Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001727
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55577/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

on 23th of October 2026

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
and
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

MDA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, Counsel, instructed by Internations Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He was born in 1996. He appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal on 7 January 2026, dismissing his appeal against the decision of the respondent on 14 February 2024, confirmed on review on 12 December 2024, refusing him international protection. In the review, the respondent also consented to the appellant raising a “new matter” at his appeal, namely that the appellant’s partner was pregnant, but found that both the appellant and his partner were citizens of Bangladesh and that they could establish or continue their family life in their county of nationality.
2. The appellant advances 7 grounds of appeal. He was given permission to appeal on all 7 grounds by the First-tier Tribunal.
(2) The Appeal Hearing
3. For the appeal hearing, the respondent produced a Rule 24 notice, not drawn by Ms Clewley, and Ms Clewley produced a skeleton argument. The Rule 24 notice accepted that grounds 1 and 7 exposed errors, but contended that the errors were immaterial. This theme was developed in Ms Clewley’s skeleton argument and her oral submissions. She stated that grounds 1, 2 and 7 were conceded to be errors of law.
4. There is also a skeleton argument for the appellant prepared by Mr Nazib Ulla from the appellant’s solicitors. The appellant’s skeleton argument made clear that the appellant accepted that the materiality of any errors was the main issue in the appeal and said that, if an error of law was established, then the decision must be set aside and remade unless, on the materials before the First-tier Tribunal, “any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion.” Mr West referred for this purpose to the decision in SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at [49] (Sales LJ). We accept this as a working summary of the correct approach.
5. In outline, it was the appellant’s case that, far from this being the only conclusion possible, regardless of whether the appellant was truthful, the decision did not show proper consideration of all of the background evidence and the case needed to be redetermined.
6. Not all of the grounds alleging errors of law had been conceded and we decided on this occasion that it would be helpful to hear the arguments in two distinct parts. First, the parties would address us on whether there had been any error of law. Once that had been done, the parties would address us again on whether the errors or alleged errors were material. Mr West submitted that, if we did hear the appeal in two distinct parts, then, although he would open the case on error, the Secretary of State should open the case on materiality and he would reply. We do not say that this approach was necessary, but it was convenient to the parties and we were happy to approve it.
7. We agree with the parties that the materiality of any errors is the fundamental issue in this appeal. Nevertheless, we have to look at all of the grounds and, as we will explain below, we have concluded that the judge made clearly unsustainable findings of fact.
(3) Background
8. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh who entered the United Kingdom with a student visa on 15 February 2022.
9. He claimed asylum on 12 August 2022. When he did so, he said that, after arriving in the United Kingdom, he was told by his uncle that his family in Bangladesh had been approached by someone in the Rapid Action Battalion (“the RAB”), who threatened to kill him.
10. The RAB is described in the background material before us as a specialist police enforcement unit, staffed partly by military personnel, which spied on opposition activists and which is associated in credible background material with the disappearance of political opponents.
11. According to the appellant’s witness statement, dated 7 October 2024, he was of interest to the RAB because of “a comment I made against the Bangladeshi authorities under the Doynik Nobojuk online newspaper on 30 July 2002”. In his asylum interview, he said that he made a comment against the RAB in response to an article published in the Doynik Nobojuk online newspaper on 23 July 2022. It is uncertain if the applicant meant that he posted his response on 23 July or that he later made a response to an article published on 23 July.
12. According to a subsequent extended and updated version of the article, it was published on 23 July 2022 and was entitled, in translation, “RAB Banned by US Government but Awami League’s Support for RAB Stands Unwavering: What Do Readers Think?” The appellant’s undated comment, which was one of many, was critical of the Awami League government.
13. The appellant made clear at paragraph 30 of his statement that there were two limbs to his claim. He said that he feared not only unlawful retribution by the RAB, but also criminal prosecution, amounting to persecution, because of his criticisms.
14. He accepted that he had said in his Preliminary Information Questionnaire dated 2 October 2022 that a case had been filed against him, but that he later produced evidence showing that a case was filed against him on 9 May 2023. He denied being dishonest. He said that, based on the reported threats from the RAB, he thought when he claimed asylum that a complaint had been made, but that he discovered later that it was not made until May in the following year.
15. In her decision of 14 February 2024, the respondent did not believe that the appellant had published something critical of the government and did not believe that the appellant had been the subject of a criminal complaint.
16. The respondent reviewed her decision in a “Respondent’s Review” dated 12 December 2024. This affirmed the decision of 14 February 2024 but, in addition to consenting to the appellant raising a new matter, namely that he had a pregnant partner, the respondent additionally and, perhaps more importantly, asserted that the Awami League was removed from power on 5 August 2024.
17. The Secretary of State said at paragraph 8 of the Respondent’s Review that it was “worth to note” that on 5 August 2024, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, a member of the Awami League, had resigned.
18. The review letter drew particular attention to an article published on 20 August 2024 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noting that there was an interim government consisting mainly of civil society representatives and two student leaders and that it was supported by the army.
19. At paragraph 10, the Secretary of State said:
“Even though the R does not accept that the A is at the adverse attention of the RAB, as there has been a change of government, the A has not demonstrated how much influence the RAB has in Bangladesh, given that they were used to monitor opposition of the Awami League, who are no longer in power, as stated in the [CIPIN].”
20. It was therefore plain that the Secretary of State argued that, as well as not having given a truthful account of himself, the appellant’s own account now did not place him at risk, even if true.
21. The appellant appealed on protection grounds, claiming that he feared the government of Bangladesh, and on human rights grounds, relying particularly on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(4) The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s Decision
22. The appellant was not represented before the First-tier Tribunal.
23. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) did not believe him in any material respect, other than his personal identity.
24. Further, the Judge did not accept that the appellant would be at risk now even if he did face legal proceedings. The Judge said at paragraph 32 of the Decision and Reasons:
“I find that even if the court documents are genuine, the allegations relate to criticism of the Awami League, RAB and Sheikh Hasina. The Awami League is now out of power, the head of the RAB has been replaced. The appellant can apply to the interim government for those allegations and any charges to be withdrawn”.
25. We note that there was no direct evidence before the Judge to support the finding that the head of the RAB had been replaced or that there was any mechanism for a defendant to apply to charges to be withdrawn.
26. In reaching this conclusion, the Judge also followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, which noted the change of regime in Bangladesh and referred (at paragraph 14 of the judgment) to the Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) of December 2024 on “Bangladesh: Political situation” to show that there was a new political landscape in Bangladesh, which eliminated risk to Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) activists. This CPIN was not before the Judge, but the decision in MU is a matter of public record and is something which the appellant can be expected to have known. The CPIN does say, at [4.1.4], that the head of the RAB was replaced after the change of government and, at [13.3.5], that “earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn”. We will refer later to what the Court of Appeal said about this CPIN.
27. The Judge said as follows at paragraph 41 of the Decision and Reasons:
“In MU v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 812, the Court of Appeal considered the significant change in the circumstances in Bangladesh following the overthrow of the Awami League government. The Court noted the CPIN dated December 2024 and accepted that the changed political landscape eliminated any real risk of serious harm to a BNP political activist. The state is now able and willing to protect against rogue or non-state actors. I find [sc the appellant] is not affiliated to any political party. I do not find it credible that he would be targeted by anyone on return.”
28. In line with this paragraph, it was the Secretary of State’s case before us that, although the Judge had erred, so that her adverse credibility findings were unsound, the errors were not material because, following changes in the government of Bangladesh, the appellant’s case was hopeless.
(5) Error of Law
29. As we have said, there were 7 grounds of appeal. It is convenient to begin with those grounds which concern the Judge’s findings as to the appellant’s credibility and then to turn to those grounds which concern the Judge’s finding that it was not credible that the appellant would be targeted by anyone on return.
30. The grounds of appeal do not concern the Judge’s dismissal of the appellant’s appeal pursuant to Article 8 ECHR and we say no more about it.
(5)(a) Error of Law: Grounds 1-4
31. Grounds 1 to 4 challenge the Judge’s adverse credibility findings.
32. Given the entirely realistic concessions made by the respondent in relation to grounds 1 and 2, we need not consider in great detail the judge’s unsustainable findings of fact, but the Judge clearly did err.
33. As for the first aspect of ground 1, it was the appellant’s case that his home was visited by the authorities in the first week of August 2022 and the judge found that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum until 14 February 2024 was something which damaged his credibility. The problem with this reasoning is that the claim was not made on 14 February 2024. That is the date on which the claim was decided by the respondent. The claim was made on 12 August 2022, which is soon after the visit complained of was said to have occurred. This is not a typographical error, but a feature of the reasoning, and it is simply wrong. Moreover, it was such an important part of the reasoning that, we find, all of the Judge’s adverse credibility findings were undermined.
34. As for the second aspect of ground 1, the Judge was also wrong to say that the appellant’s student visa expired on 3 June 2022. In fact, his leave expired on 3 June 2023, so his asylum claim was made soon after the appellant says that he learned of the visit by members of the RAB to his family and, on any version, at a time when he still had several months’ leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
35. The Judge disbelieved evidence that the appellant was facing legal proceedings in Bangladesh. Grounds 2 and 3 relate to this issue.
36. As for ground 2, the Judge said that the appellant had not produced documents supporting his claim until after it had been refused. The Judge’s point appears to be that the appellant did not trouble to produce them until he realised that the claim made in their absence had been refused and that this delay made them less reliable. The late production of documents may invite an explanation, but more is needed before late production can be seen confidently as indicating unreliability and, in any event, in this case the premise of the Judge’s reasoning is just wrong. The documents were submitted in July 2023, roughly six months before the decision was made. Again, the Judge’s reasoning clearly includes an error in analysing the evidence.
37. As for ground 3, the appellant produced a report from a person identified as a member of the Bar in Bangladesh, who said that he visited the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court at Narail and was shown documents confirming that the appellant faced a charge. The appellant’s advocate in Bangladesh photographed them and the photographs were provided, but he said that he was not allowed to “copy” them. The Judge said that he did not find it credible that someone would be permitted to take photographs of the documents, but not be given, or allowed to make, photocopies of them.
38. We have reflected on this. The Judge’s reasons make no sense to us. We must be very careful not to assume that a finding cannot be right simply because we would not have made it on the facts presented to us, but the finding is, to some extent, self-contradictory because, on any version, the appellant’s case was that his advocate was allowed to make copies, but that he had to make copies by photographing the originals rather than by using a photocopier, which, allegedly, was only available for representatives. We do not understand why the Judge found this unbelievable and again we find that there is clearly an error, because there is an unexplained finding.
39. Ground 4 is that the Judge failed to conduct a holistic assessment of the evidence in making her findings on the appellant’s credibility. It is unnecessary to say anything about ground 4 in the light of our findings on grounds 1 to 3.
40. The Judge’s adverse credibility findings are clearly unsustainable for the reasons given and, on the facts of this case, we must set them all aside and order that the appeal be redetermined unless they are immaterial.
(5)(b) Error of Law: Ground 7
41. Ground 7, which, as we have said, was conceded, alleges procedural unfairness. It is suggested that the Judge relied on evidence which was not before the Tribunal. The findings which lead to Ground 7 are something of an enigma, because the Judge said in paragraph 37 of the Decision and Reasons that she relied in part on an article from the Daily Star newspaper, dated 31 December 2025, which showed that the interim government planned to withdraw all politically motivated cases over the last 15 years by February 2026. The problem, spelled out in the grounds, is that, as far as we can see, the article relied upon was not in the papers before the Judge.
42. As we have said, the appellant was unrepresented in the First-tier Tribunal. Understandably, Mr West could not illuminate this mystery. The date of the alleged article is after the First-tier Tribunal bundles were submitted, causing us to wonder whether the document had been produced at the hearing. It may be that Ms Clewley had similar concerns, because she told us that she had contacted the Presenting Officer who had conducted the case in the First-tier Tribunal, but that he could offer no assistance at all. Clearly, the newspaper article is the kind of country evidence which might well have been presented in a case of this nature, but we have no basis for finding that it was before the Judge in these proceedings and it would be idle for us to speculate how the Judge came to rely on it.
(5)(c) Error of Law: Ground 5
43. Ground 5 alleges that the Judge misapplied the decision in MU v SSHD.
44. The Court of Appeal does not give Country Guidance, but its findings on country conditions should, obviously, be given great weight. Although the Court of Appeal in MU v SSHD was clearly considering only the appeal before it, the clarity and scope of the Court of Appeal’s guidance in MU should not be overlooked. Giving the judgment of the court, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, Underhill LJ, said:
“14 The next question is whether we should remit the appeal to either the FTT or the UT or re-make the decision ourselves using our powers under section 14(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. That decision is affected by a fundamental change in the circumstances underlying the respondent's human rights claim. In August 2024, i.e. after the decisions of both the FTT and the UT, the Awami League government was overthrown and replaced by an interim government under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, who belongs to no political party. In December 2024 the Secretary of State issued a new CPIN. So far as relevant for our purposes, I need only refer to the executive summary which contains the following statements:
"Leaders, members, and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state and/or rogue state actors. Although politically motivated violence occurs, it has generally declined since the July and August protests. The number of people who are affected remains low in proportion to the size of the major parties.
Leaders, members, and supporters of the BNP Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.
Low-level supporters and members of the AL and auxiliary (student and youth) organisations, including a person who was simply a participant in a protest are unlikely to be of ongoing interest to the authorities.
…
In general, the state is able to provide effective protection to a person who fears a 'rogue' state and/or non-state actor. The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective state protection.
A person is likely to be able to internally relocate to escape persecution or serious harm by a rogue state and/or non-state actors, where the threat is localised.
Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002."
15 Mr Malik submits that that evidence is in practice incontrovertible and clearly establishes that the respondent, as a member and activist in the BNP, will no longer face any real risk of serious harm if returned. He submits that this court is in as good a position to make that decision as the UT or the FTT and that we should do so.
16 Mr Collins' response was that the CPIN did not show an unequivocal picture. He noted that the passage quoted said only that it was "unlikely" that BNP members or supporters would face persecution or serious harm from the government, and he drew our attention also to the final paragraph about the inappropriateness of certification. I am afraid that that is clutching at straws. It is quite clear that the term "unlikely" is used in this context to connote no real risk, and that is unsurprising in the context of the overthrow of the Awami League from whom the feared risks would emanate. In so far as the statement about certification implies a degree of uncertainty, it is evidently related to the possibility of risk to Awami League supporters: without going through the full text of the CPIN, one can see that, as I say wholly unsurprisingly, that is the area where there is the possibility of some risks continuing.
17 The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.
18 I would for those reasons not only quash the decisions of the FTT and the UT, but exercise our jurisdiction to re-make the decisions by dismissing the respondent's human rights appeal.”
45. We recognise that the Court of Appeal was remaking the decision in that case on the evidence before it. We are not doing that. We are considering, at this stage, whether the Judge made an error of law.
46. Ground 5 complains that:
(1) The Judge failed to take account of the differences between the appellant in this case and the appellant in MU, i.e. that: (a) the appellant is not a member of the BNP and, as the Judge recognised in paragraph 41, the appellant was not affiliated to any political party; (b) as the Judge recognised in paragraph 28, the appellant had no history of being a political critic; and (c) the appellant’s claimed risk arose from the online comment and the criminal case against him.
(2) The Judge’s reasoning did not engage with the specific nature of the claimed risk.
(3) If the credibility findings are undermined by factual errors, the changed circumstances in Bangladesh cannot operate as an alternative ground for dismissal of the appeal.
47. We find that the Judge was following the example of the Court of Appeal when he decided to dismiss the appeal not just because the appellant was untruthful (based on findings which we reject as unlawful) but also because, taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, the appellant could not show a risk of persecution on return. On that basis, the finding in paragraph 41 was unaffected by any errors in the Judge’s credibility assessment. Moreover, the Judge expressly dealt in paragraph 41 with rogue state actors and also acknowledged that the appellant was not affiliated to any political party. The Judge also noted, in paragraph 32, that the online comment was directed towards the Awami League, the RAB and Sheikh Hasina, but the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina were out of power and the head of the RAB had been replaced. The Judge further noted, in paragraph 36, that the appellant had not sought to have any charges against him withdrawn.
48. As part of ground 5 (at paragraph 44(b)(i) of the grounds of appeal), the appellant submitted that the Judge was assuming that it would have been safe for the appellant to apply for the charge against him to be withdrawn, but Mr West acknowledged that the appellant had produced no evidence on this point.
49. In those circumstances, we see no merit in ground 5.
(5)(d) Error of Law: Ground 6
50. Ground 6 criticises the Judge for adopting an inadequate and selective approach to the background evidence in the bundle before him. Certainly, the Judge did not comment expressly on all of the evidence. As a general rule, there is no need for a Judge to comment on everything which was presented.
51. That is particularly the case in relation to ground 6, which focuses on what the Judge said in paragraphs 38 and 40 of the Decision and Reasons about two CPINs dating from November 2023, i.e. before the change of government in Bangladesh.
(6) Materiality
52. We have found that the Judge erred in law in a number of respects and, in particular, made findings of fact which were not open to her. However, notwithstanding Mr West’s measured and firm submissions, we are not able to say that these were material errors in this case, applying the test identified above. The background material before the judge and the judge’s consideration of it are sufficient to show that the evidence before her justified the finding in paragraph 41 of the Decision and Reasons that the appellant is not at risk now, even on his own account.
53. The finding in paragraph 41 was not dependent on the Judge’s findings in relation to the appellant’s credibility and therefore the errors identified in relation to the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility were not material to the outcome of the appeal.
54. The fact that the Judge erred, as alleged in ground 7, in taking account of the Daily Star article did concern evidence about conditions in Bangladesh, but we do not consider that the finding in paragraph 41 was dependent on the Judge taking account of the Daily Star article.
55. Standing back, and having regard to the fact that the appellant’s political activity was limited to a single online comment which, moreover, was critical of the previous government, with no other basis being identified for the charge against him, and having regard also to the evidence as to conditions after the change of regime as identified in the CPIN quoted in MU v SSHD, we consider that, notwithstanding the errors which we have found, “any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion.” It follows therefore that we dismiss the appeal.
(7) Notice of Decision
56. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of errors of law, but those errors were not material.
57. The appeal is dismissed.

The Honourable Mr Justice Lavender, President
and
Judge Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2026