Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001646
UI-2026-001648
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65102/2024
PA/65106/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of September 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

MS
HH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Fazli of Counsel, instructed by Solicitors’ Inn Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The appellants appeal, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Coll (“the judge”), promulgated on 20 January 2026, dismissing their appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 9 May 2024 refusing their claims for asylum and humanitarian protection.
(2) Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellants. There has been no application to set aside that order. While we recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case we are satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order, given that the appellants seek international protection.
(3) Background
3. The appellants are nationals of Pakistan.
4. The second appellant (“HH”) entered the United Kingdom on 27 October 2021 with leave to enter as a student. On 14 July 2022 he was granted leave to remain as a skilled worker.
5. The first appellant (“MS”) entered the United Kingdom on 13 February 2022 with leave to enter as a student, accompanied by her then husband as her dependant. The marriage subsequently broke down and the parties divorced in September 2022. On 18 October 2022 MS notified the Home Office that the relationship was no longer subsisting.
6. On 9 October 2023 MS claimed asylum, with HH recorded as her dependant. The appellants’ case was that MS’s marriage had ended after her husband discovered that she had been communicating secretly with HH, whom she had met in the United Kingdom. According to the appellants, MS’s husband informed her family of the relationship with HH, leading her father to believe that she had brought shame upon the family. They claimed that, as a consequence, they would face a real risk of serious harm from him if returned to Pakistan.
7. As we have said, in a decision dated 9 May 2024, the respondent refused the appellants’ protection claims.
8. The appellants exercised their rights of appeal against that decision.
(4) The Appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
9. In a decision promulgated on 20 January 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellants’ appeals. The judge rejected the core factual basis of MS’s claim, finding that her account lacked credibility and that she had failed to establish that her father was a member of, or held any influential position within, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (“TLP”), that he had threatened her as alleged or that he had threatened or assaulted HH’s father. The judge further rejected the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellants, including alleged threatening communications, finding that those documents were not reliable. The judge therefore concluded that MS did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan arising from her relationship with HH, her divorce or her alleged pregnancy outside marriage. In the alternative, the judge found that, even if the claimed risk had been established, there would be a sufficiency of protection from the Pakistani authorities and that internal relocation to another part of Pakistan would not be unduly harsh.
(5) The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. On 7 April 2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge CJ Williams granted the appellants permission to appeal on three grounds (although it was observed that the final ground appeared to carry less force than the others), by which the appellants alleged that:
(1) The judge took a disproportionate and/or unfair approach to the appellants’ credibility.
(2) The judge erred by requiring the appellants to provide corroborative evidence and she also made inadequate and unreasonable findings when assessing the documentary evidence which had been relied upon.
(3) The judge failed to make adequate and sufficient findings in relation to the risk posed to the appellants from the Pakistani authorities and extremists.
(6) The Hearing
11. We had before us the consolidated hearing bundle, the skeleton arguments filed by each party and the respondent’s Rule 24 response.
(6)(a) The Late Service of the Hearing Bundle
12. As a preliminary issue, we granted the appellants’ unopposed application for an extension of time to file the consolidated bundle. It had been filed one day late, which in our judgment was not a serious or significant delay, and, moreover, there was a good explanation for the delay, it being the result of a technical issue with CE-File.
(6)(b) The Parties’ Submissions
13. For the appellants, Mr Fazli submitted that the judge had adopted an unfair and disproportionate approach to the issue of credibility. He argued that the judge wrongly attached significance to: the description of the appellants in their skeleton argument as “unmarried partners”; the timing of their marriage; and the omission of certain matters from the screening interview, including the termination of MS’s pregnancy and her father’s alleged involvement with TLP. He further submitted that the judge had erred by effectively requiring corroboration of the first appellant’s account, particularly in relation to the video evidence, certain WhatsApp voice messages, a letter said to be from MS’s father and the first instance report (“FIR”) allegedly made by HH’s father to the police, and by wrongly rejecting the statement of HH’s father as “self-serving”. Finally, he argued that the judge had failed properly to consider the risk arising from allegations of Zina (extramarital sex) and the risk from extremists and the authorities, as distinct from the risk from MS’s father.
14. For the respondent, Mr Simpson relied upon the respondent’s Rule 24 response and skeleton argument. He submitted that the judge was entitled to take account of omissions from the screening interview and to assess the inconsistencies identified in the appellants’ evidence. He argued that the judge had not imposed any impermissible requirement for corroboration, but had simply subjected the documentary and witness evidence to appropriate scrutiny before concluding that it was unreliable. He further submitted that the judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation had been reached on an alternative basis, taking the appellants’ case at its highest, and had not been the subject of any substantial challenge. Accordingly, any error in the judge’s credibility assessment would not be material to the outcome of the appeal.
15. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.
(7) Discussion
(7)(a) Grounds 1 and 2
16. We consider the first two grounds together because both complain about the judge’s approach to the appellants’ evidence.
17. We are satisfied that there are several findings made by the judge which were not reasonably open to her.
18. First, at [34], the judge found that it was “surprising” that MS would have delayed marrying HH after her divorce, on the basis that this would have “safeguarded her position from any criticism in Pakistan which might have been forthcoming” because her first pregnancy would have occurred whilst married. However, as Mr Fazli contended, the appellants’ case was multifaceted. They did not claim that the sole reason they were at risk was because MS had become pregnant out of wedlock. They also claimed that MS’s father believed she had dishonoured the family by having an affair with HH and divorcing her husband. We are therefore satisfied that it was irrational for the judge to find that an earlier marriage to HH would have safeguarded MS from any criticism in Pakistan.
19. Secondly, we accept Mr Fazli’s submission that, by suggesting, at [54], that the appellants could have obtained an expert report from a voice analyst to verify that the threatening WhatsApp voice messages purportedly sent to MS were in fact sent by her father, the judge imposed an unrealistic evidential burden upon them. That is particularly so when it is unclear how any such expert could have obtained a reliable sample of the father’s voice for comparison purposes. In those circumstances, the criticism made by the judge was not one which was reasonably open to her.
20. Thirdly, at [70], the judge attached no weight to a witness statement provided by HH’s father on the basis that he “can be assumed to wish for the 1st Appellant’s claim to succeed; it is a self-serving document” and that his “evidence has not been tested in cross-examination”. While we bear in mind that the weight to be attached to evidence is generally a matter for the judge, we are satisfied that her approach in this respect was flawed. It may well be true that HH’s father wished the appellants’ appeal to succeed. However, that would be equally, if not more, likely to be the case if he genuinely believed that they faced a risk of harm in Pakistan. The judge’s reasoning appears to imply that witness evidence cannot be accepted unless the witness is available for cross-examination. That cannot be correct. In the present case, there was no realistic opportunity for HH’s father’s evidence to be tested in that way because he resides in Pakistan. As Mr Fazli submitted, the inability to cross-examine a witness may be a factor reducing the weight to be attached to their evidence, but it does not follow that the evidence should be accorded no weight whatsoever. The proper course was to assess the witness statement in the context of the evidence as a whole. There is no indication that the judge undertook that exercise.
21. We do not, however, accept that the appellants have established the remainder of the challenges advanced in the grounds.
22. We begin with the appellants’ contention that the judge adopted a flawed approach to two matters which MS did not mention during her asylum screening interview. At [35]-[37], the judge noted that MS had not disclosed during her screening interview her claim that her father had pressured her to undergo an abortion, despite later raising that matter in her witness statement. Similarly, at [38]-[41], the judge found it damaging to her credibility that she did not assert until her substantive asylum interview that her father was a senior and influential member of the extremist TLP group in Pakistan. Mr Fazli submitted that there was no inconsistency in the evidence and that the appellant had merely omitted those matters from her screening interview.
23. MS’s response to question 4.1 of the screening interview was as follows:
“Please BRIEFLY explain ALL of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country?
I cannot go back to Pakistan because my dad is threatening to kill me because I divorced my ex-husband.
Who do you fear? My dad.
Why do you fear him? He is threatening to kill me.
When did this happen? 2 months ago.
What do you fear will happen to you if you go back to Pakistan? I will get killed.”
24. Although question 4.1 directs applicants to keep their answers brief, it nevertheless asks them to explain “all” of the reasons why they could not return to their country of origin. On balance, we are satisfied that the judge was reasonably entitled to conclude that the alleged pressure to undergo an abortion and, perhaps more significantly, the claim that MS’s father was a member of a banned extremist Islamist organisation were matters of sufficient importance that they could reasonably have been expected to be mentioned during the screening interview.
25. At [26], the judge discussed the fact that the appellants’ skeleton argument described the couple as “unmarried”, notwithstanding that they had undergone an Islamic marriage ceremony, while at the same time treating MS as having been married to her first husband, despite that marriage also having been conducted according to Islamic rites. As Mr Fazli submitted, that finding was factually inaccurate. There was evidence before the First-tier Tribunal that MS’s marriage to her first husband had been formally registered with the Pakistani authorities (see page 195 of the consolidated bundle). Moreover, the skeleton argument was not evidence. In our judgment, the distinction between a purely religious marriage and a marriage recognised in law (at least in the United Kingdom) was of little relevance in this context and the description of the appellants in their skeleton argument as “unmarried” was not a matter capable of undermining the appellants’ credibility. However, the judge did not say that she treated it as a matter undermining the appellants’ credibility. Rather, her conclusion at the end of [26] merely concerned their status:
“For the purposes of my analysis, the Appellants were married from 18th of April 2023 in such a way as to count as marriage in her father’s eyes.”
26. The appellants further contend that the judge erred at [43]-[44] in her treatment of the evidence regarding the existence of photographs of MS’s father. This issue arose in the context of MS’s reliance on a video recording of a TLP gathering in which she claimed that her father appeared. The presenting officer questioned the absence of photographic evidence establishing that the individual depicted in the video was in fact MS’s father. In response, MS gave a number of explanations for her inability to produce such evidence. First, she said that she had forgotten to provide it and had not appreciated that it was required. Secondly, she stated that she possessed no photographs of her father because he regarded photography as sinful. Thirdly, she suggested that she could check her phone for photographs of him. Finally, she maintained that her father did not permit photographs to be taken and denied having said that any photographs of him existed or that she might possess such photographs.
27. Whilst the grounds submit that the judge ought to have recognised that a person may regard photography as sinful yet nevertheless permit or participate in family photographs, that submission amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s assessment of the evidence and fails to engage with the judge’s actual reasoning. The judge’s finding at [46] was not that the appellant’s explanation was inherently implausible, but rather that the various and inconsistent explanations advanced by MS for her failure to produce a photograph of her father undermined the reliability of her claim that he was the individual depicted in the TLP video. That finding was reasonably open to the judge on the evidence before her. Whilst we have accepted that the criticism at [54] effectively imposed an unrealistic evidential burden in relation to the identification of MS’s father’s voice, we do not accept that the judge's treatment of the photographic evidence involved any requirement for corroboration.
28. The appellants also argue that the judge erred at [78] by requiring corroborative evidence in relation to the FIR recounting a purported attack on HH’s father. We do not accept that submission. The weight to be attached to that document was a matter for the judge. Whilst not every judge would necessarily have attached no weight to the FIR, the judge gave adequate reasons for doing so, namely that there was no evidence as to how the document had come into the appellants’ possession and no evidence as to what, if anything, occurred following its filing with the police. In those circumstances, the judge’s assessment of the weight to be attached to the document was one which was reasonably open to her. In any event, we do not consider that the decision to attach no weight, rather than limited weight, to the FIR made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
29. Whilst we are satisfied that the judge made a number of errors, the question remains whether those errors were material to the outcome of the appeal. In our judgment, they were not. Even if the judge had accepted the appellants’ claim to fear MS’s father, she made clear alternative findings that there was both a sufficiency of protection and a viable internal relocation alternative: see [80]-[97]. As we explain below in relation to Ground 3, the judge was reasonably entitled to conclude that the appellants could avail themselves of state protection. Moreover, the appellants have not advanced any distinct challenge to the judge's findings on internal relocation. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the errors identified in Grounds 1 and 2 were material to the outcome of the appeal and we therefore find that those grounds are not made out.
(7)(b) Ground 3
30. We can deal with this ground briefly.
31. We reject the appellants’ contention that the judge failed properly to consider the risk posed to them by the Pakistani authorities or by Islamist extremists arising from the nature of their relationship. Nor do we accept the appellants’ submission, advanced by reference to HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596, that they would be compelled to conceal their relationship in order to avoid persecution. The judge did not find that the appellants would be required to modify or suppress any protected characteristic. Rather, her findings were directed to the likelihood of the appellants coming to the adverse attention of either the authorities or non-state actors. In those circumstances, HJ (Iran) has no application.
32. At [83]-[86], the judge expressly considered whether the appellants faced a more generalised risk and concluded that, apart from their respective families, no one in Pakistan was likely to be aware of the circumstances of their relationship unless the appellants themselves disclosed that information. The judge further found that, even in the unlikely event that the police became aware of their extramarital relationship, the appellants had not established a real risk of persecution. In reaching that conclusion, she had regard to the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006 and the country guidance decision in KA and Others (Domestic Violence – Risk on Return) Pakistan CG [2010] UKUT 216 (IAC). In addition, at [87], the judge found, by reference to the Country Policy and Information Note, Pakistan: Women Fearing Gender-Based Violence, that where a risk arose from non-state actors, the Pakistani state was, in general, both willing and able to provide effective protection. Those findings were adequately reasoned and were plainly open to the judge on the evidence.
33. Finally, the appellants contend that the judge erred by failing to take account of MS’s suicide attempt in 2024 when assessing her Article 8 claim. We do not accept that submission. The issue was not expressly raised in the appellants’ skeleton argument for the First-tier Tribunal hearing, nor was it suggested before us that it had been advanced before the judge in oral submissions. It is well established that a judge is not required to trawl through the evidence in search of points which might assist an appellant, but which have not been identified as part of the case being advanced. As the Upper Tribunal observed in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), a judge is required to determine the principal controversial issues raised by the parties, not to identify and address every potentially relevant matter that might emerge from the evidence.
34. Accordingly, this ground is also not made out.
(8) Notice of Decision
35. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law. The decision shall stand.
36. The appeals are dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th August 2026