UI-2026-001778
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001778
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66016/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOWARTH
Between
I.J.K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr O. Sobowale, Counsel instructed by AB Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss S. McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 14 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Iqbal dated 9 April 2026 against the decision of First tier Tribunal Judge Fox (‘the judge’) dated 1 October 2025.
Anonymity Order
2. I have made an Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. On the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq who appealed the Respondent’s decision dated 1 December 2023 to refuse his protection claim made on 19 October 2021. The basis of his claim is his fear that if he were returned to Iraq he would face persecution and/ or serious harm at the hands of ISIS.
The Secretary of State’s Decision
4. The Respondent had accepted the Appellant’s identity, including that he was a Sunni Muslim of Kurdish ethnicity and a citizen of Iraq. Significantly, the Respondent had also accepted the core elements of the Appellant’s account. Namely, that he had reported four members of ISIS to the local police and in retaliation ISIS attacked his village and blew up his family home, killing members of his family. However, the Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim because it was not accepted there would be a risk on return to Iraq owing to a sufficiency of state protection and because internal location would be available to the Appellant. Furthermore, the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity alone would give rise to persecution in Iraq.
Proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The matters in issue at the hearing before the FtT were identified by the judge as follows: (1) whether the Appellant could seek state protection, (2) whether the Appellant could internally relocate, (3) whether there was an Article 3 risk to the Appellant as a result of a lack of documentation, and (4) whether there was an Article 15c risk to the Appellant on return. Despite these issues having been set out clearly by the judge did not limit his findings to the issues identified. Although the judge stated at paragraph [13] “I do not need to examine the Appellant’s credibility, as the core elements of his account have been accepted by the Respondent”, the judge did in fact examine the Appellant’s credibility. Thus, at paragraphs [15] to [25] the judge set out and relied upon a series of adverse credibility findings to support his ultimate conclusion at paragraph [25] that he was not satisfied, even to the lower standard, that the Appellant has been, was, or remained of adverse interest to ISIS.
Grounds of Appeal
6. Ground 1 asserted the judge had materially erred by reaching a finding contrary to the express concession made by the Secretary of State in relation to the core aspects of the Appellant’s claim. In granting permission to appeal in relation to Ground 1, First-tier Tribunal Judge S Iqbal noted the issues for the hearing had been narrowly framed and that by making adverse credibility findings and concluding at paragraph [25] he was not satisfied the Appellant had been, was or remained of adverse interest to ISIS, the judge went behind the Respondent’s concession, resulting in an arguable error of law.
7. Permission to appeal was also granted in respect of the remaining Grounds 2 to 4, which were described as in the grant of permission as “inextricably linked to, and dependent upon, any error being found”. Ground 2 concerned a failure to consider all the relevant evidence in relation to the finding at paragraph [25], Ground 3 made the same complaint in relation to the judge’s finding at paragraph [26] regarding the adequacy of state protection, and pursuant to Ground 4, it was submitted that the judge had failed to apply the relevant Country Guidance case.
The Rule 24 Response from the Secretary of State
8. In the Rule 24 Response, the Secretary of State conceded that in concluding that the appellant has not demonstrated he had been of interest to ISIS, the judge had gone behind the concession made by the Secretary of State, which not been withdrawn and was not in issue in the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. The Rule 24 Response also accepted that the judge’s further findings “may have been coloured by this finding”. Consequently, the Secretary of State did not oppose the application for permission to appeal and submitted the appeal should be reheard, with the new Country Guidance case of AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 00150 applied at the re-hearing, and noting that the background evidence which had been before the First-tier Tribunal was unlikely to be applicable at the date of the re-hearing.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
9. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal Ms McKenzie, for the Respondent, maintained the same position as set out in the Rule 24 Response. Both parties therefore invited me to allow the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal Decision on the basis of Ground 1, in view of which both parties also agreed it was unnecessary for the remaining Grounds to be expressly considered by the Upper Tribunal. Both parties invited me to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal, given a complete re-hearing would be needed because the judge had taken a procedurally unfair approach by going behind the Respondent’s concession and in view of the need to apply the new Country Guidance case.
Decision
10. In circumstances where matters have been accepted by the Respondent in a refusal letter (as well as in this case the Respondent’s Review and at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal) it is procedurally unfair for a judge to go behind the accepted facts, without first explaining to the parties that he or she does not agree with the concession, and providing the parties (especially the appellant) with an opportunity to address the judge (see Abdi & Ors v Entry Clerance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 [34] and AM (fair hearing) Sudan [2015] UKUT 00656 (IAC) [7].
11. I agree with the position adopted by the Respondent in conceding the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal judge’s decision. In making the adverse credibility findings at paragraphs [15] to [25] of the Decision and in relying on those findings to conclude at paragraph [25] that he was not satisfied, even to the lower standard, that the Appellant has been, was, or remained of adverse interest to ISIS, the judge went behind a significant concession made by the Respondent in relation to the appellant’s account and his having come to the adverse attention of ISIS in Iraq. It was not open to the judge to reject the appellant’s account in relation to this important matter without first addressing the Respondent’s concession and hearing from the parties on the matter. The judge’s error is plainly material because this issue concerns the very important matter of whether the Appellant was and is at risk from ISIS if returned to Iraq. The judge therefore acted in a procedurally unfair manner which has given rise to a material error of law. I therefore allow the appeal in relation to Ground 1. As discussed at the hearing, in the circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds of appeal because the result of allowing the appeal in relation to Ground 1 is that the appeal will need to be reheard in its entirety.
12. Having concluded that the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law, I must consider whether the appeal should remain with the Upper Tribunal for re-making, or whether the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. I have regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers and the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, [2023] 4 WLR 12, and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), [2023] Imm AR 558. I also agree with the parties that a complete re-hearing is necessary in the circumstances because the judge had taken a procedurally unfair approach which means that it will be necessary for the case to be considered afresh with no preserved findings of fact. Substantial fact finding will need to be made at the re-hearing, applying a new Country Guidance case and the case materials which were before the First-tier Tribunal are no longer likely to be applicable at the date of the re-hearing of the appeal. In the circumstances, the most appropriate course is to remit this matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
13. I therefore allow the appeal, set aside the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and remit the matter back to the First-Tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error on a point of law. The appeal is accordingly allowed to that extent, and the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision is set aside.
2. The remaking of this appeal will be undertaken by the First-tier Tribunal, and it is to be listed before any judge, save First-tier Tribunal Judge Fox.
K. Howarth
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026