Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001851
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54711/2024
LP/00361/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

GT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jaisri of Counsel, instructed by Lawlex Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant is a male citizen of Georgia. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) against a decision of the respondent refusing his asylum claim. In a decision dated 3 January 2026, the FtT dismissed the appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The appellant now appeals that decision to the Upper Tribunal.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that his marriage to his wife is not permitted by the Orthodox Christian Church in Georgia, as they are related through baptism. That is, his father baptised his wife’s father. The appellant claims that marriage between offspring of such relationship is subject to familial and societal persecution in Georgia. Their families found out about the marriage after they arrived in the UK and they fear harm from them.
3. Given the nature of this appeal and the issues under consideration, I have decided to maintain the anonymity order.
4. The appellant wrote to the Upper Tribunal on 13 July 2026 seeking to admit new evidence in accordance with Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The new evidence is a copy of the birth certificate of the appellant’s child. Rule 15(2A)(ii) requires the appellant to explain why the evidence was not submitted to the FtT. The child was born after the FtT proceedings, which is why the birth certificate was not available at the time. Mr Ojo did not object to the new evidence and I saw no unfairness in admitting it. I admitted the new evidence under Rule 15(2A).
Grounds of Appeal
5. The appellant advances four grounds of appeal:
i. Unlawful finding on Convention reason.
ii. Material misdirection and misunderstanding of the appellant’s claim.
iii. Procedural unfairness – adverse findings based on matters which were not put to the appellant or his wife and/or speculation.
iv. Failure to take into account expert evidence.
6. Permission to appeal was granted on a limited basis, in respect of grounds (i), (iii) and (iv) only. Permission was refused for ground (ii).
Discussion and Findings
7. I will address each ground of appeal in turn, for which permission was granted.
Ground (i) – Unlawful finding on Convention reason
8. The appellant argues the FtT Judge erred by finding that his claim did not engage a Convention reason. He notes the respondent acknowledged that his claim was covered by a Convention reason in her review, and argues the FtT Judge failed to adequately deal with that in the decision. While the appellant understands a Tribunal is not bound by concessions, Mr Jaisri submitted that where it departs from them the Tribunal must give clear and reasoned justification for why it has done so.
9. Mr Jaisri helpfully provided me with a copy of the transcript of the proceedings. At pages 3 to 4, the FtT Judge said that she wanted to ensure the issues to be determined were agreed. She raised the various issues from the ASA, refusal decision and review, which included the Convention reason. That is also reflected in the decision. At [11] the FtT Judge noted that the Convention reason was one of the issues agreed between the parties as needing determination at the hearing. Further at [23] that, despite her raising the issue at the outset of the hearing, neither representative made any submissions on the law or on the issue at all, and it was not engaged with at the hearing.
10. At [20] to [33] the FtT Judge analysed in detail whether a Convention reason was engaged, before concluding at [33] that it was not. The reason given was that the evidence and submissions did not establish that the appellant fears persecution as a result of his religion or perceived religious beliefs or belief system, or that any persecution is feared from the state, or emanations of it.
11. It was clear to the parties that Convention reason was in issue. The FtT Judge carefully considered the issue and set out clear reasons for finding that a Convention reason was not engaged. There has been no error of law.
Ground (iii) – Procedural unfairness – adverse findings based on matters which were not put to the appellant or his wife and/or speculation
12. The appellant argues the FtT Judge materially erred by making adverse credibility findings on matters which were not put to him or his wife during the hearing, denying them a fair opportunity to respond. He said the credibility assessment is infected by speculation and conjecture. He argues that, at [35] to [47], the FtT Judge substituted personal assumptions about expected behaviour of the appellant and his wife, and drew adverse inferences from that without giving them a chance to address any concerns. Three examples are given.
13. The first is that there was no evidential basis for assumptions made by the FtT Judge at [35] such as that the baptism certificate would have been in the possession of the appellant’s wife’s family, or adverse findings arising from the fact the baptism did not take place in babyhood. Mr Jaisri took me to extracts from the transcript where, for example at page 18, the FtT Judge asked the appellant questions about the provenance of the baptism certificate. The appellant explained that it was obtained with the help of his sister who secretly took it, however the appellant could not remember when that happened.
14. At [35] the FtT Judge noted the respondent took issue with the baptism certificate in the review, and answers given by the appellant at the hearing when asked about the certificate. The FtT Judge commented on the evidence, including that it was not clear how the appellant’s sister obtained the certificate as presumably it would have been in the possession of the appellant’s wife’s family; the translation was undertaken in Georgia; she had not seen the original certificate; and the baptism had purportedly taken place when the appellant’s wife’s father was twenty. The FtT Judge concluded that apart from the document itself, there was an absence of evidence to support the claimed baptismal relationship between the appellant and his wife.
15. The second example is that there was no basis for the FtT Judge to assume the appellant’s wife would have informed her GP and/or the GP would have recorded the violent circumstances surrounding her previous miscarriage. The appellant points to [47] and says this provides a further example of the FtT Judge speculating and coming to adverse findings based on matters which were not put to them.
16. The FtT Judge noted at [47] the absence of medical evidence that the appellant’s wife discussed the circumstances of her previous pregnancy with doctors in the UK, which she considered surprising given it would be important in assessing any risks to her current pregnancy. In addition, that the medical notes contained nothing which supported either a prior traumatic miscarriage as a result of a violent assault or years of trauma and psychological symptoms as a consequence of living in constant fear of being murdered by her family, and her child and partner being killed.
17. The third example is that at [42] the FtT Judge questioned whether marriage between those who are spiritually related is forbidden in Georgian society on the basis of an absence of country information about attacks on such people. The appellant argues an absence of evidence can be equally indicative of how rare such unions are and is not decisive of whether such unions are forbidden within society.
18. Mr Ojo took me to Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, and said that there is no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all matters on which it may rely when reaching its decision. Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the appellant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment. Mr Ojo submitted all of these points were plainly relevant.
19. The FtT Judge’s credibility assessment was not infected by speculation and conjecture. She made observations based on the evidence which the appellant provided. Those observations must be seen in light of the credibility assessment in the round, which is set out at [35] to [47]. The FtT Judge went into detail assessing all of the evidence, including the answers given by the appellant during the hearing. In addition to the examples above, the FtT Judge considered the provenance of various documents and chain of evidence documentation; issues of plausibility within the appellant’s account itself; photographic evidence; corrections made to what was said in the witness statements; timing of the asylum claim and inconsistency in the appellant’s explanation given to the respondent about only intending to come to the UK for six months. All of which led her to conclude at [48]:
“[…] that there are issues with the claim before me, as to detail, plausibility, and within the documents, and an absence of information and evidence I find should be available which lead me to find it is not credible. I therefore do not accept the factual history is as claimed, or that the appellant or [his wife] are at risk in Georgia for any reason.”
20. The appellant knew that credibility was in issue. The FtT Judge specifically asked him questions about the provenance of the baptism certificate. The comments around the medical evidence and absence of country information are observations on the evidence. The approach of the FtT Judge was consistent with Abdi and she was not required to put each specific matter to the appellant. Importantly, the comments which the appellant takes issue with were part of a wider assessment of all of the evidence, which led the FtT Judge to find the appellant was not credible. While I find none of those comments demonstrate an error of law, in the event the FtT Judge had erred, it would not have changed the overall outcome of the credibility assessment given the other issues raised and would not therefore have been material.
Ground (iv) – Failure to take into account expert evidence
21. The appellant relied on an expert report which was unchallenged at the hearing. He argues the FtT Judge dismissed the report on the basis that she was unable to find anything in the expert’s CV which was specific to the issues raised in the appeal. He argues that is a fundamental error given the expert’s expertise. The appellant says that, in so far as the FtT Judge did refer to the report, she has erred in dismissing the expert’s views on the basis that the report does not assert that persecution or serious harm is widespread or a systemic issue. He argues this applies a higher threshold than required. Further, that the FtT Judge failed to consider the internal relocation impossibility that was addressed in the report.
22. I do not agree that the FtT Judge dismissed the expert’s evidence on the basis of his CV. She noted at [31] that she could not identify anything in the CV specific to the issues raised in the appeal. Rather than dismissing the evidence, she went on to specifically consider it at [31] and [32]. The FtT Judge noted the report asserts that the teachings of the Orthodox Church permeate the law in Georgia and societal views, but that it does not say that the teachings of the church have affected the law on this issue or address the law on this issue. The FtT Judge considered that was particularly important, as the appellant did apparently marry in a legal marriage. She said that in a case where it is asserted that the state will not protect the appellant from the implications of a forbidden spiritual marriage, it is fundamentally important to address what the government’s law and policies are on this issue, both in relation to marriage, registration, marriage enquiries and assessments by registrars and officials conducting marriages, but also in relation to the legal and other consequences of prohibited marriages.
23. At [32], the FtT Judge noted that while the report asserts in extreme cases there might be physical violence against those who violate church laws on marriage, it falls short of asserting societal persecution or serious harm was a widespread or systemic issue, or establishing systemic state tolerance of it. She did not, however, apply that as the test. It is clear from the decision that the FtT Judge reached her conclusions after considering all of the evidence set out at [20] to [33].
24. The appellant further argues that the FtT Judge failed to consider the internal relocation impossibility that was addressed in the expert report. Paragraph 23 of the expert report, for example, notes that Georgia’s relatively small size and interconnected communities make it easy for family members to trace individuals. The FtT Judge appeared to deal with this directly at [41], where she considered the assertion that the appellant could be found because of the size of Georgia, and the evidence given by the appellant during the hearing when asked questions on this point. She concluded that she did not find his evidence credible.
25. The FtT Judge considered the expert evidence, alongside all of the other evidence, in reaching her conclusions. She has set out where she did not accept the evidence and the reasons for it. The treatment of the expert evidence does not demonstrate any material error of law.
Conclusion
26. In light of the above, I find that the grounds of appeal fail to demonstrate that the FtT Judge materially erred in law for the reasons argued by the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

N Hills
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 1 September 2026