Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001776
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51003/2022
IA/04232/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Chakmakjian, Counsel instructed by Kilby Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant, her partner or her children. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Background

1. The appellant is a twenty eight year old citizen of Albania. She states that she entered the United Kingdom on 1 May 2019 hidden in a lorry and without leave to remain. On 21 May 2019 she claimed asylum stating that she faced persecution in Albania by her parents and by people traffickers. The applicant was referred to the Single Competent Authority (SCA) as a suspected victim of trafficking. The appellant says that two months later, while her claim was being considered she was joined in the United Kingdom by her Albanian partner AB, who became a dependant on her asylum claim. Together they have three children – C1 born on 4 August 2019, C2 born on 20 July 2021 and C3 born on 3 June 2023.

2. The basis of the appellant’s claim was that having been born in Kukes, she grew up in Tirana with her parents and two brothers and that prior to coming to the United Kingdom she was studying at University in the city and in a relationship with AB who is her cousin. In September 2018 her father borrowed money from “Adi” which he was then unable to repay. Adi and her father agreed that the appellant would marry Adi as repayment for the debt and when the appellant refused, her father beat her and Adi tried to rape her. She tried to tell the police but they would not intervene, describing it as a private matter. Her family would not accept her relationship with AB because they are cousins and when they discovered the appellant was pregnant with his child they locked her in her room and demanded she have an abortion. The appellant managed to escape in April 2019 and fled with AB to Italy, from where they travelled to Belgium where they stayed for three days with friends of AB. During those three days, while AB was out looking for work, the appellant was forced by the men with whom they were staying to work as a prostitute. On the third day a client took pity on her and arranged her escape in a lorry to the United Kingdom. Once in the United Kingdom she contacted AB’s cousin and stayed with him. She claimed asylum three weeks after her arrival and two months later she was joined by AB who had also managed to clandestinely enter the United Kingdom.

3. On 11 November 2021 the SCA found the appellant to have be the victim of modern slavery having been sexually exploited in 2019 when in Belgium during her journey to the United Kingdom.

4. On 8 March 2022 the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. The respondent rejected the appellant’s account of events in Albania and concluded that she would not be at risk of ill-treatment by her father or Adi if she were to return to Albania. The respondent accepted that as a victim of sexual exploitation in Belgium, the appellant was a member of a Particular Social Group in Albania but found that she would not be at risk of re-trafficking in Albania as she would be returning with AB, and the previous incident of trafficking occurred in Belgium and not Albania. Alternatively the respondent concluded that the appellant would be able to receive adequate protection from re-trafficking within Albania, by relocating with AB if necessary. Finally the respondent concluded that interference with the appellant’s Article 8 right to family life would be proportionate given the public interest in immigration control, the fact the appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain and the family would be returning to Albania together. The respondent recognised evidence that the appellant was suffering from depression but found she could receive adequate treatment for that condition in Albania.

5. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. Her appeal was heard and dismissed in August 2023 but that decision was found by this Tribunal to contain an error of law and was set aside. The appeal was heard again afresh by First-tier Tribunal Judge Simpson (the Judge) on 20 October 2025. The appellant and AB gave evidence at the hearing. There was also documentary evidence adduced by both parties, and submissions made by advocates on behalf of both parties. On 20 December 2025 the Judge’s decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal was promulgated. It is against that decision that the appellant now appeals.

(2) The Judge’s Decision

6. At [30] of his decision the Judge identified the facts of the appellant's claim that were in dispute and the Judge analysed the evidence relevant to those disputed facts at [49] – [92] of his decision. The Judge then provided his conclusions at [93] – [99] under the heading “Findings of fact”.

7. At [93] the Judge found that the appellant had not been truthful in her account of events in Albania, explaining that inconsistencies and vagueness reduced her account to a level below that of the credible. At [94]-[95] the Judge clarified that this meant he found that the appellant’s account of her parent’s disapproval of her relationship with AB and her pregnancy, of the attempt to force her to marry, of the existence and activities of Adi, and of her departure from Tirana was all not reasonably likely to be true and not more likely than not true. The Judge concluded that the appellant is still in contact with her family and the family of AB and that they would support her, AB and their children on their return to Albania. At [97] the Judge found that the appellant is educated and capable, albeit in poor mental health. At [98] the Judge found that AB has had a number of medical issues but that there was no suggestion he was not capable of working. At [99] the Judge found that the appellant was the survivor of sexual violence having been forced into sex work for three days whilst in Belgium.

8. The Judge then applied those facts to the relevant law. In light of the finding that she had been forced into sex work in Belgium, the Judge found at [102] that the appellant has a subjective fear of being re-trafficked on return to Albania. The Judge found however at [103] – [108] that it was not reasonably likely that the appellant would be re-trafficked, referring to her strong support network at [104] and [106]. The Judge considered the appellant’s mental health would be a risk factor but found that inadequacies of mental health support in Albania were not such that the support of the appellant’s family and AB would be insufficient to prevent her from falling victim to traffickers again.

9. At [109] – 115] the Judge considered the “alternative scenario” in which the appellant’s family were hostile towards her and she and AB were consequently relocating to Kukes. The Judge found that the appellant would be directed to sheltered accommodation and various support services, she would have the support of AB and that she would be able to reintegrate into life in Albania without facing very significant obstacles to integration. In these circumstances and in view of the fact the previous trafficking occurred in Belgium, the Judge concluded at [115] that the appellant would not be reasonably likely to be at risk of re-trafficking on return to Albania.

10. The Judge continued to consider the “alternative scenario at [116] – [124] and found that in that alternative scenario the appellant would be able to rely on adequate protection from traffickers and could relocate within Albania without facing unduly harsh consequences.

11. At [129] – [136] the Judge considered whether return to Albania would breach the appellant’s right under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) not to suffer ill-treatment. The Judge noted the appellant’s diagnosis of Mixed Depressive and Anxiety Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) but concluded that the appellant is not a seriously ill person and would not suffer a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her mental health which will lead to a reduction in life expectancy or intense suffering. The Judge found that the appellant would be able to obtain the antidepressant medication she is prescribed in Albania.

12. At [137] – [149] the Judge considered whether return to Albania would breach the appellant’s limited right under Article 8 ECHR to respect for her private and family life. The Judge found that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Albania and did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for being granted leave to remain. The Judge balanced the public interest in the maintenance of immigration control against the private and family life enjoyed by the appellant in the United Kingdom. When doing so he had regard at [145] to the best interests of the appellant’s children. The Judge concluded that the public interest greatly outweighed the appellant’s interests such that interference with her Article 8 rights was proportionate.

13. The Judge therefore dismissed the appellant's appeal on all grounds.

(3) The Appeal to this Tribunal

14. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien on two detailed grounds. In the first ground the appellant asserts that the Judge failed to consider material evidence when considering the credibility of her claim and failed to give adequate reasons for concluding that her account of events in Albania was not true. In the second ground she asserts that the Judge failed to consider material evidence when assessing the risk to the appellant of re-trafficking in the “alternative scenario” and failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk of re-trafficking in that scenario.

15. Having authored those grounds of appeal, Mr Chakmakjian made skilful and helpful submissions about them during the hearing before me. I set out Mr Chakmakjian’s submissions in relation to each ground of appeal in my analysis below. Mr Chakmakjian acknowledged that in view of the Judge’s consideration of “alternative scenarios”, for the appellant’s appeal to be successful it would be necessary to establish that both grounds of appeal are made out.

16. The respondent served a reply to those grounds of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 resisting the appeal. Mr Pugh who was the author of the reply made helpful submissions in support during the hearing before me. Again, I set out those submissions when analysing the two grounds in the paragraphs below.

17. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now provide together with my reasons.

(4) Analysis

18. At the beginning of my analysis I remind myself of important principles to be applied by an appellate court asked to interfere with factual findings made by a first instance Judge or to assess the reasons given by that Judge for his findings. Those principles have been often repeated by the Senior Courts and though they may be considered trite they bear further repetition in the context of the complaints being made about the Judge’s decision in this case.

19. In Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62 Lord Justice McCombe quoted in an immigration context the judgment of Lewison LJ in Fage United Kingdom Ltd v Chobani United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 as follows at [29]:

At [114] - [115], Lewison LJ explained the caution to be exercised by appellate courts in interfering with evaluative decisions of first instance judges. Para [114] is particularly well known, but para [115] it is also of relevant to the present case. The Lord justice said this:

114. Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them….. The reasons for this approach are many. They include:

i. The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed.
ii. The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.
iii. Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case.
iv. In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping.
v. The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence).
vi. Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practise be done.

115. It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgement given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties, and if need be, the Court of Appeal, the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted. These are not controversial observations.

20. Lord Justice McCombe continued in Lowe to say the following about the reasons given by a Judge:

31. Equally, it is to be recalled that judgments at first instance are necessarily an incomplete impression made upon the judge by the primary evidence. This FTT judge reached the conclusion that he did on the issues raised and he expressed himself succinctly on them. This is what Lord Hoffman said on the point in the well known passage of his speech in the House of Lords in Biogen Inc v Medeva PLC [1997] RPC 1 at 45:

“The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge's evaluation of the facts it is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said la verite est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judges overall evaluation…”

21. It is also fair to observe before analysing the specific complaints made about it, that the Judge’s decision is detailed, considered and demonstrates that the Judge reviewed the evidence adduced with conspicuous care. The Judge gave himself appropriate self-directions about the assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s claim at [44] – [48] before undertaking that assessment. Those self-directions included recognition that the term credibility does not have a special technical meaning and that the question to be resolved was whether, following a holistic assessment of all the evidence, the person’s account of their personal history is to be believed. It is that assessment which is challenged in ground one.

Ground One
22. Mr Chakmakjian submitted that the Judge made errors when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account which cumulatively meant that the Judge’s conclusion was unsafe. As the ground identifies the complaints in this ground relate both to the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and the reasons he gave for his conclusions. Mr Chakmakjian specifically submitted that the Judge erred:

• When assessing the appellant’s evidence: By failing to consider consistencies in the appellant’s evidence as part of the overall assessment of the credibility of her account, by failing to explain why a different approach was taken to matters omitted in the appellant’s screening interview, and by finding an inconsistency in the appellant’s account of Adi trying to rape her when there was in fact no such inconsistency.
• When assessing AB’s evidence: By concluding that he was not assisted by AB’s evidence because much of it was second hand and without addressing the direct evidence he gave.
• When assessing the evidence of the appellant’s friend who lives in Belgium: By giving no material weight to her witness statement on the basis that the witness had not attended to give live evidence

23. I consider each of these complaints in turn, conscious of the danger identified by Lewison LJ that in doing so I can only be “island hopping” when the Judge had regard to the whole sea of evidence

The assessment of the appellant’s evidence
24. Mr Chakmakjian submitted that the appellant gave consistent evidence about the violence she suffered in Albania and who perpetrated that violence, plus her escape from Albania and travel through Europe and that consistent evidence is not recognised in the Judge’s decision. By reference to a judgment of Carnworth LJ (as he then was) in R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116, Mr Chakmakjian submits that anxious scrutiny required the Judge to show in his reasoning that he had taken account of these factors when assessing the appellant’s evidence.

25. Despite Mr Chakmakjian submission to the contrary, in my judgment this complaint is one of form and not substance. The Judge gives detailed consideration to the evolution of the appellant's account from screening interview to her evidence in the appeal hearing at [67] – [80]. Although it does not explicitly comment on the consistencies in the appellant’s account Mr Chakmakjian identified, the record of her evidence does make those consistencies plain. The analysis however concentrated on the respondent’s probing of her account in the substantive interview and focused on resolving the challenges to the accuracy of the account that were made in the respondent’s decision letter and through cross examination. Having done so the Judge’s analysis considered with care whether the inconsistencies that had been established could be explained by an explanation which did not indicate that the account was untrue. This was an entirely appropriate way to analyse the account and assessment its truth.

26. I am not persuaded that the comment in R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department relied upon by Mr Chakmakjian bears the weight that has been given to it. The requirement to show in the reasoning of a decision that every factor which might tell in favour of an appellant has been taken into account, does not involve a requirement that the reasons spell out every aspect of the account that has remained consistent. As was identified in UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27] the basis on which the tribunal reaches its decision may be set out directly or by inference. Further, as was identified by Singh LJ at [26] of his judgment in MD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958, in the context of the requirement to give adequate reasons, “adequacy” means “precisely that, no more and no less. It is not a counsel of perfection. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits.”

27. Likewise, neither the obligation to give the appellants claim anxious scrutiny, nor the requirement to provide adequate reasons for his decision, meant the judge was required to explain in the decision why the appellant's account of sexual exploitation during her time in Belgium was accepted to be likely to be true despite her failure to mention it in her screening interview. As the Judge correctly directed himself (see [44]), it does not follow from the fact that a person lied about one matter that they have lied about everything and the Judge was entitled to conclude that although the appellant’s (unchallenged) account of sexual exploitation in Belgium was likely to be true, her (challenged) account of violence at the hands of her family in Albania was not reasonably likely to be true.

28. A fair reader of the Judge’s decision will in my judgment be left in no doubt that the Judge has considered the appellant’s account as a whole and had regard to those aspects that remained consistent as well as those aspects which did not remain consistent, before reaching his conclusion. In order to explain to the appellant why her account has not been believed, the Judge has understandably and permissibly concentrated on those areas of her evidence where that had been challenged. It is significant that the Judge made explicitly reasoned findings rejecting some of the complaints made about the appellant’s evidence by the respondent (e.g. [90] and [91] of the decision), further demonstrating that his approach was to resolve disputes about the evidence rather than recite aspects of the evidence that were not in dispute. Where he determined that the evidence of the appellant was inconsistent or unreliable, the Judge has considered the appellant's explanation for those inconsistencies and given adequate reasons to explain why he did not accept that the account was true notwithstanding those explanations. In summary the Judge has undertaken a lawful assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account in which he has given her account anxious scrutiny.

29. I am not persuaded that the Judge made a mistake of fact at [79] and [81] as was asserted in this ground, when finding that the appellant’s evidence about an attempt by Adi to rape her was inconsistent. Rather, I consider this an example of why McCombe LJ described at [30] of Lowe judgments at first instance being an incomplete impression made upon the judge by the primary evidence. It is clear from [79] of the Judge’s decision that the appellant gave oral evidence in cross examination about this incident and responded to the assertion that there was an inconsistency in her account about where her parents were during the incident. A forensic analysis of the interview account and the witness statement now does not recognise the impression that that evidence made upon the Judge.

30. In any event, as Mr Pugh identified in his submissions, even if the Judge were mistaken about whether the appellant’s evidence about the claim of an attempted rape incident was internally consistent, it was not a material mistake given the numerous other factors identified by the Judge for why he did not believe the appellant’s account of events in Albania to be true. As the Judge said explicitly at [90] of his decision: “I am not concerned with any particular inconsistency or moment of vagueness, however looking at the evidence holistically I find that the appellant has not been a truthful witness in respect of the supposed events in Albania”.

The assessment of AB’s evidence
31. The Judge considered the evidence of AB at [88] of his decision and concluded that he “was not assisted” by it. Mr Chakmakjian identified that the Judge explains that conclusion in part by the comment that AB’s “statement is largely confined to things that the appellant has told him.” Mr Chakmakjian submits that the Judge’s explanation for his conclusion fails to recognise that AB’s account was relevant evidence of a contemporaneous complaint. Mr Chakmakjian further submits that the Judge failed to address the direct evidence that AB gave about his illicit relationship with the appellant in Albania and their decision to flee together. Mr Pugh by contrast submits that the Judge patently did address all the evidence of AB but was not persuaded by it, and submits that this complaint is simple disagreement with the Judge’s assessment.

32. The witness statement from AB is very short and contains just one brief paragraph about events in Albania. The judge is accurate when describing that much of that paragraph is confined to things that the appellant has told XB. This was unquestionably a factor that the Judge was entitled to consider when assessing the weight to give to the evidence. It was not however the only thing the Judge considered. The Judge refers at [88] to a statement that AB made in earlier proceedings in which unlike in his more recent statement, he said he had been beaten up four times in Albania. The Judge also refers to AB’s oral evidence that he could not remember making the earlier statement. The Judge was also unquestionably entitled to have regard to this inconsistency and the weak explanation provided for it when assessing the weight to give to AB’s evidence.

33. Ultimately the weight to be given to the evidence of AB was a matter for the Judge’s assessment. The brevity of the Judge’s assessment of AB’s evidence reflects the brevity of his witness statement and the evidence that he gave. The conclusion that the evidence from AB proved to be of little assistance to the Judge is adequately explained by the Judge in his assessment.

The assessment of the evidence from the appellant’s friend
34. At [27] the Judge referred to a witness statement from the appellant’s friend DJ who lives in Belgium. He identifies in that paragraph that a request had been made for permission for that witness to give evidence from Belgium but there had been no response to the request and in those circumstances the Judge could not hear evidence from overseas. The Judge added: “however I have her witness statement”. At [89] the Judge considered that witness statement, summarised its contents but concluded that: “without the opportunity to test this evidence in cross examination I am unable to give the statement any material weight.”

35. Mr Chakmakjian argues that material evidence from DJ which supported the credibility of the appellant’s account was overlooked because the Judge considered himself unable to give DJ’s witness statement weight in her absence. Mr Pugh argued that the Judge’s phrase “I am unable to” should not be construed literally and that what the Judge was really saying was “I have chosen not to give the witness statement material weight” which was a conclusion the Judge was entitled to reach.

36. This was the complaint which most concern Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien and led to the grant of permission to appeal. On the face of it the Judge’s decision to give little weight to the written statement because there was no opportunity to cross-examine the author of the statement is difficult to square with the fact the Judge earlier accepted that unsuccessful attempts had been for the witness to give evidence remotely from Belgium. Ultimately however, I agree with Mr Pugh that the Judge was not suggesting by the use of the words “I am unable to” that he was prohibited from attaching material weight to the witness statement but was reflecting his assessment of the quality of the evidence and making the evaluative assessment that it should attract little weight.

37. The absence of the witness was necessarily a factor in that assessment. The judge was evidently conscious of the fact that some attempts had been made for the witness to give evidence remotely and there is no reason to infer that he had lost sight of those attempts when evaluating the weight to be given to the evidence. That was however an evaluative assessment that was properly for the Judge to make in all the circumstances, including the fact, as the Judge identified, that much of the evidence was second hand. It was an evaluative assessment with which an appellate court should be slow to interfere. In all the circumstances and in the context of the Judge’s comprehensive analysis of the whole sea of the evidence, I am satisfied that this evaluative assessment did not involve an error of law.

Conclusion on Ground One
38. Despite Mr Chakmakjian’s very capable submissions I am not persuaded that the Judge erred by failing to consider material evidence when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account. The Judge considered the whole of the appellant’s account, focusing in his decision on resolving the disputes between the parties that had arisen in connection with that account. The Judge’s reasons were adequate to explain how he resolved those disputes and ultimately to explain why, having considered all the evidence holistically, he was not persuaded that the appellant’s account of events is Albania was true. Accordingly ground one is dismissed.

Ground two
39. As identified in the written grounds of appeal, the second ground of appeal challenges the Judge’s assessment of risk to the appellant in the “alternative scenario” that her account of events in Albania were true. Since I have maintained the Judge’s contrary conclusion, any error when assessing this alternative scenario cannot be material to the Judge’s decision.

40. On the facts as he found them to be, the Judge determined at [103] – [108] that the appellant would not be at risk of being trafficked on return to Albania and at [126] that the appellant and her family are not at risk of serious harm from either family or traffickers. The Judge found that the appellant could return with AB and their children to Tirana where they would have the support of their families and where the maximum of economic opportunities exist. Notwithstanding the appellant’s poor mental health, the Judge determined that with the support of her partner, her family and “a strong support network” the appellant would not be at risk. Those findings have not been challenged and they were dispositive of the appellant’s protection appeal.

41. In those circumstances it would be unnecessary and ill-advised to go on to consider the academic assertion in ground two that, in the theoretical alternative scenario, the Judge failed to consider material evidence when concluding that the appellant would be directed to sheltered accommodation and support in Kukes in the event that she had to relocate to escape her family. I do however observe, as Judge O’Brien did when granting permission, that this ground appears to have less obvious merit than ground one and note that the suggestion the Judge failed to consider evidence in the GREVIO report appears weak in view of the Judge’s reference to that report at [11], [103], [107], [113], [117], [119], and [132] of the decision.

(5) Conclusion

42. For all the reasons identified above I do not consider that ground one establishes a legal error in the Judge’s decision. I do not therefore interfere with the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant could safely return to Albania with AB and their children and, with the support of their families, they can reintegrate without facing very significant obstacles.

43. It is not necessary to consider the second ground of appeal which challenges the Judge’s consideration of a theoretical “alternative scenario” since any error in that analysis cannot be material to the Judge’s decision.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Simpson does not contain an error of law and shall stand.

The appeal is dismissed.

L:uke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 August 2026