 3 or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
(See also section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (asylum claims etc: behaviour damaging to claimant’s credibility).)
(3) Subsection (4) applies if the decision-maker finds that—
(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (or has such a characteristic attributed to them), and
(b) the asylum seeker fears persecution as mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) The decision-maker must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a), and
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation)
24. The SSHD submitted that the headnote JCK was applying the above primary legislation.
25. Ms Everett submitted that it was clear from a fair perusal of the determination that the Judge considered all available evidence in some detail and has given valid reasons for concluding at [33] that the appellant has not established the core of his claim on balance of probabilities and that on balance of probabilities he does not find the appellant to be a bisexual.
26. The Judge evidently considered Section 32, article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention and head note (3) of JCK and arrived at the conclusion she did on the correct standard of proof constituted by primary legislation.
27. Judge Swaney in granting permission to appeal states at [3] of her decision that the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim to be a bisexual man on the basis of her findings that he is not credible and that this is contrary to the warning given at [13] of JCK. However this paragraph on a closer look refers in part to facts specific to that case where the respondent had accepted pertinent characteristics of the appellant such as his religion and membership of his claimed tribe. Para [13] also states that “([t]he simple question is whether the claimant has a protected characteristic which could cause them to fear.” With all due respect albeit there is some tension in that paragraph it also states that whether someone (as an example) is “gay or holds a religious belief” must be something that must be evaluated in the round. This is what the Judge has done in coming to her conclusion and it follows therefore that there is no error in in ground 1.
28. Ms Everett submitted that grounds 2 - 6 do not have any merit and are merely disagreements with the Judge’s detailed findings made on balance of probabilities in establishing the appellant’s claimed sexuality.
29. Finally in relation to ground 7 in relation to Article 8 does not have any merit either. Having found that the appellant is not bisexual and hence will not be at risk on return to Pakistan the Judge concluded that there would not be unjustifiably harsh consequences on the appellant. As to the appellant’s mental health evidence his condition is clearly not at a level to reach the Article 3 threshold, relying on the presidential panel in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka 2022] UKUT 111:
182. So far as concerns Article 8, the Court of Appeal has recently reiterated that Article 8 is not in this contest to be regarded merely as Article 3 with a lower threshold: SL (St Lucia) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1894. An appellant cannot succeed under Article 8 simply because of their mental ill-health and suicide risk, if those are insufficient and meet the high Article 3 test set by Paposhvili and (now) explained by Savran.
30. Hence she submitted that there are no material errors of law in the determination.

Analysis
31. In my judgment the Judge did not materially err in law such that her findings as to the conclusions she reached on the appellant’s credibility can be said to be not properly reasoned such that they cannot be relied on.
32. In respect of ground one in my judgment the Judge did not err in her application of the split-standard of proof framework that was brought in under s.32 NABA 2022. The Judge correctly directed herself at [12–13] as to the framework, thereafter in my judgment, it is clear that the Judge did in fact adopt that approach correctly to her findings of fact.
33. At [33] the Judge concluded that the Appellant has not established the core of his claim on the balance of probabilities and found that therefore then proceeded to determine that on account of that therefore the appellant is not bisexual or that he has threats from anybody in Pakistan and therefore “does not…have a well-founded fear of persecution” and that “there is no risk to him should he return”. Whilst the Judge does not state that taking his account at its highest it could establish a convention reason, it is clear that had she found his account to be credible on balance of probabilities that she would have concluded that his account of a claim to being sexually attracted to men could have done so, i.e. taking his account at its highest. Whilst her ultimate conclusions do include an objective risk conclusion that there was no risk on return to the appellant, her reasoning is clear - this was on account of the fact that she had rejected on balance of probabilities his account of bisexuality and past threats. He does not have a subjective fear as his past account was not credible on her findings and therefore there is no real risk of harm to him, should he be returned to Pakistan, on the lower standard. Hence there was no material error of approach per paragraph 13 of JCK.
34. As to ground two in my judgment whilst the Judge only briefly addressed the material corroborative and medical evidence in the supplementary bundle at [32] in reaching her adverse credibility findings, she was entitled to find that evidence did not directly go to the issue of establishing bisexuality as opposed to sexual activity on balance pf probabilities. That is save for the NHS Talking Therapies letter of 23 January 2026 (which was dated 7 days before the hearing). The referral for depression had been made on 20 May 2025 and the assessment 02 June 2025 and with sessions from 30 October 2025 wherein it records that the appellant had reported his one cause for his risk factors being “Loss: family has rejected patient due to sexual orientation”. The omission in the assessment at [32] to directly refer to that letter which is a report from the appellant, rather than a diagnosis or medical assessment, is not sufficient to make good a structural Mibanga error in relation to the assessment of medical evidence of the nature and degree to which Wilson LJ (as he then was) refers there.
35. As to ground three and the vulnerable witness guidance, Judge having identified at paragraph [8] that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, (for reasons which are not recorded but was made with reference to the medical evidence contained in the supplementary bundle and the very recent NHS letter of 23 January 2026 that he was suffering from depression and was receiving Cognitive Behavioural Therapy) did not on its face require her to explain further how that affected her evaluation of his evidence and the inconsistencies relied upon by her in her determination at [23–31]. The Judge’s observation at [8] that the appellant did not appear distressed during his oral evidence is not inconsistent with that contemporaneous mental-health evidence of depression, nor did any failure to undertake any further analysis as to its impact render her credibility findings unsafe or procedurally unfair.
36. Grounds 4, and 5 relate to the approach of the Judge as to her use of “plausibility” or inherent probability reasoning in assessing her evaluation of the appellant’s behaviour, including as to delay in claiming asylum, and with reference to his cultural context, contrary to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. In my judgment the challenges to the Judge’s reasoning were not made out with reference to the following:
(i) [24], that if the appellant knew bisexuality would be problematic (including by reference to not claiming asylum in Saudi Arabia), that it was not credible that he intended to return to Pakistan and “continue to live his life there” as a bisexual man.
(ii) [25–26] it is not credible the appellant would share his passcode with flatmates linked to his family, including that “it is not necessary to have a passcode to answer” a call.
(iii) [30] it is not credible the appellant could not retrieve email evidence because password recovery is “normally possible”.
(iv) [28–30] a phone dropped from a hand would not wipe all data; because the appellant was studying Computer Science, he should have been able to recover the data; and it was not credible that he could not access an old email account due to forgotten password and/or inability to reset it.
When properly considered in context they were all findings that were open to the Judge to reach on the balance of probabilities evaluating the appellant’s evidence and she gave detailed reasons for doing so.
37. As to ground 6 in my judgment the Judge’s conclusion in rejecting as to the appellant’s witness Ali Afzal’s evidence were ones that she was entitled to give and were not inadequately reasoned. At [31], the Judge in rejecting his evidence noted that very recent witness statement did not mention that he and the appellant had had sexual intercourse and that he only raised this in oral evidence. She was entitled to reject his account on balance of probabilities for the reasons she gave, and including as she stated that as “a Pakistani man who has secured refugee status because of his homosexuality” he “should have realised” the importance of including it. Moreover I note that the statement was expressed and limited to the following terms: that he was a “close friend” of the appellant and that “I also confirm that I am aware and have witnessed the appellant having keen interest as per his claimed sexuality. We do regularly socialise together and with common circle of friends and mates, having specific sexuality” [sic]. This only goes to further demonstrate the critical lack of detail in the statement and the omission of any reference to their sexual history was a matter on which the Judge was entitled to find central to her rejection of that aspect of his account and of his evidence as a whole.
38. Finally as to Article 8 ECHR in light of the Judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility, there was no material error of law in her determination that there was no engagement with Article 8, nor any material defect in her reasoning on proportionality in [34] and [35] contrary to the Razgar approach.
39. Hence in conclusion there were no material errors of law by the Judge in her determination. She gave detailed reasons for her conclusions for rejecting on balance of probabilities the credibility of the appellant’s claimed bisexuality and his past account of threats from his family members arising for that reason, leading to her conclusion therefore that there was no real risk of serious harm to him in the future on return to Pakistan, nor any breach of Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge did not involve the making of an error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed

S Naik KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 August 2026