Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001804
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55308/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

ATB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not Represented
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a 14 year old Ghanaian national. When she was 12 years old she applied for leave to enter and join her father who has settled in the United Kingdom (the sponsor). The application was made on the basis that the appellant met the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules (the Rules) for being granted entry clearance.

2. The respondent refused the appellant’s application on 10 April 2024. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant met the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules and was not satisfied that there were any other compelling reasons why the application should be granted.

3. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal on the sole permitted ground that the respondent’s decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which prohibits the respondent from taking decisions that are incompatible with a person’s Convention rights. Whilst waiting for a hearing of that appeal the respondent twice reviewed and maintained her decision to refuse the application. The appeal was heard on 17 November 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ruth (the Judge). The sponsor attended and participated in the hearing remotely by video link together with his son (the appellant’s brother).

The appellant’s case and paragraph 297 of the Rules.

4. Paragraph 297 of the Rules sets out the requirements for being granted indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a person settled in the United Kingdom. So far as is relevant it provides as follows:

297. The requirements to be met by a person seeking indefinite leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a parent, parents or a close relative present and settled or being admitted for settlement in the United Kingdom are that he:
(i) is seeking leave to enter to accompany or join a parent, parents or a close relative in one of the following circumstances:
(a) both parents are present and settled in the United Kingdom; or
(b) both parents are being admitted on the same occasion for settlement; or
(c) one parent is present and settled in the United Kingdom and the other is being admitted on the same occasion for settlement; or
(d) one parent is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement and the other parent is dead; or
(e) one parent is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement and has had sole responsibility for the child’s upbringing; or
(f) one parent is present and settled in the United Kingdom or being admitted on the same occasion for settlement, their other parent does not have (and is not being granted) limited leave in the UK, unless there are serious and compelling reasons to grant the applicant settlement; or
(g) a close relative is present and settled in the United Kingdom and the applicant has no family other than the close relative in the UK that could reasonably be expected to support or care for them;

(ii) is under the age of 18; and

(iii) is not leading an independent life, is unmarried and is not a civil partner, and has not formed an independent family unit; and

(iv) can, and will, be accommodated adequately by the parent, parents or close relative the child is seeking to join without recourse to public funds in accommodation which the parent, parents or close relative the child is seeking to join, own or occupy exclusively; and

(v) can, and will, be maintained adequately by the parent, parents, or close relative the child is seeking to join, without recourse to public funds; and

(vi) holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity; and

(vii) the applicant must not fall for refusal under Part Suitability.

5. The respondent has not questioned the appellant’s ability to meet requirements (ii) – (vii) of paragraph 297 of the Rules. The issue in dispute has always been whether the appellant meets one of the alternative requirements contained in paragraph 297(i) of the Rules. The appellant’s case is that she meets the requirements of paragraph 297 (i)(e) of the Rules because her father, the sponsor, has sole responsibility for her upbringing. Alternatively the appellant’s case is that there are serious and compelling reasons to grant her application because the uncle with whom she lives is no longer able to support her, meaning she meets the requirements of 297(i)(f).

6. The appellant’s case is that the sponsor left Ghana and came live in the United Kingdom at an unspecified time in the past, leaving her in Ghana living with her mother. The relationship between the sponsor and the appellant’s mother’s ended in 2022, at which time the appellant’s mother became abusive towards the appellant. The sponsor therefore returned to Ghana and without legal proceedings, made arrangements for the appellant to move away from her mother and to live with the sponsor’s cousin. It is said that since then, the appellant’s mother has had no further involvement in the appellant’s life and the sponsor has had sole responsibility for the appellant. It is also said that the sponsor’s cousin who is 76 years old can no longer care for the appellant.

7. Since she says she meets the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules, the appellant’s case is that the respondent’s decision to refuse her entry clearance breaches her right under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to enjoy family life with her father, the sponsor. Even if she does not meet the requirements in paragraph 297 of the Rules, the appellant’s case is that the respondent’s decision to refuse her entry to the United Kingdom amounts to a disproportionate interference with the family life she shares with the sponsor and is therefore unlawful.

The Judge’s Decision

8. On 25 November 2025 the Judge issued his decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal.

9. At [15] of his decision the Judge referred to “striking problems with the evidence presented”. The Judge noted that the appellant’s claim was that she went to live with an uncle after the breakdown of her parents in relationship in 2020, but he identifies that this account is inconsistent with the fact that in 2021 the appellant and her mother together made applications for entry clearance to join the sponsor in the United Kingdom on the basis that the appellant and her mother were living together and that both had an ongoing relationship with the sponsor. At [17] the Judge noted that there was inconsistent evidence about with whom the appellant currently lives. The man was originally described as the brother of the sponsor but in his oral evidence the sponsor eventually described him as his cousin. The Judge considered the explanation provided by the sponsor and his son for those discrepancies at [16] and [17] but concluded at the end of [17] that these discrepancies in the evidence meant that he could give little weight to the appellant’s claims that she meets the requirements of paragraph 297 of the Rules.

10. At [18] and [19] the Judge considered documentary evidence the appellant had adduced about her circumstances which the Judge stated “was thin on the ground and quite limited.” At [19] the Judge said that he gave little weight to witness statements made by people who had not attended the hearing and been cross examined. He went on to refer in that paragraph to a letter from the appellant’s school, a letter from a local hospital about treatment the appellant received, a letter from the pastor of a church in Ghana, money transfer receipts and financial documents as well as evidence from Google about the appellant monitoring the appellant’s use of the internet. At [20] the Judge found:

“While these various documents do partly support the contention of the sponsor as to his role in the life of the appellant, they are very limited and in the overall light of the concerns I have set out above and the limitation in the other evidence below they do not provide sufficient clarity as to the circumstances of the appellant”

11. At [21] the Judge considered evidence of WhatsApp text conversations between the appellant and the sponsor and said that the difficulty with that evidence was that the sponsor is not literate. Notwithstanding the sponsor’s explanation, the Judge found that in those circumstances the text messages “do not take matters very much further.” Equally the Judge found that telephone logs that had been adduced provided no substantive information and did not take matters any further.

12. At [22] the Judge provided his conclusion on the evidence that had been adduced:

Looking at all these matters together and in the round and reminding myself that it is for the appellant to demonstrate her eligibility for entry by way of evidence and on the balance of probabilities, I conclude that she has failed to do so. In the light of the problems identified above, her circumstances in Ghana are simply insufficiently clear. In the absence of clarity as to her circumstances, I cannot conclude she is more likely than not to be solely cared for by the sponsor or to be in compelling family circumstances. She cannot satisfy the requirements of the immigration rules”

13. The Judge then considered at [23] – [27] the proportionality of interfering with the family life shared between the appellant and the sponsor. At [24] the Judge found “there is no basis for me to conclude that refusal of entry would be contrary to her best interests or would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.” Accordingly the Judge found at [26] that the interests of immigration control outweighed those of the appellant and at [27] that refusal of the application would not breach the appellant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.

The Appeal to this Tribunal

14. The appellant has appealed against the Judge’s decision to this Tribunal having been granted permission to do so by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce. The grounds of appeal are:

i. That the appeal hearing was procedurally unfair
ii. That the Judge failed to consider material evidence and to assess that evidence “in the round”
iii. That the Judge misapplied the legal test for establishing “sole responsibility” when considering paragraph 297 of the Rules.
iv. That the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the sponsor was irrational and culturally insensitive
v. That the Judge failed to treat the appellant’s best interests as a primary consideration
vi. That the Judge failed to conduct an assessment of the proportionality of interfering with the appellant’s family life with the sponsor
vii. That the Judge made irrational findings of fact that were not supported by the evidence.

15. The respondent provided a written response to the appellant's grounds of appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the Procedure Rules) which argued that the Judge’s decision did not involve an error of law and should be maintained. The appellant provided a written reply to that response in accordance with rule 25 of the Procedure Rules.

16. The sponsor and his son attended and participated in the hearing of the appeal against the Judge’s decision with the assistance of a Twi interpreter. The appellant was not legally represented at the hearing but the sponsor and his son acted on her behalf. They told me that the written grounds of appeal and the rule 25 reply had been drafted with legal assistance and that they wished to rely on the arguments made in those documents. I heard submissions from Mr Sheikh on behalf of the respondent. I then heard a helpful response to those submissions from the sponsor’s son (the appellant’s brother).

17. Having heard those submissions from the parties I reserved my decision. I now provide that decision together with my reasons for the decision, having considered with care the submissions made along with all the documentary evidence that has been provided. Ultimately I have concluded that the Judge’s decision did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

Analysis

Ground one
18. In ground one the appellant asserts that the hearing before the Judge was procedurally unfair. It is argued that the fact the sponsor is illiterate and that the interpreter at the hearing did not have access to the evidence bundle meant the sponsor’s ability to understand the proceedings was impaired. The ground complains that rather than mitigate those disadvantages the Judge “treated the sponsor’s illiteracy and communication difficulties as adverse to credibility”. In reply the respondent argues that the Judge made extensive efforts to ensure a fair hearing despite the sponsor’s illiteracy and the difficulties with interpretation.

19. I agree with the respondent’s submission and the view expressed by both the Judges to have considered the appellant’s application for permission to appeal, that in difficult circumstances the Judge did all he could to ensure a fair hearing. At [7] and [9] of his decision the Judge explains how, faced with the sponsor’s inability to read his witness statement or to recall its contents and the fact the interpreter did not have access to the documents, the Judge allowed the sponsor’s son to read the sponsor’s witness statements to his father ensuring that the sponsor was able to understand and adopt the evidence in those statements. It is not clear how this process could have resulted in any unfairness to the sponsor or the appellant. It ensured that sponsor was able to effectively participate in the hearing and to adduce the evidence he had prepared in advance of the hearing. Contrary to the assertion made in the ground of appeal the Judge did mitigate the disadvantages the sponsor faced by allowing his son to translate for him.

20. The suggestion in ground one that the Judge treated the appellant’s illiteracy and communication difficulties as adverse to credibility is entirely without foundation. Equally the suggestion that it was unfair for the Judge to have “relied on errors contained in solicitor-drafted documents which the sponsor could neither read or verify” is without merit. The Judge was plainly not only entitled to consider the basis on which the application was advanced in the letter drafted by the appellant’s solicitors but he was required to do so when considering her case.

Ground two
21. The assertion in ground two is that the Judge “ignored or minimised” the evidence from the school, hospital, pastor and community leaders, the photographs, financial evidence and the evidence of communication and monitoring that was advanced by the appellant to establish that the sponsor has sole responsibility for her. The respondent argues that the Judge did consider this evidence and that this ground seeks to re-argue the appellant’s case.

22. The suggestion that the Judge “ignored” this evidence has no merit. The Judge makes reference to each of these aspects of the evidence at [18] – [21] of his decision. It is correct that although the Judge refers to evidence from a hospital local to the appellant, he does not refer to the appellant suffering from malaria and being hospitalised. This does not however establish that the Judge has ignored that evidence. The Judge was not required to identify and comment on every piece of evidence that was submitted. As the Court of Appeal made clear at [2(iii)] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. In my judgment, the Judge’s decision plainly demonstrates that the Judge did not ignore evidence but considered all the documentary evidence that was submitted to support the appellant’s claim.

23. Similarly the complaint made in this ground that the Judge failed to consider this evidence “in the round” cannot be sustained in the light of the Judge’s explicit confirmation at [22] that he had done just that (see [12] above).

24. I agree with the respondent, that the complaint in this ground that the Judge “minimised” this evidence is in reality a disagreement with the conclusion that the Judge reached having considered the evidence, and an attempt to re-argue the case. The Judge was required to evaluate the evidence and to determine how persuasive it was when assessing the case being advanced by the appellant. The complaint that the Judge minimised this evidence and instead focused disproportionately on the inconsistencies in the appellant’s case is no more than a disagreement with the evaluation properly undertaken by the Judge.

Ground three
25. Although ground three asserts that the Judge “misapplied” the legal test for establishing “sole responsibility” that is identified in TD (Paragraph 297(i)(e): “sole responsibility”) Yemen [2006] UKAIT 00049, rather than identifying any such misapplication, the ground instead re-argues the appellant’s case that the evidence adduced established that the sponsor has sole responsibility for the appellant. In TD (Yemen) the tribunal identified that “sole responsibility is a factual matter to be decided upon all the evidence”. That is what the Judge did in this case.

26. The full headnote to TD (Yemen) States as follows:

“Sole responsibility” is a factual matter to be decided upon all the evidence. Where one parent is not involved in the child’s upbringing because he (or she) had abandoned or abdicated responsibility, the issue may arise between the remaining parent and others who have day-to-day care of the child abroad. The test is whether the parent has continuing control and direction over the child’s upbringing, including making all the important decisions in the child’s life. However, where both parents are involved in a child’s upbringing, it will be exceptional that one of them will have “sole responsibility”.

27. There is nothing in the Judge’s decision to indicate that the Judge failed to apply this reasoning when assessing the appellant’s case. Fatal to the appellant’s case was the fact that when applying this headnote, the Judge, having considered the evidence, was not persuaded on balance that the appellant’s mother was not involved in the appellant’s upbringing. The Judge explained that conclusion by reference to the inconsistencies in the evidence and his assessment in the light of those inconsistencies and the evidence as a whole, that the appellant’s circumstances in Ghana are simply insufficiently clear. These were evaluative assessments of the evidence that the Judge was entitled to reach. They do not indicate that the Judge misapplied the legal test or applied an incorrect legal framework.

Ground 4
28. This ground complains about the Judge’s treatment of an inconsistency in the evidence about the relationship between the sponsor and the man he says is currently caring for the appellant. That inconsistency involves all the documentary evidence refereeing to the man as a brother of the sponsor, whereas the sponsor explained when asked by the Judge that the man is in fact his cousin. The explanation for this inconsistency given by the sponsor when asked by the Judge, is that in Ghana it is culturally acceptable to refer to a cousin as a brother. The complaint in this ground is that the Judge ignored this explanation and reached an irrational and “culturally insensitive” conclusion that the inconsistency undermined the sponsor’s credibility.

29. The suggestion that the conclusion reached by the Judge was irrational has no merit. There was a range of conclusions the Judge could have reached having considered the appellant’s explanation for what was a plain inconsistency in the evidence. One conclusion within that range would have been to accept the sponsor’s innocent explanation that the terms cousin and brother are interchangeable. That was not however the only rational conclusion that could be reached. It was plainly open for a reasonable judge to conclude as this Judge did, that the inconsistent explanation about the relationship in fact reduced the weight to be given to the sponsor’s evidence. As the Judge makes clear at [17] he reached this conclusion about the inconsistent evidence, at least in part as a result of the fact the appellant was “not immediately forthcoming about the true nature of the relationship.” It was also relevant for the Judge to note as he did that whilst it is culturally acceptable in Ghana to refer to a cousin as a brother, this was evidence provided in a formal application for entry clearance being made to the United Kingdom authorities and therefore the expectations for accuracy are different.

30. Cultural sensitivity did not require the Judge to accept the sponsor’s explanation for why he called a man who is in fact his cousin, his brother. The Judge was required to consider the explanation in the round including the circumstances in which the inconsistency was identified, the way the sponsor gave his evidence and the other discrepancies in the evidence presented. It was having done so, that the Judge reached the entirely rational conclusion he did.

Grounds 5 & 6
31. Ground five asserts that the Judge failed to apply section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 which requires a child’s best interests to be treated as a primary consideration. This ground however fails to acknowledge the Judge’s clear finding of fact at [24] that “there is no basis for me to conclude that refusal of entry clearance would be contrary to [the appellant’s] best interests”.

32. Similarly the complaint in ground six that the Judge did not consider whether refusal of the appellant’s application would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant fails to acknowledge the rest of the judge’s analysis at [24]: “there is no basis for me to conclude that refusal of entry clearance would be contrary to [the appellant’s] best interests or would result in any unjustifiable harsh consequences”.

33. Whilst the appellant maintains that it is in her best interests to be allowed to join her father in the United Kingdom and that she would suffer unjustifiably harsh consequences as a result of not being granted entry clearance, that was not the finding of the Judge on the evidence before him. It was on the basis of these findings of fact that the Judge conducted his proportionality assessment and reached the conclusion that the interests in immigration control outweighed the appellant’s private interests and that refusal of the application was a proportionate interference with the family life of the appellant and her father.

Ground 7
34. Although it is the last ground of appeal, ground seven most accurately reflects the appellant’s complaint about the Judge’s decision and the reason why Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce granted permission to appeal to this tribunal. Ground seven complains that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant has not established what are her circumstances in Ghana to the required standard, was irrational and outside the range of conclusions open to the Judge. The ground also complains that the Judge failed to explain how “a substantial body of documentary evidence” could result in a finding of uncertainty. The respondent by contrast, argues that the Judge’s conclusion is well-reasoned and rational.

35. It is useful to set out some legal principles when considering a challenge to the factual findings of a first instance Judge. At [2(i) and (ii)] of his judgment in Vopli v Volpi, Lewison LJ identified that an appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong and when considering that question what matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

36. The decision reached by the Judge in this case was that the appellant had not established that it is more likely than not that her mother has no involvement in her life and that she is living with an uncle while her father exercises sole responsibility for her. In my judgment that was unquestionably a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. The appellant’s case involved a fundamental inconsistency. When the application was made it was asserted that the appellant’s parents had separated in 2020 and since then the appellant’s mother had no involvement with her life. When the respondent identified that that was inconsistent with the applications made by the appellant and her mother in 2021 the appellant’s case changed so that it was claimed that in fact the separation of her parents and the abandonment by her mother occurred in 2022. The Judge was entitled to treat that shift in the case advanced by the appellant with a great deal of circumspection.

37. The Judge was also entitled to reject the explanation advanced by the sponsor and his son for the inconsistency. That explanation was that the solicitors made a mistake when submitting the application and should have referred to the separation as occurring in 2022 not 2020. As the Judge identified, the mistake was not only made in the letter from the solicitors but it was also made in the application itself. There was no evidence from the solicitors to corroborate the explanation that they were responsible for such a glaring error and as the respondent identified, there was no evidence that the appellant had complained about such a serious failure by the solicitors. The explanation was also inconsistent with the letter from the appellant’s “uncle” that was submitted with the application and which stated that the appellant had been living with him since 2020. This was evidence which on its face was not drafted by the solicitors but by the witness, and so, as the Judge identified, the inconsistent evidence in the letter could not be attributed to the solicitors.

38. In his oral submissions the appellant’s brother argued that the Judge failed to explain why the other documentary evidence was not sufficient to satisfy the Judge that the sponsor was exercising sole responsibility over the appellant notwithstanding the inconsistency about the separation of the appellant from her mother. The judge does however explain in his decision that he considered that evidence to be “thin on the grounds”, “quite limited” and later “very limited”. These were all evaluative assessments for the Judge to make. As part of a holistic assessment they were no doubt influenced by the glaring inconsistency in the appellant’s case. As the Judge’s assessment identifies the contents of the documentary evidence was brief and the documents do not include any detail about the circumstances in which it is said the appellant ceased to live with her mother and how it came to be that her mother abdicated all responsibility for her daughter having been involved in her upbringing for the first eleven years of the appellant’s life. The Judge explains that the evidence from Google was of less weight because it related to 2020 which on the appellant’s revised case was at the time when she was living with her mother. The Judge explained that the communications evidence did not “take matters further” in circumstances where the sponsor’s evidence was that he could not read or understand the messages shown and the call logs provided no substantive information about who was talking to whom.

39. Ultimately the Judge recognised that the documentary evidence provided some support for the appellant’s case but in the light of the glaring inconsistencies and discrepancies in the case, the Judge’s conclusion was that, notwithstanding the documentary evidence, he could not be satisfied that it was more likely than not that the appellant’s circumstances were as claimed. Despite the appellant’s continued assertion that this is the wrong conclusion, it was unquestionably a conclusion that a reasonable Judge could reach on the evidence provided. It was also a conclusion that was adequately explained, bearing in mind that the requirement for adequate explanation is exactly that, no more or less and is not a counsel of perfection.

40. For all these reasons the grounds of appeal do not identify an error of law in the decision of the Judge and in those circumstances the appeal against the Judge’s decision must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ruth did not involve an error of law and shall stand.

The appeal to this tribunal is dismissed.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 August 2026