Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001856
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52506/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHANA

Between

FE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Sellwood, counsel instructed by Southwark Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his human rights appeal following a hearing which took place on 21 January 2026.
Anonymity
2. Having considered the principle of open justice, the anonymity direction made previously is maintained because this appeal concerns the appellant’s confidential medical records regarding his mental health.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of Nigeria, aged in his mid-twenties. He was granted leave to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of undertaking a short course in 2018 which was sponsored by his then employer. Thereafter the appellant overstayed.
4. In November 2022, the appellant made a human rights claim based on his poor mental health. That application was refused by way of a decision dated 1 March 2024 as it was not accepted that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to his re-integration in Nigeria, that there were exceptional circumstances such that leave should be granted or that the decision breached his rights under Article 3 ECHR. This is the decision under appeal.
5. The respondent has reviewed the appellant’s appeal on three occasion, 14 November 2024, 10 April 2025 and 14 January 2026. Ultimately, after considering the updated medical evidence, the respondent maintained the decision under challenge.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal and was treated by the judge as a vulnerable witness [19].
7. The following issues were agreed to be in dispute [22].
(a) Whether the Appellant has established that there is an absence of appropriate treatment in Nigeria
(b) Whether the Appellant has established there is a lack of access to such treatment in Nigeria
(c) Whether, due to an absence or lack of absence to treatment, there is a real risk of the Appellant being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy
(d) Whether there are very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Nigeria such that he qualifies for leave to remain under Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules
(e) Whether there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant such that there would be a breach of Article 8 outside of the Immigration Rules.
8. Before the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent confirmed that it was accepted that the appellant had a serious illness for the purpose of the Article 3 assessment.
9. Between [46-62], the judge made the following findings. The appellant was in good health when he came to the United Kingdom in 2018 and that it was on 29 January 2024 that he first reported mental ill health to his GP. He was diagnosed with chronic depression by a private doctor on 30 January 2024 and on the following day, after attending A&E with suicidal ideation, the appellant was assessed and given a diagnosis of Depressive Disorder.
10. Thereafter the judge notes that the appellant was discharged to the care of his GP for treatment by way of antidepressant medication and monitoring of his mental state. The appellant has also been diagnosed with hypothyroidism.
11. The judge notes that the position had not altered significantly at the time of the hearing, other than that Dr Balasubramaniam had provided a series of reports which link the appellant’s mental state to an ‘intense’ fear of returning to Nigeria as well as his immigration status. The judge records that Dr Balasubramaniam’s view was that any risk of self-harm or suicide was low to medium, that the appellant had no active plans but that the risk would escalate if the appellant was removed to Nigeria. Dr Balasubramaniam recommended that antidepressant medication be continued and that Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) be commenced. At the time of the hearing, the appellant had not started receiving CBT. Dr Balasubramaniam’s view was that without treatment, the appellant’s mental health would seriously decline.
12. The appeal was dismissed on all bases.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
13. The grounds of appeal argued that the judge erred in his assessment of the following matters:
(i) whether the appellant, owing to his ill health, would be able to access to the required medical treatment for his diagnosed illnesses in Nigeria;
(ii) whether due to a lack of access to that treatment, there is a real risk of him being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health;
(iii) the consideration of the appellant’s private life claim both within and outside of the Immigration Rules
14. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought.
15. The respondent filed no Rule 24 response.
The error of law hearing
16. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
17. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
18. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.
Discussion
19. In light of the guidance given by the Court of Appeal, including at paragraph [77] of KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693, we acknowledge that judicial restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by a First-tier Tribunal Judge for their decision and that it should not be assumed too readily that the Judge misdirected themselves.
20. In this case [77(2)] is pertinent in that a court or tribunal should be slow to characterise as an error of law what is no more than a disagreement with the assessment of the facts.
21. We have also been assisted by 77(3) and (v) from KM.
(3) Third, where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account (per Lord Dyson in MA (Somalia) at [45]).
(4) Fourth, experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so
Ground one
22. The first complaint in the grounds is that the judge, in concluding that the appellant would be able to gain access to the treatment he requires in Nigeria, failed to consider all the relevant factors. It was never argued before the judge that there was an absence of medical treatment in Nigeria for depression or hypothyroidism, only that the appellant’s circumstances would prevent him from accessing that treatment.
23. The factors it is said that the judge did not consider were set out in two country expert reports of Dr Inge Amundsen and concern the appellant’s job prospects in Nigeria in view of his mental state, the likely outcome of employer’s checks, the economy and the competitive jobs market.
24. This ground amounts to mere disagreement with the judge’s findings and as such no material error of law is identified. At [67-83] the judge directly engaged with Dr Amundsen’s evidence and made findings which were open to the judge based on the appellant’s particular circumstances. There was no requirement for the judge to set out every aspect mentioned in Dr Amundsen’s detailed reports.
25. Furthermore, the judge made no error in firstly focusing on the availability of medical treatment and the appellant’s circumstances. In any event, at [76] the judge separately considered the ability of the appellant to access the available treatment. The judge notes the concerns of Dr Amundsen, that there is stigma attached to mental illness, but the judge was entitled to conclude that this would not adversely affect the appellant who had, nonetheless, sought both private and NHS medical services in the United Kingdom. The judge also notes that the appellant had insight into his mental health condition as well as the importance of taking medication [77].
26. The judge separately considered the proposition that the appellant would be unable to afford medication or private mental health services in Nigeria and gave adequate reasons for rejecting it. In providing reasons, the judge engaged with the employment situation likely to face the appellant in Nigeria, finding that the appellant was well-educated, with previous work experience in Nigeria and would be likely to find employment again. [79].
27. There is no basis for suggesting that the judge was unaware of the economic situation in Nigeria as regards the job market. The judge rightly took account of the appellant’s circumstances, that is he had received a better education than most in Nigeria (an HND from a polytechnic), that he had been sponsored to study in the United Kingdom by his Nigerian employer and that he had completed a course at the University of London.
28. The judge was further entitled to take account of the appellant’s evidence that his network of friends had provided him with financial support in the UK for four years, until he obtained Home Office support in 2025. The judge was correct to note that the appellant had two siblings in the UK as well as close family members in Nigeria in the form of two working parents, siblings and cousins.
29. At this point, we acknowledge that the appellant states that one of his siblings was “taken away by unknown people” in June 2018. This claim underpins his subjective fear of return to Nigeria. The appellant has not made a protection claim and thus it has not been established that there is an objective basis for this fear.
30. The judge made no error in taking into consideration the appellant’s ability to apply for financial assistance of up to £3,000 for an Assisted Voluntary Departure from the UK [81-82]. The judge notes that the cost of the appellant’s medication, according to Dr Amundsen, could be as little as £89 for a 12-month supply (slightly more if ordered online) and weekly CBT would cost £1,400 for 12 months [83].
31. The judge’s findings, which followed a careful and holistic assessment, were ones which were entirely open to him.
Ground two
32. This ground is partly parasitic on the first, as it is only if the appellant is unable to access medical treatment in Nigeria that it could be argued that there is a real risk of him being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health. As we have already concluded the errors alleged in respect of the first ground have not been made out and therefore the judge’s conclusion that the appellant can access the treatment he requires in Nigeria stand.
33. A point in the grounds emphasised by Mr Sellwood is the claim that the judge misdirected himself by imposing a burden on the appellant, in the form of the six points set out in J [2005] EWCA Civ 629, rather than applying MY (Suicide risk after Paposhvili) Occupied Palestinian Authority [2021] UKUT 232 (IAC).
34. While the judge did refer, in passing, to the six matters in J as ‘tests,’ it is apparent from [89] that the judge was cognisant of the up-to-date position because he referred to the fact that the position had been amended by subsequent case law. Thus, there is no material misdirection here.
35. Contrary to the impression given in the grounds, the judge carefully considered the medical evidence including the series of reports from Dr Balasubramaniam and was entitled to conclude that while the appellant suffered from a serious mental health condition, that he could access treatment in Nigeria and that he had not discharged the burden of demonstrating that his removal would result in him suffering a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering or a substantial reduction in his life expectancy.
36. The judge engaged with Dr Balasubramaniam’s opinion as to the increased likelihood of suicide and self-harm if attempts are made to remove the appellant, noting that the expert believed that the Secretary of State would be unlikely to minimise the risk by supervision before, during and after the appellant’s proposed removal. The judge rightly did not accept that view, finding that the respondent would be aware of any risks and would ‘put in place the usual prevention measures.’
37. At [53], the judge records that the appellant reports that he has contemplated suicide and has had on and off thoughts of self-harm. On the issue of carrying out such actions, the judge notes that the appellant ‘reports taking 10 tablets of paracetamol a month previously but with “no intention to die, but to help him relax as he is constantly worried about life generally.’ There was no other reference to a suicide attempt or self-harm in the evidence before the judge. It is against this background that at [88] the judge concludes that he is not satisfied that the risk of suicide is high. This was a finding the judge was entitled to make. We find that the facts of the appellant’s case are far from being able to make out an Article 3 case and the judge made no error in reaching such a conclusion.
Ground three
38. In the third and final ground it is contended that the judge omitted key features from his assessment of whether the appellant would encounter very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nigeria. Those features include many of the matters raised in the expert medical and country reports, with which the judge had grappled in his Article 3 assessment at [46-91] of the decision.
39. It is the case that the judge’s treatment of very significant obstacles was brief in that his findings occupied just one paragraph [94]. Nonetheless, in the context of the judge’s thorough assessment in the earlier paragraphs, his findings were adequate and there was no requirement for him to repeat those, multiple, earlier findings.
40. The judge made no error in concluding that the appellant would be considered an insider in Nigeria, applying Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, in view of the appellant’s 28 years of residence in Nigeria where he was educated and worked; that he had parents and siblings in Nigeria with whom he was in contact and that appropriate treatment was available for his mental and physical health conditions and that he could access that treatment.
41. Lastly, there was no error in the manner in which the judge considered whether the removal of the appellant to Nigeria would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. Given that the appellant was unable to meet the requirements of the Rules or qualify to stay on Article 3 grounds, was an overstayer for several years before attempting to regularise his status and wishes to remain in the United Kingdom to continue to access medical treatment, the judge’s conclusion that the respondent’s decision was not disproportionate was one which was open to him to make.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 June 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email