Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001768
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56285/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

ZZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The appellant neither appeared nor was represented
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a citizen of China, appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (“the judge”) promulgated on 8 January 2026, refusing his asylum claim.

2. The appellant was neither present nor represented. I therefore considered whether to proceed in his absence or to adjourn the hearing. In doing so I have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

3. I am satisfied that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the appellant of this hearing. A notice of hearing was sent to the appellant’s address; and an email sent by the Tribunal yesterday to remind him of this hearing.

4. The appellant has not provided his solicitors with his instructions for this hearing. On 17 June 2026 his solicitors emailed the Tribunal that they had been without instructions for some time. Yesterday his solicitors confirmed that they were no longer instructed. Accordingly, no representative has attended on the appellant’s behalf.

5. For reasons that will be clear from my decision, I considered that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with this hearing. I have considered the 342-page Bundle and heard brief submissions from Mr Nappey.

6. For reasons that will also become clear from my decision, it is unnecessary to set out the background to this matter in great detail. The appellant was born in 1991. In his undated statement, the appellant maintains that he lived and worked in a lay capacity in a major Chinese temple, where he was approached by the religious leader of a different temple requesting a charitable donation. The appellant recommended to his own temple that the donation should be made; and a total equivalent to around £5,000.00 was transferred in two payments. Shortly afterwards, the police attended the appellant’s temple and arrested the appellant for having made the payments, as they claimed, for the benefit of Tibetan ‘traitors’. The appellant was beaten; and after a few days made a false confession that he deliberately paid out the sums to assist traitors. He was bailed and, without assistance from his own temple, acted on their advice to leave China. The appellant, with the help of his parents, paid an agent to arrange travel to the UK, which in the event took the appellant to Turkey and Belgium prior to his arrival in September 2022. As part of the payment, the appellant was to work in a factory on arrival in the UK which, for a short period, he did before escaping. The appellant claimed asylum on 26 January 2023.

7. The respondent essentially rejected the appellant’s story in its entirety in the reasons for refusal letter dated 5 February 2024.

8. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against that decision on all grounds, making several adverse credibility findings against the appellant.

9. The grounds of appeal (“the grounds”) dated 22 January 2026 may be summarised as follows.

a. Ground 1: the judge relied upon factual errors to dismiss the appeal.
b. Ground 2: the judge failed to have regard to objective evidence.
c. Ground 3: the judge failed to consider the evidence in the round.
d. Ground 4: the judge placed unlawful reliance on discrepancies arising from the screening interview.

10. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Watson on 13 April 2026.

11. In his submissions, Mr Nappey very pragmatically conceded all but ground 4.

12. In ground 1, the appellant relies on E & R v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49 for the proposition that a material error of fact giving rise to unfairness provides a distinct and actionable head of challenge. The ordinary requirements for a finding of unfairness are set out at paragraph 66 therein:

“First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal's reasoning.”

13. The appellant’s case is that the judge made at least three mistakes of fact falling squarely within these requirements. Firstly, at [11] of the decision, the judge set out the respondent’s reasoning for considering the appellant’s evidence on paying the agent incredible:

“The appellant claimed that he paid the age[nt] of [sic] 50,000 RMB to arrange to leave China in his screening interview. However in his substantive interview he claimed that the cost for the arrangement was 200,000 RMB. This was considered to be a discrepancy in the appellant’s evidence and damaging to his credibility.

14. At [36] the judge went on to find:

“The appellant stated that he paid the agent 50,000 RMB to flee China (Scr. 3.4). Alternatively, the appellant claimed that the agent was paid 200,000 RMB (AIR Q76). I find this to be a further discrepancy in the appellant’s evidence and further damaging to his credibility.”

15. This finding, the grounds contend, is not an accurate assessment of the appellant’s evidence. The appellant did indeed state in his screening interview dated 12 February 2023 at 3.4 “I paid the agent 50,000”. However, the appellant explained in his undated statement at paragraph 17:

“My parents told me that the fee to have me leave China would be 200,000.00 RMB. The agreement was that they would pay 100,000.00 RMB and the rest of the money I would have to work for once I arrived at the destination. We were told that the best place to go was the UK. It was agreed that they would pay 50,000.00 immediately and then I would pay the remaining 50,000.00 once we were out of China.”

16. In his asylum interview dated 9 January 2024, the appellant answered as follows:

Q76: “How much did they [an agent] cost, were you able to pay for them?”
A76: “200,000 RMB and given by my parents 100,000 and in the UK I had to work to pay the other half.”

17. These sources taken together, it is argued in the grounds, present not a contradictory account, but a consistent one. To make an adverse credibility finding, the judge should have considered all of the available evidence. There is nothing in [11] or [36] to suggest that the judge took the undated statement into account at all. The words “and further damaging to his credibility” leave no doubt that [36] is a significant plank in the judge’s adverse credibility assessment.

18. Secondly, the judge set out another of the respondent’s concerns in the reasons for refusal letter at [12]:

“In his screening interview, the appellant claimed that he was. Work [sic] in the factory in the UK between September 2022 to Christmas Day 2022. In his asylum interview however the appellant claimed that he wasn’t paid after one week and so ran away. This was considered to be a further discrepancy in the appellant’s evidence.”

19. The judge went on to find at [37]:

“The appellant claimed that he was brought to the UK. Worked in a factory in order to assist to repay monies owed to the snake had. He variously claimed that he worked in a factory for 3 months before escaping and alternatively that he worked there for just one week (Scr 2.5/AIR Q84). I find this to be a further discrepancy in the appellant’s evidence and further damaging to his credibility.”

20. The grounds argue that here, again, the judge found an inconsistency where there is only consistency. The appellant says at 2.5 of his screening interview that he worked at the factory for three months: “Yes – September 2022 until Christmas Day 2022”. He did not, however, say in his asylum interview that he worked for only a week; he said he was paid for only a week:

Q84: “Was you working in the factory for the traffickers were they paying you?”
A84: “After 1 week I didn’t get paid so I ran away.”

21. If there was any ambiguity in that answer, the grounds argue that it is resolved in his undated statement at paragraph 20:

“After the first week they stopped giving me any money at all and I had to just eat the really poor food and had to ask to use other people’s toiletries. I think that they were trying to make it difficult for me so that I would ask to work somewhere else but I was determined that I would not do anything illegal. They kept saying that they would pay me but would become aggressive if I asked for this. I never received any more money after that first week. I decided that I could not stay there and so I used the excuse of being out on Christmas day to escape.”

22. Once again, in weighing up the appellant’s account, there is no reference in [12] or [37] to the undated statement at all.

23. The third example under ground 1 also seeks to identify a factual mistake made by the judge. The decision states at [38]:

“The appellant claims that he collected donations in the temple for a Tibetan Lama and remitted them and therefore came of interest to the authorities. The appellant however was merely a housekeeper in the temple. I appellant’s claim [sic] that he was singled out by the authorities and that there were no repercussions for the temple to be implausible and further damaging to the appellant’s credibility.”

24. The appellant does indeed state that he worked as a housekeeper in his asylum interview:

Q15: “What was your occupation in China before you left?”
A15: “Housekeeper in Kai Yuan Shi Miao Temple.”

25. However, he corrects this at paragraph 2 of his undated statement:

“… I worked at the Kai Yuan Shi Temple as an administrator. I have been described in the interview as a ‘housekeeper’ but this is incorrect as I understand that this is a term used to describe someone who has domestic duties…”

26. It is entirely plausible, argue the grounds, that the appellant transferred the money in his capacity as administrator. But in any event, the judge does not engage with the appellant’s explanation at paragraph 2 of the undated statement at all.

27. I do consider that ground 1 discloses a material error of law. The judge appears not to have taken account of the appellant’s undated statement with respect to any of the three adverse credibility findings. Applying E&R v SSHD, the judge did make mistakes as to objectively verifiable existing facts where neither the appellant nor his advisers were responsible for that mistake’ and those findings were plainly material to the judge’s reasoning.

28. This error of law by itself requires that the matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Having found that error, I will not go on to consider grounds 2 or 3 in any more than outline. I have already stated that grounds 2 and 3 are conceded by Mr Nappey.

29. Ground 2 concerns [39] of the decision:

“Having regard to the objective evidence, I find the appellant’s claim of being under a daily reporting restriction to the authorities at 9 AM but nonetheless being able to leave the airport without detection, despite the fact that China has the largest degree of surveillance in the world and extensive checks at the airport to be further implausible and further damaging to the appellant’s credibility.”

30. The grounds contend that although the judge states that he has had regard to the objective evidence, he has not engaged with it. The appellant’s skeleton argument (which was before the judge) at paragraph 24 advances argument, citing various sources in support, as to why the appellant’s account is plausible. The judge has not addressed the argument or the sources beyond stating in [39] that he has. The appellant relies on the case of MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan v SSHD UKUT 641 (IAC) for the proposition that there must be clear reasons for rejecting evidence or witness credibility. I do not consider that the decision does provide any such reasons. There is a material error of law here.

31. Ground 3 holds that the judge failed to consider the evidence in the round, citing as an example the finding at [35]:

“The appellant in his witness statement claimed that after being released from detention that he returned to the temple. In cross-examination the appellant denied returning to the temple after his release from detention. Only after this discrepancy with his evidence in his witness statement was put to him did he seek to amend his evidence and claimed that he did return to the temple but only for a short time. I [sic] that the appellant has given discrepant evidence concerning whether he returned to the temple or not after his release from detention and find this to be further damaging to his credibility.”

32. The grounds argue that the appellant’s qualification in oral evidence is plainly compatible with the written evidence. In his undated statement at paragraph 13, the appellant states:

“I went to the Temple the day after I was released as I was sure that they would be able to intervene on my behalf. When I went there most of the staff refused to speak with me. I was able to speak to my manager, Chai Ming Jia but he insisted that we meet in the open where other people were around. He explained that I was no longer welcome as I had broken their trust and involved the temple in very dangerous activities. He said that I should leave the Temple and leave China as I was no longer welcome.”

33. In his asylum interview, the appellant answered:

Q69: “Once you were released did you go back to the temple to confront them about what they did to you?”
A69: “Yes I went back they said they cannot help me and asked me to leave if I could.”

34. Although ground 3 adds little to ground 1, I consider that ground 3 also identifies a material error of law. This was not a discrepancy on which an adverse credibility finding could be made, but the appellant’s amplification of the written evidence: the appellant returned for a short time, but not to live or work there as he had before. It was not reasonable for the judge to rely on A69 to find the appellant incredible.

35. Ground 4 is not conceded by Mr Nappey. Given my analysis above, I have not invited detailed submissions from him. The purported discrepancies under ground 4 are more nuanced than the matters argued in grounds 1 and 3; the applicant is neither present nor represented; and in the light of my decision it is simply not necessary to grapple with ground 4.

Notice of Decision

1. The judge’s decision involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 June 2026