Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-001757
UI-2026-001758
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/63563/2023
LH/06389/2024
HU/63567/2023
LH/06388/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

EMMANUEL KORANKYE
ROSE KORANKYE
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Sharma, Counsel instructed Justice and Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants are citizens of Ghana. When they were children, they applied to join their father, the sponsor, in the UK by applications made on 29 August 2023. Their human rights claims were refused by decisions dated 7 November 2023, and they appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Their appeals were dismissed in a decision promulgated on 2 February 2026. The appellants now appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

Background

2. The appellants claim that the sponsor has sole responsibility for them. This was disputed by the respondent when refusing their applications for entry clearance.

3. The appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Morgan on 28 January 2026.

4. The Judge did not accept that the sponsor had sole responsibility for the appellants and so dismissed the appellants’ appeals.

5. The appellants submitted grounds of challenge. By decision dated 9 April 2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker granted permission on the following terms

3. I can deal with the grounds together given the nature of them.
The Judge arguably failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that contact with the children’s mother and one payment by the sponsor to the children’s mother in the circumstances detailed by the sponsor, lead to the conclusion that the parents shared responsibility for the children. Whilst the extant legal guidance states that it will be exceptional that one parent has ‘sole responsibility’ when both parents are involved in a child’s upbringing, the Judge failed to provide any/adequate reasons for his finding that the mother was involved in the children’s life in any meaningful way.

6. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge Morgan’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

The Hearing

7. Ms Sharma relied on her grounds of appeal and expanded on them.

8. In relation to ground one and the claim that the Judge had mischaracterised the sponsor’s oral evidence in paragraph 7 of the decision, Ms Sharma accepted that there was no evidence presented to support the contention that the recording of the evidence was inaccurate. Ms Sharma was the advocate before the Judge, and she had not been asked to provide a witness statement or provide her record of proceedings.

9. Ms Sharma acknowledged that she could not give evidence but did try to indicate that her notes of the hearing suggested that there was an issue with the recording of the sponsor’s evidence in paragraph 7. Mr Tufan stated that he had the notes of the presenting officer from the hearing, and he confirmed that the respondent did not agree that there was any inaccuracy in the judge’s recording of the evidence.

10. As there was no evidence of any mistake by the judge in the recording of the evidence and there had been no request to listen to the audio recording of the hearing (and no application to adjourn to obtain the recording), Ms Sharma acknowledged that she could not sustain reliance on ground one. She accepted that the Judge’s recording of the sponsor’s evidence in paragraph 7 must be accepted and she would advance the rest of her submissions on that basis.

11. Ms Sharma submitted that the Judge had failed to apply the relevant case law. She submitted that the Judge had provided inadequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s mother was involved in their lives. Ms Sharma submitted that the Judge failed to consider that the appellant’s mother was not involved in any decision-making regarding them.

12. Mr Tufan submitted that there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. He accepted that the decision was short, but this did not mean it was wrong. He submitted that the Judge set out the relevant case law and clearly applied it.

13. Ms Sharma briefly responded stating that there was overwhelming evidence that the sponsor had control of the upbringing of the appellants and that the weight of the evidence was in favour of the sponsor having sole responsibility.

14. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.

Discussion and Analysis

15. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellants’ appeals, I have remined myself of the following principles.

16. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).

17. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge's decision is “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.

18. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.

19. The Judge’s reasons are short, but this is understandable when the sponsor’s oral evidence is considered.

20. In paragraph 7 the Judge records that the sponsor stated in his oral evidence that “the appellants and their mother were in regular contact and that they saw their mother frequently.” The grounds asserted that this was a mischaracterisation of the sponsor’s evidence. However, Ms Sharma rightly conceded that no evidence had been presented to support this contention and as such the recording of the evidence by the Judge must be taken to be correct.

21. This concession that the Judge’s recording of the evidence must be taken to be correct deals with both ground one and ground two. The remaining grounds are that the Judge failed to apply the correct test for sole responsibility and gave inadequate reasons. I find that the grounds fail to disclose any errors of law.

22. The Judge confirms in paragraph 5 that he considered the relevant case law, namely TD (Paragraph 297(i)(e): "sole responsibility") Yemen [2006] UKAIT 00049. He also refers to TD (Yemen) when reaching his conclusions in paragraph 9. I have no doubt that the Judge clearly had the relevant case law front and centre when he reached his decision. Further, it is clear that the Judge correctly applied that case law.

23. TD (Yemen) states in the headnote, “where both parents are involved in a child's upbringing, it will be exceptional that one of them will have "sole responsibility".” The case law on sole responsibility is reviewed in TD (Yemen) and between paragraphs 35 and 42 the Upper Tribunal consider “Two-parents cases.”

24. The Judge was fully aware that it is only in “exceptional” cases that one parent would have sole responsibility when both parents are involved in a child’s life. In this case, the Judge found that the appellant’s mother was involved in the appellants’ lives and that this was not an exceptional case, and thus the sponsor had failed to prove that he had sole responsibility for the appellants. This was an entirely rational conclusion on the evidence before the Judge.

25. The Judge stated in paragraph 6 that the sponsor confirmed that the appellants’ mother consented to them having DNA testing in June 2023 and took them to the have DNA samples taken.

26. In paragraph 7 the Judge stated that the sponsor confirmed that “the appellants and their mother were in regular contact and that they saw their mother frequently.”

27. The Judge stated in paragraph 8 that the sponsor confirmed that “he had sent money to the biological mother of the appellants, when he could not get hold of his wife or cousin and that the latest payment had been made in July 2023 shortly before the application for entry clearance.” The reference by the Judge to “the latest payment” indicates that, contrary to what is said in the grounds, money was sent to the appellants’ mother on more than one occasion.

28. The Judge’s finding that the appellants’ mother is still involved in the appellants’ upbringing was open to him on the evidence before him. In fact, the sponsor’s own evidence on this issue made the Judge’s conclusion inevitable. The Judge then correctly applied TD (Yemen) in finding that, as both parents are involved in the appellants’ upbringing, this is not an exceptional case where the sponsor can prove that he has sole responsibility.

29. The Judge’s reasons are brief but sufficient. There is no error of law in his decision.

30. Therefore, in conclusion, for the reasons above, I find the Judge has not made material errors of law in his decision and reasons.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination shall stand.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 June 2026