Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001722
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/59059/2024
LE/01910/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

HAREH DANGI
correctly known as ANANDEEP SINGH DHILLON
Appellant
and

SECETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No representation
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell, promulgated on 13 January 2026, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to curtail his limited leave under the EU Settlement Scheme. The respondent’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that the appellant had used a false identity and false Portuguese documentation in obtaining pre-settled status. The appeal was determined on the papers.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria on 13 May 2026. The grant of permission recorded that the appeal had been allocated for paper determination on 22 December 2025, that the appellant subsequently applied for an oral hearing on 7 January 2026, and that the First-tier Tribunal decision was promulgated on 13 January 2026. Permission was granted on the basis that it was arguable, applying Ghira [2025] UKUT 350 (IAC), that the First-tier Tribunal had failed adequately to demonstrate that the appeal could fairly and justly be determined without an oral hearing.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
3. At the hearing before me, the appellant did not attend. The respondent was represented by Ms Keerthy, Home Office Presenting Officer. In the absence of the appellant, I proceeded with the other case in my list. By 11:52 in the morning the appellant had still not attended and having satisfied myself that appropriate notice had been given continued with the appeal in the interests of justice.
4. Ms Keerthy properly conceded that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law. She accepted that, in light of the guidance in SSGA (Iraq) [2023] UKUT 00012 (IAC) and Ghira [2025] UKUT 00350 (IAC), the First-tier Tribunal had fallen into procedural unfairness by determining the appeal on the papers in circumstances where the central issues involved allegations of false identity and deception, and where the appellant was unrepresented and had requested an oral hearing before the decision was promulgated.
5. Having considered the concession, I am satisfied that it was properly made and I accept it.
Error of law
6. The central question before the First-tier Tribunal was whether the respondent had discharged the burden of establishing that the appellant had used a false identity and false Portuguese documentation in obtaining leave under the EU Settlement Scheme. That issue was plainly fact-sensitive and credibility-dependent. The First-tier Tribunal nevertheless proceeded to determine the appeal without hearing oral evidence from the appellant.
7. In SSGA, the Upper Tribunal made clear that rule 25 of the First-tier Tribunal Procedure Rules requires a hearing before disposal of an appeal unless one of the recognised exceptions applies. The decision whether to proceed without a hearing is a judicial decision for the judge deciding the appeal, and the judge must give reasons explaining why the appeal can properly and fairly be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal further emphasised that where credibility is disputed on a material issue, a hearing should ordinarily be held, and cases where it would be fair to proceed on the papers in such circumstances will be rare. It stated;
“Judges are reminded that a hearing should be held whenever credibility is disputed on any material issue or fact. Cases in which it would be appropriate to determine an appeal without a hearing if credibility is in issue would be rare indeed. In almost all cases, the appropriate course of action would be to list the case for a hearing and decide the case on such material as is before the Tribunal.” [65].
8. In Ghira, the Upper Tribunal reaffirmed that even where a party has consented to, or not objected to, a paper determination, the First-tier Tribunal must still ask whether the appeal can fairly and justly be disposed of without a hearing. In the case of appellants in person, the Tribunal must be particularly alert to whether the appellant has understood and addressed the principal controversial issues, whether clarification is required, and whether an oral hearing is necessary to secure fairness.
9. In the present appeal, the appellant was an unrepresented litigant. The respondent’s allegation was serious, namely that he had used a false identity and false documentation. Those matters carried obvious implications for credibility, honesty and identity. The appellant had also sought an oral hearing before the decision was promulgated. In those circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal was required to engage carefully with the fairness of proceeding on the papers and to give adequate reasons for concluding that an oral hearing was unnecessary.
10. Although the First-tier Tribunal referred briefly to SSGA and Ghira, it did not adequately explain why, notwithstanding the credibility-based nature of the allegations and the appellant’s position as a litigant in person, the appeal could fairly and justly be determined without hearing oral evidence. Nor did it adequately engage with the appellant’s request for an oral hearing made before promulgation.
11. I am satisfied that this amounted to procedural unfairness. The error was material. Had the appeal been listed for an oral hearing, the appellant would have had the opportunity to give evidence, to explain his position, and to respond directly to the respondent’s allegations. The outcome could realistically have been different.
12. For those reasons, and in light of the respondent’s concession, I find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law. The decision must be set aside.
Disposal
13. I have considered whether the decision should be remade in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The error identified is one of procedural unfairness. The appellant has not yet had a fair opportunity to give oral evidence on the central disputed issues. The appeal will require fact-finding on identity, alleged deception, and the lawfulness of the respondent’s curtailment decision.
14. Applying the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in SSGA and Ghira, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is remittal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing de novo before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell.
15. No findings of fact are preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell, promulgated on 13 January 2026, is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo by a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell.
No findings of fact are preserved.
The appeal before the Upper Tribunal is allowed to that extent.

V S Rae-Reeves
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22/07/2026