Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001716
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55383/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

HANAA DERBAS
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Lemer (Counsel), Spector Constant and Williams
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 18 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. Although the appeal was brought by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) hereinafter, for clarity, the parties are described as they were before the First-tier Tribunal, that is Hanaa Derbas as the Appellant and SSHD as the Respondent.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Syria who applied for entry clearance to join her son, a recognised refugee in the United Kingdom. The Respondent refused that application on 24 April 2024. The appeal came before First‑tier Tribunal Judge Degirmenci (‘the Judge’). The Judge reserved her decision and promulgated her decision on 4 January 2026, allowing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
3. The Judge found at §32 that the Appellant was financially supported by the sponsor and was dependent on that support for essential living needs. She further found at §33 that there was emotional dependence through regular contact and reassurance. On that basis, she concluded at §34 that the Appellant and sponsor enjoyed family life going beyond normal emotional ties.
4. In relation to proportionality, the Judge reasoned at §§35–42 that refusal would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences, having regard in particular to the Appellant’s precarious legal and social position in Egypt, the risk of deportation, and the anticipated departure of her son Jamal.
5. Applying a balancing exercise §§45–47, the Judge concluded that the public interest in maintaining immigration control was outweighed by the Appellant’s right to family life and allowed the appeal.
6. The SSHD sought permission to appeal. Permission was granted by First‑tier Tribunal Judge SJ Clegg on 7 April 2026.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The Respondent advanced four grounds summarised as:
7.1 Failure properly to apply the additional elements of dependency test;
7.2 Failure to conduct a sponsor‑centred proportionality assessment;
7.3 Undue weight was given to hardship abroad;
7.4 Failure to accord proper weight to the public interest and Immigration Rules.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
SSHD Submissions
8. For ground 1, the SSHD relied upon IA & Ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 at [76]–[77], [114], [128], and [136], submitting that family life between adults is exceptional and requires a stringent dependency test which is not engaged by findings of financial and emotional support alone.
9. The SSHD submitted that §§32–34 of the decision demonstrates reliance on support rather than dependency and fails to apply the requirement of additional elements of dependency outlined in Kumari v the Netherlands (App no. 44051/20) at [38]–[41].
10. For ground 2, the SSHD relied upon IA at [11] and [142]–[143], submitting that the Judge failed to focus on the sponsor’s Article 8 rights. It was submitted that §§36–41 that there was improper focus on the Appellant’s circumstances, and §42 frames the conclusion in terms of the Appellant’s rights and this demonstrates a material misdirection.
11. For ground 3, the SSHD relied on IA at [157], submitting that the Judge’s reasoning is replete with references to hardship abroad and that such emphasis distorts the Article 8 balancing exercise. The SSHD pointed to the detailed reasoning at §§36–41 of the decision to demonstrate that error.
12. For ground 4, reliance was placed on IA at [173], emphasising that the Immigration Rules attract “considerable weight” and require “very exceptional or compelling circumstances” for departure. It was submitted that §§45–47 failed to demonstrate that this elevated threshold was applied.
Appellant’s Submissions
13. The Appellant submitted a 5-page Rule 24 response which was considered as part of the response to the appeal grounds.
14. For ground 1, the Appellant relied on IA at [121]–[123], submitting that “real, committed or effective support” may evidence dependency. It was argued that §32, dependency for essential needs and §33, emotional reliance, constitute clear findings satisfying the legal test.
15. The Appellant submitted that the Judge’s reasoning, although not explicitly referencing IA, applied the correct test in substance, and that the Respondent’s argument impermissibly sought to re‑argue the evidential findings.
16. For ground 2, the Appellant relied on §35, impact on the sponsor of relocation, and §46, impact on the sponsor’s ability to maintain family life, to submit that the Judge’s reasoning was properly sponsor‑focused when read fairly.
17. For ground 3, the Appellant submitted that the matters identified at §§36–41 were plainly relevant to proportionality, as they bore directly upon whether family life could be enjoyed and whether refusal resulted in unjustifiably harsh consequences.
18. For ground 4, the Appellant relied on §45, recognition of weight to the Rules, and the balancing exercise at §§45–47, submitting that the Judge lawfully applied Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11 and reached an evaluative conclusion open to him.
Legal Framework
19. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decision. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.
10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
20. I must consider whether the Judge made an error of law which is material to the outcome.
21. In Kumari v Netherlands at [38]–[41], the ECtHR made clear that family life between adult relatives requires dependency going beyond normal emotional ties, and that financial support alone is insufficient.
22. The Court of Appeal in IA & Ors v SSHD clarified of the correct legal framework for Article 8 entry clearance cases involving adult relatives. The central principle, is that family life between adults will only exist where there are additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties. This is a fact-sensitive inquiry ([37], [119]) requiring an assessment of genuine dependency, not merely the existence of affection or contact. At [121]–[123] the Court of Appeal draws a distinction between support and dependency, rejecting the notion that real, committed or effective support constitutes the appropriate test. Support may be evidence, but dependency denotes a materially stronger relationship of reliance. Indicators such as serious illness requiring care, or meaningful financial reliance, may contribute to this assessment ([38]–[42]), but neither financial assistance nor emotional closeness alone will suffice ([41], [46]). The Court of Appeal further confirms that the test does not require exclusive or total dependency, but it must nevertheless go beyond ordinary family ties ([120], [125]).
23. In relation to Article 8(2), the Court of Appeal provides guidance on structure and weight. The proportionality exercise must be sponsor‑centred ([11], [142]), even though family life is unitary in substance; the rights engaged are those of the person within the jurisdiction ([141]–[143]). At [157] a decision is subject to challenge where it is replete with references to hardship abroad and thereby distorts the balancing exercise, elevating external conditions into the determinative factor. The Court of Appeal emphasises that hardship abroad and the best interests of children, whilst relevant, are not decisive and must not operate as a trump card ([153]–[157]). Instead, considerable weight must be given to the Immigration Rules and the public interest ([158]–[160], [166]–[167]), reflecting democratic policy and endorsed in Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11. The ultimate question is whether very exceptional or compelling circumstances are established ([146], [169], [173]). Absent such circumstances, even serious hardship abroad will not ordinarily outweigh the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
24. The Upper Tribunal must not interfere merely because it would have reached a different conclusion, even if aspects of the reasoning can be criticised (Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74).
Analysis and Conclusions
Ground 1: Article 8(1) – Dependency
25. The SSHD submits that the Judge erred by failing to apply the correct test for family life between adults, relying instead upon findings of financial and emotional support at §§32–34. The Appellant submits that the Judge made clear findings of dependency for essential living needs (§32), supported by emotional reliance (§33), and that these findings satisfy the test identified in IA at [121]–[123].
26. The correct legal framework is not in dispute. The Court of Appeal clarified in IA that family life between adult relatives exists only where there are additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties. Further, at [121]–[123], the Court of Appeal emphasises that real, committed or effective support is not the legal test, but may constitute evidence of dependency. Support is analytically distinct from dependency.
27. The Judge decided at, §32 that the Appellant is dependent on the sponsor for essential living needs. That is not merely a finding of support, it is a finding of reliance, which engages directly with the concept of dependency as understood in Kumari and IA. That finding is reinforced by §33, which identifies emotional reliance linked to fear and the need for reassurance. The Appellant submits that dependency need not be exclusive and that the existence of alternative support for example, the Oman-based daughter referred to at §32 does not undermine the finding.
28. The SSHD’s submission that the Judge conflated support with dependency must be considered against those findings. I conclude that the Judge did not apply a support test in substitution for dependency. Rather, she relied on evidence of support as demonstrating and explicitly stated that the Appellant depends on the sponsor. That approach is consistent with IA, which permits reliance upon support as evidential material and confirms that dependency need not be exclusive.
29. Therefore, there is no material error of law in respect of ground 1 relating to dependency and this is dismissed.
Ground 2: Failure to conduct a sponsor‑centred proportionality assessment
30. The SSHD submits that the Judge failed to structure the proportionality exercise in accordance with IA [11], instead focusing on the Appellant’s circumstances. The Appellant submits, in response, that the Judge did consider the sponsor, relying in particular on §35 and §46(i) where she found that it would be unjustifiably harsh to expect the sponsor to leave the UK and put himself in a precarious situation in a neighbouring country to Egypt.
31. IA underlines that the proportionality exercise must centre in the Article 8 rights of the person within the jurisdiction, namely the sponsor [11]. Whilst family life is unitary the focus remains the sponsor’s rights. IA[142]–[143]
32. The Judge refers to the sponsor at §35 and finds that it would be unjustifiably harsh for him to relocate. However, the remainder of the proportionality analysis, at §§36–41, is directed almost entirely to the Appellant’s circumstances including her risk of removal and vulnerability (§37 – 41).
33. Mr Lemer submits that §§35 and 46, read together, demonstrate a sponsor‑centred approach. I do not accept that submission. First, the references to the sponsor are limited and discrete. Secondly, they do not amount to a structured evaluation of:
33.1 the nature of the sponsor’s family life;
33.2 the degree of interference with that life; or
33.3 the consequences for him of continued separation.
34. This deficiency is confirmed by §42, which frames the conclusion in terms of a breach of the Appellant’s rights. That is inconsistent with IA [11] and demonstrates that the Judge did not correctly identify and undertake the proper assessment.
35. This is not simply a matter of deficiencies in drafting. It reflects a failure to apply the correct analytical framework. The proportionality exercise was not properly undertaken.
36. I therefore conclude that there is a material error of law in respect of ground 2.
Ground 3: Distortion of proportionality through hardship abroad
37. The SSHD submitted that the Judge placed impermissible weight on the Appellant’s circumstances abroad. The Appellant submits that those matters were relevant and properly considered as part of the proportionality exercise.
38. There is no dispute that the Appellant’s circumstances in Egypt are relevant considerations. The issue is whether their weight and role within the analysis was properly undertaken. IA indicates that a decision may be wrong where it is replete with references to hardship abroad and focuses so closely on those conditions as to distort the Article 8(2) balancing exercise [157].
39. In this case, the Judge’s reasoning at §§36–41 is detailed and is predominantly concerned with the Appellant’s circumstances. Those matters occupy the central portion of the proportionality assessment. Mr Lemer submits that these factors were relevant to the feasibility of family life and to the question of unjustifiably harsh consequences. That submission is correct in principle. However, the difficulty lies not in their inclusion, but in their dominant role.
40. The Judge does not articulate how those matters bear upon the sponsor’s Article 8 rights. Instead, they are treated as determinative of the outcome. The conclusion at §41 of unjustifiably harsh consequences is directly grounded in those circumstances. In my judgment, this is the form of distortion identified in IA [157]. The analysis is replete with references to hardship abroad, and those factors operate as the principal driver of the proportionality conclusion.
41. I therefore conclude that there is a material error of law in respect of ground 3.
Ground 4: Public interest and Immigration Rules
42. The SSHD submits that the Judge failed to properly apply the public interest. The Appellant submits that the Judge recognised the significant weight of the Immigration Rules at §45 by conducting a proper balancing exercise.
43. IA at [109]–[112] and [158]–[160] and Agyarko emphasise that the Immigration Rules represent a democratically endorsed statement of policy and must be given considerable weight at a general level. Further, IA at [146] and [173] confirms that success outside the Rules requires very exceptional or compelling circumstances and the Tribunal must not displace immigration policy on the basis of hardship abroad alone. The Rules can only be displaced in cases meeting the high threshold of exceptionality circumstances.
44. Whilst the Judge states at §45 that the Rules carry significant weight that statement is not followed by any structured analysis demonstrating how that weight is applied.
45. Mr Lemer submits that the balance sheet approach at §§45–47 demonstrates a proper weighing exercise. I do not accept that submission. Whilst the Judge identifies factors on either side, the analysis does not identify any circumstances as very exceptional or compelling, it does not reference the necessary elevated threshold or demonstrate how the considerable weight of the Immigration Rules is overcome. The outcome is driven by the same factors identified under Ground 3, namely the Appellant’s circumstances abroad. The Judge recognises the public interest in form, but I do not accept that she has applies it in substance. I conclude that this is a failure to apply the correct legal standard, not merely a disagreement with the outcome.
46. I therefore conclude that there is a material error of law in respect of ground 4.
Summary
47. The SSHD appeal in relation to Ground 1, dependency, discloses no material error of law. However, the SSHD’s grounds are made out in relation to Grounds 2, 3 and 4. The proportionality assessment:
47.1 is not properly undertaken by reference to the sponsor’s rights;
47.2 is distorted by an over‑emphasis on the Appellant’s hardship abroad; and
47.3 fails to properly apply the public interest in accordance with the Immigration Rules
48. These errors are interrelated and materially affect the outcome.
Disposal
49. Mr Ojo submitted that, if error were found, the decision must be set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved, and the matter remitted for a full rehearing. Mr Lemer submitted that, if error were found, some factual findings could be properly preserved, particularly those relating to financial support and family arrangements, and that a limited reconsideration of proportionality might suffice.
50. I consider that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, see, AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). Specifically, the effect of the material error means that there will need to be a fresh assessment of proportionality, and I accept the SSHD’s submission that the errors go to the core of the proportionality assessment. The Appellant’s submission that findings can be preserved does not address the extent to which those findings are intertwined with the flawed reasoning. I conclude that the proper course is to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
I set aside that decision and remit the appeal to the First Tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge Degirmenci.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 June 2026