The decision


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2026-001736
FtT No: HU/61254/2024
LH/01953/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 November 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O'CALLAGHAN

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

DERVIN KEONE EUSEBE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr D Ball, Counsel, instructed by J McCarthy Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 12 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. In this decision the parties are referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Eusebe is referred to as ‘the appellant’ and the Secretary of State as ‘the respondent’.
2. The respondent appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appellant's appeal on human rights (article 8 ECHR) grounds. The decision was sent to the parties on 11 February 2026.
Relevant facts
3. The appellant is a national of Dominica and aged thirty-three.
4. Dominica is an island country in the Caribbean. It is 290 square miles in area and has a population of some 72,400 which is approximate to the population of Stafford in the United Kingdom.
5. The appellant entered the United Kingdom as a four-year-old child with his mother in February 1998. On 5 January 2010, when aged sixteen, he was granted three years' discretionary leave in line with his parents. His leave was subsequently varied to expire on 11 November 2016. Following an in-time application he was granted indefinite leave to remain on 28 March 2017. He has been present in this country for most of his life and lawfully present for sixteen years which is a little under half of his life. He has been settled for the past nine years. His education was undertaken entirely in this country.
6. Up to approximately eight months before offending, the appellant had been employed with the same employer for some seven and a half years. Having broken his wrist at work he claimed Universal Credit. He fell into significant financial difficulty.
7. On 19 October 2023 he was concurrently sentenced on two counts to four years' imprisonment. A co-accused was sentenced to a custodial sentence of fourteen-and-a-half years. The sentencing judge noted that the appellant was of previous good character and in a relationship. The appellant’s remorse was also noted.
8. OASys, a risk assessment tool used by the Probation Service (‘the OASys report’) references the appellant’s offending as a “spontaneous reaction” to increasing debt and a misguided response to his financial predicament.
9. The respondent served the appellant with a first stage decision to make a deportation order on 11 March 2025 in accordance with section 32(5) the UK Borders Act 2007. On 15 April 2024, the appellant served reasons as to why he should not be deported. The respondent refused the appellant's human rights representations by a decision dated 29 May 2024.
First Tier Tribunal decision
10. The appeal came before a First-tier Tribunal Judge sitting at Hatton Cross on 4 February 2026. The appellant attended and gave evidence. He was represented by Mr Ball, Counsel, who represents him before this Tribunal. His parents also attended the hearing and gave evidence.
11. It was agreed by the parties that the core issue to be addressed by the First-tier Tribunal was whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the ‘Exceptions’ to deportation established in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The appellant accepted that he could not satisfy either of the ‘Exceptions’ based on private life or family life with a qualifying partner or child.
12. The appellant observed before the First-tier Tribunal that he has resided in the United Kingdom for most of his life since entering this country as a four-year-old child and by the time of the hearing he had been lawfully resident for sixteen years. He observed that he grew up in this country, went to both primary and secondary school and then attended university for a time. He has lived and worked in this country and all his immediate family are present here. He contended that he has been socially and culturally integrated into this country since infancy and the Tribunal considered that "it cannot seriously be suggested by the Respondent to the contrary". The Tribunal concluded that article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was engaged in respect of the appellant's private life and this finding is not challenged by the respondent before this Tribunal.
13. As to very compelling circumstances, the First-tier Tribunal accepted the appellant's evidence that he has not returned to Dominica following his entry into this country in 1998, and that he has no family residing in Dominica. His mother's relatives live either in the United States of America or in the United Kingdom. His father's family all reside in the United States of America. It was also accepted that the appellant's family do not own property in Dominica. The Tribunal identified the appellant's lack of connection to his country of birth as a factor in its assessment.
14. The First-tier Tribunal accepted the appellant's evidence that his mother works part-time earning a low income and has several medical conditions. His father has taken early retirement on ill-health grounds and is receiving Universal Credit. It was found by the Tribunal that the appellant's immediate family were not in a financial position to support him on his return to Dominica, nor was there a realistic possibility that any of the wider extended family could support him.
15. The appellant relied upon expert evidence in the form of a report prepared by Dr Aretha Campbell, Adjunct Lecturer at the University of West Indies Global Campus. Dr Campbell specialises in the areas of international political economy, risk management and compliance and small island developing status, with specific focus on the Caribbean region. The respondent did not challenge Dr Campbell's expertise at the First-tier Tribunal hearing and before this Tribunal Ms Gilmour readily, and properly, accepted that Dr Campbell is expert on the matters she was asked to address in her report.
16. The First-tier Tribunal, at [19]:
"Dr Campbell stated that the appellant's cultural connection to the country would be dependent on his upbringing but given the fact that he has not lived there since he was 4 years old, he would have ‘difficulties in connecting to the local culture.’ She goes on to say that as Dominica is a country with a small population, the community is ‘close knit’ and the appellant would find it ‘extremely challenging’ to ‘integrate’. She says, ‘Returning to Dominica after an absence of 28 years with no known family members … would result in the appellant being a foreigner in a land unfamiliar to him.’ She states that the majority of the work in the country is unstable, informal and low paid and that the unemployment rate is very high with the cost of living considered to be very high due to lack of economic resources. She states, ‘Not having family support, stable environment and limited access to financial services would result in increased difficulty for the Appellant to secure housing and basic needs. This would result in living in substandard conditions and could eventually lead to homelessness.’ She also states that the appellant's qualifications and experience of working in the UK would not stand him in good stead given the informal employment structure in Dominica. I find the above conclusions of Dr Campbell weighty factors in favour of the appellant."
17. The appellant has significant adverse health concerns. Both parties are aware of these concerns and readily agreed at the hearing that I was not required to detail them in this decision, save that I could properly record that the appellant recently made a very serious attempt to kill himself and his life was saved by a passerby. The First-tier Tribunal found the appellant's medical history to be a factor in his favour in its very compelling circumstances assessment.
18. The First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant has significant private family life ties to this country through his parents, various aunts and uncles, and a host of cousins all living here. The appellant's evidence, and that of his parents, as to the extended family members being supportive of him was accepted. The Tribunal noted, and it is not challenged on appeal, that the appellant's extensive private life in this country was a factor in favour of the appellant.
19. The appellant's accepted evidence is that following his release from prison in October 2024 he has not committed any further offences and that he no longer maintains contact with his co-accused. The First-tier Tribunal also accepted the professional recordings in the OASys report that identify the appellant as being strongly motivated to make improved decisions in the future, that he had learned his lesson and it was one that he would never want to repeat. The OASys report recorded the appellant's acknowledgement that he was naïve and vulnerable due to his circumstances arising at the time of his offending but believes that he has since matured because he understands that he did wrong. The appellant’s subjective reflection on his offending was accepted by the Tribunal, which rejected the respondent’s contention that the appellant was in denial of his acts.
20. The balance sheet approach was adopted by the First-tier Tribunal. It was acknowledged that the appellant has lived lawfully in this country for many years and speaks English fluently. Consequently, section 117B(1) and (2) of the 2002 Act did not weigh against him; rather they were neutral factors. The Tribunal further considered that the appellant would be more likely than not financially independent if he remained in the United Kingdom with the support of his family and so concluded that section 117B(3) did not weigh against him. Again, it was a neutral factor. As the appellant enjoyed indefinite leave to remain for at least twelve years prior to the offence, and so was settled in this country, his status at the time of the offence was not precarious and consequently the Tribunal was not required to put “little weight” on his private life as developed.
21. The First-tier Tribunal turned to section 117C(6) and was mindful of the Supreme Court judgment in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784. The Tribunal recognised at [27] of its decision that there was a very significant public interest in the appellant's deportation as he had been sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The public interest in deterrence weighed against him, as did the public interest in maintaining public confidence in the immigration system: Zulfiqar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 492, [2022] 1 WLR 3339, at [44].
22. The core of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning in respect of very compelling circumstances and section 117C(6) is addressed at [29], which I cite in full below:
“I step back and way the above identified considerations together and in the round. Having done so, I find that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation and, when a fair balance is struck between the competing interests, the refusal decision disproportionately interferes with the appellant's article 8 rights to family and private life. In summary, I come to this conclusion on the basis that the appellant has spent the vast majority of his life in the UK and is culturally and socially integrated here. He came to the UK when he was four years old and has no connection to Dominica other than the fact that he was born in that country. As set out in Dr Campbell's expert report if he was to be deported, he would face very significant challenges in establishing himself there and is likely to find it extremely difficult to obtain a job or survive in a culture that she says is foreign to him. Given the fact that the appellant has a long-term diagnosis of depression and has exhibited very recent suicidal conduct, it is foreseeable that he may indulge in similar conduct again. I have considered the OASys report in my deliberations and note that whilst the offence he was convicted of was serious, it was a one-off offence committed by a young man with no previous criminal record. The appellant has shown remorse for his offences and wishes to turn his life around. I consider it to be a matter of significance - and I am permitted to do so by HA (Iraq) as set out above - that the appellant is rehabilitated and the risk of reoffending is low. This means that one of the key components of the public interest in his removal is not present in this case. “
Grounds of appeal
23. The respondent's grounds of appeal are unhelpfully drafted. They are convoluted and can properly be said to lack adequate structure. First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker helpfully sought to refine the respondent's case when granting permission to appeal to this Tribunal.
24. By means of his rule 24 response, Mr Ball further refined the respondent's appeal grounds. Ms Gilmour had no hesitation in agreeing that the further refinement was appropriate and sets out the respondent’s grounds of appeal with clarity.
25. With the representatives’ agreement, this Tribunal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's grounds of appeal are properly identified as follows:
i. Did the First-tier Tribunal err by considering the matters contained within Exception 1 per section 117C(4) as evidence of very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1 when it was accepted by the appellant that the requirements of Exception 1 could not be met?
ii. Did the First-tier Tribunal err by failing to consider the availability of treatment and medication for the appellant's mental health condition when determining whether this was a very compelling circumstance?
iii. Did the First-tier Tribunal err by failing to attach appropriate weight to the public interest in removing foreign criminals e.g. by failing to carry out a proper assessment of the appellant's offending behaviour?
Submissions
26. The core of the respondent’s case is that the First-tier Tribunal inadequately reasoned how the factors it found “went over and above” Exception 1 to establish very compelling circumstances. The First-tier Tribunal is said to have given lip service to the requisite test. Whilst the severity of the appellant’s health concerns was accepted, it was incumbent on the First-tier Tribunal to provide lawful reasons as to why it was a foundation for very compelling circumstances being established. Though relied upon, Ms Gilmour accepted the third ground was not the primary thrust of the respondent’s case.
27. Mr Ball submitted that the true target of the respondent’s case was [29] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. In considering the case advanced, this Tribunal should properly be mindful of the propositions addressed by the Court of Appeal in Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987, at [20] and [21]. Additionally, reliance was placed upon the guidance provided in Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [62] to [64]. Mr Ball contended the Tribunal lawfully considered expert evidence, and it could not properly be said that it did not lawfully consider the public interest, having expressly considered it in detail at [27].
Law
28. Section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971 empowers the respondent to make a deportation order against a person who is liable to deportation on conducive to the public good grounds under section 3(5) of the 1971 Act.
29. Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007, by section 32(5), requires the respondent to make a deportation order under the 1971 Act against someone who is a “foreign criminal”, as defined by section 32(1), and is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least twelve months.
30. In a case where the removal of a person from the United Kingdom, including by way of deportation, would interfere with their protected private and family life rights, article 8(2) ECHR requires the respondent to show that that interference is justified. That entails a proportionality assessment in which the effect of the interference is weighed against the public interest in removal.
31. The purpose of Part 5A of the 2002 Act, in general terms, is to promote consistency, predictability and transparency in decision making and to reflect Parliament's view of how as a matter of public policy the proportionality balance should be struck.
32. Section 117A of the 2002 Act provides that when a tribunal is required to determine whether a decision under the Immigration Acts would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 it must, in all cases, consider section 117B and, in respect of foreign criminals, section 117C.
33. Section 117C(3)-(6) of the 2002 Act:
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
34. A foreign criminal who has been sentenced to at least four years' imprisonment is a serious criminal. Pursuant to section 117C of the 2002 Act, the public interest requires their deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the criminal. In principle, the nature of the offending might also be a relevant consideration, provided care is taken to avoid double counting.
35. The Court of Appeal confirmed in Majera v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1597, at [41] and [42], that the very compelling circumstances test includes the following factors: the legitimate public interest aims which could justify interference with article 8 rights include both public safety and deterrence; the weight of the public interest in deportation increases with the seriousness of the offending; the circumstances relied on to override that interest has to be within the scope of article 8; and those circumstances have to provide a very compelling basis for concluding that deportation would be a disproportionate interference with article 8 rights. The circumstances must also be substantially more compelling than a bare claim within Exception 1 or Exception 2 would be or, putting it another way, "very strong indeed".
36. The requirement of “most of C’s life” identified in section 117C(4) was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 2112, [2018] 1 WLR 4004, at [53], to mean simply “more than half of C’s life”. The appellant agrees that he cannot satisfy this requirement.
Analysis
37. At the outset of my analysis, I observe that I should properly exercise judicial caution and restraint when I consider whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. As Baroness Hale observed in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30], an appellate tribunal should not rush to find misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
38. As confirmed by the Court in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662, [2017] 1 WLR 20, there is no “exceptionality” requirement. It follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare.
39. The approach to be taken to the public interest in the balance to be undertaken is to recognise that the public interest in deportation of foreign criminals has a moveable rather than a fixed quality. The public interest is therefore approached flexibly.
Ground 1: Did the First-tier Tribunal err by considering the matters contained within Exception 1 per section 117C(4) as evidence of very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1 when it was accepted by the appellant that the requirements of Exception 1 could not be met?
40. In NA (Pakistan) the Court of Appeal considered the operation of the section 117C(6) test. A foreign criminal is not disentitled from seeking to rely on matters falling within the scope of the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2 when seeking to contend that there are “very compelling circumstances”. Consequently, in this matter, the appellant could rely on matters falling within Exception 1 in combination with other factors falling outside the Exceptions. As an expert tribunal, the First-tier Tribunal will have understood that factors within the Exceptions will apply with greater or lesser force depending on the specific facts of a particular case. It understood that it was to undertake a generally multifactorial assessment that is holistic in nature with the weight to be given to a particular factor necessarily dependant on the facts and circumstances arising.
41. The First-tier Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in law by placing factors falling within Exception 1 into its very compelling circumstances assessment.
42. By her succinct and focused submissions, Ms Gilmour contended on behalf of the respondent that the First-tier Tribunal failed to identify how the various factors it gave weight to went “over and above” the Exceptions. According to the respondent it is implicit that the First-tier Tribunal simply found Exception 1 to have been established and no more despite the appellant accepting that he would not meet the relevant requirements of this Exception.
43. I agree with Mr Ball that a tribunal is not obliged in every case to make an explicit and particularised finding as to “something more” than the Exceptions being made up. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 74, [2024] 1 WLR 1626, at [62], where Underhill LJ said that it would place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two.
44. Observing the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Kapikanya, at [27] and [43], the requirement of “over and above” in section 117C(6) does not always mean the same as “in addition to”. “Something more” is required than under the Exceptions and a serious offender will have to surmount a higher threshold than a medium offender.
45. The question for this Tribunal as raised by the respondent is whether the First-tier Tribunal found the "something more" which is necessary to satisfy the higher threshold under section 117(6). At its core, an assessment of the question posed requires identification of the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq), at [51], namely that when considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case are considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation.
46. The very strong public interest was unarguably identified by the First-tier Tribunal at [27] of its decision and clearly placed on the respondent’s side of the balance.
47. The First-tier Tribunal placed the appellant’s long personal connection with the United Kingdom into its assessment, whilst acknowledging at [13] that he fell short of the “lawful residence” requirement of section 117C(4)(a). The Tribunal noted the parties’ acceptance that at the relevant time the period of the appellant’s lawful residence amounted to eleven years and eleven months with him having enjoyed lawful residence from January 2010 to January 2013, November 2013 to November 2016, and then from November 2017 to 19 October 2023 with time in prison not counting as lawful residence. Such time did not amount to half of his life at the relevant date. The Tribunal could properly place into its assessment the length of time the appellant has spent in this country and that he is socially and culturally integrated. The appellant’s health concerns were also placed into the assessment. No error was made by treating these individual factors as determinative; rather they were clearly factors amongst several others that were weighed against the very strong public interest.
48. On a reasonable and fair reading of the decision, the First-tier Tribunal found Dr Campbell’s report to be the most compelling part of the appellant’s case as to an Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree. In particular, there being very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the Dominica on return. I consider that “very significant challenges” can fairly be read at [29] as addressing “very significant obstacles”.
49. Dr Campbell’s expert opinion was founded, in part, upon the appellant’s lack of any real ties with Dominica beyond his citizenship, his personal circumstances and the impact of existing circumstances upon him on his return to Dominica. Dr Campbell also addressed the general country situation. Her expertise and her opinion were not challenged before the First-tier Tribunal, nor before this Tribunal. It was reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal to accept Dr Campbell’s evidence, particularly as to the personal challenges the appellant would experience on return to Dominica but again these challenges were not determinative. It is clear at [29] that Dr Campbell’s expert opinion formed part of the holistic assessment, with the challenges being considered with the appellant’s mental health concerns, the severity of which were accepted by Ms Gilmour on behalf of the respondent at the hearing. On a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasoning, Dr Campbell’s expert evidence underpinned Exception-specific circumstances being present to an elevated degree.
50. I consider it appropriate to detail various sections of the report that were relied upon by the First-tier Tribunal when concluding at that the appellant had met the compelling circumstances test. I turn first to the “social challenges” section:
“15. Stigma and Social Perception: Returning to Dominica after an absence of more than 28 years with no known family member or distance relatives, would result in the Appellant being a foreigner in a land unfamiliar to him. Further, natives in the local communities would view the Appellant and an outsider making it even more difficult to integrate.
16. Additionally, because the communities are very close knit, and talebearing is very prevalent within these communities, in the event locals become aware that the Appellant has been deported, this would result in a negative added stigma, which would lead to mistrust, making it increasingly difficult for the Appellant to integrate into the community and establish lasting relationships in my view.
17. Weak Support Systems: In addition to experiencing a cultural disconnection, coupled with the local stigma and perception of the Appellant, not having close ties of friends in Dominica would likely lead to isolation and plausibly depression.
18. As Dominica is a relatively poor and small country crippled by economic challenges, access to social services, including mental health services are limited and inadequate. As mental health issues are on the rise in the country, Government resources are limited to community programs and peer groups. While the Government recognises the need for a comprehensive, affordable mental healthcare program that is accessible to its citizens, its economic resources remain limited and its ability to provide such programs is uncertain.”
51. “Financial challenges”:
“21. High Unemployment: Dominica’s unemployment rate is considered to be very high. With 20.8% in 2020, the unemployment rate fell to 13.4% in 2004 showing some improvement. Despite this decline, limited job opportunities exist on the island, particularly among young adults, which is the hardest hit segment among the local unemployed population. For an individual such as the Appellant, who does not have any local employment history or professional connections on the island, it would be extremely difficult to find gainful employment in my expert opinion.
...
27. Housing and Basic Needs: Not having family support, stable employment and limited access to financial services would result in increased difficulty for the Appellant to secure housing and basic needs. This would result in living in substandard conditions and could eventually lead to homelessness.”
52. “Integration”:
“30. Social isolation: The lack of an established support system, not having family ties or social bonds, could contribute to social isolation making the integration process even more challenging for the Appellant and therefore virtually impossible to establish himself in the country. Additionally, the stigma associated with deportation particularly on a small Caribbean island, with well-established close-knit communities such as Dominica, could result in a negative perception of the Appellant and discrimination. This would result in increased difficulty for the Appellant to integrate into such communities to establish relationships and social bonds in my view.”
53. “Economically vulnerability”
“34. High unemployment rate in Dominica, the limited formal job opportunities, coupled with the fact that the Appellant does not have prior work history on the island, including professional contacts, make finding gainful employment very difficult. Thus, securing employment for returning migrants is extremely challenging.”
54. Dr Campbell’s opinions were properly considered by the First-tier Tribunal against the backdrop of the appellant’s mental health concerns.
55. Observing MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10, [2017] 1 WLR 1260, at [107], I am mindful that it is of the nature of proportionality assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case and the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law.
56. I am not with the respondent that the First-tier Tribunal simply found Exception 1 to be met and consequently was erroneously satisfied that very compelling circumstances were established. The Tribunal expressly confirmed that Exception 1 was not met, at [13]. I find that the reference by the Tribunal at [29] to very compelling circumstances being established over and above the Exceptions to deportation was a genuine and considered conclusion reached following a rigorous holistic assessment as to whether there was “something more”. Several strands of evidence were placed on the appellant’s side of the balance, including the expert opinion of Dr Campbell, establishing very significant obstacles to his integration in Dominica on return to an elevated degree, coupled with his long residence in this country, his insight into his offending behaviour, and his social and cultural integration in this country. As addressed below in respect of ground 2, the appellant’s health care concerns and needs flow into the elevated assessment of the section 117(4)(c) factor because the lack of medical and psychiatric care available renders it foreseeable that he may again make a serious attempt to kill himself. Additionally, at [37], Dr Campbell opines that the identified social and financial challenges put into question the appellant’s mental capacity to integrate on return to a small (‘tiny’) community in Dominica.
57. The respondent’s complaint as to “lip service” is not made out. The reasoning provided at [29] is adequate and therefore lawful. It establishes that the First-tier Tribunal lawfully concluded as to there being very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1 by application of Exception-specific circumstances being present to an elevated degree. I dismiss this ground.
Ground 2: Did the First-tier Tribunal err by failing to consider the availability of treatment and medication for the appellant's mental health condition when determining whether this was a very compelling circumstance?
58. At its core, this ground replicates the respondent’s first ground but with focus directed to the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of the appellant’s mental health and the application of the test of very compelling circumstances. As previously noted, this factor was one of several that comprised the holistic assessment undertaken by the First-tier Tribunal.
59. Ms Gilmour contended that the personal health circumstances found to be in the appellant’s favour at [20] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision were not expressly considered in [29]. I do not agree. There was no need to repeat the findings at [20]. It was sufficient for the First-tier Tribunal to incorporate those findings into its balancing exercise by reference to “[g]iven the fact that the appellant has a long-term diagnosis of depression and has exhibited very recent suicidal conduct, it is foreseeable that he may indulge in similar conduct again”.
60. The respondent accepted at the hearing the severity of the appellant’s mental health concerns. She contended that it was incumbent on the First-tier Tribunal to explain why these concerns satisfied the “over and above” requirement. Underpinning the complaint is a purported failure by the Tribunal to consider the availability of appropriate treatment and medication in Dominica. The respondent is not aided by her decision letter of 29 May 2024 referring to the appellant being deported to both “Jamaica” and “Dominica” when addressing health care provision on return. As its height, the decision letter baldly asserts:
‘Although the medical treatment in Dominica is not to the same standard as that of the UK, it is considered that there is an availability of healthcare and treatment in Dominica, which you can access as a citizen of Dominica.
In line with the caselaw AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 there is no evidence to suggest that your health has deteriorated to the point that returning you to Jamaica would breach your rights under Article 3 of the ECHR. It is considered that there are sufficient medical facilities for your medical issues upon return to Jamaica and therefore it is not considered that your return to Dominica would breach the UK’s obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR.’
61. The respondent did not file objective country evidence concerned with this availability of medical and psychiatric care in Dominica before the First-tier Tribunal or this Tribunal.
62. I agree with Mr Bell that this Tribunal should be slow to proceed on the basis that the mental health section of Dr Campbell’s report was not relied upon in the assessment because it was not expressly referenced. There is no indication in the First-tier Tribunal decision that any element of Dr Campbell’s opinion was rejected. I consider it reasonable to read into the First-tier Tribunal’s reference at [29] to Dr Campbell considering it extremely difficult for the appellant to survive in a culture that is foreign to him to include the impact such difficulty will have upon his mental health.
63. I consider it appropriate to cite relevant paragraphs from the mental health treatment and support section of Dr Campbell’s report:
“44. Dominica faces major challenges in providing support/treatment for mental health issues such as those [the Appellant] is suffering from.
45. Severe shortage in mental health professionals: One of the main challenges is that the country suffers from an extreme shortage in mental health professionals. For every 100,000 people, only 1.9 social workers, 2.7 psychiatric nurses and 1.6 psychiatrists exist in the country. Further, resources are limited for mental health services and infrastructure is lacking. Add to these circumstances, there is a strong local stigma regarding mental illness on the island resulting in limited disclosure and treatment.
...
47. Local treatment options: Treatment options available in Dominica limits access to counselling and psychiatric consultations. There is a scarcity in inpatient facilities and structured therapy schemes. As a result of inadequate resources on the island, many persons residing in Dominica seek care in the US or Europe.
48. Critical implications: While local initiatives exist to increase mental health awareness to reduce the stigma associated with it, as well as to train local service providers with a view to improving service delivery, mental health care on the island is underdeveloped, with significant infrastructural and professional capacity gaps. The local care services that exist are insufficient to meet the demand, particularly following natural disasters. For chronic or server conditions such as depression and anxiety, international treatment is considered to be a viable option.
49. Overall conclusions: Mental health services are limited, especially to treat depression and anxiety. A gap in care continuity exists due to disruption in treatment and management of medication. The mental health care system faces physical health risk, and the infrastructure is relatively poor in comparison to the system in the UK.”
64. I note in respect of §45 of Dr Campbell’s report that the country has a population of less than 100,000 people which establishes the very low number of social workers, psychiatric nurses and psychiatrists in the country.
65. Being mindful of the appellant’s accepted severe mental health concerns, and his recent suicide attempt which required the intervention from a stranger to prevent its success, the First-tier Tribunal could properly place into its assessment the unchallenged evidence of Dr Campbell as to there being significant problems in the availability of mental health treatment for the appellant upon return to Dominica. As found above in relation to ground 1, this was but one of several factors lawfully placed into the holistic assessment and was properly coupled at [29] with the appellant having no connection to Dominica beyond being born there and having no family support available to him on return. I dismiss this ground.
Ground 3: Did the First-tier Tribunal err by failing to attach appropriate weight to the public interest in removing foreign criminals e.g. by failing to carry out a proper assessment of the appellant's offending behaviour?
66. The core of the respondent’s case under this ground is that though the First-tier Tribunal observed the relevant matters of deterrence and maintaining confidence, as well as the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Zulfiqar, it “seemingly glossed” over these matters by placing too great a reliance upon the appellant’s prior good character and its acceptance as to rehabilitation at [28] and [29] of its decision. The consequences of the appellant’s offending are said to have been ignored. Though this ground was acknowledged by the respondent not to the primary thrust of her challenge, it was not withdrawn and is therefore to be considered.
67. The First-tier Tribunal placed the very significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation on one side of the balance, at [27]. The Tribunal was also mindful of the nature and substance of the appellant’s serious offending, at [4], [27] and [28]. As to rehabilitation, the Tribunal could properly find that the appellant was now employed, and that the latest OASys report does not raise any significant concerns with the likelihood of reoffending being assessed as low (0.24%) and the risk to the public also being low. The Tribunal reasonably accepted that the appellant had insight into his offending behaviour and was committed not to reoffend. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the facts before it to consider the serious offences to be rooted to a particular time (“one-off”) and that the appellant has shown genuine remorse. The findings as rehabilitation, though properly open to the Tribunal, were not determinative of its decision as to the very compelling circumstances test but lawfully formed part of the holistic assessment. The finding as to rehabilitation was not itself given great weight.
68. In the circumstances, the respondent has not made out this ground. It is properly to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
69. The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 11 February 2026 did not involve the making of a material error on any point of law and is upheld.


D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 October 2026